



Cristobal Rojas y Spinola, Cameralist and Irenicist 1626-1695

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CRISTOBAL ROJAS Y SPINOLA,
CAMERALIST AND IRENICIST
1626-1695

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To
JOSEPH LORTZ
and
HEINRICH O. BENEDIKT

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PREFACE

It often happens that the life of a many-sided individual, even though he does not figure prominently in the great events of his time, will mirror the variety of currents which are coursing through his times and shaping the destinies of nations. Such was the case with Cristobal de Rojas y Spinola, whose public career covers most of the second half of the seventeenth century. Rojas' life work is most commonly identified with his attempt to reunify the Protestant and Catholic churches. His idea of Christian unity extended beyond ecclesiastical reform, however, and encompassed a much broader concept of spiritual and temporal unity within the framework of a Christian empire.

This essay is an attempt to sketch this man's life as the sources reveal it. It is not the first attempt at such a study. Shortly after Rojas died in 1695 his friend, the philosopher and polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, went to Wiener Neustadt in order to gather together the Bishop's papers with the intention of writing a biography of Rojas which would further by example the cause of Christian unity. Leibniz took many papers, copied others, and returned with them to Hanover where he proposed to write the biography at his leisure. This project was never completed.

Another man who remembered Rojas with affection, the Jesuit Marcus Hansitz, set about the same task in Wiener Neustadt, writing a lengthy Latin biography which is preserved in manuscript in the Austrian National Library along with several bound volumes of original correspondence and copies of papers relating to Rojas' life. This body of materials is the nucleus of the primary sources available to scholars, and with the documents in Hanover forms the bulk of the material upon which most previous studies of Rojas have been based.

Rojas was an inveterate traveler, and his frequent tours through the smaller German states, his trips to Spain and Rome, the Netherlands and Hungary left items of interest scattered everywhere in Europe, many doubtless still reposing unnoticed in local German archives. Professor Ingomar Bog of Nürnberg has proved recently just how fruitful these documents can be when they are sought out. To search for all the documents that may be obtainable would be far beyond the efforts of one scholar, or several for that matter; most certainly it would be more effort than the subject warrants. An attempt has been made here, however, to add significant details from documents in the Austrian National Archives, the Leibniz papers in Hanover and the General Archives of Simancas in Spain.

One question which has had to be settled arbitrarily concerns the name of the subject. Until 1666 when he became Bishop of Tina and began using his ecclesiastical title "Christophorus, Episcopus Tiniensis" as his

signature, he always wrote his own name "Christoval de Roxas." For this reason the modern Spanish spelling "Rojas" has been used throughout. Many writers, chiefly German, have ignored the "Rojas" and referred to him commonly by his matronymic, "Spinola." The only reason for going against this well-established tradition is that he gave his own name more often as "Roxas" than as "Roxas y Spinola," and never simply as "Spinola." The protocol surrounding Spanish aristocratic family names was sufficiently exotic to Germans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as to cause considerable confusion. Some thought they were dealing with two or three persons, misled by the compound name and the variety of ways in which Roxas was rendered phonetically into German. The most common variant was "Royas," a version which has been perpetuated in the recent study of Dr. Ingomar Bog. Others found even in letters written during the Bishop's lifetime are Rocca, Roccus, and Rochas.

This study is the product of two research projects which converged on a single subject. In order to acknowledge the many sincere debts of gratitude for assistance received in carrying out the research involved, the authors must momentarily part company for the pleasant task of recalling the friendly guidance and assistance of those who will, it is hoped, recognize the part they have played in bringing these projects to fruition.

Samuel J. T. Miller's research, centering on the proposed reunion of churches in the late seventeenth century, was forwarded by a United States Government grant (Fulbright) and a grant awarded by the American Philosophical Society. Among the many who have encouraged his work, his thanks go especially to Joseph Lortz of the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz, whose wisdom and interest in the reunion of churches has provided many Germans and guests of Germany a fine example of what scholars can do in reducing tensions between confessions. Professor Hermann Schüssler of Christophorus-Stift, Heidelberg has, by his friendship and example, enriched this work beyond any poor attempt at recognition by words. William F. Church, Professor at Brown University, through his careful guidance and patience gave invaluable supervision in the preliminary stages of this book. The Gräfin von Brockdorff, Assistant to Professor Lortz, provided notable help in locating and translating documents. To William Daly, Professor of History at Boston College, whose sense of humor made the apparently impossible seem possible, a special debt of gratitude is due. The officials of the libraries at the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz, the Neidersächsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover, the Austrian National Library in Vienna, and the Vatican in Rome have all given valuable assistance and

met a variety of requests efficiently and courteously. Thanks are due also to Mrs. Eria Richmond who has typed much of the manuscript, and to Boston College which has provided the environment in which there was time to carry out the research for this work.

John P. Spielman's research, concerned primarily with the diplomatic and mercantilistic programs of the Habsburg monarchy, was begun with assistance from a United States Government grant (Fulbright). To Professor Heinrich O. Benedikt of the University of Vienna, more is owed than can be mentioned here. His contagious interest in the seventeenth century provided an inspiration which will not soon be forgotten. The director of the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, Dr. Gebhardt Rath, gave his friendly cooperation; and Dr. Anna Benna provided much very practical assistance and enthusiastic cooperation. Dr. Fritz Posch, director of the Landesarchiv in Graz shared his discovery of the Hardberg papers, and these were made available by the Rev. Dr. Klamlinger,

director of the Fürstliche Seckauer Diözesanarchiv in Graz. Professor Wodka of the University of Vienna very kindly brought to that city materials from St. Pölten, which was then in the Soviet Zone of occupation and inaccessible to American scholars. Professor Sanchez Canton of the University of Madrid, and Dr. Ricardo Magdaleno, director of the Archivo General de Simancas, rendered valuable assistance in obtaining material in Spain. The research is but the beginning, however, and a special debt of gratitude is owing to Professor Chester V. Easum of the University of Wisconsin whose careful guidance and painstaking, constructive criticism did so much to bring this project to its completion.

S. J. T. M. and J. P. S., Jr.

October, 1961

Chapters II and III are the work of Mr. Spielman. The remaining chapters are the work of Mr. Miller with the exception of chapters I and IV are the cooperative work of the two authors.

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I. THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The concern for restoring the lost unity of European Christendom by reuniting the Catholic and Protestant confessions is an important part of the intellectual history of the later decades of the seventeenth century. In retrospect the triumph of religious toleration in modern European society may seem to be the inevitable outgrowth of the ideas explored by the British and Dutch thinkers in the seventeenth century; but to many of their continental contemporaries toleration was a compromise with heresy, or even worse, a betrayal of truth, and many of these continental statesmen and theologians preferred to think in terms of reconciliation within the old, established, perhaps broadened framework of a single ecclesiastical community embracing all Christians. To write off the irenical movement as a hopeless cause because it failed in the long run is to assume that the alternative choices were narrower than the seventeenth century thought them to be.

For more than a millennium between the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west and the religious upheavals of the sixteenth century, the existence of a universal Church was regarded as the essential basis of civil order. The violence of the revolt in the sixteenth century and the long religious wars seemed to prove the futility of schism. Within the Lutheran confession a strong movement, stemming from Philip Melancthon and the humanist tradition, envisioned a return to the ancient constitution of the universal Church, finding its guiding principles in the decisions of the ecumenical councils of the early Christian era.¹

The prolonged agony of the Thirty Years War acted as a catalyst, focusing attention on the still unsolved problems Europe inherited from the religious revolu-

tions of the sixteenth century. Quite aside from horror at the physical destruction wrought particularly in Germany by the armies of Europe, the war left in its wake a feeling of contempt for religious passion which was, rightly or wrongly, supposed to have been the cause of the troubles. The irenical movement itself grew strong in such an atmosphere, and even in the popular medium of fiction can be seen evidence of this sense of frustration at the violence of religious controversy. In his rambling novel *Simplicissimus* Grimmelshausen introduces at one point a madman, Jupiter, who predicts the arrival of a German Hero. The Hero will reorder the world by making the theologians work out their controversies in temperate discussions.² If, when enjoined by the Hero to solve their differences, the theologians persist in acrimonious controversy, then they will be starved, threatened, and harangued from the gallows until they reach a compromise.

Such a simple solution might appeal to the desire for direct and drastic action. Both the theologians and the rulers of Europe well knew, however, that the problems of religious pacification could not be separated from political issues. While the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius might outline in his *De jure belli et pacis* a society and government outside the Church and separate from it, in the rest of Europe political thought could not yet be so easily separated from religious controversy. This was particularly true in the Germanies, where the religious divisions of the Reformation had become enmeshed in the constitutional framework of the Holy Roman Empire. Protestantism, especially

² Grimmelshausen, J. H. C. von, *Der abenteuerliche Simplicius Simplicissimus*, 253-256, Stuttgart, 1950. Book three, chapter five is entitled: "Wie er die Religionen miteinander vereinigen und in ein Modell giessen wird."

¹ Miller, S. J., Molanus, Lutheran irenicist (1633-1722), *Church History* 22: 197f., 1953.

Lutheranism, was more than a faith to its princely adherents. It was at the same time a spiritual guarantee of political independence which sanctified particularism by elevating political matters to the realm of conscience.

