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THE NOTES OF SECRETARY OF STATE AZZOLINI ON PÁZMÁNY'S NEGOTIATIONS IN ROME

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The Notes of Secretary of State Azzolini on Pázmány’s Negotiations in Rome

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CHAPTER II.

THE NOTES OF SECRETARY OF STATE AZZOLINI ON PÁZMÁNY'S NEGOTIATIONS IN ROME

INTRODUCTION

The deep and modern study of the Roman embassy of Cardinal Péter Pázmány in *Chapter I* is based on the correspondence of the nunciature of Vienna and the papal Secretariat of State, the published documents of the Hungarian cardinal and international secondary literature redeems an old debt of international historiography. The statements listed in the previous chapter, the imperial embassy at the zenith of the Thirty Years' War and the analysis and evaluation of the contemporary papal policy prove that the abundance and nature of the Vatican sources support the extraordinary prospects of the historical acknowledgement and recognition – even 400 years later.¹

¹ The German version of *Chapter I*, as has already been mentioned in the *Preface*: ROTRAUD BECKER, *Der Skandal um den Rombesuch Kardinal Pázmáys im Spiegel der Nuntiaturberichte des Jahres 1632*, *op. cit.* – Here, in *Chapter II* there are several events, data discussed that have naturally already been touched upon in *Chapter I*. These are taken as known facts; therefore, they are rarely referred to or corss-referred to.

The text of ROTRAUD BECKER supplies the documents published in our volume with a concrete framework of interpretation. These documents are an integral part of his work of *Nuntiaturberichte*.² The majority of them are written by Lorenzo Azzolini, Secretary of State,³ as well as the orders sent to the nunciature of Vienna. The expert's *discorsos* were obviously prepared at the command of the Secretariat of State, one about the use of the treasures of the *Castel Sant' Angelo* and the other about the uselessness of the aid given to Germany ("*Nullum desideratur Sanctissimi officium ad repellendum e Germania militem infidelem*").⁴ They served to provide background information of the negotiations. The level of their preparedness indicates that they were planned to be used directly on certain occasions; for instance, as the appendix of a diplomatic letter or in publication.

The publication of the sources is motivated by historiographical need. After the correspondence of the nunciature, this is the last significant collection of documents about the journey of the Hungarian cardinal that has not been published yet. The lack of their publication is not due to their obscurity. They could be found in the *codex* of the Vatican Apostolic Library that includes the collected documents of the Borgia-protest as well as Pázmány's embassy. The existence

² BECKER, NBD IV/5, *op. cit.*

³ See *Chapter I* above, note 92. Except for the mentioned items in the following note, all of the sources are related to Azzolini.

⁴ Published below, *Documents*, 8 and 9. Besides, there are two letters published; one from the secretary of the papal consistory, Giovanni Battista Doni and one from the imperial envoy in Rome, Paolo Savelli (2 and 5).

of the mutual codex can be informative and symbolic at the same time. The contemporary judgement of the two cases was the same in Rome and abroad.

The reference number of the codex is *BAV Barb. lat 2629*. In 1911, FERENC HANUY had already published the documents written by Pázmány. The others were neglected regardless of their historical relevance. Namely, his commission was only to collect the documents written by the Hungarian cardinal.⁵ Previously, VILMOS FRAKNÓI used these documents – still in the *Palazzo Barberini*, not in the *Biblioteca Apostolica* – however, he employed only a few details in his narrative.⁶ Document

⁵ Cf. FERENC HANUY, *Kutatás Pázmány levelei után*, Religio 67 (1908) 310–312, 325–327, 341–343, 358–361. – In his publication he mentions the verbals of Azzolini at times, see later at certain documents.

⁶ For instance “*Memoriale del discorso tenuto dal S. Card P. col Vescovo di Ripa, 9 aprile 1632; 12 Aprile; 26 Aprile*”; “*Risposte date da me da parte di Sua Santità al S. C. Pazman a bocca, Roma a 10 maggio*”. VILMOS FRANKL (FRAKNÓI), *Pázmány Péter és kora I–III*, Pest 1868–1872, III, 21. 23. 35. 38 etc. (see also in the notes of certain documents). FRAKNÓI denotes only the “Barberini archives” as the place of the notes that were made by Lorenzo Azzolini about his negotiations with Pázmány. – The above given information is also valid for the diplomatic correspondence relating to Pázmány’s embassy in 1632, which was used also by FRAKNÓI during the elaborate analysis of the embassy’s history: *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 1–47. He does not list every detail and tries to smooth the conflict in his narration. FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 3. 8. 12. 19ff. and 26ff. 31. 44. 46. 48. 31. 44. 46. 48; furthermore, ID., *Pázmány Péter 1570–1637* (Magyar Történeti Életrajzok), Budapest 1886, 237–256. He carried out his research on the correspondence of the Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna also in the *Palazzo Barberini*.

I–3, II–12 and – from another depository – document 6 are also quoted in the NB IV/5 volume.⁷

It is worth stopping at the related research of the eternally wise man of the Hungarian historical research in the Vatican. In 1872, as a 29-year-old he wrote the history of the embassy in 50 printed pages in his great monograph's (*Pázmány Péter és kora*) Chapter III, which is still the most thorough work on the topic. His narrative is surprisingly objective, though, he evidently wanted to smooth the blooming conflict. Unfortunately, his work remained completely unknown for the international science; though, its certain details are still time-proven. The positivist source-employment of Fraknói is almost unbelievable. Besides, the correspondence between Pázmány and the court of Vienna (a great amount of which survived in a copy in Hungary and were published by MILLER and MEDNYÁNSZKY), not only did he utilize the nunciature's correspondence and the majority of the documents of the Secretariat of State published in this volume, but he also used the contemporary *avvisi* – that sometimes proved to be canards –, verbals of the Secret Council and the Spanish Secretary of State, as well as the reports of the envoys of Venice and Florence in Rome and Vienna. Some examples are as follows. "The envoy of Florence writes from Vienna on 8 May that according to the court the pope «*per liberarsi della molestia delle sue riccheste et farlo ritornare quanto prima*» caused inconveniences for Pázmány. Pázmány also shared this opinion, as we can read it in one of his statements that the envoy of Florence wrote from Rome on 1 May. According to the Venetian (from Vienna on 15 May) in the imperial court many announced that the pope had been made confident by the peace treaty with Venice and the promises and encouragement of the French monarch." – "The envoy of Florence wrote on 30 May: «*S'è detto che a Palazzo habbia dubitato, ch'il medesimo Cardinale fusse per far in Consistorio qualche simile azione a quella del Borgia*» ... The envoy of Florence wrote to his government from Rome on 5 June: «*Il Cardinale Pázmán se incaminato verso Ancona sodisfatto, per*

⁷ More precisely, BECKER only mentions their existence and their reference number, NBD IV/5, 225, note 12; 227, note 21; 241, note 20, 253, note 2; 257, note 3 and 5; 257, note 3.

quanto sento da un suo amico, più dell'uscirsene di quà, che da ogni favor ricevuto» ... The envoy of Venice knew more. «Presento – wrote on 10 July – da un confidente, che ha fatto pessima relatione da inclinazione del Pontefice, dichiarandolo come aperto inimico della Casa d'Austria» (op. cit., III, 31. 45. 47.).»⁸

Until now, neither the Hungarian, nor the international historiography undertook the intense analysis of Azzolini's verbals. Apart from the relevance of the *Nuntiaturberichte* in the German research, the adverse history of the Hungarian research in the Vatican and its immaturity may give the obvious explanation for it. The publication of the reports of the papal nuncios from the 17th century is itself a heroic challenge considering the increasing number of the sources. However, Lorenzo Azzolini, the Secretary of State had a viewpoint that should not be neglected. He apologised to Urban VIII twice for the illegibility of his writing that he put down hastily. "I ask Your Holiness for forgiveness for my less than legible writing, just after arriving home; I quickly put the words down", wrote the secretary of state on the verbal of the negotiation of 9 April, 1632 (*Documents*, 3). At the beginning of his note of 26 April, he asked the following: "The text of the negotiation

⁸ Cf. PÉTER TUSOR, *Magyarország és Róma, 1628–1635* (G.B. Pallotto, C. Rocci és M. Baglioni bécsi nunciatúrájának magyar vonatkozásai), *Aetas* 32 (2017) 3, 74–93, 90, note 83. – VILMOS FRANKÓI also wrote the history of the Roman embassy in his historical synthesis on the relations of Hungary and the Holy See. It is practically the summary of his previous research without any new data, aspects or corrections: *Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római szentszékekkel III*, Budapest 1903, 304–332. The references to the correspondence of the Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna, on *avisis*: 535–537, note 1016–1076.

with Cardinal Pázmány was noted down with hastily and hardly legible writing. I hereby humbly ask Your Holiness to forgive for it” (*Documents*, 12). If it caused difficulty for the contemporaries, what shall the present historians say? Yet, the legibility of the other documents is not better, either.⁹

Apart from the historiographical relevance, the special historical value of the documents also made the publication reasonable. These sources filled in gaps; they strengthen outlines and enrich details, which will be described later. However, before analysing the documents, one has to make some important observations of source criticism.

The above mentioned sentences of Azzolini – in relation to the palaeographical challenges – also supply us with the important historical information that he recorded the negotiations with the primate of Hungary not only to help his own work, but also to inform Urban VIII.¹⁰ This might be the case concerning his comments on the proposed plan of a league (*Documents*, 6) and concerning his notes made on the papal audiences of the Hungarian cardinal. We do not know yet whether there were written records made on these occasions on the spot, or not. Despite the unbelievable richness in detail, one would

⁹ By the publication of these sources, the publication of the documents relating to Pázmány from the Vatican codex *Barb. Lat. 2629* will finally be complete. The description, which is written according to the number of the folios and can be found in the *Appendix I*, gives a whole picture of the full content of the volume. The earlier published as well as the newly published (in the volume) texts are also listed.

¹⁰ Urban VIII’s latest biographical monograph with the comprehensive analysis of his papacy: ULRICH KÖCHLI, *Urban VIII. und die Barberini* (Päpste und Papsttum 46), Stuttgart 2017.

most likely say not. Azzolini would have only relied on his memory and outstanding mnemotechnic ability. Namely, it is hardly believable that he negotiated with the cardinal with a paper and ink in his hand, even if there was a clerk from the Secretariat of State.¹¹

The source value of the verbals that immediately, thoroughly and lineally recorded the discussed material in such detail, like that of an audio recording, is exceptional. They provide an almost *Oral History*-like behind the scenes insight into the Roman negotiations in the Apostolic Palace. Although the correspondence of the nunciature serves – irreplaceable and unique – information about the curial opinion of the Hungarian cardinal's conduct, one could see in *Chapter I* that the events of Rome could mainly be learnt from the archbishop of Esztergom's reports sent from Rome to Vienna and then from his closing reports. Now, the detailed curial narrative is also revealed, above all not in Latin, but in modern Italian.

The basic methodology of our analysis is these documents' comparison to Pázmány's reports. We do not balk at

¹¹ In the above mentioned sentences of Azzolini written down after the negotiation on 9 April, 1632 he used the term of "*bavendolo in fretta registrato*" (*Documents*, 3), which might refer to a certain written material's compilation in one text. However, on the audience of 6 April, where he had more chance to make notes while being only an observant and not a negotiator he did not do that, since Urban VIII himself wanted to write down Pázmány's requests: "And then, by seeing that he wanted to present his requests, His Holiness moved and wanted to go to the table to note down what the cardinal asked". (*Documents*, 1).

drawing conclusions in other cases, either, based on historical text philology. It is striking at first glance that Secretary of State Lorenzo Azzolini's notes are much more detailed than that of Pázmány's. Let us see, what novelty they have. Are there any serious differences, or even contradictions in their texts?

1. THE AUDIENCE OF 6 APRIL, 1632 (DOCUMENTS, I)

The audience of the Hungarian cardinal on 6 April has been known from his written memoir of the papal audience (*"Summarium legationis..."*),¹² from his letter to Ferdinand II of 10 April, his summarising report written still in Rome at the end of May (*"Relatio legationis..."*), its supplement written already at home in late June/early July – according to the issuer's incorrect dating –;¹³ and from Cardinal Francesco Barberini's letter sent to Ciriaco Rocci, the nuncio of Vienna, on 10 April.¹⁴

¹² The latest edition HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 256–261, n. 275 (cf. later in the *Appendix*, I).

¹³ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 265–267, n. 727; 315–328, n. 755 (*"Relatio legationis Romanae, quam obiit card. Petrus Pazmany iussu Caesareae maiestatis apud suam sanctitatem anno 1632"*); n. 758, 331–332 (*"Cardinalis Petri Pazmany privato nomine cum sua sanctitate"*). The dating will immediately be corrected.

¹⁴ BECKER, NBD IV/5, n. 64.1, 222–228 (225–228). – This as well as the sources listed before were used by VILMOS FRAKNÓI; however, he did not use Azzolini's report of the audience on 6 April. Cf. *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 19, note 2.

The latter one was drafted by Bishop Lorenzo Azzolini and – apart from some small differences –¹⁵ can be regarded as the abstract of the verbal made about the audience. All these increase the source value of the verbal (*Documents*, 1): it is work material of the Secretariat of State that was also utilized in the diplomatic correspondence. The source value is also increased by the fact that this is the most detailed and lineal description of the historical audience. Namely, Pázmány only highlighted the important moments that were relevant for the then current policy in his report of 10 April as well as in his summarising report of late May (*Relatio legationis...*). The third Pázmány-document on the audience of 6 April, which was uncertainly dated for late June/early July by HANUY, is *not* the cardinal's "continuous report to the imperial council", as it was stated by its issuer.¹⁶ If one carefully reads the text of his summarising report of late May and its "supplement", they can see that it is far from being a supplement. The summarising report is a coherent whole, besides; there is significant overlapping in the two texts: the Bavarian demise of the imperial dignity, the documents of Genoa and Mantua and the effect of the Borgia-protest on the relations with the Spanish monarch. It is more likely to be a detail of the chronological report that was mentioned by Pázmány in his letter of 10 April and was sent to Vienna as

¹⁵ For instance in relation to Pázmány's gestures: where there is silence in the verbal, according to the document "he was murmuring something".

¹⁶ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 331–332, n. 758 (331).

an attachment of his letter signed “B”¹⁷ along with the “*Summarium legationis...*” formerly handed to the pope.¹⁸

The determination of the exact dating is not only a simple task of philology, but offers a chance to make a rather delicate historical conclusion. As one could read in *Chapter I* too, the Hungarian cardinal promised to be silent about those matters that the pope ordered him by referring to sacred canons:

¹⁷ Apart from its existence, there has not been more information known about this chronological report: “*Quid in exhibitione literarum maiestatis vestrae sanctitas sua dixerit feceritque; quid postea acciderit; et in quo statu nunc res sint, ex scripta sub litera B. cognoscet maiestas vestra.*” HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 265–266, n. 727 (265). Document 758 includes certain elements of the “*quid postea acciderit*” events (which could be virtually removed to 727.a). The original document was lost; it might have been handed over to the president of the imperial Secret Council, to Hans Ulrich von Eggenberg, or to the more and more influential Maximilian von Trauttmannsdorf. The extract that survived only in a copy might originate from Pázmány’s notes. It explains that there is an odd part at its end, in which Pázmány recalls – as a post reminder and note – that before his setting off from Rome, through György Lippay the head of the Swiss guards (an imperial subject) apologised for being unable to visit him, but he feared that he would become suspicious. The copies that served as the basis of the document (Kaprinay-collection, Hédervári-codex, OszK Fol. Lat.) are such materials that include documents that are not of the provenience of Vienna, but Pozsony and Nagyszombat.