Although there was plenty of sentiment in the chief countries of western Europe which was favorable to restoring church unity and encouraging the efforts of irenicists, the shifting face of politics was of the utmost importance in determining the degree of success of any one project of the theologians. Keeping in mind the importance of these political considerations, it must also be seen that the fundamental causes for the inability of Catholics and Protestants to direct their arguments in such a sense that reunion would result were religious. Religious differences were markedly less in the seventeenth century than at the present time, but papal supremacy, the *poenae tridentinae*, the scriptural canon, the manner of man's justification, the question of tradition, all these were gigantic barriers that would have demanded solution even though every Christian prince of Europe might have desired in his secret heart to see the Church one and Catholic, and even though political factors, with their roots fastened in timeless developments, had not opposed one another. Even though the kings and princes of Europe, as rulers, caused irenic plans to advance or blocked their way completely, the religious issues had also to be settled by theologians, and in terms acceptable to theologians. It is appropriate, then, to begin with a brief review of the religious situations in Germany and France.

Within the Roman Church the consolidation of the Trentine reforms had effected salutary changes in almost every quarter. In Germany many of these fostered conditions favorable to the general plans for religious reunion. The work of the Jesuits had held Bavaria and Austria for Rome. For the most part German Catholicism had not the Erastian problem which existed in France, and was not to experience it until the reign of Joseph II (1765–1790) and his Febronian contemporaries. Moreover, German pietists and mystics were not as aggressive as those in France, and therefore they did not stand actively in the way of church reunion as did the fire-eating French Calvinists and the adherents of Madame Guyon who could see their way clear to dispensing with organized religion altogether.³

Whereas German Catholicism was an expanding religion after 1648, German Protestantism had settled down to administer and consolidate the areas it held before this date. In general the Lutherans and Calvinists held much the same territories they had gained before 1600. At the end of the sixteenth century, Electoral Saxony, Brunswick, and Württemberg were the chief Lutheran centers, while Calvinism held sway in the Rhenish Palatinate, in Hesse and in much of

Brandenburg. Protestantism was completely Erastian. It not only accepted the domination of the prince in religious affairs, but legitimized it as well.⁴ Among Lutherans the civil power was absolutely supreme. The consistories which governed the various territorial branches of the Church were, for the most part, mere creatures of the princely will. While in some instances, notably in Saxony, attempts were made to introduce the synodal form of church government with elective councils chosen by the congregations themselves, these were easily suppressed by the princes in most cases and bypassed in the others.

To be sure, the religion of entire countries could not be violently changed if the prince abjured, but even so, be the prince Catholic or Protestant, there was no independence for the consistories which, in addition to depending completely on orders from the court, were further enslaved by an ossified theology and doctrine which had to be put in harmony, in the case of the Lutherans, with the Formula of Concord.⁵ As a result Protestantism became static and began, in the seventeenth century, to lose ground largely by the conversion of many of its important members to Catholicism. In large part this was a result of the vigor and acknowledged superiority of the Jesuit schools, where many Protestant princes sent their sons for instruction.

One of the major features of German Lutheranism in the seventeenth century was a marked trend toward a stabilization in theology and church government which led to an uncompromising orthodoxy on the one hand, and to a revival of what might be called the Melancthonian-Erasmian school of compromise on the other. This later trend is best illustrated by the views of important members of the University of Helmstedt in the Duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel.

The Lutherans who wished to regain church unity were one and all spiritual children of Melancthon or Cassander. Melancthon, author of the Augsburg Confession, far from continuing along the path of separation, looked forward earnestly to the restoration of the ancient constitution of the unified Church and to the business of patching up those places where the old order had been destroyed. George Cassander (1513–1566), of Flemish origin, although neither Lutheran nor Catholic, was a second source of inspiration to the irenic school of German Lutherans. He wrote a treatise⁶ in which he advanced a program that would not, in any way, disturb the structure of the ancient Church, but eliminate the abuses therein. One of Cassander's works was placed on the Index of 1581, and the Lutherans and Catholics alike disclaimed him.

⁴ Chevalier, Jacques, *Cadences*, 10, Paris, 1939.

⁵ Döllinger, Ignaz, *Conférences sur la réunion des églises*, 82, Paris, 1880.

⁶ Cassander, George, *Opera omnia: De articulis religionis inter Catholicos et Protestantos controversis ad Invictissimos Imperatores Augustos Ferdinandum I et Maximilianum II, eius Successorem*, Paris, 1616.

³ Biedermann, Karl, *Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands im achtzehnten Jahrhundert* 2: 275–276, Leipzig, 1854–1858.

Nonetheless, in a less heated age, both sides drew inspiration from his work.⁷

The Lutheran irenical movement reached its apogee at the University of Helmstedt where George Calixtus (1586–1656) created a center for a school of thought far removed from Wittenberg orthodoxy. Calixtus owed much to Erasmus and Cassander. It is significant that his father was a student of Melancthon at Wittenberg, and also a protégé of Chyträus, a Melancthonian adherent at Rostock.⁸ Calixtus, under the influence of his irenical Lutheran predecessors and with the study of humanistic philology and the church fathers, attempted to organize religious peace on the basis of the so-called fundamental articles. By *articuli fundamentales* he meant the dogma of the first five centuries of Christianity. He was bitterly attacked as a syncretist and crypto-Catholic by the orthodox Lutherans, notably those at Wittenberg.⁹ His attempts at pacification at the Diet of Thorn, called in 1645 by Ladislas IV of Poland as a meeting between Catholics and Protestants, were met by fierce invective on the part of his Lutheran colleagues, an invective which raged until his death.¹⁰ Calixtus' influence, nevertheless, was very broad. He had support from Protestant theologians in Holstein and Brandenburg. Abroad the voices of Moses Amyraut of the Calvinist Academy at Saumur and Johann Hoornbeck of Utrecht were raised in behalf of his teaching.¹¹

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Calixtus' career was that he taught Gerard Wolter van Meulen (Molanus) (1633–1722), future Consistorial Director of Hanover and Abbot of Loccum in Lower Saxony.¹²

⁷ *Ibid.* On one of the principal doctrines of Christianity, the Incarnation, Cassander was completely orthodox. For an analysis of Cassander's thought see Birck, M., *Georg Cassanders Ideen über die Wiedervereinigung der christlichen Konfessionen in Deutschland*, Cologne, 1876.

⁸ Leube, H., *Kalvanismus und Luthertum im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie*, 273, Leipzig, 1928.

⁹ As an example of the orthodoxy of the Wittenberg brand, Abraham Calovius, professor and superintendent at Wittenberg in 1668, had this to say of good works: "Bona opera neque et causa, neque et medium, neque et conditio, neque ullo respectu aut modo sunt necessaria ad salutem." Quoted in Menge, G., *Zur Biographie des Irenikers Spinola, Franziskanische Studien* 2: 3, 1915.

¹⁰ Neudecker, C. G., *Die Hauptversuche zur Pacification der evangelischen-protestantischen Kirche Deutschlands*, 170, Leipzig, 1846.

¹¹ Soldan, W. G., *Dreissig Jahre des Proselytismus in Sachsen und Braunschweig*, 23, Leipzig, 1845. Pfarrer-Doktor Hermann Schüssler of the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz published in 1961 a fine study, *Georg Calixt: Theologie und Kirchen politik*, Wiesbaden, which unfortunately came too late to be used in this study.

¹² For a good, brief biography of Molanus see Amann, E., Molanus, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 10: part 2, column 2082, *et seq.* This article is most useful because it discusses the textual problems which are a part of the writing of any life of Molanus. See also Weidemann, Heinz, *Gerard Wolter Molanus, Abt zu Loccum* in the series *Studien zur Kirchengeschichte Niedersachsens*, Numbers 3 and 5, Göttingen, 1925 and 1929. See also Miller, S. J., *op. cit.*

By way of a preliminary insight into Molanus' theology one must look more carefully into Calixtus' thought. To Calixtus the Calvinist, Lutheran, and Catholic churches are the only ones that can properly be considered churches. Socinians and other sectaries are not worthy of the name of church.¹³ In point of fact there is already actual communion among the three religious bodies deserving the name of church, since they agree on the ecumenical confessions which are necessary for eternal salvation.

... between us and the Papists there is no controversy concerning the most important articles appertaining to Divine Majesty and both sides confess these articles. Therefore the Papists and we, ourselves, commune by an act of faith in as much as it [faith] is aware of these articles. We are therefore united by an actual union on these questions.¹⁴

According to Calixtus, it follows that, if the Calvinists may commune with the Lutherans, then the Calvinists are in actual communion with the Catholics. *Communio in sacris*, as distinguished from *communio actualis*, is impossible, however, because of the errors of Roman Catholicism; but this does not preclude the possibility of salvation on both sides, and it makes mutual toleration absolutely necessary.¹⁵

The irenical propensities of the Helmstedters did not go unchallenged. For the most part Lutheranism had been as rigid in its dogma as Rome since the Formula of Concord. This dogmatic rigidity was based upon the "verbal inspiration of the earliest texts of Holy Scripture, even to the vocal signs under the Hebrew consonants."¹⁶ The chief centers of Lutheran orthodoxy were Wittenberg, the *cathedra Lutheri*, and Jena. The chief proponents of this orthodoxy were Abraham Calovius (1612–1686), Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–1688), both from Wittenberg, and David Hollaz (1648–1713) of Pomerania. This solidly entrenched condition of integralist Lutheranism was well known to Catholic sponsors of church reunion, and it made them dubious about how far they could expect the

¹³ The ideas here considered are actually those of Friedrich Ulrich Calixtus, son of George. However, they are from the preface of Calixtus' treatise on tolerance, and they differ not at all from the ideas expressed in the body of the text. The preface was written by the son of Calixtus. The entire work was published as: Calixtus, Georg, *Georgii Calixti de tolerantia reformatum circa quaestiones inter ipsos et Augustanam Confessionem professos controversas consultatio, etc.*, unnumbered page opposite 3, Helmstedt, 1697.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, article 44. See Ermoni, V., Georges Calixte, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 2(2): column 1363. Ermoni sums up Calixtus' belief in this wise: "... he taught the necessity of good works, rejected the ubiquity of Christ in His humanity, denied the absolute corruption of man, recognized a primacy for the pope established on human law and granted that the Mass could be called a sacrifice."

¹⁶ Heussi, Karl, *Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte*, sections 94–95, Tübingen, 1949.

generality of Lutherans to go along the way to compromise.¹⁷

Fundamentally more dangerous to the irenicists of all parties was the upsurge of Pietism toward the close of the century. Pietism was, of course, not confined to Germany, but had its parallels in French Jansenism and Quietism and in English Puritanism of the left and Quakerism. Toward the middle of the century Boehme and Andrea had laid the foundation for this movement in the Empire, but it reached its culmination in the person of Jakob Spener (1635–1705), author of the *Pia Desideria*, a manual of Pietistic thought. Although admirable in its emphasis on the practical application of the Gospel, the encouragement of an active and lively faith, a cessation of polemicism, and the reform of theological studies, it was nonetheless little conducive to church reunion. Rather than dwelling upon the constitution of the visible Church and those aspects of doctrine upon which Christians could agree, it simply set aside any visible ecclesiastical organization as unnecessary in the last analysis. It was suitable to German princes who had no desire to see a strong hierarchy for their territorial churches or a return to Rome even with the concession of a Teutonic rite. Pietism was one of the principal reasons for the check to the constitutional and organic approach to church reunion advocated by the moderate Lutherans, notably Leibniz and Molanus.¹⁸

The results of the Trentine reforms were not felt as rapidly in France as they were in Germany where several rulers gave their official sanction to the decrees of Trent. It was not until 1615 that a clerical assembly accepted them in France. The French monarchs, for their part, never gave specific lay support to the reform. These conditions did not, however, prevent a remarkable revival and purification of Catholicism which took place between 1600 and 1700. To attest to the vitality of this revival, one need mention only Saint Francis de Sales, Saint Vincent de Paul, and the Abbé de Rancé. Ecclesiastical architecture, with its model at St. Sulpice, and church scholarship both experienced a period of brilliant expression. The stage, with such masterpieces as *Polyeucte*, *Athalie*, and *Esther* reflected the union of purified Christian ideals and the ingenious invention and artistry of the classical model.

The Roman Church was not without its difficulties in France. Jansenism caused endless trouble with its rigoristic concept of religion, while the Jesuits erred in the opposite direction by drawing upon their society suspicions of laxity. But the most disturbing thing by far was the exaggerated growth of episcopal Gallicanism

and its combination with the royal and parliamentary urge to win more concessions from Rome. Episcopal Gallicanism meant in its simplest form the superiority of the council over the pope, capitular election of bishops, and the refusal to accept graces and reservations granted at Rome. Although this position can be admired as resisting the extremes of ultramontanism, it was, nonetheless, dangerous in a certain sense; it set the French hierarchy against the pope to such a degree that schism seemed a constant possibility. It set them against the king, who was also seeking freedom to establish greater and greater powers for himself; and, finally, it forced them to take up arms against the parliamentarians, who were not as fearful of schism as the clerks, and who considered the dependency of the French bishops on Rome as a form of disgraceful servitude.

Gallicanism was a potentially dangerous matter for the Church, but the existence of Protestantism, although surely not a threat to Catholicism, was an even more present problem wanting solution. The presence of a Christian body, endowed with political privileges, considered heretical by Rome, was a thing looked upon dimly both by the Church and the monarchy, since the ideal of both institutions was unity under one visible sovereign. The Edict of Nantes was never considered by the vast majority of the French people and their governments anything more than a *pis-aller*. The aim of the French state, whether clergy or laity, was unity, and steps toward this end were undertaken first by irenic means, and finally by violence which culminated in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the dragonnades.

By 1685 it was clear that the Catholic party which believed in repression would call the tune in France, but the moderate Catholics were also vocal throughout the century. The moderates hoped for a position which would be outside sects, schools, and disputes; which represented a Christianity that claimed neither Scotus, nor Occam, nor Luther, nor Zwingli, and which based its beliefs on the most general truths of the Gospel and the least contested traditions of the Church.¹⁹ This party maintained a strong defense against ignorance and bigotry until the very last in 1685, and finally it lived on to gain a long-delayed victory on the eve of the French Revolution.

The moderates had their sixteenth-century precursors in the Circle of Meaux under the auspices of Bishop Briçonnet and in the opinions of those who surrounded Marguerite of Navarre. To this group also belonged the Cardinal of Lorraine, who represented the Catholics at the colloquy at Poissy.²⁰ The poet Ronsard was a

¹⁷ Bossuet was, for example, fearful that the opinions of the Helmstedt faculty were limited to a small group of *catholisant* Lutherans. See letter from Bossuet to Leibniz dated Germigny, 12 August, 1701, in Foucher de Careil, *Œuvres de Leibniz* 2: 388, Paris, 1859–1864.

¹⁸ Faure, C. B., *Diplomatie de Leibniz*, *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 19: 225–242, 1905.

¹⁹ Imbart de la Tour, P., *Les origines de la réforme* 3: 609–610, Paris, 1905–1911.

²⁰ Evennett, H. O., *The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent*, Cambridge, 1930. Evennett, a decisive apologist for the Guise family and their politics, also discusses the irenic efforts of the Cardinal.

moderate²¹ as was Claude d'Espence, one of the most prominent lay representatives at the Council of Trent.²² The greatest churchman who interested himself in church reunion was Cardinal Richelieu. Despite his tyrannical approach to government, he was one of the earliest and strongest supporters of the concept of freedom of thought. He gave official encouragement to discussions between Catholics and Protestants, and sent the converted Calvinist minister Brachet de la Milletière on one fruitless irenical mission after another to various Protestant communities.²³ The celebrated salon of Conrart, where Protestants and Catholics met with perfect freedom, was under the special protection of the Cardinal.²⁴

The French Calvinists, like the Catholics, also produced their intransigents and their irenicists. The polemical group followed the line set by Agrippa d'Aubigné and the official proclamations of the Calvinist synods. "At bottom the Calvinist dreamed of setting up a theocracy, and Geneva was eternally before him as the fairest example of the will of God with respect to the organization of the Church."²⁵ Unlike Lutheranism with its uncoordinated character and relatively "high" tendencies, Calvinist theology and ecclesiastical organization presented a rock barrier to counsels of moderation. The influential national Synod of Charenton, opened September 1, 1631, warned against lending ear to that party which would have the "temple of God" (the Calvinists) share communion with those who "worship idols" (the Roman Catholics.)²⁶ In 1661 during a provincial synod at Nîmes "backsliders" were castigated for their great sin, presumably that of being of a nonsavage cast of mind, and told: "It is not possible to unite shadows with light and Christ with Belial."²⁷ Throughout the century the pope was Antichrist to the orthodox Calvinists, the Roman religion the Whore of Babylon, and the Roman clergy the gates of Hell and the concubines of Satan.²⁸

There were also Calvinists who were willing to keep up the dialogue with the Catholics. The conversion of Henry IV caused the spiritual sons of Geneva to reflect more seriously on the possibilities of religious

understanding.²⁹ At Charenton (1631) reunion with Lutherans was effected *in sacris*, although Lutheran theologians felt uncomfortable about being classed with the Calvinists on such an intimate basis and regarded the synodal statements as having no validity whatsoever and not binding upon them. It still enabled the Calvinists to serve in the army of Gustavus Adolphus and to communicate in the Lutheran manner. It also declared the Lutherans, then serving in the army of the Duc de Rohan in the Valteline, capable of communicating in the Calvinist *Cène*.³⁰ In 1677 Dize, who had been a minister at Grenoble and a professor of theology at Die, showed Bossuet a reunion project which was not accepted by the Catholics because it granted too little. It was wholly unacceptable to the Protestants because it got over the problem of Calvinist dogma by ignoring it in large part.³¹ Apart from all these piecemeal approaches there was the correspondence of Bossuet, while a canon at Metz, and Paul Ferry which represents the most thoughtful set of arguments from both sides to be found in the entire century.³²

There was much free discussion between Romans and Protestants throughout the century, much more, in fact, than is commonly supposed. The topics discussed ranged over a wide field, but religion was one of the central ones. The Protestant Academy at Saumur was a center of light in a wilderness of fanaticism. The members of this academy cooperated in a scholarly way with the Oratorians in that city. One of the Oratorians said this of his Protestant confreres:

When you speak against the heretics, let it be with respect, compassion, tenderness and witness of your affection, granting them all that you can without compromising the truth. Abstain from injury, invective and words which display contempt.³³

The Protestants repaid with the same coin. There was a powerful Arminian tendency among them which gave their Calvinism an unusually liberal flavor. Pastor Amyraut edulcorated the Calvinist dogma of grace. De La Place had a doctrine on original sin which approached the Catholic in many respects. Coppel defended a theory of punctuation in Hebrew which undermined orthodox interpretations upon which Calvinist dogma was built. Amyraut was so respected by the Oratorians that they said, if he had died in their communion, they would immediately have taken steps to have him canonized.

Another area of cooperation was to be found in the learned academies created in the seventeenth century. The attitude of the academicians toward theology was usually more mystical than rational. The humanist

²¹ Yates, F. A., *The French academies of the sixteenth century*, 208, London, 1947.

²² Evennett, H. O., Claude d'Espence et son discours au Colloque de Poissy, *Revue Historique*, 67, May-June, 1930.