¹⁸ The copy that was given to the pope: BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 79r–85v. The word of ‘*Legationis*’ is truly crossed out many times by the pope, as it is referred to in many descriptions; however, there is no sign (neither under ultraviolet lamp) that it was corrected to ‘*Negotiorum*’. Cf. for instance FRANKÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 18; and which is also stated as fact: HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 256–261, n. 725, 261 (‘negot.’). – See also below the content of note 146 of point 8 in *Chapter II/4*.

“The pope heatedly declared that a lot had been said without any documentary proof and he talked so intensely, and at the end he ordered silence by referring to the restrictions written down in the bull of Leo X. I will not tell to anybody that I heard then.”¹⁹

If we examine Azzolini’s verbal of the audience on 6 April, 1632, we can see that the first “official” half of the negotiation contained the following: the introduction of the general political and war situation of Germany, the debate over the Holy See’s view of the restitutional edict of 1629, and the problems concerning the title of the imperial envoy. Furthermore, three imperial requests were also presented: the pope should give financial aid, dissuade Louis XIII from the Swedish alliance and join the newly formed anti-Protestant league. Every other problem was presented to the pope in a “private way” by Pázmány.

“After the presentation of the requests ended, as it was written down above, the cardinal expressed his concern due to his oath as a bishop and cardinal” – he promised obedience and loyalty to the pope and agreed to the unconditional support of the papal politics²⁰ – “though, he still wants to tell certain things to His Holiness in his honour and service. Therefore, he would like to return sometime. His Holiness answered that he had enough time so he could speak; moreover he promised to be discrete about what he would like to share.”²¹

¹⁹ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 331–332, n. 758.

²⁰ The cardinal’s oath of Pázmány is published: PÉTER TUSOR, *Petri Pázmány epistolae, acta notationesque inedita*, Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok–Regnum 9 (1997) 1–2, 83–146, 115–118, n. 15.

²¹ *Documents*, I. (fol. 203v).

According to Azzolini's verbal, the documents that were found in Genoa and might compromise the pope, the plan to gain the Kingdom of Naples, the seized letter of Cardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno, the nuncio of Paris, the House of Austria's deprivation of their imperial title, the papal documents found in Mantua that might harm the emperor, the question of Borgia's opposition and the discussion of the Spanish relation were all introduced in the framework of the personal presentation; namely, in that part of the audience when the pope ordered discretion about what he had answered.

It clearly turns out from Azzolini's report that Urban VIII ordered silence – based on canonical sanctions – concerning his answers of the above mentioned topics and that the Hungarian cardinal finally did not follow the instructions of the pope despite his vow. Although in less words than that of the content of the audience – beside the exploration of the papal personal anger's manifestation – he shortly concluded for the Secret Council in his summarising report of late May what Urban VIII had told him in connection with Borgia's protest:

“After this he touched upon the protest of Cardinal Borgia and started to explain vividly what grave deed he had committed in front of the pope on the consistory. If he had indicated that he had wanted to privately protest in the presence of 2-3 cardinals, he would have listened to him; however, this way the cardinal deserved punishment and he would not be the envoy of his Catholic monarch for good, etc. As His Holiness addressed me in an informal way many times (otherwise he called me “Signor”), he apologized by arguing that he had done it out of carelessness and Latin allowed it. I did not reflect upon it and I said nothing” – Pázmány wrote in his summarising report.²²

²² HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 755 (319).

Despite the papal order and his vow, he also mentioned Urban VIII's reaction to the secret documents found in Genoa in his summarising report. Namely, he said "they were all story-booklets, forgeries, they were not authentic, anybody could have written those fabrications".²³ He also mentioned the answer of the pope concerning the accusations of Cardinal Guidi di Bagno and Mantua and the concerns for the spoiling relationship with the Spanish court:

"Cardinal Bagno refused to have written such document and it is certain that he cannot have written such without his [the pope] will, since he had made his nuncio promise at the imperial assembly of Regensburg that he would support Ferdinand III's election to Roman king. In Mantua he did not write anything, with which he could hurt anybody... He was very angrily disculpating the consistory, and stated that the Datary receives little income from Spain, barely 30,000, the dispensations cannot be abolished; however, he could dissolve the crusade's and other privileges, out of which the Spanish monarchs have significant incomes..." – listed the pope according to the Hungarian cardinal.²⁴

If we compare Pázmány's summarising report with Azzolini's above mentioned verbal, we can see that the Hungarian cardinal did not leave anything important out of the pope's speech. Despite his initial vows, at the very end of his embassy he reported everything to the court of Vienna. The explanation is simple: the events of the two months in Rome and the escalating conflict overwrote the archbishop of Esztergom's decision, his loyalty as a cardinal and his gullibility that

²³ *Ibid.*, n. 755 (319–320).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 755 (320).

had existed at the beginning of his embassy. He answered the pretence with pretence. By the end of May, when he wrote his summarising report, his Habsburg-loyalty, his oath as the royal Hungarian councillor (*consiliarius Hungaricus*) and the imperial secret councillor (*consiliarius intimus*)²⁵ overwrote his papal clientele and his cardinal's oath; moreover, especially the order of the pontifical secret. This is the most important historical source value of Azzolini's verbal. In the knowledge of the correspondence of the Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna – which was explored by ROTRAUD BECKER and analysed in *Chapter I* – one should not be astonished by Pázmány's behaviour.²⁶

2. THE VERBAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON 9, 12 AND 26 APRIL (DOCUMENTS, 3, 4, 12)

a) Negotiation in the sacristy of the St. Peter's Basilica on 9 April

The negotiations with Azzolini were closely related to the audience on 6 April. In the post-summary of these meetings written in July 1632 – which was shortly presented in *Chapter I*

²⁵ On his secret councillorship and its nature: PÉTER TUSOR, *Pázmány és a Titkos Tanács (Pázmány and the Imperial Privy Council)* ("Judák Margit Emlékkönyv", Budapest 2012), http://institutumfraknoi.hu/sites/default/files/pazmany_es_a_titkos_tanacs.pdf (m.s.).

²⁶ He had to go against his cardinal's oath already during his negotiations in Rome, when he urged the usage of the *Castel Sant'Angelo's* treasures in front of Azzolini: "*Scio iuramentum cardinalium, contra quod nemo assensum praebebit. Invitus dico, sed dicere tamen debeo...*" – he wrote in his later summary. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 263–265, n. 726 (265).

by ROTRAUD BECKER – the Hungarian cardinal mentioned more occasions, such as personal meetings, and discussions in the presence of the pope and Cardinal Barberini.²⁷ He reported the negotiation on 9 April, when he himself visited Azzolini, as “the secretary of the Congregation of State”. “We have discussed many cases” (*“cum ipso multis egi”*), he wrote by emphasising that the French should avert all suspicion and give back the fortress of Pinerolo to Savoy, which was a key entrance to Italy. Azzolini concluded his counter-arguments in three points: according to the secretary of state if the owner voluntarily allowed the control of the fortress for the French, there had been no misconduct; the Spanish created the situation, since they had not armed properly; France controlled the fortress only for the sake of their own safety. The archbishop of Esztergom – in his opinion – argued against it in vain, only the first two points were repeated, and then he answered: the whole world and also he himself believed that along with their alliances the French were only waiting for the right moment to attack the Spanish territories in Italy – depending on the events in Germany –, that is why they needed the bridgehead.²⁸ In his summarising report of his embassy,

²⁷ “*Diversis vicibus proposita per dominum Azzolinum. Iterata saepius singula et coram sua sanctitate, et coram cardinale Barberino*”. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 263–265, n. 726. The endorsement of the imperial chancery reports about the time of the compilation in July, which we cannot doubt. The date of 9 April was written down here, as well, which was employed by HANUY in his publication. We will see that it is not precise, moreover it is rather deceiving, since it contains the outline of other negotiations that happened later. It should be placed rather after the summarising report (n. 755: “*Relatio legationis...*”) as “n. 755.a”.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

he drew the conclusion about the meeting, namely it became obvious for him that the pope would not join the league as Pinerolo was also mentioned in the draft of the league, and would not want the French to withdraw their forces from the fortress.²⁹

The negotiation in the sacristy of the St. Peter's Basilica was immediately recorded by Azzolini, and he sent it to the pope. One could reconstruct from the verbals (*Documents*, 3.) that the negotiations were more complex than the content of the above mentioned summary written to the Secret Council that only highlighted the main questions. It appears, for instance, from Azzolini's records that Pázmány – by being aware of the secretary of state's true role – endeavoured to win him on every occasion and often requested his helping favour. Not only was Pinerolo discussed among the Italian geopolitical problems of the pope's joining the league, but the question of Casale, Susa and Valtellina also occurred. Namely, these places were important regarding the passage to Germany, to the Spanish Low Countries through the Alps' passes from Italy, the Spanish Lombardy to north.³⁰ According to the archbishop of Esztergom, the league would have been only for the sake of

²⁹ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 755 (321).

³⁰ On the significance of Pinerolo and the importance of the Alps' passes: the classic monograph of GEOFFREY PARKER, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659*, Cambridge 1972, 80–101. On the Spanish and French military aims in general: PEER SCHMIDT, *Spanische Universalmonarchie oder „Teutsche Libertet“. Das spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Studien zur modernen Geschichte 54), Stuttgart 2001. On Valtellina (Veltlin) latest: KÖCHLI, *Urban VIII. und die Barberini*, 250–256.

defence against the Protestants. He expressed that the occurrence of the Italian problems in the league-text should not cause any nuisances, since the pope had also participated in the Treaty of Regensburg,³¹ namely he was an active participant of the international power politics. Moreover, in his view the pope had such authority that he could persuade the French. Although – during the long exchange of views recorded by Azzolini like a dialogue – he agreed that he should stay neutral towards the Catholic monarchs, he highlighted that an anti-Protestant alliance was in question. In his opinion, with the mediation of papal diplomacy the Spanish and the French should form a league against the Swedish like Aristides and Themistocles had done.³² One of the most important utterances of Pázmány for the sake of reconciliation was that he took the responsibility for the Italian moves of the Spanish on behalf of the emperor. He stated that the Spanish would never disturb Casale Monferrato not even by the will of Ferdinand II.

Seemingly the axiom of the papal role of a great power – experienced in the previous century – reflects in the Hungarian cardinal's ideas. During the negotiations, Azzolini already saw

³¹ On the Treaty of Regensburg that concluded the war of Mantua and on the secret Bavarian-French negotiations: DIETER ALBRECHT, *Die kurialen Anweisungen für den Nuntius Rocci zum Regensburger Kurfürstentag 1630*, QFIAB 35 (1955) 282–289; ID., *Die auswärtige Politik*, 211–302; REPGEN, *Die Römische Kurie*, 191–239; ANDREAS KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII. Grundzüge und Wendepunkte*, Mélanges Eugène Tisserant IV (Studi e Testi 234), Città del Vaticano 1964, 407–426, 415–418.

³² Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* is naturally the basic of the ancient example. In the text the name of Alcibiades can be read, it must have been the slip of Azzolini's pen while making notes.

the future: “the monarchs respect the pope only to such an extent that their interests require” (*“Ho detto che i Prencipi la stima quanto porta il loro interesse”*). This role of being a great power had its turning point at that time. The modern historiography considers that the Barberinis’ “real-politics” significantly contributed to the loss of the papacy’s role as a great power.³³

On the negotiation on 9 April, the question of the financial aid was also discussed. Azzolini – not for the last time – referred to the well-known dire situation of the papal finances. Pázmány’s reply was of a personal tone. He claimed that he was an old man and knew that if a monarch wanted to have some money, he would find the way for it. As the Hungarian cardinal hardly dealt with the question of the oft requested aid, the secretary of state drew the conclusion that the court of Vienna preferably focused on the league, which would be of defensive nature and would be against the German Protestants – he repeated in his summarising note.

The introduction of the regional circumstances and morale was also touched upon during the debate. On his way out, the archbishop of Esztergom noted that according to the bishops of the Catholic League, the pope’s comforting words were not enough and detailed the latest war destructions. Hungary was also mentioned during the meeting: the moves of György

³³ GEORG LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, Enciclopedia dei Papi. III: Innocenzo VIII – Giovanni Paolo II, a cura di Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma 2000, 298–321, 306–307; KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII.*, 420–425; BIRELEY, *Religion and Politics*, 209–230; LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 438–439.

Rákóczy I, the prince of Transylvania to assist the Swedish; the preparations of Palatine Miklós Esterházy against the emperor and the Ottoman's engagement with the Persians. He mentioned Hungary's unique constitutional position. He stated that "he was not German and was not from the hereditary province of the House of Austria, but from a clear elective monarchy. Insomuch that when the prevailing monarch was elected, he had to give a *reservalis* that he would be satisfied with the fact that he ruled the country by the free-will of the estates. Which charter was enacted into the country's laws, where it can be read".³⁴ It is not known, however, in what context he did that; his excursus can be read in Azzolini's marginal notes attached to the verbal. Nevertheless, Pázmány's Hungarian identity is strongly expressed here; he – as an imperial envoy – found it necessary to call the papal secretary of state's attention to it, who found it important to write it down. For us, this is the most sensational historical record of the analysed verbal.

*b) Pázmány's conclusion of his further negotiations
with Azzolini*

In his report of July 1632, the Hungarian cardinal describes his other meeting (*alia vice*) with Azzolini in more detail, whose exact date is not given. According to his report, all in all he advised seven points to Urban VIII via his secretary of state.

It is to be feared that the left alone emperor will sign a separate treaty with the Saxon elector, which will hurt the Church's

³⁴ *Documents*, 3 (fol. 110v).

interests. (1.) If the pope did not help the Catholic war (*bellum catholicum*) against the Protestants (*contra haereticos*), it is to be feared that there will be serious consequences. Urban VIII could avoid every suspicion and gossip only if he headed the defensive league of the emperor and the Spanish monarch. (2.) The world will be rightly shocked if the pope objected a sacred alliance that would not hurt a single Catholic monarch. According to the firm belief of the people, the French support the Swedish with the pope's approval and the Protestants announce with joy that the pope does not help the Catholics. (3.)

The next three points were related to the question of financial aid. Pázmány rejected those excuses that the expenses of the war of Mantua had completely exhausted the papal treasury. On the one hand, he found these expenses unnecessary, since the emperor as well as the Spanish monarch had guaranteed the safety of the Papal State. In his opinion, the pope should behave like a father: he should not seek the mistakes of his son, but immediately provide medicine for his illness; besides, if he had 6 million for the fortification of the border of Mantua, does he not have 1 million to save Christianity in this situation? (4.) A state always finds the way to collect money, even if it is not easy. It would also be in the best interest of the Papal State to keep the imminent danger away. Moreover, a good pastor should sacrifice not only the treasures of the Church, but also his life. (5.) According to his viewpoint, the bull of Sixtus V in question makes it possible to use the contingency reserve of the *Castel Sant' Angelo*. He was surprised that the pope did not ask the opinion of the cardinals; he found the argumentation of the Roman subjects' objection a simple ex-

cuse. (6.) He also found the sending of the extraordinary nuncio unnecessary. In his opinion, to answer his questions raised on behalf of Ferdinand II by ignoring him was not a humiliation of his, but of the emperor. (7.)³⁵

*c) Negotiations on 12 and 26 April at the residence
of Pázmány in Rome*

Thanks to the notes of Secretary of State Azzolini, we can certainly state that the majority of the archbishop of Esztergom's statements were mentioned on the negotiations of 12 and 26 April. On both occasions Azzolini visited the Hungarian cardinal at his residence in Rome (*"Palazzo de Signori Vesalli"*).³⁶ One serious statement – namely the Protestants' joy over Urban VIII's passivity – could not be identified. This must have been uttered in the presence of the pope or Cardinal Nephew Francesco Barberini – Pázmány mentioned that he had also talked to Azzolini on the occasion of his audiences, and as there were only two key meetings (on 6 and 24 April) that were informal, it could easily happen.