²³ There are at least a dozen published works of Brachet de la Milletière in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, probably enough to provide material for an essay on his thought.

²⁴ Bonet-Maury, G., *Histoire de la liberté de conscience en France depuis l'Édit de Nantes jusqu'en juillet 1870*, 35, Paris, 1900.

²⁵ Jordan, W. K., *The development of religious toleration in England (1603-1640)*, 240, Cambridge, Mass., 1940.

²⁶ Haag, Emile, Réunion, *La France protestante, pièces justificatives* 10: 341, 1884.

²⁷ Puaux, F., *Histoire de la réformation française* 6: 13, Paris, 1859-1869.

²⁸ Ruhlières, Claude, *Eclaircissements sur la révocation de l'Édit de Nantes* 1: 45-46, Geneva, 1788.

²⁹ Benoît, Elie, *Histoire de l'Édit de Nantes* 1: 113, Delft, 1693-1695.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 3: 124.

³¹ *Ibid.* 4: 350.

³² This correspondence is to be found in Bossuet, J. B., *Oeuvres complètes* 17, Paris, 1885.

³³ Proust, J., *La philosophie à l'académie protestante de Saumur (1606-1685)*, 72-75, Paris, 1907.

learning cultivated there foresaw the formation of a body of occult knowledge which would be common to all religions and a deepening of the mysteries of the Church by a universal doctrine in which the "differences between Protestant and Catholic Christians cannot have seemed so irreconcilable as they did to rational theologians."³⁴

Among theologians of prominence there was considerable mutual respect. Richard Simon consulted both Protestant and Hebrew savants in his work. Bossuet was singularly gracious to Ferry during the early period of correspondence and to Molanus at a later time. As in Germany, so too in France, there were many men of moderation willing to meet with their religious antagonists on a footing of mutual respect. Religious reunion projects could, and many did, thrive in such an atmosphere wherever it was present. For such projects to bear fruit, however, it was necessary in the seventeenth century to have the support and acquiescence of the temporal state. It was, therefore, essential that the theological discussions be held in the light of a full knowledge and understanding of the political considerations which were inseparable from the religious conflicts of the age.

This intimate connection between theological and political questions, and the importance of the latter in the motivation of church reunion negotiations, require a certain amount of investigation of the political issues at work in the *theatrum europaeum* after 1648. Since the Holy Roman Empire, comprising at this time most of central Europe, was the center of the religious upheavals and the focal point of seventeenth-century international conflicts, it would be well to begin there.

The process by which the ancient tribal duchies and early medieval feudal states had been broken into smaller territories to satisfy cadet lines of noble families had already, by the time of the Reformation, reduced that medieval federation of states to a congeries of over three hundred small, virtually independent territories. Parallel to this went the decline of imperial authority, as the power of the crown was wasted through the alienation of crown lands to the local territorial aristocracy. This process was intensified by the failure of the medieval emperors, in their long conflict with the papacy, to keep firm control over the tremendous power wielded by the German prelates. Between these territorial states and the Empire, and among the states themselves, existed a maze of legal relationships so complex as to render central government ineffectual. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 broke up finally the feudal organization of the Holy Roman Empire, and in effect left every state of the Empire possessed of its "liberties," free, that is, to go its own way both in local and international affairs even in defiance of the titular ruler of Germany.

Kleinstaaterei is the most exact term by which the

Empire may be described. Among the many states which together made up the Empire, the most important were the Habsburg patrimony,³⁵ Bavaria, Brandenburg, Baden, Württemberg, Electoral Saxony, and Brunswick. Of the many ecclesiastical states only the electorates of Cologne and Mainz were strong enough to pursue an independent policy. In the Protestant states ecclesiastical government was firmly under the control of the prince. In Roman Catholic states there was a separate spiritual and temporal allegiance binding upon all people; but in the principal Catholic state, the Habsburg dynastic patrimony whose head was traditionally also elected emperor, the emperor found it not only to his liking, but also expedient and in accord with his faith to function harmoniously with the papacy despite the heterogeneity of constitutional arrangements which obtained in his domains. All of these states individually shared the strong tendency toward royal or princely centralization common to all other European states in the seventeenth century; but nowhere in the Catholic states of the Empire was there a strong national church which compared in any way with the Gallican Church of France.

While elsewhere in Europe the establishment of royal authority acted to destroy the political independence of the aristocratic class, in the German states this developing absolutism had quite the opposite effect. There it was the territorial princes who, in defiance of their traditional feudal loyalty to the emperor, built miniature states from their possessions. Encouraged by the French, who quite reasonably feared a powerful German state, these smaller units of the Empire gladly exchanged their diplomatic voice for French subsidies which alone could make possible their dreams of grandeur. Within a decade after the end of the Thirty Years War this arrangement developed into a systematic pattern of alliances which became the League of the Rhine, a treaty organization tying many of the west German states to France with cords of gold. The French monarchy reaped rich rewards both in the security of its traditional frontiers and in territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the Empire by encouraging centralization of power on the local level in Germany, while vigorously opposing the same tendency on a national level.

Germany and the Habsburg patrimony were, toward the end of the seventeenth century, experiencing the benefits as well as the disadvantages of the Peace of Westphalia. It was difficult for subjects whose princes changed religion. Although in principle the change affected the prince alone, pressure was usually brought to bear to make effective the celebrated maxim

³⁵ The Habsburg family possessions within the empire included Austria, Bohemia, small enclave territories between Bavaria and the Rhineland plus whatever parts of Hungary were not at the moment under Turkish domination. The union of these territories was still purely dynastic in 1648, and taken together they did not form an integrated policy.

³⁴ Yates, *op. cit.*, 235.

cuius regio eius religio. But the destructive and bloody conflict of the Thirty Years War had ended, and dragonnades against individual subjects were rather mild in comparison with the sack of Magdeburg and the desolation of the Palatinate, which two events mark the end of a period of unbridled violence in 1631 and its resumption in 1688.

What unity there was in the Germanies after 1648 was represented by the moribund institutions of the Holy Roman Empire, and personified in the figure of the Habsburg Emperor. Ineffectual as this symbolic unity had become in practical power politics, the tradition it represented was still strong and appealed to the minds and hearts of many Germans and non-Germans alike. This tradition represented, among other things, a commitment to the universality of the Christian Church; and while the Protestant princes of the Empire had won by force a degree of toleration from the emperor, the feeling of unity within a Christian empire was not dead.

The problems facing the generation of German statesmen after 1648 were tremendous. Their states had provided the stage setting for most of the military campaigns, and it was there that the physical destruction and moral exhaustion of that violent generation were most noticeable. Depopulation was one of the gravest problems facing nearly all the German princes. It has been estimated that the Empire lost well over one-third of its population between 1618 and 1648 through slaughter, siege, famine, pestilence, and emigration. Even allowing generously for local exaggeration of the terrors of the war, the physical exhaustion of German society was the one inescapable fact of political life after 1648. None of the major states of the Empire could escape the fact that it had to face a net loss in population, in wealth and commerce; in social capital in the form of bridges, city dwellings, fortifications, workshops, and roads. In some areas the land, carefully reclaimed from the forest by generations of hard labor, reverted to woodland through neglect. Once prosperous centers of trade and industry were still, a generation later, what our own time knows as depressed areas. As the armies fighting in the Empire followed the natural routes of communication across the land, the violence they brought with them tended to concentrate at the centers of manufacture and exchange which were located where these routes intersected. The result was a blow to the commerce of German towns from which they did not recover until the nineteenth century.

Reconstruction and recovery were the fundamental concerns of every German ruler after 1648. Policy varied from state to state, and some, particularly in the Rhineland, found a measure of capital for reconstruction at hand in the form of French subsidies. In general, however, efforts of local princes to restore their exhausted territories tended to look in three directions: toward economic reconstruction, political centralization on the French model, and religious compromise.

These divergent aspects of the central problem became, in a short time, hopelessly intertwined, and inherent contradictions in policy appeared to rob many honest efforts of success. These conflicts became all the more important because the similarity of means implicit in many projects did not imply common objectives. To the states of the Empire individually political centralization meant increasing independence from the emperor. To the Habsburgs, on the other hand, it meant just the opposite; that is the imposition of imperial authority over the Empire and the creation of a more solidly unified state to replace the old confederation of princes. Economic programs ran afoul of the same divergent interests. Most of the schemes for economic recovery were mercantilist in their inspiration and shared the aggressive philosophy of that bellicose notion of political economy. Here again the princes sought advantages for their own states at the expense of their neighbors, whereas the Habsburgs aimed toward increasing the area of economic cooperation as a prelude to greater political integration. On questions of religious compromise, and this issue will form the central concern of the following chapters, the conflicts were different and vastly more complex, for the issue was an international one, but the results were not much different.

A marked irenical trend characterized certain German courts, and Vienna, the Habsburg capital, was the first among these. Elsewhere the electoral court of Mainz and the ducal court of Hanover were the chief centers for plans of religious reunion. Johann Philipp von Schönborn, Archbishop-elect of Mainz (1647–1673), made a special point of collecting about him figures who wrote, negotiated, and pleaded constantly for a solution to the difficulties which existed between Rome and the reformed churches. Among the celebrated irenicists who found welcome and patronage at the court of Mainz can be ranked Philipp von Schönborn, patron of Leibniz; Leibniz himself, Volusius, the prolific writer on many theological topics; the brothers Wallenburg, and the chief irenicist of them all, Cristobal de Rojas y Spinola.

One of the principal and quite objective factors in producing a desire for religious peace in the Habsburg empire was the need for presenting a united front against the Turkish advance in southeastern Europe, particularly during the years 1660–1683 which witnessed a recrudescence of Turkish military power and expansive energies. Hungary became at that time the scene of a dual battle of Turk against Christian, and of Protestant against Catholic. The extreme eastern portion of Hungary, commonly known as Transylvania, had early become a Turkish protectorate, and was a nucleus around which French, Polish, and Turkish plots operated against Austria. It was predominantly a Protestant region, and was constantly a source of vexation and trouble for the Habsburg emperors. Hungary itself, although largely regained for Rome by

the Jesuits,³⁶ included substantial Protestant communities. The development in Austria of a strong trend toward centralization and absolute monarchical government served to exacerbate Hungarian feeling so that a multitude of conspiracies based on religious, political, and racial differences developed against rule from Vienna. An abortive rebellion in 1671 led to incidents of grave retributive justice which reacted not only against the political rebels, but against the Protestants as well.³⁷ In many cases the Protestant pastors had incited their followers to revolt, but, whether they had or not, they were assumed to be at the bottom of the whole unhappy series of events. The ultimate result of the persecution was a mass exodus of Protestants from Hungary to Transylvania and Electoral Saxony which served to arouse sentiments of hatred toward imperial rule and intensified the traditional conflict between the Protestant leaders in Germany and the Catholic emperor. When the Habsburgs sought aid against the Turkish threat from their German vassals, the task was made much harder by the wounds left by the Hungarian rebellion and persecutions.

It was natural for Emperor Leopold I to use the Turkish threat to gain sympathy and support from his nominal vassals. Every successive attack against the weak eastern frontier of Austria brought fresh memories of the siege of Vienna in 1529, when Suleiman II had pounded at the gates of western Europe. The danger was real, ever present, and to all of central Europe the Turk represented the ultimate threat to Christianity and civilization. The cynical alliance of Louis XIV of France with the Sublime Porte provided the Habsburgs with an unassailable argument against French influence in the Empire and an unflinching excuse for their efforts to strengthen the defenses of the Empire against the threat of invasion, even if such strength could be purchased only at the expense of the "liberties" of the German princes. Religious opposition to Habsburg rule in Hungary, on the other hand, weakened the argument. Negotiations toward religious reunion, with concessions to toleration in the meantime, provided Leopold I with the means of answering both Catholic and Protestant critics of Austrian policy. With the disappearance of the Turkish threat in Hungary during the years after 1683 the same reunion negotiations were used as a means of reconciling Protestants in the reconquered areas to their new masters.

While in Germany the tendency toward absolute rule on the part of the princes in part balanced and impeded

the same trend in the institutions of the Empire as a whole, the reverse was true in France. In the Bourbon monarchy there were no small, independent lands. Centralization was a steady process, usually shepherded forward by the monarch as a conscious policy. The religious wars checked it momentarily, but in the end they made it even more logical for vast powers to be centered in royal control so that peace and order and profits could be secured by authority.

The advance toward centralization began under Henry IV and Louis XIII, but its climax was reached with the long reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715). The established rights of the various organisms or corporations which made up French society, both private and public, which had flourished in the Middle Ages, suffered a decline under royal pressure. The two bodies which felt this regicentric trend most strongly were the courts of justice and the Church. It was not only the Protestants who felt the heavy hand of royal power, for the Catholics were as deeply affected. For example, the faculty of theology at Paris lost its right of *committimus*,³⁸ a right which had also been granted the Protestants in the *Chambres de l'Edit*. The faculty humbly prayed that its right be restored, but in such feeble terms that, in fact, the king was free to act without restraint. When the *Chambres de l'Edit* were suppressed, the language of the Protestant suppliants was as cringing as that of the faculty had been. On this one count, the standardization of justice under royal agents, the monarchy treated with equal harshness both the Catholics and the Protestants.³⁹ Contrary to common opinion, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was not the final step in a totally one-sided affair in which the Protestants were the only losers.

The Catholics were, nonetheless, in a particularly favored position, since the King himself was a loyal son of Rome. During the course of the seventeenth century there were two parties among French Catholics: one represented by Richelieu and to a certain extent by Mazarin, and another, the majority party, which looked forward with fierce joy to the day when all heresy would be banished, forcibly if necessary, from the realm of France.⁴⁰ The Catholics who advocated a moderate policy toward religious dissent worked tirelessly to achieve their aims and allay fanaticism. Richelieu encouraged conferences with the Protestants wherein Holy Scripture was to be used as the only basis for argumentation, and in which such words as Mass, transubstantiation, and the like were to be foregone by the Catholic disputants in favor of compromise terms such as Eucharist, Last Supper

³⁶ One of the best exponents of the Roman religion in Hungary in the early part of the seventeenth century was Peter Cardinal Pázmány, who is mentioned several times by Rojas as a precursor of his reunion project in Hungary. See Schwicker, *Peter Pázmány und seine Zeit*, Cologne, 1888.

³⁷ For a general survey of the Hungarian rebellions of the seventeenth century and their impact on Austrian policy see Redlich, Oswald, *Oesterreichs Grossmachtbildung in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I*, Gotha, 1921.

³⁸ The right of *committimus* meant that certain religious bodies had the privilege of carrying cases before a special tribunal which they selected. Olivier-Martin, F., *Histoire du droit français des origines à la Révolution*, section 390, Paris, 1948.

³⁹ Ruhlières, *op. cit.* 1: 70–71.

⁴⁰ Bonet-Maury, *op. cit.*, 22.

(Cène), and Real Presence.⁴¹ During the second half of the century a variety of religious reunion negotiations and conferences were held, frequently under the patronage of the King. The Clerical Assembly of 1682, at which the problem of heresy was as great a concern as were the Four Articles, treated the whole problem of a religious minority with a sense of unusual toleration. At the end of the session, the King's agents, sent to the provinces to administer the decisions of the prelates, were admonished to exercise particular care to treat the Protestants "with great circumspection," and to make certain that they were not prevented from enjoying the special provisions made by the conference in their behalf.⁴²

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes three years later was in part the outcome of the growing strength of the uncompromising Catholics in France. There were, however, political reasons which were equally as strong as the religious. In the first place the French Protestants appeared, rightly or wrongly, to be standing in the way of the general trend toward centralized monarchy. Beyond that there was real opposition to an expanding France from the Protestant Dutch, who were, in turn, assisted by the English, the German Protestants and even by the Catholic Habsburgs. Louis XIV was a genuine *Mars Christianissimus*, but there was a shrill type of bellicosity on the part of his Protestant opponents which turned his natural dislike for them into fear and loathing. At the same time the French Calvinist synods kept their position clear by reiterating time after time that the Pope was Antichrist and the Roman Church the Scarlet Woman of Babylon, a point of view little calculated to calm feelings and set spirits at rest. Moreover, there was a real intrigue against the French government by a small group of Calvinists in France. Although most of those of the Genevan persuasion were loyal subjects, this fanatical group of plotters made the entire body of French Protestantism suspect in the eyes of the King.⁴³

In the relationship between the centralized authority of the monarchy and the religious complexion of France, the most important aspect for the late seventeenth century was Gallicanism. Gallicanism, in general, is a word which had, and still has, varied meanings. In France in the seventeenth century there are to be distinguished three types: royal, parliamentary, and episcopal. Episcopal Gallicanism has already been touched upon in connection with the religious state of France, and further discussion of it may be reserved for later in connection with Bossuet's reunion negotiations, since the Bishop of Meaux was probably the chief representative of this line of thought in France. Gallicanism in its crudest guise was simply a form of French nationalism which saw its leader in the mon-

arch, and which regarded the state as a unity capable of opposing attack from without.

There is some danger in linking too closely the concept of absolute royal authority and that of Gallicanism, but, in broad outlines, it is most difficult to distinguish one from the other. The same people who taught and wrote on one taught and wrote on the other. Both centralization of royal power and Gallicanism are "comprised in the word *regalia*."⁴⁴ The King of France recognized no superior in matters temporal. He could demand taxation from all his subjects, including those ecclesiastical, without the consent of the pope. He had the right of the *Régale*. He could not be excommunicated, because without his consent the bulls could not cross the French frontiers. No ecclesiastical election could be carried out without his consent. The bishops of the realm owed him an oath of allegiance. The king alone had legislative power in his realm; he alone could be elected emperor.⁴⁵

Parliamentary Gallicanism is a somewhat less complex phenomenon than its royal counterpart. It may be summed up briefly. The power of the ecclesiastical courts was to be lessened as much as possible, for the more cases that were in the church courts, the more appeals for final judgment there would be to Rome, and to a parliamentarian, the worst possible thing that could happen was to see French justice deprived of its cases, and the fruits thereof, by the papal courts.⁴⁶

Finally Gallicanism was simply another expression of the regicentric trend which characterized the total policy of Louis XIV. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes may likewise be considered another step in governmental centralization, and not specifically a persecution move against the Protestants. The parliaments had been stilled for the moment in 1685; provincial officials such as military governors had seen their offices disappear or brought under royal control. The Rhenine, Savoyard, and Flemish seizures had brought luster to the glory of Louis XIV and made him cordially detested abroad. The revocation Edict of Fontainebleau may be regarded as the climax of a rule which, up until that time, had steadily gained in prestige, and in doing so had turned the politics and religion of Europe upside down. As a kind of visitation, from that year on, the French monarchy suffered the fate promised to those who live by the sword.

In summary it may be said that there were present in Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century two trends, one irenic and the other anti-irenic. In Germany the Roman Church, strong in Austria under the aegis of the Habsburgs and partially reformed by the salutary decrees of Trent, was obliged

⁴⁴ Hanotaux, G. *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs: Rome* 6: i.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 6: i. For a typical expression of the Gallican point of view by a parliamentarian see Pierre de Marca, *De concordia sacerdotii et imperii* 1: 17, 52-53, 69-70; and 2: 18, 25.