There is no place here – neither is it our present task – to introduce the meetings of 12 (*Documents, 4*) and 26 (*Documents, 12*) April in such detail as the one on 9 April; for instance the at-

³⁵ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 726, 263–265.

³⁶ Cf. FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 15, note 1. The reference of the Roman *avvisi* could not be located yet. There is no such place known as Vesalli-palace, FRAKNÓI must have misread the source and the *Palazzo Veralli* was in question at the *Piazza Colonna*. DOROTHY METZGER HABEL, *"When All of Rome was Under Construction": The Building Process in Baroque Rome*, University Park (Pen State Press) 2013, 25–28.

mosphere of the one on 12 April was even more tense; therefore, the dynamic of the dialogues, the tactics of the parties, their pretence and argumentations were worthy of being analysed. The reading of here, in the present volume published verbals cannot be avoided, neither is it worth doing so, since they are unique, pre-modern diplomatic texts. The summary of their content here is not sufficient at all. We are dealing with the written form of the negotiations' – and audiences' – "recordings". Furthermore, in contrast to the sources of the Secretariat of State from the 20th century, the question of manipulation cannot be raised, since these documents were not compiled for the public or the ones involved in the negotiations, neither for publication, leaking or for posterity, but these documents helped the daily routine of papal diplomacy, the Secretariat of State. These are extremely confidential documents that were written while making the decision of the most important and serious consequences of the Papal State's history. There are no other sources from the early modern period that offer such an insight into the politics of papal court.

Here there is only place to briefly show how Pázmány's statements looked like in Azzolini's presentation, or to chronologically list them and quote some aspects of peculiarity from the notes of the secretary of state.

* * *

By reading the verbals it seems that certain argumentations were frequently mentioned pro and contra, like that of the suspicion that the pope supported the French and the one that the

most obvious and real solution of the pope would be to join the planned league – not just for the sake of avoiding the gossips. It might have often occurred that the subjects of Europe were shocked at the behaviour of the pope and felt as if the pope had abandoned them. However, this was only written down by Azzolini on 26 April with the supplementation that according to the primate of Hungary's communication they condemned Urban VIII's behaviour in comparison to the earlier popes.³⁷ The accusation of the French collaboration was worded in the most severe form on 12 April. According to the notes of the secretary of state, the Hungarian cardinal said the following during the increasingly heated discussion: "His Holiness feels with France. He [Pázmány] is not convinced about it, and although in public opinion the most Catholic monarch is a saint, Cardinal Richelieu does what he wants and does not do anything against the pope". According to the present viewpoint of historiography, let us state that this was an exaggeration of Urban VIII's influence and capability in great politics.³⁸

The grave question of the separate peace with the Saxon elector was discussed on 26 April.³⁹ The move of Rome concerning the hereditary war of Mantua (1628–1631) was considered on 12 April; however at that time neither the exact sum of the papal expenditure (6 million) was mentioned nor the way the pope should behave – like that of the prodigal son of the Bi-

³⁷ *Documents*, 3 (fol. 132v).

³⁸ Apart from the above quoted content, the comprehensive study of the papal loss of power: PÉTER TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy (1600–1700)*, Viterbo 2016, 35ff.

³⁹ *Documents*, 12 (fol. 133v).

ble – was detailed, as it was written down in the report of the archbishop of Esztergom. In reality, it was declared that the case of Mantua belonged to the past and should not be brought up (yet, according to Pázmány, the case of Pinerolo was still relevant, because it was contradictory to the peace of Regensburg). The Hungarian cardinal also added that he had heard from the emperor himself how much the pope had spent on the defensive actions; and in comparison to that, everybody was shocked how little he gave for the wars against the Protestants. Naturally, the secretary of state gave account on his own counter-arguments, namely, even the imperial generals had spoken volumes about the Papal State's defensive actions that were necessary especially as the German mercenary troops had also consisted of Protestant soldiers.⁴⁰

The statement – that a state always finds a way to collect money – was expressed in more detail on 26 April after being briefly mentioned on 9 April. On 12 April, the Hungarian cardinal shortly mentioned that the pope could give 200–300 scudi – even if it had not been easy – whereupon Azzolini shortly answered that even 5,000 would have been impossible since every income was frozen. He also returned the Hungarian cardinal's argumentation, namely, the emperor could have gained money from his subjects, not only the pope.⁴¹

In contrast, two weeks later, on 26 April, the question of the aid was in focus. The secretary of state details the course of the meeting altogether on 9 manuscript pages. Their detailed introduction should not be necessary here, since in this volume

⁴⁰ *Documents*, 4 (fol. 117r and 118rv).

⁴¹ *Documents*, 4. (fol. 118v and 120r).

they are mentioned in summary as well as in complete text form. A couple of days later, Pázmány also gave a substantive summary of the secretary of state's presentation. (However, he concluded his own argumentations only with the following sentence: "I have replied to certain cases, yet in vain.")⁴²

In the centre of the Hungarian cardinal's argumentation – who knew the structure of the papal budget and the details of the papal aid remarkably well – stood the fact that it was also in the evident interest of Rome to keep the imminent danger away from its borders. However, he should not send troops – although Clement VIII's interventions in Hungary were often referred to – but a one-time aid would be a significant help; for instance from the new papal tithe imposed on the Italian clergy. According to Azzolini, who had a long row of counter-arguments, there was no difficulty in the case, only impossibility. However, he stated that the Hungarian prelate had already put emphasis on the aid rather than on the league. In his summarising report – where he detailed the negotiation on 26 April by referring to its date –, the primate of Hungary only shortly mentioned this along with highlighting the danger of the Saxon separate peace.⁴³

The argumentation of the archbishop of Esztergom – inspired by the Bible; namely that not only should the good pastor sacrifice his money for his sheep but also his life – was not

⁴² "*Ego multa in singulis replicavi, sed frustra*". His letter to Ferdinand II, Rome, 1 May, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 286–287, n. 736.

⁴³ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 755, 326.

commented upon by the secretary of state.⁴⁴ Either it was mentioned on another occasion, or the Hungarian cardinal wanted to summarise his argumentation this way in front of the Secret Council. It is difficult to decide. However, Azzolini cannot have withheld Pázmány's provocative words from Urban VIII only for the sake of discretion.

The aid from the incomes of the papacy was not in the centre of the negotiation of 26 April by mistake. On 12 April, they had intensely discussed the possible usage of the treasures of the *Castel Sant'Angelo*, which debate was rather shortly referred to by Pázmány. In contrast, Azzolini discussed their dialogue in many pages.⁴⁵ He also added that the primate of Hungary admittedly raised the question against his cardinal's oath. Namely, the oath included a short sentence that the newly appointed cardinal should comply with the bulls of Sixtus V that regulated the usage of the treasures of the *Castel Sant'Angelo*. The three bulls *explicite* banned the cardinals from raising this question.⁴⁶ The archbishop of Esztergom argued his move with the extraordinary emergency. Their debate was not about it, however, but about the opinion of the Hungarian prelate: the pope should make the cardinals vote on a consistory, and if

⁴⁴ *Documents*, 12 (fol. 130r–134r).

⁴⁵ *Documents*, 4 fol. 119r–120r.

⁴⁶ "*Necnon perpetuo, et inviolabiliter observare promitto, atque iuro... et constitutionem eiusdem Sixti papae V. de decies centenis millibus nummorum aureorum, in arce Sancti Angeli repositis.*" TUSOR, *Petri Pázmány epistulae*, 115–118, n. 15 (116). Sixtus V issued his first relating apostolic constitution on 21 April 1586. *Bullarum, diplomatum et privilegiorum ... Taurinensis editio*, VIII, 693–700.

three fourths of them agreed, the treasures of the *Castel Sant' Angelo* should be used. According to Azzolini, this would be an interpretation, since the mentioned bulls of Sixtus V should be taken word for word, and only if the circumstances described in them prevailed, the agreement of three fourths of the cardinals would be required. He called the attention of the Hungarian cardinal that the disturbance of this question is rather delicate due to the strict canonical sanctions written down in the bulls. However, in his reply Pázmány emphasised that the case of the word for word interpretation of the bull existed and the “contingency reserve” could be used, since Catholic provinces had been attacked by Protestants. Yet, in Azzolini’s opinion the closely related sub-circumstances – that were not detailed by him – did not stand;⁴⁷ besides, the subjects of the pope would not like it if they mishandled the reserves of the *Castel Sant' Angelo*.⁴⁸ Pázmány’s disagreement could be felt when he said that the pope was a sovereign monarch, therefore the subjects, the people of Rome, could not have a say in such decision making. He also referred to the example of Gregory XIV – who had immediately opened the treasury and joined the French war of religion by sending troops⁴⁹ – and again that of Clement VIII’s move when he had aided Hungary. According to Azzolini, the actions of Gregory XIV were still being questioned and Urban VIII

⁴⁷ See later, *Documents*, 8. Azzolini must have referred to the unbelievable demur within it.

⁴⁸ REPGEN, *Finanzen, Kirchenrecht und Politik*, 62–74.

⁴⁹ The Sfondrati-pope used 300 000 scudi from the *Castel Sant' Angelo*. Cf. AGOSTINO BORROMEO, *Gregorio XIV*, *Enciclopedia dei Papi*, 230–240.

provided even more assistance than Clement VIII or Paul V. Presumably looking at the shocked face of Pázmány he added his rather cynical argument by cleverly twisting the archbishop of Esztergom's words that if the monarchs could collect money in need, the emperor could also do that, like the pope himself.

In the last point of his summary – above introduced in points in sub-chapter “b” – of the negotiations with the secretary of state the primate of Hungary remembered his objection to the sending of the extraordinary nuncios. The question was the opening topic of the negotiation on 12 April.⁵⁰ Right at the beginning Pázmány asked about the mission of Nuncio Grimaldi. He could not comprehend how he could make amends in the court of Vienna, while three imperial envoys had not got an answer for what Ferdinand II had commissioned them.⁵¹ According to the excuses of Azzolini, they could not answer due to the shortage of time; and the aim of Grimaldi's travel was to advance the general good. For Pázmány's statement that he still did not see the true reason for the extraordinary nuncios Azzolini replied that the reconciliation of the Catholic monarchs' difference of opinion and the alliance against the Protestants were the true reasons. However, the Hungarian prelate believed that it was unnecessary to send a nuncio to Ferdinand II for this reason, since the emperor wanted the same which is

⁵⁰ *Documents*, 4 (fol. 115r–116r.)

⁵¹ Apart from himself and Paolo Savelli, Pázmány thought of Federico Savelli. Cf. Fosi, *La famiglia Savelli*, 73–74; and above, *Chapter I*, note 173. Cardinal Harrach was not in Rome at the time, he arrived at the beginning of May. See the related notes of his diary: KELLER–CATALANO, *Diarien*, 66ff.

why he had sent him to Rome. Yet, in Azzolini's view, if papal legates were sent to kings – who specifically asked that – they should also be sent to the emperor. As an answer for Pázmány's disagreement he argued that the ordinary nuncios could not effectively represent such an important case. Then, the Hungarian cardinal articulated that the cost of the extraordinary nuncios' travel should rather be given to the emperor as an aid. Azzolini declared that Cardinal Francesco Barberini was not for the sending of the extraordinary nuncios, but it was requested by the ministers of the Catholic monarchs. Yet, the primate of Hungary was still not convinced about their mission's *raison d'être*. Moreover, he found it rather awkward that he, as a cardinal and creature of the pope, was not trusted with the information that the extraordinary nuncios were commissioned with.

*d) Reverentia and dissimulatio. Data for the anatomy
of the diplomatic negotiations in the Baroque Era*

By being absorbed in the world of the highest levelled diplomatic negotiations in the early modern period – speaking of the representatives of the pope and the emperor –, one can experience that the debate is extremely tense. With the exception of one or two generalities – like they mutually disapproved of the impolite behaviour against the pope – the parties could hardly agree on anything. However, one can also state that Azzolini's communication with the Hungarian cardinal, who was thirteen years older, lacked the hostile tone that char-

acterised his orders written to the nunciature of Vienna at the same time.⁵² Azzolini was not the representative of the cardinal secretaries of state that became persistent after the late 17th century. He was not the second person after the pope, he did not have the role like Alderano Cybo, Ercole Consalvi, Giacomo Antonelli, Mariano Rampolla or Eugenio Pacelli did. He was a really important employee; though, the cardinal nephew was always above him. He was a bishop who never stopped having respect for the cardinal of the Mother Church and the envoy of the emperor. The *reverentia* was organically supplemented by the unavoidable element of the Baroque politics, the pretence (*dissimulatio*). The well constructed argumentations served or tried to mask clear political purposes for both parties. The purpose of Azzolini was to avoid any changes in the politics of the Holy See; Pázmány wanted change, in which he believed up to the first week of May, or even later – according to him. This was the Baroque world of the Italian Renaissance Machiavelli.⁵³

The Hungarian cardinal did not have real latitude, not even in the question of the extraordinary nuncios' sending. Namely, this question had already been decided upon in the Curia on 12

⁵² The openly hostile tone first appeared in the document sent to Nuncio Rocci on 17 April, 1632, in the order of the Secretariat of State completely drafted by Azzolini. BECKER, NBD IV/5, 233–242, n. 66.I. The protesting document of “*Intermittere non possum...*” was considered as the “mutual dish” of Borgia and Pázmány: “*E si vede chiaro, che la protesta è farina loro*” (*ibid.*, 239–240).

⁵³ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 740, 295–296. See also later (II/3/c *sub-chapter*, note 92–96). – See also footnote 116.

March with the involvement of the selected Roman State Council, the *Congregazione dello Stato*. There is little information about the function of the congregation that was occasionally summoned; it did not operate as a permanent office, yet helped to settle important decisions.⁵⁴ The analysis of the meeting summoned in the palace of Cardinal Bernardino Spada is worthwhile.⁵⁵

There were altogether nine people attending it (together with Bernardino Spada): Laudavio Zacchia (the cardinal of San Sisto), Berlinghiero Gessi, Giulio Sachetti, Giovanni Battista Pamphili (the later Innocent X), Giovanni Guidi di Bagno, Fabrizio Verospi, Francesco and Antonio (the younger) Barberini.⁵⁶

The sending of the extraordinary nuncios to Paris, Madrid and Vienna was supported by the following cardinals: Sachetti, Pamphili, Gessi – though he found it difficult, he suggested Panziroli as one of the nuncios – and both Barberinis. All of them considered sending legates, especially to Germany, but they found this fundamentally problematic. There were three cardinals who questioned the idea. According to Zacchia – who considered the ordinary nuncios or monks a better choice –, the

⁵⁴ Cf. TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 186–187.

⁵⁵ The verbal of the meeting among the documents of the Secretariat of State on Pázmány's embassy: BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 191r–193r ("*Die Veneris 12.a Martii 1632. In Congregatione in aedibus Em.mi D. Card. Spadae*").

⁵⁶ This is a longer list of participants that has already been known. KRÄUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 282–283 according to his publication, Sachetti and Guidi di Bagno were not members of the body (his data are relevant for 1633).

extraordinary nuncios were not efficient enough. The former nuncio of Paris, Guidi di Bagno – who had had a main role in the Francophile Barberini-politics in 1627–1631 – expressed his reservations in a more subtle way.⁵⁷ He would have sent a legate to Germany for the assistance of the emperor and a nuncio to the Italian dukes to convince them to give assistance. He believed that the ordinary nuncios could more efficiently work in Madrid and Paris, where he would have sent monks instead of the slow and inflexible legates to secretly mediate between Richelieu and Olivares.⁵⁸ In contrast to his former conduct, this opinion of his markedly differed from the official papal politics and he endeavoured to handle the conflict in an effective way between the Catholic powers. The comment of Cardinal Verospi was similarly remarkable. He suggested that they should wait for the arrival of Pázmány before they made a decision, since they could directly get to know what the emperor's purpose was, whether he wanted to welcome a legate or a nuncio, and if so, for what reason. In his opinion, the emperor would need neither a legate

⁵⁷ “S. Card. Bagno. Mandar legato ad Alemagna per assister al Imp.re, e consigliar i Prenc.i d’Alemagna con autorità mandar un Nuntio a Prenc.i di ’Italia, per moverli a contribuire gli offitii e gli aiuti. Non inclina a Legati nè in Francia nè in Spagna stanti i pregiudizi e lunghezze. Non li pare che si mandino Nuntii straordinari in Francia e Spagna, perché fariano meno delli ordinarii. Ma a questi due supplirebbe con due persone Religiosi e accreditate, che andassero uno in Spagna, e uno in Francia per levar principalmente le picche particolari fra Richelieu e l’ S.r Conte Duca...”. BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 192r.

⁵⁸ Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel (1587–1645), was the chief minister of Philip IV in 1621–1643, Cf. J.H. ELLIOTT, *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline*, New Haven 1989; on his rivalry with Richelieu: ID., *Richelieu and Olivares*, Cambridge 1991.

nor a nuncio; all three places should be visited by a monk, like Giacinto da Casale or Domenico della Scala⁵⁹ had done earlier. The main purpose was the emperor's cooperation with the Duke of Bavaria, who could also persuade the other electors.⁶⁰ Opposed to them, Antonio Barberini categorically rejected the sending of the monks.⁶¹ The host Cardinal Bernardino Spada – who was the nuncio of Paris in 1623–1627 – did not disapprove the employment of the discrete and efficient service of the monks and the sending of the extraordinary nuncios; however, he firstly suggested the ceremonial sending of a legate.⁶²

⁵⁹ On the secret diplomacy of the Capuchins in the service of the Holy See: DIETER ALBRECHT, *Die deutsche Politik Papst Gregors XV. Die Einwirkung der päpstlichen Diplomatie auf die Politik der Häuser Habsburg und Wittelsbach 1621–1623* (Schriftenreihe zur Bayerischen Landesgeschichte 53), München 1956, 19–31. 49–82, especially 20–21; ID., *Die auswärtige Politik*, 22–25. 66–69. 73–76. 94–101. 110–113. etc. On the Carmelite fra Domenico: SILVANO GIORDANO, *Domenico di Gesù Maria (1559–1630)*, Roma 1991; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 404, note 119. j. and *ad indicem*.

⁶⁰ “S.r Card. Verospi. Sappiasi prima l'intentione dell'Imp.re che è il principale, e questo col mezzo del S.r Card. Pasman, e da lui sentire. Offerirli, quando così desiderì, un legato creatura di S. S.tà. La maggior importanza è riunir Baviera e l'Imp.re, e son fra loro beneficii reciprochi. Baviera tirerebbe gli altri elettori. Dunque aspetterebbe Pasman per veder se vuol Nuntio o legato, et a che fine. Intanto è di parere che si mandi un Religioso come l'esempio di, Fra Giacinto, Fra Domenico etc. Et anco in Francia, e in Spagna. Crede che l'Imp.re non si curerà di Legato, nè di Nunzii...” BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 192r. On the secret diplomacy of the monks the latest work: ELENA BONORA, *Il sospetto d'eresia e i «frati diplomatici» tra Cinque e Seicento*, Hétérodoxies croisées. Catholicismes pluriels entre France et Italie, XVI^e–XVII^e siècles, sous la dir. de Gigliola Fragnito–Alain Tallon, Rome 2017, 49–74.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 192v.

⁶² *Ibid.*, fol. 193r.

It seems that many cardinals of the papal Congregation of State took on the mediation seriously; they did not consider it a “fever of idleness”, between the Spanish and the French crown, or the emperor and the Duke of Bavaria. They were aware of the gravity of the situation, since there had not been such danger for 100 years – as they proclaimed during the meeting.

The recalling of the events of the meeting of the *Congregazione dello Stato* proves that Pázmány had a long debate with Azzolini about such a question that had already been defeated in the Curia; namely, it had already been discussed on a higher level and a decision had already been made.⁶³ The masterly advanced pretence of the Baroque diplomacy is clear in these negotiations. It is obvious that the Roman decision makers were not interested at all in what the primate of Hungary would tell on behalf of the emperor; Cardinal Verospi had suggested hearing and considering Pázmány’s views in vain.⁶⁴ Apart from the pretence, Azzolini can also be caught out in a lie. While he told to the Hungarian cardi-

⁶³ After the decision of the congregation – as it has already been discussed in *Chapter I* (note 94 and 149) – on 29 March, the announcement of the consistory also happened about the pope’s purpose; the courts that were involved were officially informed about the sending of the extraordinary nuncios. See Rocci’s report on the reception of the news in Vienna, Vienna 10 April, 1632. BECKER, NBD IV/5, 221–222, n. 63.2.

⁶⁴ Partly his viewpoint explains why he was sent to negotiate about the title of the envoy, which was correctly believed by Pázmány to be a private business (“*baud crediderim suo solius nutu*”). Pázmány to Ferdinand II, Rome, 24 April, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 282–284, n. 734 (283). Verospi could personally know Pázmány from the time he was an extraordinary nuncio of Vienna (cf. *Chapter I*, note 103); his commission was related to the release of Pázmány’s patron, Cardinal Klesl.

nal that Barberini himself – who was gaining power in the control of the papal state affairs – had also objected the sending of the extraordinary nuncios; yet in the protocol of the *Congregazione dello Stato* one can find the exact opposite of that. The statement, namely the pope himself had written a letter to the French monarch, is even more serious.⁶⁵ On the basis of the research of GEORG LUTZ we know that there had never existed such a document despite its articulation on the audience of 24 April and in the correspondence of the nunciature; only a *duplicatum* was fabricated as an argument against Pázmány. They argued that the original document had been left on the way to Paris. While LUTZ mentions a breve, an even more special document is in question here, the *lettera di proprio pugno*, which was usually written by the pope indeed and sealed by his family coat of arms and solely addressed to monarchs. The possibility of the machination is affirmed by the fact that despite the breves, the letters were not registered, or not officially at least, like those documents that were issued by the *Segretaria dei Brevi ai Principi*.⁶⁶

*e) The frameworks of the pretence. Pázmány's opinion
of his red hat*

If we examine the negotiations of Pázmány with the secretary of state, moreover with the pope in general, on the basis of

⁶⁵ *Documents*, 12 (fol. 129v).

⁶⁶ Cf. TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 206–207. – On the breve-case and the tools of the secret papal diplomacy: LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit*, 245–253; ID., *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 435–436; in conclusion: KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII.*, 419.

the sources being published in this volume one can state that Azzolini and the pope practiced the pretence more intensively than that of the Hungarian cardinal.⁶⁷ It is true, however, that they were in a more advantageous situation. Their fundamental negotiating attitude was that they would do anything in order to support the emperor, moreover, they did everything that was possible; taking more actions were not only difficult but simply impossible (*“non s’hanno da chiamar propriamente difficoltà, ma impossibilità”*).⁶⁸ As the envoy and secret councillor of the emperor, the archbishop of Esztergom had to act assertively to achieve a change. He had to use all of his cards, for example concerning the secret papal-French relations, or he had to directly apply pressure when he mentioned the shock of the European Catholic public opinion concerning the passivity of Rome. In this sense, the Hungarian cardinal did not have much scope for action in the Eternal City to cleverly demonstrate his abilities during the negotiations by employing them with the delicate twist and thrust of diplomacy. He only started to masterly use them after his change of loyalty, around the time of his setting off. Until then, he had to be satisfied with such gestures, like listening to the secretary of state with “great atten-

⁶⁷ The outline of the models of politics in the 17th century: ROSARIO VILLARI, *Elogio della dissimulazione. La lotta politica nel Seicento*, Roma (Laterza), 1987. The period was aware of the term of “decent pretence” (*dissimulatio honesta*). IDEM, *Breve riflessione sulla Dissimulazione onesta di Torquato Accetto*, Les Dossiers du Groupe de Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur l’Histoire du Littéraire, 2009, 2. Online: <https://journals.openedition.org/dossiers-gribl/3673> (22. 10. 2018.).

⁶⁸ *Documents*, 12 (fol. 129v).

tion and eagerness” when he talked about Urban VIII’s “honest and immaculate nature” who “was suspected to like secret thoughts”.⁶⁹ However, the effect of this gesture was immediately ruined when he changed the topic of the discussion on 12 April; namely that he would set off in a couple of days, since he had nothing more to do in Rome just to wait for the answers of his requests. Apparently, he had to travel to Rome in such an old age only to obtain his red hat, which served nothing else but to hang it above his grave, in his opinion.

This is a very idiomatic statement of Péter Pázmány, who is considered to be the “Hungarian cardinal Cicero” by the Hungarian historical memory. Yet, the belittling of his creation and dignity as a cardinal cannot be truly comprehended, not even at the time when the adverse experiences of his embassy made his Habsburg-loyalty and identity of an imperial subject more accentuated and even exclusive. He unnecessarily opened a new topic of discussion during the negotiation, which was immediately exploited by Azzolini by saying that the cardinals who personally obtained their red hat (*galerus*) enjoyed more privilege – than those who did not – like they could partake of the *spolium*s.⁷⁰ The Hungarian primate questioned the latter information in the case of the imperial cardinals, and then they immediately started a historical debate over the origin of the *spolium*s, which was concluded by the secretary of state by stating that the cardinals should essentially stay in Rome. And if somebody could not manage it, it would be decent of them to travel to Rome at least once for

⁶⁹ *Documents*, 4 (fol. 120v).

⁷⁰ On the *spolia* with further literature: TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 122.

their hierarchical insignia and to pay their duty to the head of Church and the tomb of the apostles. In his reply Pázmány shared this opinion, and he himself would wholeheartedly spend his last years in Rome “not out of curiosity and pleasure, but for the sake of the service of the Church” if the pope would provide his living; therefore, he could resign from his diocese. Although, according to Azzolini, Pázmány had said that only in the heat of the dialogue and not by previous determination (*più per discorso, che con animo deliberato*), he did not even suspect pre-tence;⁷¹ it is well-known that the return to Rome was indeed the intention of Pázmány and the Habsburgs. This is the first known uttering of this plan by Pázmány that caused another conflict between Vienna and Rome; therefore, it can be excluded that it had been created in the heat of the moment.⁷²

3. THE AUDIENCE ON 24 APRIL AND THE FINAL NEGOTIATION ON 10 MAY (DOCUMENTS, 10, 13)

a) “*Inganno politico*”. *The audience on 24 April and the text of the papal answer*

The meeting of Lorenzo Azzolini and Péter Pázmány on 26 April was the close continuation of the fateful – concerning the embassy – papal audience on 24 April. On the meeting

⁷¹ *Documents*, 4 (fol. 120v).

⁷² See TUSOR, *Diss.*, 2000, 169–180; ID., *Pázmány állandó római követségének terve (1632–1634)*, Pázmány Péter és kora (Pázmány Irodalmi Műhely. Tanulmányok 2), ed. by Emil Hargittay, Piliscsaba 2001, 151–175; ID., *Le origini*, 205–226.

they discussed the topics of the short and cold audience in more detail. These points are already known and have been examined above. However, there are some details of the audience worth mentioning. The source is again Azzolini's notes.⁷³ The most important element is that the tactics of the papal decision making are palpable: they should provide at the least an opportunity for the Hungarian cardinal to speak in front of the pope. They wanted to avoid the Borgia-affair and the climax of the culminating tension that had started on the audience of 6 April, and continued by the written protest of the archbishop of Esztergom that he had circulated. He was allowed to report on the latest diplomatic and war developments by both speaking and writing,⁷⁴ though, he did not get any comments on them. In the main part of the audience Urban VIII read out his prepared answers for the questions of the Hungarian cardinal, and then he declared that he would not hand them over, since it was not the habit of the popes. He could later discuss them with Azzolini in more detail. In the created cold atmosphere only a short dialogue could evolve: the pope personally referred to his written, though lost letter to Louis XIII – that had never existed according to LUTZ – and confirmed that he would take part in an Italian defensive league, whose text would be well drafted, against Gustav Adolf. He did not lack his hot-tempered conduct either: he was ready to show the moneybags kept in the *Castel Sant'Angelo* to prove Pázmány's

⁷³ *Documents*, II.

⁷⁴ The majority of them were discussed with Azzolini two days later. The publication of his memoir: HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 279–281, n. 733. See also *Documents*, II.

mistake: the reserve was not from the savings of Sixtus V but from the papal subjects' taxes. According to his intriguing argumentation, in contrast to the Germans, the Italians always endeavoured to show more wealth than they had and this could feed the exaggerated expectations.⁷⁵

We are in such an advantageous situation that the draft as well as the final text of what the pope read out survived. There is technically no new information in them: they list Pázmány's various proposals presented in speaking as well as in writing, and then shortly they discuss the pope's answers. The new information would be surprising, since the papal answer was drafted by Azzolini. Therefore, the only decisive source value of the corrected, supplemented and edited draft is that one can have a glance at the division and method of the work of the pope and his secretary of state. Azzolini directed, controlled and specified every little detail.⁷⁶ Yet, the examination and identification of the draft enrich the research with an unexpected new result. ROTRAUD BECKER correctly calls attention to the fact that the onetime financial aid given by the pope as a result of the archbishop of Esztergom's embassy was as a matter of fact not an extra aid, but the payment of the already promised Italian papal tithes in one sum that had been paid in instalments. It seems that in the end, during the negotiations

⁷⁵ Azzolini's verbal does not mention it; however according to the summarising report of Pázmány the pope was expressly talkative during the audience. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 755, 324.