⁴⁶ Hanotaux, *op. cit.* 6: li.

⁴¹ Benoît, *op. cit.* 2: 512-517.

⁴² Duranthon, A., *Collection des procès-verbaux: Les assemblées générales du clergé de France* 5: 280, Paris, 1767-1780.

⁴³ Ruhlières, *op. cit.* 1: 45-46.

by the conditions of the times to be irenic for the most part. Leopold I attempted repression of the Protestants in Hungary, failed in his endeavor, and, from 1681 on until the end of his reign in 1705, he tended to listen to those who advised abandoning methods of force. He granted toleration to his Protestant subjects in the lands reconquered from the Turks, and supported unity projects, both political and religious, in the Empire. At Mainz and at Hanover the princely courts patronized people with universalist and catholic ideas, and made it possible for irenicism to be a thing much discussed and regarded as a worthwhile activity for men of talent and honest purpose.

Among the German Protestants the anti-irenic trend was strong in the centers of Lutheran orthodoxy and in the Pietistic movement which scorned formal and historical church organization. However, the reasonable character of Melancthon, Cassander, and Calixtus, of Leibniz and Molanus and the liberal tendencies of the University of Helmstedt made it possible for a nucleus of adherents of church unity to develop and influence German Lutheran and Calvinist thought.

Political conditions in Germany were favorable to irenic moves. The small German states, although Erastian, were forced by the very condition of their smallness and their proximity to live in peace with one another, to avoid the evils of forced conversion, and to look upon religious union as the prelude to imperial unity and the restoration of the Ottonian greatness of the Reich. In the citadel of Catholicism, Vienna, the Habsburgs, moved both by sincere Catholic sentiments and political expediency, viewed irenicism and its originators with favor and gave them support and privileges.

In France, by way of contrast, both religious and political conditions were unfavorable to irenic trends. This is not to say that such trends did not exist. The free communication of Protestants and Catholics in the scientific and learned academies, the existence of such centers of moderation as Saumur, where Romans and Protestants circulated in an amiable atmosphere and regarded each other with mutual trust and admiration, the deliberate attempts of prelates such as Richelieu and Bossuet to sponsor church reunion, all these are witness to the fact that some French at least were willing to consider means of reunion other than forced conversion and violence.

However, both French religious and political circumstances militated against the overall picture of European church unity projects. Gallicanism in all its forms was, in the last analysis, a particularistic factor that constituted a dreadful block to irenic progress and the political peace of Europe in general. Leibniz and those of similar mind among his contemporaries may have considered the French Gallican Church as a bridge between Protestants and Catholics, but, with historical hindsight, it proved to be a poor weak vessel for such

an exalted role. The King's shocking greed for civil and religious power and the stiff-necked attitude of his Calvinist subjects made any meeting of minds a crazy dream. French policy in Rome blocked papal efforts at cooperation with Rojas and his colleagues. Finally the revocation of the Edict of Nantes put an end to nearly a hundred years of religious peace in France, and forced most of those possessed of a moderate frame of mind to submit or go into hiding to await a more propitious day. In short, the various factors which made up the contemporary French ecclesiastical and civil policy gave the European irenic complex a fatal setback.

It was into this scene, so promising and auspicious in some respects, so forbidding in others, that Cristobal de Rojas y Spinola brought his schemes for the revival of Christian unity in Europe. It has already been suggested that the initial successes and ultimate failure of his plans were in large part the result of the religious and political currents present in western Europe in the seventeenth century. But to understand the ideas he advanced, to gain some notion of the reasons why they took the form they did, it is essential to study the man himself.

II. EARLY CAREER

Cristobal de Gentil de Rojas y Spinola was born in 1626 near Gheldern in Flanders, the son of Diego de Gentil, a lieutenant-general of artillery in the Spanish army.¹ From his mother, Isabella de Rojas y Spinola, Vasosaval y Cubas, Cristobal inherited an illustrious ancestry and affiliation with the highest-ranking nobility of Spain. Although later in his life he was to refer to his ancestors as all "castellanos viejos," that is Christians who had remained true to their faith during the Moslem occupation of Spain, in actual fact his father was undoubtedly of Italian extraction. Diego de Gentil was ultimately killed fighting the Dutch, and Isabella de Rojas y Spinola retired to a nunnery near Cadiz. Their other son, Bartolomeo de Rojas, followed his father's military career and also died serving Spain in Flanders.

While still very young, Cristobal was entrusted to the care of the Franciscan friars of Cologne to be educated in the Church. Whether from a natural inclination to pursuits of the mind, poor physical development, or both, he renounced the military career which would have been logical for him to follow, and instead took the vows of the order of St. Francis. Following his ordination he read scholastic philosophy and theology at Cologne, and by 1657 he was a *lector*

¹ Vienna, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (cited hereafter as HHStA.) Nachlass von Onno Klopp, 13:E44. Some of the details of Rojas' family ties can be inferred from a patent of nobility notarized in Cadiz in 1672. Other manuscript copies of this patent exist beyond the one in the Klopp manuscripts.

emeritus.² According to the statutes of the German Franciscans, this meant that he had completed a course of study which included four years of philosophy and six of theology.

It was while he was studying at Cologne that Rojas first came under the influence of the German irenic movement. Cologne served as an informal headquarters for the efforts made principally by the Jesuits, but also by other orders, to convert influential Protestants to the Roman confession. During the years around the middle of the century many professional people and noblemen were converted, and it was in Cologne that most of them received instruction in their new faith. Around 1650, apparently on his own initiative, Rojas established a "permanent seminary" (*seminarium perpetuum*) to give religious instruction to adolescent converts.³ The seminary was supported by alms and contributions collected by Rojas, and the Franciscan friars provided the young converts a good education at the expense of the order. Among the more illustrious names associated with the seminary was that of Gustav Adolf of Baden-Durlach, later Abbot of Kempten and Fulda and a cardinal of the Church, godson of the famed Protestant general King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.⁴ Certainly many of the associations Rojas found during these years in Cologne were later to be of considerable service to him as he undertook missions throughout Germany in the service of the Church and the Empire.

It is significant that Rojas was a Franciscan. Although one must, for the most part, proceed from speculation rather than facts in this question, it is reasonable to assume that a great religious order such as the Franciscans puts its stamp on its members. Just as a good college or university gives its alumni a distinctive *Weltanschauung*, so does a religious order. While the Jesuits were more active in rapprochements with the Protestants from the time of their foundation until the dissolution of the Society, this does not mean, in the long run, that their ideology or their methods were best adapted to the problem of reunion in general. Their ultramontanism, their emphasis on clericalism,

their sometimes slippery use of terminology offended as many as it attracted. The Dominicans, having played a sorry role at the beginning of the Lutheran movement, were too compromised to appeal to those already outside the Roman communion. The Augustinians had been in the very vanguard of the separation from Rome.

What then of the Franciscans? It is significant that one of the most effective opponents of Luther was the Franciscan Kaspar Schatzgeyer,⁵ whose emphasis on personal purity of life, tolerance for one's opponent, and reliance in the last instance upon God to heal schism and heresy pointed the way to real Christian understanding. The methods of coercion were then, as now, generally useless in swaying consciences. St. Francis himself was one of the first western Europeans to forego the crusade as a means of showing Moslems their errors and to understand that suasion and preaching and personal example are the mightiest weapons of the faith. Despite the attempt to structure the order after the death of Francis, a joyously free spirit has always been characteristic of his spiritual sons. Sometimes it became anarchic as in the case of Fraticelli, but generally it remained as the signal feature of a movement which was so humble and prayerful that it could in most eras find a golden mean between the deadening influence of a cold and legalistic clericalism and the intoxicating attraction of ungoverned religious enthusiasm. It seems probable, then, that Rojas, by the very nature of his Order, was disposed to approach his theological opponents in a conciliatory and humble manner and to use every possible means, short of doctrinal compromise, to restore to the European scene a visible *Una Sancta*.

Shortly after he finished his formal training with the Franciscans of Cologne, Rojas went to Spain. For a short time, probably in 1658, he taught theology at Valladolid.⁶ He appears next as an official in the governing hierarchy of the Franciscan order. As a result, perhaps, of the influence of his high-born relatives at the Spanish court, Rojas was named provincial of the order for the congregation of Valladolid.⁷ This visit to Spain was a brief one, and in 1659 he was again in Germany, this time as *definidor general* of the Franciscans. Since in this capacity he participated in the governing of the entire order, he was required to travel frequently and extensively. His aristocratic birth and cosmopolitan background were qualities which could well serve the Church in administering the inter-

² Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, Handschriftensammlung cod. 9308-9313 (cited hereafter as Hansitz) 9310, 136f. Shortly after Rojas died in 1695, his friend Leibniz went to Wiener Neustadt, gathered many papers, copied others and took the material to Hanover where he proposed to compose a biography of Rojas at his leisure. This project never came to fruition. Later on in the eighteenth century Marcus Hansitz, S. J., an Austrian antiquarian and historian, gathered together many of the Wiener Neustadt papers, again copying some, and wrote a Latin history of Rojas' life and work. His biography and the manuscripts he collected are preserved in the Austrian National Library. On Hansitz, see A. Coreth, *Österreichische Geschichtsschreibung in der Barockzeit*, 116-117, Vienna, 1950.

³ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 18-20.