⁷⁶ *Documents*, 10 and 10.a. Delineated in Hungarian language by FRANKÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 33–34 and 40–41 (see also below *Chapter II/3/c* and especially the notes 97–99 and at the apparatus of the publication.

with the secretary of state the Hungarian cardinal mentioned this solution as the minimal aim of his embassy. Based on the established custom of tithe collection in Hungary he even suggested leasing them out. The Curia rejected this method of collection; although, they did not reject the idea itself. However, the confirmation of the idea of the payment of a onetime greater sum based on the papal tithes was not told to Pázmány by Azzolini, neither by any other curial prelate, which was the main grievance of Pázmány upon his return. Namely, he felt publicly annulled; while he had been fighting for the aid as a cardinal in Rome, Nuncio Girolamo Grimaldi had been heading to Vienna with the news of its granting.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, in the papal court he was treated in a more delicate way. It was a genuine “political deceit”, which had already had a term in Italian at the time: *politica dell'inganno*. The papal answer – that was read out by the pope but refused to be handed over in writing until the end of the embassy – clearly apprised the Hungarian cardinal: that in order to avoid Grimaldi’s commission – so to say – remaining “alone, they would see if they could grant more financial aid based on the instalments of the following months despite their financial hardships” (*Vederemo anche, acciò gli uffizi del Nuntio non siino affatto soli, di farli rimesse*

⁷⁷ BECKER, NBD IV/5, 325–329, n. 89.1. Due to its importance, details from the report were also cited by FERENC GALLA, *cf.* above, *Chapter I*, note 153. – The instructions of Grimaldi are not known yet, he might have been given orders in speaking before his departure. He must have been informed also then about the aid, whose exact amount was decided in the Curia only after Pázmány’s demonstrative departure. See also later at Point 2 of *Chapter II/4* (note 112–113).

di denaro quanto ci sarà possibile in tanta strettezza a conto delle mesate future"). Furthermore, the pope also declared that the requested sum could not be provided by emphasising that the present result was due to his meritorious zeal ("*se ne dia la dovutalode a V. S., et alli suoi diligenti offitii portati con efficacia e premura*"), with which he represented the emperor.⁷⁸ It is not accidental that it was not mentioned by Azzolini on their meeting two days later. He partly took it for granted that the information had already been known, yet he also might have suspected that this important information escaped the attention of the Hungarian cardinal – since Pázmány did not bring it up – which he tried to exploit. The latter happened.

Although Pázmány's command of Italian – that he gathered during his Roman studies⁷⁹ – could not have become worse, it might have gotten stale. It is not only suspected, but a fact that he did not understand everything that was read out on the audience. Namely, the archbishop of Esztergom wrote a report to Vienna about his audience on the same day. He already had a suspicion based on the time of the audience; he could not decide whether the postponement of his requested audience to Saturday – the prevailing imperial envoy was always listened on Friday – was "accidental or a matter of devi-

⁷⁸ *Documents*, 10 (fol. 196v–197r).

⁷⁹ One knows letters written (to Rambaldo Collalto) in Italian also from 1624–1626. In the 1630s he usually employed Italian secretaries, mainly the *Propaganda Fide*'s conventual Franciscan missionaries (Cosimo Fornarini, Bonaventura Magrardi). PÉTER TUSOR, *Pázmány Péter esztergomi érsek levelei Rambaldo Collaltóhoz (1621–1626)*, Lymbus. Magyarságtudományi Forrásközlemények, Budapest 2003, 111–116, 112 and 114–116, n. 2–4.

ous politics" (*"casu, an artificio"*). He feared the danger of omitting something when he asked the answer of the pope in writing (*"ne lapsu memoriae aliquid omitterem"*).⁸⁰ The answer for his request might have been the most humiliating moment of his embassy: Urban VIII refused to hand over the writing, by saying it would have been unorthodox for the Roman pope, yet he offered at the same time to read the text twice if it was needed. Pázmány obviously refused that, yet he, indeed, misunderstood the papal text: he reported to Vienna that according to the official papal answer, there would not be a further financial aid given beyond the already granted one.⁸¹ After this, until the end of his embassy the Hungarian cardinal received no extra information about Grimaldi's commission, and excluded his initial hope to bring a significant sum home at the burden of the tithes.⁸² He saw it all along; however, the commission of the former governor of Rome fit into the diplo-

⁸⁰ Pázmány to Ferdinand II, Rome, 24 April, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 282–284, n. 734 (283).

⁸¹ "*Sanctitatem suam ob quamplurimas aerarii difficultates praeter id, quod hactenus dedit, subsidii, nihil amplius dare posse.*" *Ibid.* See also in the summarising report (*ibid.*, n. 755, 324). – The pope also informed Pázmány that the document would be sent to the nuncio of Vienna, therefore, he could read it for Ferdinand II. The document was sent, indeed, however, it is not known whether it was read, or not. If it happened, it greatly enhanced the papal public annulment of Pázmány in Vienna, since it obviously proved that the pope had said different than that of the cardinal had reported. On this event and on the information when Pázmány was handed over the written form of the pope's answer of 24 April, see later in *Chapter II/3/c* (note 97–99).

⁸² His letter to Ferdinand II, Rome, 15 May, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 304–305, n. 750.

matic game played against him, to which he gave his voice in the Eternal City.⁸³ Soon we will touch upon the question of what happened to the text that was read by the pope on the audience of 24 April before Pázmány's setting off.

b) The expert material of the audience on 24 April

Apart from the purpose of the determined defence of the Papal State's political priorities, such diplomatic tactics must have derived from the fear of Pázmány, rather than from failing to appreciate him. For that reason the Curia endeavoured to choreograph the audience of 24 April as well as to carefully prepare Urban VIII for every contingency. Specifically if Pázmány disagreed with the read answer and opened a debate over the question of aid – to which his embassy's focus was shifted – the pope would be able to effectively argue against it. This is not just an assumption. Azzolini's biglietto survived, in which he informed the pope that according to the news, the archbishop of Esztergom emphatically wanted to speak with him about the treasures of the *Castel Sant'Angelo* and therefore, he found it important to write down the arguments. He attached his *discorso* and another memoir about whether the pope could be obliged to grant financial aid or to impose extra taxes on the Papal State. He attached the report of the nuncio of Vienna of 28 February concerning the planned league. He suggested that

⁸³ To Grimaldi himself before his departure to Vienna. Grimaldi immediately forwarded Pázmány's words to the Secretariat of State. BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 142r (See later Point 5 of *Chapter II/4*, note 118).

the pope should wait for⁸⁴ the presentation of Pázmány and should postpone his answer for this request by any and all means, by following the example of Gregory XIII and other predecessors, who had never resolved to join any league that affected Italy.⁸⁵

The *discorso* about the usage of the *Castel Sant' Angelo*'s treasure is likely to have been the result of group work, though, its final drafting might be the work of Azzolini, therefore the authorship is Azzolini's, yet the handwriting of the fair copy is not his. There is no space here to introduce the memoir in depth as it can be read in this volume in its entirety together with a lengthy abstract. Its point is that it tries to interpret Sixtus V's bull with a twisted argumentation in order to defend the pope's political interests and to avoid the treasures' employment for the sake of the aid requested by the Hungarian prelate. We share his opinion that the bulls would have definitely made it possible to use the reserve against the Protestant Swedish attack in the territory of the Empire. The evasive and hair-splitting nature of the argumentation's direction and standard is illustrated best in that the bull includes the word of *regnum* and only Bohemia is considered to be one in the Empire. The lengthy and illuminating document is spectacular proof of the Holy See's attitude of clear real politics. This attitude is *explicite* expressed by the last point; namely, at the moment Italy was facing an impending danger of war that threatened the borders of the Papal State. From everywhere the threats of the Protestants against Italy and Rome could be

⁸⁴ BECKER, NBD IV/5, 179–181, n. 51 (2 and 3).

⁸⁵ *Documents*, 7.

heard. The pope's conscience cannot afford to deprive himself, Italy, Rome, the Apostolic See and his direct subjects of the reserves in favour of defending others living far away.⁸⁶

The other *discorso* is about the obligation for a generally interpreted papal aid that was to be given to Germany. Its curiosity is that it carries out an examination based on theology; its author might be the Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace or the personal theologian of the pope, or somebody else from the *assessors*, consultants of the Holy Office.⁸⁷ Its genesis is rooted in Pázmány's utterance that a theological viewpoint would make the pope give his assistance according to "the demands of love and paternal providence".⁸⁸ The memoir could be the work of one person based on the facts of the content. He states at the beginning that the pope did not hurt Germany in practice, since he did not encourage the enemy's attack. He lists several examples from the Bible to prove that the pope was not negligent, either, since he performed his duty as a supreme priest and pastor: he held prayer sessions in the Lateran or in

⁸⁶ *Documents*, 8.

⁸⁷ Nicolaus Riccardi O.P. from Genoa was the *maestro del Palazzo Apostolico* in 1629–1639; while Agostino Oreggi (who was a cardinal from 1633 and became known by the Galilei-trial) was the pope's almoner and personal theologian. WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 170 and 199 (*ibid.* with the names of the other inquisitional officials and experts that could come up).

⁸⁸ "*Quod si attingi possunt, deficiantque alii modi, quibus presenti necessitati, quantum satis est, succurratur, crediderim theologos existimatuos, quod charitas ac paternae providentiae iura ad id obligant, ut attingantur*". Azzolini never mentions this argument; it only occurs in Pázmány's notes. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 262–265, n. 726, 264.

the *Santa Maria Maggiore*, he granted indulgences and opened the Church's treasury of grace for helping those in trouble. The aid that he could give would be given from the papal tithes: 12,000 talers from the newly imposed Italian tithes and ordered the Iberian collectors to collect 60,000 golden for the Spanish monarch. According to the memoir, the interim incomes⁸⁹ are for the living expenses of the pope and his ministers and cannot be given to secular monarchs who are laymen. Moreover, relying on several decrees of universal councils the clergy cannot be obliged to pay taxes for a secular power. The calling for a crusade would neither be advisable, since the movement of Luther was also triggered by the "alms given to gain indulgences" – as one can read this unique Roman interpretation of the cause of Luther's reformation from the 17th century. The pronouncement of a crusade with privileges of indulgences, etc. in the Low Countries would only deepen the conflict – stated the theological expert opinion.⁹⁰

In the preparatory material of Azzolini given to the pope before the audience of 24, the question of the league is barely mentioned. It happened because the secretary of state had earlier expressed his opinion about the plan drafted by Pázmány on 6 April and he had already reported his critical views (whose main elements occurred during the oral negotiations) to Urban VIII.⁹¹

⁸⁹ On the papal tithe, interim incomes and on the various church incomes of the papacy with further literature: TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 119ff.

⁹⁰ *Documents*, 9.

⁹¹ *Documents*, 6.

c) The negotiation with Azzolini on 10 May

The examination of the unpublished documents of Péter Pázmány's embassy mainly enriches the results of the research as it has been discussed above. It should be added to our examination that although the Hungarian cardinal was completely aware of the direction and nature of the curial politics, he hoped that he could achieve a significant result up until the end of his embassy:

"I have not completely abandoned the hope that His Holiness will listen to new advice; however, I do not expect such a determination that the case would require. I see that the Spanish force is observed with distrust here and a huge amount of hope is dedicated to the French monarch. Therefore, everything indicates that I should believe: apart from certain pseudo-actions nothing can be hoped here. It will turn out within a couple of weeks. (If I reckon that my staying is useless) I will set off at around the Pentecost [30 May, 1632], unless something happens that justifies my staying. Namely, it is my firm intention that I will not give up my case while there is the slightest hope to achieve my goals" – he wrote to Ferdinand II from Rome on 8 May, 1632.⁹²

Pázmány maintained his fundamental idea – namely that he would stay in Rome while there is the faintest hope – for three more weeks, despite the fact that he had another fruitless debate with Azzolini, who visited him by the order of the pope, two days later, on 10 May. The desperate letter of the Hungarian cardinal written to Francesco Barberini on 7 May was the antecedent of the secretary of state's visit. In this letter, after having described the latest imperial events Pázmány almost

⁹² HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 740, 295–296.

begged that the pope “should not abandon the almost sunk ship of the Catholics in the North”.⁹³

Besides Azzolini,⁹⁴ their previous lengthy negotiation was also reported almost point-by-point by Pázmány in his summarising report, which was similar in content.⁹⁵ The negotiation was almost like that of a dialogue of the deaf, both parties kept reiterating their already known arguments. The source value of the verbal of the secretary of state from 10 May could be concluded like that.

The primate of Hungary addressed the need of the German aid again on the consistory of 15 May, as a reply for which the pope – “*longissimo discursu*” – again detailed the difficult situation of the Apostolic Chamber.⁹⁶ However, the answer of the pope on their last audience of 26 May (“he will do his utmost to help the struggling Germany, he will negotiate with his officials and will give a definite answer”) put new hope into the Hungarian prelate. Well, the definite answer was nothing else but the written form of the papal answer given orally on 24 April; it was handed over during the unexpected visit of the secretary of state two days later, on 28 May. The document

⁹³ “*Quae cum ita sint, Caesareae maiestatis nomine, rursus ad sanctitatem suam recurro ac instantissime rogo: ne navem catholicam in Septemtrione pene mersam deserat...*”. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, n. 739, 293–294. See Barberini’s letters to Pázmány from the time, *Documents, Appendix*, II, 2–3.

⁹⁴ *Documents*, 13.

⁹⁵ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 755, 326–328.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 328.

was immediately forwarded to Vienna by Pázmány.⁹⁷ In his letter he openly expressed his anger for the first time: “*Scriptum involutum, irresolutum, ambiguum, verbis tantum copiosum, cum admiratione legi*” – he wrote. There is no need to translate his lines, such as his indignant adjectives concerning the ambiguity and wordiness, etc. of the given document.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ On this copy, namely it was published on the basis of the text given to Pázmány on 28 May: MEDNYÁNSZKY, *Petri Pázmány... Legatio Romana*, 96–99, n. 39: “*Provocatum relationis septimae sub C. Die 28a Maii per dominum Azollinum data ultima responsio*.” It is not clear from the publication and the content of the document that it is not the answer of Azzolini but of the pope and this text was read out on 24 April. This was not realised even by FRAKNÓI, though, he knew the speech and its title, since he published the Hungarian translation of its couple of paragraphs. However, he does not mention the publication of MEDNYÁNSZKY here, he only cites the Roman copy (“The original copy of the document written in the office of the secretary of state is in the roman archive of the Barberinis”). FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 33–34. Later, certain parts of the papal answer are linked to the audience on 26 May by FRAKNÓI. The document delivered by Azzolini on 28 May is believed as such a “bulky paper”, “which repeated the pope’s official statements at length”. Cf. FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 40–41, note 3.; FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány Péter*, 231–232. In fact, the text of the papal oral answer of 24 April is in question (this was not realised by HANUY, either cf. *op.cit.* II, 311), which was slightly altered based on the oral remarks of Urban VIII (see *Documents*, 10.a at the notes of textual criticism). – While Pázmány was only handed over the written text of the papal answer one month later, it was sent to the nunciature of Vienna already on 24 April. See *Chapter II/3/a* and cf. *Chapter I*, note 108 (the text quoted there is similar than that of the content of the document referred to in *Chapter I*, note 138). It was also forwarded to Grimaldi, who noted its arrival on 14 May. BECKER, NBD IV/5, 257.

⁹⁸ See the next footnote.

The decision making of the Holy See masterly employed the pre-modern techniques of the diplomatic negotiations. The delivery of the answer that had been read out one month earlier and the confirmation of the already decided aid in written form, moreover the commission of Grimaldi, extraordinary nuncio to announce the exact sum and its payment were the professional culmination of the *inganno politico*. It meant the perfect public annulment of Pázmány's diplomatic commission, while Urban VIII kept being completely "safe"; he had already pronounced at the end of April that he would grant significant aid, even if not the requested amount. On 28 May, it became immediately clear to the Hungarian cardinal, and he straightaway wanted to ensure that the extraordinary nuncio would not be heard in Vienna until his return; yet this request fell on deaf ears.⁹⁹ However, at the expense of future tithes, Urban VIII granted significant aid as the result of the Hungarian primate's persistent conduct in a way that he cleverly evaded him. The manoeuvring of the papal politics was made even more conspicuous when the proclamation person-

⁹⁹ "*Ex hoc scripto constabit maiestati vestrae, quid novus nuncius acturus sit. O quam bene fieret, si audientia illius tantisper differretur, donec ego praesens essem...*". Pázmány to Ferdinand II, Rome, 29 May, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II. n. 753, p. 313. – The reception of Grimaldi was pleasant in Vienna at the beginning; he was clever in his politics, though, his commission proved to be a total failure. Not only Pázmány, he was not either able to arrange the tense French–Habsburg relations, neither the question of Pinerolo's (and Metz, Toul, Verdun) annexation. In January, 1634 he left his position without a certain instruction concerning this matter and returned to Rome. FILIPPO CRUCITTI, *Grimaldi, Girolamo*, DBI LIX, Roma 2002, *ord. alph.*

ally drafted by Pázmány was accepted without any question, while at the same time they showed a completely changed attitude towards the artificial dilemma of the title of a legate – that was covered in Pázmány's writing.¹⁰⁰

4. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

The aim of our historical research was to highlight the details of Péter Pázmány's imperial embassy in Rome. In this chapter we relied mainly on – until now – unpublished documents of the Secretariat of State: verbals of the audience, negotiations, and the documents of the experts. We aimed at continuing the modern analysis and complementing the objective and clear view that BECKER created based on the correspondence of the Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna

¹⁰⁰ “*Hucusque sua sanctitas clementer et benigne audivit omnia quae Caesaris maiestatis suae nomine per me proposita sunt, neque intendit unquam quo minus negotia Caesaris per me eodem modo pari auctoritate et privilegiis repraesentarentur, quibus sancti sunt vel praeteritis temporibus S. R. E. cardinales ad tractanda negotia principum, vel etiam de praesenti fungitur cardinalis Borgia.*” BAV Barb. Lat., vol. lat., vol. 2629, fol. 105r. The copy sent to Vienna published by: MEDNYÁNSZKY, *Petri Pázmány... Legatio Romana*, 95–96, n. 38: “*Provocatum relationis septimae sub B. 25^a Maii, 1632*”. – See also Pázmány's lengthy report – cited also in the previous note – to Ferdinand II, Rome, 29 May, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, n. 753, 311–312. He informs that he succeeded in having his title as an envoy accepted through negotiations, he is sending the papal statement in his drafting and notifies that the solution was accepted by Savelli as well as by Borgia, therefore he renounced the ceremonial protest.

by redeeming an old debt and expectation of international historiography.

The most important result is that while analysing and reading the sources published in this volume the historical atmosphere itself appears. The papal audiences of the Hungarian cardinal and the negotiations with Azzolini can be experienced almost in real time, even now, 400-year-historical later. The key words of our analysis are: loyalty and pretence, sub-observations, corrections of the history of diplomacy and curial decision-making. Let us conclude and further consider what we have reached while evoking the past.

1. *The breach of the papal secret (Change in the loyalty towards Urban VIII)*. The co-paper attached to the study of BECKER differs from the content of *Chapter I* only in two points. One of the corrections is the following: after correcting the faulty dating of the cardinal's documents' publication at the beginning of the 20th century one can establish that Péter Pázmány finally shared the details of the papal audience of 6 April with the imperial Secret Council, which he was also a member of, despite Urban VIII's canonical ban and Pázmány's former vow. The primate of Hungary had to choose between his loyalty as a cardinal and as a member of the Secret Council. The choice was made after a long inner and external struggle only at the very end of his embassy in Rome, in the second half of May 1632.¹⁰¹ From this time on the archbishop of Esztergom became

¹⁰¹ See his already quoted letters sent to Ferdinand II (15, 22 and especially 29 May): HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 304–305, n. 750; 305–306, n. 751; 311–313, n. 753.

the rigorous enemy of the Barberini-House, one of the “buzards” of the court of Vienna in the Italian and papal policy. Not only did the Barberinis regard him as an enemy, but the feeling was mutual.¹⁰²

His numerous supplications dated on 9 August, 1632 were the first proof of his new political attitude. In his own words, he was completely focusing on the justice of the emperor and the interests of the House of Austria in them (“*mea enim sententia eiusmodi sunt omnia, quae imperialem iustitiam ac emolumenta Domus Austriacae concernunt*”).¹⁰³ He urged a joint action in Rome with the Spanish monarch, since the pope was willing to welcome Borgia only as a cardinal and not as an envoy; while Cardinal Louis de Nogaret de la Valette was not banned from negotiating with the Protestant Dutchmen – which violated the Catholic case – as the envoy of Louis XIII, moreover, he did that while in disguise. The Hungarian cardinal explained Urban VIII’s behavior – and perhaps indirectly the adversities

¹⁰² See the requests of Pázmány on 9 August, 1632, which will be referred to in the further notes (103ff.); and TUSOR, *Diss.*, 2000, 166–225 (IV: *A konfliktusok korszaka. A trienti program episzkopalista interpretációja Magyarországon*); ID., *Az 1639. évi nagyszombati püspökkari konferencia. (A magyar klérus és a római Kúria kapcsolatainak válsága és reformja)*, *Századok* 134 (2000) 431–459; ID., TUSOR, *Le origini*, 205–226; ID., *Episcopal Crisis in the Hungarian Episcopate (1639), Il papato e le chiese locali. Studi – The Papacy and the local Churches. Studies* (Studi di Storia delle Istituzioni Ecclesiastiche 4), ed. by Péter Tusor–Matteo Sanfilippo, Viterbo 2014, 147–166; and FRANKÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 47ff.

¹⁰³ His letter to Ferdinand II, Vágsellye, 9 August, 1637. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, 339, n. 766.

of his own mission¹⁰⁴ – with the condemnation of Taddeo Barberini's Roman prefecture, and believed that the defence of the imperial dignity required an answer.¹⁰⁵ He recommended Hermann Questenberg, who was not of Italian origin, for the place of Savelli who died in the meantime. The reason why he opposed the commission of the Italians was not recorded. He must have seen that their family background and Italian interests hugely limited the effectiveness of their imperial representation of interests. He suggested Cornelius Heinrich Motmann, the Rota-auditor from the Empire, as the temporary imperial agent.¹⁰⁶ He exchanged a cipher key with him, which indicated that he left Rome with the intention of actively practicing opposing policy; moreover Motmann was chosen as the new Roman agent instead of Camillo Cattaneo.¹⁰⁷ He also

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *Chapter I*, note 38–44. The question did not occur either during the negotiations with Azzolini.

¹⁰⁵ “*Cur istae difficultates moveantur post motam de praefecto Urbis quaestionem, facile coniciet. Nescio, an Austriaca Domus salva officio dissimulare ista possit.*” HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, 340, n. 767. (De La Valette [† 1639], who was a deacon-cardinal from 1621, functioned as a general in reality.) – On the problem of the prefecture (apart from the references in *Chapter I*): KÖCHLI, *Urban VIII. und die Barberini*, 137–140 and 293–304.

¹⁰⁶ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, 341–342, n. 768.

¹⁰⁷ TUSOR, *Un «residente d'Ungheria» a Roma nel Seicento*, 8–21; ID., *Pázmány bíboros olasz rejtjelkulcsa. C.H. Motmann „Residente d'Ungheria”. (A római magyar agenzia történetéhez)*, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 116 (2003) 535–581. – Pázmány may have chosen wrongly, since Motmann was likely to have been a “double agent”. His remarkable allowances granted by the pope: ASV Segreteria dei Brevi, Registra, vol. 966, fol. 271r–272v and 485rv; vol. 969, fol. 469rv. One cannot see the name of other Rota-auditors here. Cf. TUSOR, *Magyarország és Róma*, 81.

asked the emperor and the monarch's support of Innocenzo Massimi, the bishop of Catania, who was relegated from the Eternal City expressly due to his services for the House of Austria.¹⁰⁸ Yet, it should be noted that the confrontation with the domineering papal policy did not immediately mean that he was against Rome. With his supplications he simultaneously ordered every ordinary of his primatial province to introduce the Roman rite.¹⁰⁹ (Despite its intensity, the anticurialism was characteristic in the Hungarian episcopacy only gradually and temporarily. Though, it played a significant role in the long-term strengthening of the Habsburg–Hungarian state church system.)¹¹⁰

2. *Pázmány's role in obtaining aid.* It is correct to analyse the papal aid-policy from the Barberini-policy's point of view and the question of Taddeo Barberini's Roman prefecture that he "inherited" from the Della Roveres of Urbino in 1631 is also taken into account in relation to the aid delivered by Nuncio Grimaldi, as ROTRAUD BECKER did so. What is more, the case occurs in the correspondence of the Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna over and over again, even during Gaspare Mattei's office (1639–1644). However, the relating refer-

¹⁰⁸ HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 343, n. 770. Besides, he reported Carlo Pio di Savoia's request of property to the monarch. *Ibid.*, 342, n. 769. – It might be useless to note that this is also a proof of the active connection with the Roman Habsburg-party.

¹⁰⁹ Vágsellye, 14 August, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, 344, n. 771.

¹¹⁰ See the cited literature in footnote 107.

ence of the Secretariat of State does not say that the aid was given in the hopes of obtaining the title of prefect, but – by complementing Pázmány's angry row of statements in Ancona – it remarks that as the pope gave assistance as far as it was possible, Vienna could hardly refer to its denial by the refusal of the title of prefect's confirmation:

"They also report [from Ancona] him [Pázmány] to say that he was commissioned by Vienna to recompense the case of the prefecture if this question had occurred during his negotiations that we followed carefully as we had already reported; however, we did not hear anything from him concerning the prefecture, yet, His Holiness still gave the aid that he could provide. Therefore, His Majesty the Emperor should not hesitate to make amends for the title of the prefect."¹¹¹

¹¹¹ "*Avvisano ancora che egli habbia detto di havere tenuto ordine di dare delle sodisfazioni in materia della prefettura, se bavesse potuto attaccare i detti suoi trattati, i quali nondimeno non sono stati da noi sfuggiti, sì come ho di sopra accennato, et egli in materia di tener ordine circa la prefettura non si è lasciato intender niente, oltreché S. B. ha dato e dà quelli sussidii, che può. Onde non per questo si deve restare da S. M. C. da dare giuste sodisfazioni intorno alla prefettura.*" Published: BECKER, NBD IV/5, 299–300, n. 82.2. (This paragraph is omitted in our publication: TUSOR, *Le origini*, 223–224, n. 1.) Cf. *Chapter I*, footnote 155 – The information from Ancona might have been well-designed *fake news*. The question of the prefecture is neither mentioned in the instruction of Pázmány (see later in footnote 133), nor in the letters (published and unpublished) written by and to him. His travel to Rome was first mentioned in the middle of January, 1632; he did not visit Vienna until his departure, therefore he could not get oral instruction. (For conveying the order of such relevance a messenger could not have practically been used.) There is only one counter-argument, the hint of Pázmány at the success of his commission during his visit at Francesco Barberini on Good Friday, namely "it would be decent to think of the House of Barberini and leave it in good state" ("*Uscì poi a insinuarmi, che convien pensare alla Casa Nostra e*

However, from the verbals of the negotiations with Secretary of State Azzolini, it is clear that Pázmány himself suggested and requested many times that they should grant financial aid sooner, in one lump sum, from the instalments of the Italian tithes. The grant was already mentioned on the audience of 24 April orally and was confirmed in writing on 28 May. The sum was precisely defined in Rome on 5 June, 1632,¹¹²

lasticarla in buono stato). In view of the Barberini pope's avid nepotism well-known by his contemporaries and the posterity, this utterance might have been the biggest mistake made during Pázmány's commission. However, the hint was sonorously objected by the cardinal nephew and he himself (and Azzolini who drafted the record) did not correlate it with the question of the prefecture. Barberini to Rocci, Rome, 10 April, 1632, BECKER, NBD IV/5, 222–228, n. 64.1 (228, point 6), already described by FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 20. On the various family strategy of the Barberinis and their fabulous incomes: TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 146–151; latest: KÖCHLI, *Urban VIII. und die Barberini*, 163–226 and 395–436. – Pázmány's enthusiastic congratulation to Taddeo Barberini on the occasion of his appointment might have been the basis of the Roman expectations towards the Hungarian cardinal (Nagyszombat, 26 June, 1631). HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 193–194, n. 669.

¹¹² "Being prompted by the paternal providence of His Holiness, he does more than it is possible and despite the dire circumstances of the Apostolic Chamber he found a way to collect 110–150 thousand talers... Tonight I am sending a treasury-bill of 60 thousand talers to Your Signor, the next courier is bringing the rest. Apart from his paternal care towards the Emperor and the Cath. religion, such effort of His Holiness was greatly influenced by Cardinal Pázmány's zealous endeavours." FRAKNÓI, *Pázmány... és kora*, III, 44. (Barberini to Rocci, Rome, 5 June, 1632. Latest published: BECKER, NBD IV/5, 294–295, n. 80.2. Cf. *Chapter I*, footnote 155. (Finally 130,000 talers were sent.)

after the archbishop of Esztergom had demonstratively set off, which was hardly accidental.¹¹³ This is our second correction.

3. *The techniques of the political pretence.* The important result of our verbal-analysis is that we could learn that, although being in a more disadvantageous tactical situation, the Hungarian prelate – who was actually choleric – also masterly employed the tools of diplomatic pretence like that of the curial prelates. However, it should be noted that the tone and content of his reports written to Vienna and of his negotiations only differed a couple of weeks later; on the other hand it can be detected in the correspondence of the Secretariat of State right from the beginning. The timing of his setting off – namely that he had left only a couple of days earlier than the end of the ceremonial series of his creation as a cardinal, which came during the announced consistory, in which a titular church would have been assigned to him and the *anulus cardinalitiae* would have been granted to him – was a masterful step and was almost equal

¹¹³ The demonstrative nature of the timing of his departure was already noted by VILMOS FRANKÓI (l.c.). As a counter-move, later Francesco Barberini used his departure as an argument why the archbishop of Esztergom did not get a place in a Roman congregation as opposed to Harrach, for instance. He claimed that his *presbyter* cardinal title (*San Girolamo*) was given only through a breve, not in the consistory. In more details, see TUSOR, *Diss.*, 2000, 171, footnote 788. Even his cardinal ring had to be sent after him from Rome, he also received it *per breve*. HANUY, *op. cit.*, II, 337–338, n. 764. – As a consequence of the title's granting in 1632, the earliest issuing of the HANUY, *op. cit.*, II, 32–33, n. 539 (Pozsony, 20 June, 1629.) document's copy is June 1632. He used his Roman title for the first time in a decree in Buccari on 23 June, 1632. *Ibid.*, 329–330, n. 757.

to a formal protest. At the same time it was a proper answer for the Curia's "*artificia*" concerning the forms of the official papal answer. Furthermore, we succeeded in clarifying that the text read on the audience of 24 April is identical to the document handed over to the archbishop of Esztergom on 28 May, which was criticised by Pázmány in a simple-mannered way.

4. *Pázmány's opinion of his cardinalate.* The way the archbishop of Esztergom thought of his red hat is closely related here. For the Hungarian as well as international historiography, the *purpura* is a crucial element of Pázmány's historical identity. However, apparently he did not attribute much significance to his title, which offers an insight into his personality and his monastic soul.¹¹⁴ Obviously, it was a part of his atti-

¹¹⁴ He valued his office of the primate of Hungary and as such his title of "*legatus natus* of the Apostolic See" more. TUSOR, *Diss.*, 2000, footnote 171, 788 and above, footnote 153. – Since (again as against Harrach) he did not get any papal pension, Italian benefice, etc. his position as a cardinal, indeed, proved to be financially in the red. After his death, the nunciature of Vienna carefully checked whether the cardinal had paid the duty for his ring to the *Propaganda Fide* for the support of the world missions as Gregory XV ordered. (See the relating correspondence of Nuncio Malatesta Baglioni and the Secretariat of State, BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6985, fol. 111r. 141r. 151r.) As a cardinal he also had to renovate his title-church, whose costs we do not know. The restored *San Girolamo* was consecrated by János Tomkó, the bishop of Bosnia on 8 October, 1634. (Library of the Eötvös Loránd University, Manuscript Collection, Collectio Prayana, tom. 32, n. 78.) He had further duties as a cardinal, namely – according to the tradition confirmed in a bull – from his bequest he had to give in-all 125 chamber gold to the secretary, cleric, accountant and ceremonialists of the consistory ("*ministri aliquot huius Palatii, quales sunt ceremoniarii, secretarius, clericus et computista*

tude, with which he wanted to emphasise that he did not regard himself as a Barberini-creature.