⁴ Bog, Ingomar, Christoph de Royas y Spinola und die deutschen reichsstände, forschungen zu den reichseinigungsplänen Kaiser Leopolds I., *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung Festgabe Anton Ernstberger* 14: 191-204, 1954.

⁵ Lortz, Josef, *Die Reformation in Deutschland* 2: 163f. Freiburg i.B., 1948.

⁶ HHStA., 16, Spanien Varia, 1664 folio 4. Copia de membr. del Padre Roxas a la Magd. del Empor. This brief autobiographical memorandum (cited hereafter as Memorial 1665) was presented by Rojas to Leopold I sometime in 1665 shortly after he learned of the death of Philip IV of Spain.

⁷ *Ibid.* As provincial, Rojas had some responsibility for inspecting and supervising Franciscan establishments in his area.

national institutions under its care. It was on the occasion of this tour of Germany that Rojas first became involved in the diplomacy of the House of Austria.

While Rojas was lecturing in theology at Valladolid, the College of Electors had finally chosen the Archduke Leopold as Holy Roman Emperor over the rival claims and candidacy of Louis XIV of France. During the confusion at the beginning of a new reign, some of the princes sought to enhance their positions at the expense of the prerogatives of the young Emperor. A plot, the details of which were only vaguely conceived, and are now further dimmed by time, involved a *coup* to gain control of the imperial city of Jülich. Rojas got wind of the plot and informed imperial agents of the matter in time to prevent its success.⁸ This service to the Emperor's cause, however slight it may have been, brought him to the attention of powerful men at the court of Vienna. In 1659 or early in 1660 Rojas appeared at the Habsburg capital as personal confessor to Prince Ferdinand Portia, tutor, friend and first minister of the young Emperor Leopold I.⁹ Portia, the recognized leader of the pro-Spanish faction at the court,¹⁰ probably was instrumental in securing for Rojas appointment as provincial of the Franciscan Order in the Protestant states of northern Germany. Although it is unlikely that there would be much business attached to such a commission, the position gave Rojas an excellent excuse to travel in Germany and a natural cover for his diplomatic errands.

Rojas' role in public affairs remained throughout his life much as it was at the beginning of his career. He was first and foremost a churchman, lending his diplomatic and administrative talents to the Emperor. The diplomatic and intelligence agencies of the state had not, at least in central Europe, evolved beyond an informal and very personal system. In such a situation the traveling priest or merchant could act informally as an agent for his prince, gathering information or negotiating preliminary questions without forcing his master to commit or compromise himself by issuing definite instructions and credentials.

In the beginning Rojas was useful merely as one of a fair number of agents performing small favors for a patron in addition to their normal affairs. He quickly rose to prominence, however, as a vociferous patron of men who were advancing new ideas for economic reforms. The economic situation of the Empire was such that he found a sympathetic audience; his attachment to Prince Portia assured him of a hearing at court. In order to assess Rojas' role in the early beginnings of German mercantilistic planning, it is necessary to take a brief survey of the milieu from which these programs developed.

⁸ *Ibid.* The exact nature of his services in this instance are not explained in detail in the memorial, perhaps out of discretion.

⁹ Bog, *op. cit.*, 204.

¹⁰ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 60.

Though there had been peace of sorts for a decade, the German states and the Habsburg crown lands were still in a state of economic exhaustion which the rulers of these territories were just beginning to comprehend and to master. The central problem in 1660, as it had been in 1648, was reconstruction and recovery from the ravages of a generation of barbaric warfare, most of it conducted within the Germanies. Some princes sought to increase the productivity of their states by improving agricultural techniques and settling immigrants on wasted lands. A great measure of success rewarded the efforts of such rulers as Karl Ludwig of the Palatinate, Frederick William of Brandenburg, Johann Philipp von Schönborn of Mainz and others. The more serious problem of replacing the capital investment represented by the towns and their industries, as well as the social investment in roads bridges, canals, dikes, fortifications, and the like, was not an easy one either to define or to solve. These economic difficulties were aggravated by increased political decentralization imposed on the Empire by the peace settlement in 1648. The confusion of hundreds of internal tolls and customs barriers virtually stifled commerce of any great volume, and what commerce existed was largely concentrated in the hands of French merchants or the purveyors of the Dutch carrying trade.¹¹

Looking to the relatively prosperous countries of the west, France, England, and especially Holland, many German statesmen found solutions to their economic inferiority in the ideas of mercantilism. In its elementary, seventeenth-century form mercantilism was not an economic system properly defined. It was rather a convenient term used to designate a group of principles all more or less precisely enunciated by political, rather than economic, thinkers during the rapid development of European commerce after 1500. The focal point of all these ideas was the development of a powerful, unified and centralized national state.¹²

Most mercantilist writers accepted several principles as being axiomatic. That the wealth of a state consisted of the accumulation and hoarding of precious metals was the first of these and perhaps the most understood. Modern economists and critics of mercantilism too often forget that, in an age when the state was more often at war than not, wealth and power were one and the same thing if wealth meant hard cash for paying mercenary troops.

Mercantilism was, at least in its earlier stages, a belligerent philosophy which conceived of the state in terms of wealth and of the military and naval power

¹¹ Bühler, Johannes, *Deutsche Geschichte* 4: 255.

¹² Silberman, Edmond, *La guerre dans la pensée économique du XVII^e au XVIII^e siècle*, 8ff, Paris, 1939. A basic distinction must be drawn between English and continental mercantilism. Whereas in England there were both officials like Elizabeth's ministers and merchants like Mun advancing these theories, on the continent the mercantilist doctrine was almost exclusively the province of public servants.

which that wealth could provide. Commerce was simply a different way of waging war. Foreign trade, then, was preferable to internal commerce since it brought money profits into the state; and industry was superior to any other economic activity, since it was the means of self-sufficiency and freedom from foreign exploitation. The size and density of the population were regarded as important factors of national power, and from the mercantilists of this period come some of the earliest systematic attempts to keep accurate statistics of the economic activities of the state and its population. To the state was conceded the right to intervene in the economic life of its members wherever it was necessary to create a political advantage over foreign competitors. Finally, mercantilists saw the economic interests of nations as necessarily antithetical, since the relative quantity of wealth and commerce was not subject to much increase or diminution. This did not mean that they held to a theory that allowed for no increase in the total volume of production and exchange, but rather that the relative increase in the wealth of one state must be at the expense of another, since it meant also a relative increase in the power of that state in proportion to others.

The acceptance of these primitive mercantilistic doctrines in the Germanies pointed up a serious contradiction in German politics: the essential question whether Germany was to be one or many. The notion of economic self-sufficiency was attractive to every German ruler, but it meant one thing to the Emperor and his supporters, quite another to the territorial princes. In the first instance mercantilism offered arguments for increasing imperial power within the Reich, and suggested means which the Emperor might use to regain the central position in Germany which he had lost in the past decades. From the beginning this was the position which Rojas supported and explored. To the smaller rulers, however, mercantilist theories suggested a means of consolidating their "liberties" and of further weakening their dependence upon the central political institutions of the Empire. In this situation, Rojas was in the difficult position of a man trying to convince others of the truth of ideas which they had already accepted, but which they felt meant something quite different from what Rojas intended.

How much of Rojas later plans for the reunification of the Christian Church and the revitalization of the Holy Roman Empire came from his years of study and a long intellectual conviction, and how much he picked up and pieced together as his diplomatic activities took in larger areas of statecraft it is impossible to say. The first of his many mercantilistic projects, however, dates clearly from the year 1660, and more specifically from his visit in that year to the court of Frederick William of Brandenburg-Prussia, where he made the acquaintance of the renegade Dutch admiral Aernoudt Gijsels van Lier.

Admiral van Lier had served over thirty years with the Netherlands East India Company, rising to the rank of vice-admiral. Ambitious beyond his capacities, he had then tried to set up a corporation to compete with the Dutch monopoly in its own trading area. This plan failed completely, and he turned his back on Holland, going to Brandenburg where he found service in the customs administration of the ambitious Elector in 1647.¹³ Frederick William learned the value of sea power from his war with Sweden in the Baltic, and anxious to use his newly won outlet to the sea to the best advantage, he got from van Lier a stream of projects for the development of maritime trade between Brandenburg and Western Europe. Faced with the absence of any large reserves of capital for investment, the Elector could do no more than read the proposals, absorb the principles they enunciated, and then file them for future reference.¹⁴

Early in the year 1660 Rojas appeared in Brandenburg ostensibly traveling on business of his order. What other informal diplomatic missions he may have had remain unknown, but in the course of his visit he met Gijsels van Lier who won him over to his plan for a German East India Company. Rojas proposed that, given the limited possibilities for such an ambitious undertaking on the part of Brandenburg, the emperor was the logical prince to put the plan into operation. Van Lier readily agreed and asked Frederick William for permission to go with Rojas to Vienna, there to place his proposals before the imperial government and to encourage a commercial association between the Habsburg and Hohenzollern rulers. The Elector gave his consent to the suggestion, but the journey to Vienna was delayed on one pretext or another until autumn.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Rojas and van Lier spent the summer working over the details of their scheme.

Van Lier's first concept involved the establishment of a company, privately capitalized, which would outfit a small number of ships to enter into direct trade with the East Indies, thereby making it possible for Brandenburg to import colonial wares directly and by-pass the Dutch middlemen. Rojas viewed the whole project from a completely different angle, perceiving the political as well as financial possibilities involved in it. His experience with the political and diplomatic confusion which marked Germany led him to believe that an undertaking of this nature could not be privately capitalized. Whence would come the political power to protect the investment? Even more, where would one find German merchants with enough capital to risk?