5. *The function of the Secretariat of State; Azzolini's role.* It is important for the result of the research that the *Congregazione dello Stato*¹⁵ occurs in the files; moreover, one can study the daily routine of the papal decision making and the preparatory work of the papal Secretariat of State. For instance, how thoroughly they endeavoured to prepare Urban VIII for the audience of 24 April. However, despite the rich documentation that is supplementary to *Oral History* one can hardly see clearly to what extent the outstanding canonist secretary of state (who was a known, though mediocre, poet) was involved in the decision making concerning papal foreign policy apart from his professional pre-

consistorii, secundum iura et privilegia sua antiqua"). On their request, Muzio Vitelleschi, Jesuit general, tried to gain it through György Forró, the rector of Nagyszombat, from the executors of Pázmány's testament. (Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Austr., 5 I, p. 263. 309. 343; National Széchényi Library, Manuscript Collection, Fond 366, Ms. 364, fol. 212. 220. 224; National Archives of Hungary, National Archives, Archives of the Hungarian Chamber, Acta Iesuitica [E 152], Collegium Tyrnaviense, Registra, fasc. 21, n. 10 [103. cs., 39. fol.]).

¹⁵ The Congregation of State appears in another place in the story. According to Pázmány's post-report, Urban VIII mentioned on the audience of 24 April that his oral answer is concordant with the viewpoint of the cardinals debated in the case: "*Sanctitas sua ad tria puncta, nomine maiestatis vestrae a me proposita, et ad iteratam instantiam meam, ante octiduum, responsum ex scripto legit: addendo, banc esse concordem cardinalium deputatorum sententiam*". His letter to Ferdinand II, Rome, 1 May, 1632. HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 286–287, n. 736.

paratory and executive role. It is obvious – from his confident argumentation – that he had great influence on the decision making; however, one cannot estimate its extent. Yet, on the basis of his discussions with the Hungarian cardinal it seems that he was the one who defined the direction of the Roman foreign policy. His obviously strengthening position in the Curia implies this: in August 1632 he was removed from his bishopric see of Ripastrone in March to the nearby Narni; his creation to a cardinal in November was hindered by his sudden and quick death.¹¹⁶ Namely, he was not just sent as a buffer to the envoy of Ferdinand II but to act as a competent person to negotiate with.

It is likely that Azzolini ordered Pázmány's monitoring in the Eternal City; yet it is certain that the reports were sent to him. For instance, the report on the archbishop of Esztergom's opinion – that he felt it unnecessary to send an extraordinary nuncio to the emperor, yet in his view one could be sent since an advantageous report had already been sent to Vienna about

¹¹⁶ See the literature in footnote 92 in *Chapter I*. Due to his actual role, he can be considered as the *predecessor* of the cardinal secretaries of state of the late 17th and 18–20th century. Even as Dezio Azzolini (secretary of state 1667–1669) who was created cardinal in 1654 at the age of only 31 for compensation for his cancelled appointment (*restituzione del capello*) and was better known due to his relation with Christina, the Queen of Sweden. He was a central Roman figure of the second half of the 17th century. Lorenzo Azzolini was the representative of a typical curial family career, since his uncle, sn. Dezio Azzolini was the personal secretary of Sixtus V, and then a cardinal from 1585 († 1587, at the age of 38 only). With further literature: TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 155–158, 199–200ff., (especially 207) and 285.

his traits – survived in his own handwriting.¹¹⁷ It is not clear whether Azzolini's sources meant the same as what the Hungarian cardinal had said. If so, it is another proof of Pázmány's pretence. The report – whose source is unknown – could have confused the secretary of state, since its content was not exactly the same as that which the Hungarian cardinal had personally told him as well as to Grimaldi. Pázmány had also expressed his opinion and warned him not to expect a warm welcome in Vienna if he brought such news that was not shared with Pázmány in Rome. However, according to the diplomatic answer of Grimaldi – that he gave to Azzolini while resigning his position as governor – he had no special commissions and he would always show in the imperial court what Pázmány had achieved in Rome. This answer survived in Azzolini's handwriting.¹¹⁸

In Azzolini's notes on intelligence, the members of the diplomatic bench also occur. The envoy of Tuscany, Marques Francesco Niccolini, confidentially informed the secretary of state in his residence on 9 May that he visited him in such a late hour, because he had to speak with Borgia first. Namely, the Spanish cardinal and Pázmány had sent their secretaries to him during the previous evening and requested not to negotiate

¹¹⁷ *“Che non li pareva necessaria l'andata del nunzio all'Imp.re, perché è quanto etc. – Che nondimeno andasse allegramente perché là si saria fatto conto delle sue qualità.”* BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 142r.

¹¹⁸ *“S.r Card. Pasman al Governatore. Che li parebbe strano s'egli portasse all'Imp.re le risposte delle dimande fatte da esso Card.le. Ma soggiunse che nondimeno egli non dice che non harebbe caro che fusse portata da lui qualche cosa di buono, etiam che non si comunicasse a S. Em. Rispose il Governatore, che non haveva speciali commissioni, ma sempre faria apparer ch'il seguito fusse causato dalli uffitii, et efficacia di S. Em.za etc.”* BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 141v.

about the alliance of the Italian dukes until Pázmány had finished his own negotiations. In this way, they would not obstruct each other's policy.¹¹⁹

6. *Instead of "Borgia-crisis", "Borgia-Pázmány-crisis".* The report of Tuscany's envoy called attention to the Hungarian primate's conduct in Rome exceeded the relations of the emperor and the pope by far, and functioned on the highest level of European diplomacy. Not only did he secretly negotiate with Borgia,¹²⁰ but the Spanish and the Austrian-Habsburg envoy mutually acted in front of the Roman diplomacy. They were diplomats: Borgia (also during his protest of 8 March) as well as Pázmány followed the given instructions according to the best of their knowledge. In contrast to the Hungarian cardinal's proposal introduced to Ferdinand II earlier – by staying true to the instructions of the monarch and emperor – even during his negotiations with the secretary of state he did not mention the plan of an international league against the Ottomans to stop the division of Christianity within the framework of an enterprise to free Hungary. It is known that Innocent XI succeeded in doing so. The Ottomans are mentioned

¹¹⁹ "S.r. Amb.r di Toscana. In camera mia. Domenica 9 Maggio 1632. Che egli ha tardato a rispondermi dopo che parlò al S.r Card.le Borgia, perché la sera il detto S.r Card. e Pasman mandarono da lui i lor segretarii a pregarlo, che non trattasse del negotio dell'unione de Prencipi d'Italia fin che Pasman non finiva il suo, acciò uno non impedisse l'altro. E che fin hora non li è stata resa la facoltà di trattare etc." BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 142r. (Besides, he speaks about Borgia and the French.)

¹²⁰ See the related content of *Chapter I/3*.

only once, tangentially, in the verbals.¹²¹ It is characteristic of his professional relationship with Borgia, and proves their substantive exchange of information, that Pázmány was well aware of the actualities of the Spanish envoy's negotiations in Paris. He confidently averted the excuses of Urban VIII and Azzolini – who blamed Don Gonzalo for stalling the negotiations with the French – with the argumentation that Gonzalo had had no authority to discuss every question (neither was he authorised by the emperor).¹²²

The Spanish diplomacy had been following the work of the archbishop of Esztergom for ages. Due to his role in Ferdinand III's election and coronation to Hungarian king in 1625 he was granted an annuity and they reckoned with his Roman conduct not only in 1632, but also in previous years, already after

¹²¹ See *Documents*, 3 (fol. 111r). – In his rescript of 13 February, 1632, Ferdinand II expressly denied Pázmány's proposal concerning an anti-Ottoman international alliance ("*Meditatio foederis tam amplius quam literis suis deformat pertractandī*") as being a delicate question (*res ardua*) by mainly referring to the content of the valid Treaty of Szőny of 1627. Published: MEDNYÁNSZKY, *Petri Pázmány... Legatio Romana*, 24–26, n. 16. Pázmány's proposals written down in Pozsony on 10 February, 1632: HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 245–246, n. 712. Cf. BALANYI GYÖRGY, *Pázmány Péter népszövetségi tervezete*, *Katholikus Szemle* 47 (1933) 256–268; MÜLLER LÁSZLÓ–GÁNGÓ GÁBOR, *Előterjesztette-e Pázmány törökellenes tervezetét Rómában?*, *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 96 (1992) 324–325. The comforting solution to the question became possible only now in view of Azzolini's verbals of the negotiations.

¹²² Knowing the slowness of the communication with Vienna, he must have received the information from the Spanish cardinal.

his appointment as a cardinal in 1629.¹²³ After being created a cardinal, Pázmány also reached out to the Roman *fazione Spagnuola* that is referred to in his letter – more than politely – written to Filippo Colonna, the *gran contestabile*.¹²⁴ His hint given to Azzolini on 12 April, namely that he would move to Rome for several years to serve the Church, shows that the plan of his permanent Roman imperial embassy and his cardinal protectorate did not occur during his mission in 1632, as it has been believed, but on the contrary: his commission was the first (and last) episode of a long-established plan of a Roman diplomatic role!

Pázmány was interested in European politics in another sense, as well. He possessed the texts of many important international treaties¹²⁵ and he found it necessary to share his opinion with Ciriaco Rocci about his commission at the latter's arrival to the imperial assembly of Regensburg (*"de munere legationis... iudicium"*) in 1630.¹²⁶ As the primate of the emperor's

¹²³ Cf. MARTÍ TIBOR–MONOSTORI TIBOR–TUSOR PÉTER, *Pázmány Péter kiadatlan követi instrukciója (1632. február 14.)*, Új Magyar Sion 7 (49) (2013) n. 1., 139–147, 138–139.

¹²⁴ "...e la prego assicurarsi della mia osservanza e paratissima disposizione di servir a lei et alla sua eccellentissima casa, tanto benemerita dell'augustissima d'Austria, e lo mostrare con effetti in tutte l'occasioni, che mi vorrà offerire, come più a pieno l'intenderà dal signor abbate Cattaneo esibitore di questa, a cui rimettendomi..." Biblioteca Statale Santa Scolastica, Subiaco, Arch. Colonna, Carteggio Filippo, busta 1629 [ord. cron.]. Nagyszombat, 21 December, 1629. Published: TUSOR, *Pázmány állandó római követségének terve*, 173, n. 1.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Documents*, 13, (fol. 141r).

¹²⁶ The answer of Rocci, in which Pázmány is denoted by "*Regio-Caesareae Maiestatis rebus addictissimam*", is published: MILLER DE BRASSÓ, *Epis-*

most prestigious kingdom and as one of the political leaders of his country – along with the palatine – Pázmány was also presented the breves of recommendation, which were a part of the accreditation, by the nuncios arriving in Vienna.¹²⁷

The Hungarian primate naturally kept in touch with Borghia later as well, who intervened for the sake of Pázmány's cancelled Spanish annuities' payments.¹²⁸ In the future, their fate met again in relation to the plan of a so-called bull of residence

tolae... S.R.E. Cardinalis, Archiepiscopi et Hungariae Primatis Petri Pázmány, 55–56, n. 150. By obviously misreading Ciriaco, MILLER uses the name of “Cardinal Carretto” as the author of the answering letter. However, there was not a legate called Carretto on the diet of Regensburg and there is no knowledge of a Cardinal Carretto at the time. Ciriaco Rocci was the cardinal legate of the diet of Regensburg. There is another correction; as Rocci first arrived in Regensburg at the end of July – as it was indicated by ROTRAUD BECKER –, where he continuously stayed from 13 August, the dating is likely to be 28 July, 1630 and not the one MILLER noted, 28 June.

¹²⁷ Before and after his appointment as cardinal. Pallotto's recommendation to Pázmány (extraordinary nuncio: 15 April, 1628, ordinary nuncio: 18 September); Rocci (28 April, 1630); Malatesta Baglioni (7 July, 1634). The original papal breves: Archivum Primatiale (AP), Archivum Ecclesiasticum Vetus (AEV), n. 149/1–4.

¹²⁸ “*La carta que escrivi a su Mayestad en tiempo que vuestra eminenzia se hallava en esta corte, sobre la paga de lo corrido de la pension de que hizo ... al vuestra eminenzia en los gastos de la amabsiada de Almanga. He tenido la respuesta-cuya copia es la inlussa y a unque me pususa do que los ministros de su Mayestad en Viena habran hecho en tender a vostra eminenzia.*” His letter to Pázmány, Rome, 11 September, 1632. AP AEV n. 169. See also his letter of 6 November, 1632 (ibid). On the function of the Roman Spanish party and the techniques of its management from Madrid in the first half of the 1630s: VISCEGLIA, *Fazioni e lotta politica nel Sacro Colleggio*, 53–63.

in 1634, which was discussed first at the beginning of February 1634 in connection with Pázmány's return and which later led to Borgia's removal from Rome.¹²⁹ The similarity of their political views and diplomatic role is certainly proven by a memoir which must have been written by the Spanish cardinal, though, it survived and was published under Pázmány's name.¹³⁰ Therefore, one should not only deal

¹²⁹ TUSOR, *Le origini*, 216 and 226.

¹³⁰ "Vienna (?), 24 August, 1629" "*Carta que el Cardenal Pazman lescrivio al cardenal Barberino*". HANUY, *op.cit.*, II, 55–66, n. 554. There is only a short counter-argumentation here that Pázmány was the author of the lengthy political memoir written in Spanish and also published in Hungarian. Both the Spanish language and the style and rhetoric of the text are absolutely uncharacteristic of Pázmány. The initial suspicion of FERENC HANUY, who published the text, was grounded. Although, his analysis was not. On the document that survived in a copy Pázmány's name is falsely mentioned, moreover the date of 1629 is also wrong. It is unknown, however, why Pázmány's name (apart from the similar attitude) and the wrong date was written on the document, which must have been drafted after 10 June, 1630. Namely, Urban VIII allowed the cardinals to use the title of *Eminentissimus/Eminenza* that is mentioned in the document; earlier the addressing of the members of the Sacred College was the *Illustrissimus*. MARIO BOSI, *Quando ai Cardinali fu dato il titolo dei eminenza*, *Strenna dei Romanisti* 41 (1980) 107–114, 112. Francesco Barberini never visited Vienna, it is wrongly stated by HANUY; his legation to Paris in 1625 and his legation to Spain in 1626 are only known. LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 19–26; *Relacion verdadera del viaje, entrada, y recibimiento que la ciudad de Barcelona hizo a La buena venida del Señor Cardenal Legado, en 18 de março deste Año de 1626*, Madrid 1626; latest KÖCHLI, *Urban VIII. und die Barberini*, 250–256. The document was drafted in Rome ("*Di casa*") right after the visitation to the cardinal nephew. On the basis of the inner argumentations – that are correctly used by HANUY – it can completely be dismissed that it had been

with a “Borgia-crisis” – as the international secondary literature still does¹³¹ – but while evaluating the events of the spring of 1632, Borgia–Pázmány-crisis should be mentioned according to the historical reality.

7. *The unrealities of the Habsburg–papal league.* While the question of the success of the request for aid is complex and ambiguous – as we have seen – the Hungarian primate’s attempt to involve the pope in the league was a complete and clear failure. However, Urban VIII’s Francophile policy should not solely be blamed for this fiasco and should not only be analysed in the context of Rome and Vienna’s relations. The text that Pázmány brought to Rome was not only a plan, but the text of an alliance signed by Ferdinand II on 14 February, 1632 and assisted by Jacques Bruneau, the Spanish resident of Vienna.¹³² This, however, was unacceptable not only for the papal court but also for the court of Madrid due to its phrases on

written during the embassy of 1632 in Rome. Pázmány had been there only in 1614–1615 and did not return later. The argumentation of HANUY in II, 133–134, n. 614 is even more groundless, jr Antonio Barberini had no significant influence, he did not welcome foreign envoys, and his discussed legation was not international, but it was a certain domestic governorship of which he had three at the time: Bologna, Ravenna and Urbino. Cf. ALBERTO MEROLA, *Barberini, Antonio*, DBI VI, Roma 1964, *ord. alph.*

¹³¹ KÖCHLI, *Urban VIII. und die Barberini*, 282–293 (the title of the chapter is not “*Borgia-Krise 1632*”, but it should correctly be “*Borgia–Pázmány-Krise 1632*”).

¹³² Published: MEDNYÁNSZKY, *Petri Pázmány... Legatio Romana*, 42–47, n. 20. On the original handwritten copies in the volume of Barb. Lat. 2629 see the *Appendix* (I.). Cf. *Chapter I*, footnote 31.

the Low Countries. Its ratification was denied by the *Escorial*. Therefore, the archbishop of Esztergom had to represent such a program that hadn't been supported by the Spanish monarchy in its written form. The league between the Habsburgs was finally realized in 1634.¹³³ In Italy, the alliance did not stand a chance due to the subtle geopolitical relations even though the Italian states found that cooperation against the Swedish threat was necessary. As the envoy of Savoy, Ludovico San Martino expressed to Azzolini, who had visited him at his residence on 11 May, 1632 that the biggest difficulty of establishing an Italian defensive league was the involvement of the Spanish themselves, since the French did not want to

¹³³ The extra instruction given to Pázmány concerning the league (*Instructio specialis pro cardinale Pazmány, quid ratione novi foederis cum rege Hispaniarum iam initi apud suam sanctitatem negotiari debeat*), which was issued on the day of the signing of the treaty in Vienna on 14 February, 1632, latest published: MARTÍ-MONOSTORI-TUSOR, *Pázmány Péter kiadatlan követi instrukciója*, 145–147 (on the denial of the ratification of Madrid: 143–144). On the draft of Vienna (ÖStA HHStA Spanien, Kart. 22, Map. 422, fol. 1–4) quoted: NB IV/5, 226, note 17. His main instruction issued in Vienna on 5 February, 1632 was already published in the 19th century along with the text of the league: MEDNYÁNSZKY, *Petri Pázmány... Legatio Romana*, 29–39, n. 18 (*Instructio sive memoriale pro reverendissimo in Christo patre domino Petro S.R.E. presbytero cardinali Pazmany archiepiscopo Strigoniensi locique eiusdem comite perpetuo, primate regni Hungariae, legato nato, summo secretario, cancellario et consiliario nostro intimo, legato nostro extraordinario ad summum pontificem super iis, quae reverendissimam paternitatem suam nostro nomine apud suam sanctitatem agere ac negotiari cupimus*). As extra information, Pázmány received the text of the imperial order given to Paolo Savelli on 7 May, 1631, and to Federigo Savelli on 3 December, 1631 on the same topic. *Ibid.*, 39–42, n. 10; 26–29, n. 17.

join the Duke of Milan; furthermore, the Venetians did not want to listen to the representative of the emperor, since they would never join the league without the French.¹³⁴ The plan of a controlled Italian defensive league headed by the pope was being discussed from 1633 to 1635, which was followed by ardent Spanish and moderate French opposition.¹³⁵

8. *The preparation for a publicistic war?* The last and most sensational result of our research is not directly related to the sources of the Vatican, therefore it has not been mentioned yet. During the research, the documents of the Roman embassy – kept in Esztergom – that were quoted by FRANKÓI without references and that were neglected by FERENC HANUY (who published the Pázmány-documents) were also examined. The omission is a huge philological mistake, since the final, authentic text-versions of the most important documents of the commission can be found here. These documents were corrected by Pázmány himself in many places before they became

¹³⁴ “*Amb.r di Savoia. In casa sua Martedì XI Maggio 1632. Egli dice tal lega defensiva d’Italia contro lo Sueco esser necessaria e che bisogna farla a tempo, perché lo Sueco può venir facilmente etc. Che la difficoltà maggiore sarà il metterci Spagnuoli, perché Francia non vorrà che il Duca di Milano c’entri, e i Venetiani si come non han voluto udir il Rabatta per non lasciar Francia, così ne anche vorranno entrar in questa lega non entrandovi Franzesi.*” BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 143r. Ludovico San Martino, Marchese d’Agliè represented Savoy in the Eternal City in 1627–1637. Cf. BECKER, NBD IV/5, 5, note 19.

¹³⁵ PANELLA, *Una lega italiana*, 3–36 and 21–50.

fair copies.¹³⁶ After his Roman commission, he crossed out the addresses and cadences and added titles. Besides this, a fair copy was also made of the labelled text-versions¹³⁷ in the following order:

1. *Legationis ad Suam Sanctitatem puncta. Oratio ad Summum Ponteficem habita 6 Aprilis 1632*¹³⁸ – 2. *Oratio ad Suam Sanctitatem 24 Aprilis 1632*¹³⁹ – 3. *Scriptum Cardinali Barberini exhibitum 3 May 1632*¹⁴⁰ – 4. *Scriptum Cardinali Barberini exhibitum 8 May 1632*¹⁴¹ – 5. *Copia Scripti exhibiti Card.li Barberino circa Titulum Legati*¹⁴² – 6. *Scriptum Suae Sanctitati exhibitum, quod Cardinales possint essere Legati Regum*¹⁴³

¹³⁶ AP AEV n. 154/1–9. The document-facsimiles can be read online: http://institutumfraknoi.hu/repositorium/pazman_rome_1632.

¹³⁷ AP AEV n. 154/1. – It was published by HANUY (*Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II) that was mentioned in this volume many times.

¹³⁸ *Inc. "Caesarea Maiestas et de praesentibus Germaniae..."*, its draft (the handwriting of Secretary János Törös with the corrections of Pázmány in the main body): AP AEV n. 154/4; its fair copy: n. 154/1, fol. 1–7.

¹³⁹ *Inc. "Caesarea Maiestas Sanctitati Vestrae..."*, its draft (the handwriting of Secretary János Törös, there are no corrections [of Pázmány] in the main body): AP AEV n. 154/5; its fair copy: n. 154/1, fol. 7–10.

¹⁴⁰ *Inc. "Quamvis nuper..."*, its draft (the handwriting of Secretary János Törös with Pázmány's signature): AP AEV n. 154/6; its fair copy: n. 154/1, fol. 10–12.

¹⁴¹ *Inc. "Quod Eminentiam Vestram..."*, its draft (the handwriting of Secretary János Törös, there are no corrections [of Pázmány] in the main body): AP AEV n. 154/9; its fair copy: n. 154/1, fol. 12–14.

¹⁴² *Inc. "Intermittere non possum..."*, its draft (the handwriting of Secretary János Törös, there are no corrections [of Pázmány] in the main body): AP AEV n. 154/3; its fair copy: n. 154/1, fol. 14–16.

¹⁴³ *Inc. "Cum tam multa sint..."*, its draft (with Pázmány's corrections in the main body): AP AEV n. 154/2; its fair copy: n. 154/1, fol. 16–22.

What does all of this mean? It means that Pázmány edited the most important documents of his embassy; he compiled the documents that depicted the empire's situation the best, and then – by dissolving the chronological order – he contrasted them with the documents of the abortive and diversionary debate over his title as a legate. Although the two letters of Francesco Barberini written in early May can be found in the preparatory material, they were later dropped from the compilation. These letters had been taken into account at first along with their less relevant content compared to the serious letters of the Hungarian cardinal to demonstrate Rome's attitude towards the question.¹⁴⁴ Pázmány also wrote a preface and an epilogue about the document “*Intermittere non possum...*” that explained the text's origin, which were later crossed out¹⁴⁵ and omitted from the fair copy.¹⁴⁶ Finally, the manuscript was not edited and was placed in the primatial archives. Such an antipapal publication would not have achieved its goal; it would have only made the European and Hungarian Protestant community pleased. It is assumed that not only the

¹⁴⁴ AP AEV n. 154/7–8. See their publication: below *Documents, Appendix, II, 2–3*.

¹⁴⁵ See their publication *Documents, Appendix, II, 1*.

¹⁴⁶ Similarly to the commentary of his speech on 6 April: “*Vocem hanc in praesentia mea litura obduxit Papa, et si recte memini, substituit Negotiorum. Subiungens, recte sic cohaerere.*” AP AEV 154/4. Pázmány remembered incorrectly, since on the given document only the traces of the hot-tempered zigzagged crossings out can be seen, Urban VIII did not write anything on it. BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 2629, fol. 79r. See also above in *Chapter II/1* (footnote 18).

court of Vienna was of this opinion, but also the archbishop of Esztergom after all.¹⁴⁷

EPILOGUE

As Péter Pázmány could not choose between his loyalty to the emperor and the pope, as a priest and bishop, Lorenzo Azzolini's choice between state interests and religious interests neither proved to be easy. It is shown by the fact that in 28 full pages he endeavoured to explain and prove the policy of the Holy See from the Treaty of Regensburg to Pázmány's commission ("*Relatione della serie e progresso de' negoziati di S. S.tà e de suoi Ministri per la Religione Cat.ca e per la pace*").¹⁴⁸ At the end of his lengthy memoir that analyses the policy of the Apostolic See – which is an important source of the contemporary history of the Papal State – Azzolini touches upon the imperial embassy of the primate of Hungary and places it among the events of great politics. It states that the archbishop of Esztergom arrived in Rome to have his red hat, and then to have negotiations with the pope about three points on behalf of the emperor. They were the following: the joining in the league of the emperor and the Spanish king and the motivation of others; financial aid, the assistance of the emperor and other Cath-

¹⁴⁷ Only the texts of the speech given on the audience of 6 April and the document "*Intermittere non possum...*" were published at the time; however, Pázmány had nothing to do with it. Cf. *Chapter I*, footnote 85 and 97. This contemporary publication in Latin and German is also cited by: HANUY, *Petri Pázmány... epistolae collectae*, II, 270.

¹⁴⁸ *Documents*, 14.

olic monarchs' alliance against Gustav Adolf; furthermore, the withdrawal of the French from the confederation with the Swedish monarch. The pope answered all three questions in writing; moreover, in speaking he explained them in more detail. To realise the alliance of certain countries and the emperor he sent extraordinary nuncios. In relation to the aid he expressed the impossibility to grant more than he had already done; however, due to great danger he was ready to send a bigger sum based on the instalments. He explained the real difficulties concerning his joining the league; however, Urban VIII was not barred from a useful alliance of a proper form – as it was stated in the conclusion of the secretary of state's analysis.

Azzolini's evaluation: the paradox between his self-defensive fine narrative, his further corrections and the events of Pázmány's commission – that have been explored and analysed in this volume – speaks volumes.¹⁴⁹

The difference between the confessional and political interests characterised the policy of the Holy See during the en-

¹⁴⁹ Similarly to the case of the lofty content of the papal (answer) breve issued in the *Quirinale* (apud S. Mariam Maiorem) on 29 May, 1632 sent to Vienna about Pázmány's embassy: "*Nobis quamvis immerentibus Romanae fidei tutelam elector pontificum Spiritus Sanctus mandavit. Turrim David armatura fortium spoliare videatur, qui Austriacos principes exarmari sinat potentia ecclesiam propugnantem... Qui cor nostrum coram introspicere potuit, eum sane debuit pontificiae sollicitudinis misereri transfiguntur viscera apostolicae charitatis gladio doloris ubi perpendimus, quid necessitas Germaniae possit exigere, quid necessitas Italiae vero possit exhibere. Quid curaturi semper simus, quid in praesentia conemur, quid hactenus praestiterimus, ex reducis cardinalis [i.e. Pázmány] testificatione cognoscat maiestas tua*". Published: MEDNYÁNSZKY, *Petri Pázmány... Legatio Romana*, 100–101, n. 40.

tirety of the 16th and 17th centuries,¹⁵⁰ which became especially powerful and almost unsolvable during the Thirty Years' War. The simplifying attitude that suggested a direct connection between the sacred and secular cases (*cose sacre e profane*) ceased to exist by that time. Every source and analysis of our volume offers a closer look into the catastrophic policy – despite its short-term successes – that led to the papacy's losing its secular power during the Thirty Years' War – which broke out 400 years ago – and to an openly humiliating dependency on France by the 1660s.¹⁵¹ The “modern real-politics” of Barberini/Azzolini resulted in this, which kept the wars away from the borders of the Papal State and significantly weakened the suffocating Habsburg pressure in Italy from North and South; though, it once and for all faded Pázmány's vision of Trent's expansive reform papacy that he had developed during his

¹⁵⁰ ECKEHART STÖVE, *Häresiebekämpfung und „ragione di Stato”. Die Protestanten und das protestantische Lager in den Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII*, Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605. Forschungen zu den Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII. (BDHIR 66), hg. von Georg Lutz, Tübingen 1994, 53–66.

¹⁵¹ REPGEN, *Die römische Kurie*, 164 and *passim*; LUTZ, *Rom und Europa während des Pontifikats Urbans VIII*, 74–78 and 85–90; ID., *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 429–432 and 438–439; ID., *Urbano VIII*, 305–307; ROBERT BIRELEY, *The Thirty Years' War as Germany's Religious War*, Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 8, hg. von Konrad Repgen–Elisabeth Müller-Luckner), München 1988, 85–106; in conclusion TUSOR, *The Baroque Papacy*, 36–71 (*From Vervins to Westphalia*), especially 56–64.

studies in Rome in the 1590s.¹⁵² The primate of Hungary endeavoured to find this ideal during his embassy in Rome; moreover, he wanted to restore it by the assistance of oppositionist cardinals. His efforts proved to be unrealistic in the narrow cross section of the strengthened papal absolutism and the European and Italian geopolitical situation. The complexity of the situation is shown best by the fact that a Jesuit cardinal who vowed unconditional obedience to the pope in his solemn monastic vows¹⁵³ had to openly politicise against the prevailing pope.

It is up to the reader whether this political micro-historical analysis helped them to recognise, comprehend and make these macro-political phenomena understood in the context of the Thirty Years' War.

¹⁵² On the role of great politics, for instance: PETER BARTL, „*Marciare verso Costantinopoli*”. *Zur Türkenpolitik Klemens' VIII*, Saeculum 20 (1969) 44–56.

¹⁵³ Cf. TUSOR PÉTER, *Pázmány, the Jesuit prelate. His Appointment as Primate of Hungary, 1615–1616 (A Micropolitical Study)* (CVH I/13), Budapest–Rome 2016, in conclusion 309–338 and 429–456.