Clearly, as Rojas saw it, only the states themselves

¹³ Heyck, Eduard, *Brandenburgisch-deutsche Kolonialpläne aus den Papieren des Markgrafen Hermann von Baden-Baden*, 132, Freiburg i.B., 1887.

¹⁴ Schevill, Ferdinand, *The great elector*, 239, Chicago, 1947.

¹⁵ Heyck, *op. cit.*, 151.

could supply the capital necessary to keep the venture free from foreign control. To this end he suggested the formation of a trading company on a much larger scale than that proposed by van Lier, capitalized by an alliance of several larger German states and under the protection of the Emperor. Such an association also offered a possible solution to one of the major objections to van Lier's original plans. The Dutch and the Portuguese monopolized most of the important trading posts in the East Indies, and neither was likely to welcome German competition; the Dutch because their commercial profits were the foundation of their power, the Portuguese in part at least because of the bitterness still remaining from their recent rebellion against Habsburg Spain. Spain itself was the only European power with important trading posts in the East Indies which might be willing to admit vessels of the imperial company, and Rojas hoped that the family alliance between the Austrian and Spanish branches of the Habsburg family might be broadened into a commercial alliance for this purpose. Such an alliance would enable the company to avoid having to fight its way into the well-protected Dutch trading preserves.

In the autumn of 1660 Rojas and van Lier went to Vienna to place their revised proposals before Emperor Leopold I, first winning the support of Prince Portia.¹⁶ The addition of the Spanish alliance to the plans doubtless had much to do with Portia's favorable reaction. The memorial submitted to the Emperor in 1660 was composed in its final form by Rojas. In place of the modest scheme originally advanced by van Lier, this version suggested the capitalization of an imperial corporation at one million Reichsthaler, to begin operations with a fleet of twenty-five ships.¹⁷

The proposals Rojas presented to the Emperor contained an attractive prospect for economic recovery and progress as well as a thinly veiled suggestion for increasing the power of the House of Austria in the Empire. Significantly, Rojas added to his plan a note about working toward the reunion of the churches.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 152ff. Bog, *op. cit.*, 205.

¹⁷ Hassinger, Herbert, *Johann Joachim Becher 1635-1682*, 46, Vienna, 1951. The article "Bedenken/ so Herr Pater Rochas Bischoff von Stephanien/dieser Sachen wegen eingegeben hat/auss dem lateinischen ins Teutsche versetzt/ . . ." as quoted by Johann Joachim Becher in the third edition of his *Politischer Discurs* is without date, but if it is not the exact text of Rojas' memorandum to the Emperor of the year 1660, it assuredly follows closely the details of the arguments and proposals which Rojas set forth in his first discussion of the matter in Vienna in 1660. This statement of the proposals comes prior to the negotiations with Spain which Rojas undertook for the Habsburg monarch and the Elector of Brandenburg in 1661. Becher, J. J., *Politischer Discurs* 963f., Frankfurt-am-Main, 1688.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Gründliche Weiss oder Unterricht/den Fried und Sicherheit der Deutschen Fürsten zu procurirn, erfordert Verschaffung welcher niemaln von einander abtrennen Mitteln: als Vermehr und Zunehmung des Gewalts/und vereinigung der Gemüther.

The memorial began with an analysis of the unhappy state of the Holy Roman Empire, pointing to the decline from its former greatness through "war, the importing of many foreign goods, . . . and the lack of unity of the states through particularism and differences in faith."¹⁹ The mercantilist position Rojas took in this memorial can be seen clearly in his concept of the power of the state as wealth. "Power," he wrote, "is not increased through an increase in the number of subjects or through a surplus of new fruits of the land. . . ." These were of value to the inhabitants, but brought no real power to the prince. "To increase the power of a prince it is necessary that the subjects of the Fatherland . . . in all places where the common good may require it . . . be able to defend themselves." This can be done only with the possession of a surplus of hard cash (*bare Geldsmittel*), which cannot be procured simply by husbanding and saving the gold and silver produced by the German mines.²⁰ There remain only two possibilities for procuring the security of the Empire. One either must resort to weapons, "which would not be cheap," or engage in "commerce and trade of your own produce, metals and manufactures for the gold of other princes."

Although unrealistic in its expansive optimism, the course of action recommended by this memorial had much to commend it. Based as it was on a sound understanding of affairs within the Empire, it took into account the necessity for an alliance between the Emperor and some of his important German vassals as the *sine qua non* of any such undertaking. The propaganda value of the plan was also good. It appealed to those princes who held with the Habsburgs against France, and at the same time lured the north German princes whose ambitions were frustrated by the Dutch monopoly of the carrying trade.

The Emperor himself appears to have caught some of the enthusiasm of Prince Portia and Rojas for the plan, but he was indecisive by nature, and preferred to proceed through careful negotiation rather than by taking decisive action on his own part.²¹ On December 5, 1660, the Emperor signed credentials for Rojas empowering him to negotiate with the Margrave of Baden and other Rhenish princes.²² Three days later these credentials were augmented by an imperial letter which allowed Rojas to treat with the Elector of Brandenburg and the King of Spain on the subject of the East India Company.²³

It was the Emperor's intent that the negotiations be kept strictly secret, for he suspected, not without

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 964.

²¹ For a good description of the personality and character of Leopold I, see Redlich, *op. cit.*, 59-62.

²² Becher, *op. cit.*, 912.

²³ The text of the letter to Philip IV is given in Schück, Richard, *Brandenburg-Preussens Kolonialpolitik unter dem grossen Kurfürsten und seinen Nachfolgern, 1647-1721* 2: 52-63, Leipzig, 1889.

reason, that, should the matter become generally known, the French would stir up opposition among their German allies. Rojas' warning in the memorandum concerning the importance of the religious problems involved in an alliance between Catholic and Protestant princes indicated the nature of the difficulties which the French might suggest in order to impede the negotiations. From the very beginning Rojas' proposals took on a strongly Catholic orientation.²⁴

Rojas left Vienna shortly after receiving his letters of credence and went to the Rhineland to confer with the important lay and ecclesiastical princes of that region. Early in the year 1661 he appeared at the court of Margrave Hermann of Baden-Baden, where he informed the Margrave, "as secretly as possible," of the project he envisioned for the Germanies.²⁵ Margrave Hermann favored the plan and made the cause his own, becoming a sincere propagandist and eager supporter of the commercial alliance. When Rojas went on from Baden to meet Frederick William of Brandenburg at Cleves, the Margrave of Baden accompanied him.²⁶

Apparently the Elector had not planned to go into further details on the commercial treaty at that time, for he had left the papers concerning the project in Berlin.²⁷ In spite of his absent-mindedness, however, Rojas did manage to convince him to make an important decision at Cleves. As Frederick William originally proposed it, the company was to be an association of German princes with himself at the head, each other prince in the league providing money for one regiment of troops. The company was to have nothing to do with America, but would concern itself exclusively with trade in the Far East. For this, however, bases in Asia were essential and could be obtained only by using the Spanish harbors, presumably those in the Philippine Islands, which at that time were still open only to commerce with the New World. The Elector was aware of the importance of bringing Spain into the partnership, but he did not wish the company to be a means of increasing the power of the Habsburgs. The alliance he had signed with Leopold I in 1658 was already cooling. The Elector wanted only two things from the Emperor: first, Leopold would act in his capacity as emperor as a protector of the undertaking, lending his standard to the fleet; second, the Emperor would use his good offices as intermediary in the negotiations with the senior branch of his own family, the Spanish ruling house.²⁸ Frederick William decided to make a direct approach to Spain with his

plan alongside that of Leopold I, using Rojas as his representative in Madrid.

Credentials were inscribed for Rojas and signed by the Elector at Cleves on April 13, 1661.²⁹ The commission enabled Rojas to acquaint the Spanish government with all the exchanges between the Elector of Brandenburg and the Emperor concerning the East India Company. In the event that Philip IV should agree to join the enterprise on terms acceptable to Brandenburg, Rojas was empowered to "conclude, ratify, and so best order the matter for the general interest."³⁰ Rojas proceeded from Cleves to Spain, parting company with Margrave Hermann of Baden, who went to Vienna to work there as a supporter of the project.

Rojas arrived in Madrid in July, 1661. His first report to Margrave Hermann was written on the third of August. The impressions he reported of his reception in Spain were not encouraging.³¹ The time was hardly auspicious for the discussion of such an arrangement between Spain and Austria. The Spanish Council of State was concerned already with the succession to the throne. The peace with France concluded in 1660 had been humiliating for Spain, and the pro-Austrian faction at the court was losing influence in the face of accusations that Austria had failed Spain in her hour of need. To complicate matters further, the Austrian representative in Madrid, Count Lamberg, had been recalled; and from 1661 until the arrival of Count Eusebius von Pötting in 1663 there was no official representative of the Emperor at the court of Spain.³²

In the absence of an official Austrian representative in Madrid, Rojas was presented at the court by the papal nuncio, Cardinal Carlo Bonelli. In a report to the papal secretary written in April, 1662, Bonelli reported on the progress of the commercial negotiations in Madrid up to that time. Philip IV was apparently favorably inclined toward the project, in spite of his initial reservations and the contrary inclinations of some of his ministers.³³ According to Bonelli, who remained in touch with Rojas during the negotiations, a treaty had been outlined and the concept provisionally accepted by the King. "The only differences which remain," wrote Bonelli, "are caused by the diversity of religion among the confederates."³⁴ Rojas, in spite of his perennial optimism, was most certainly aware of the magnitude of the problems caused by those religious differences. According to Cardinal Bonelli, Rojas was working diligently to gain what advantages he could for the Catholic faith.

²⁴ Heyck, *op. cit.*, 164.

²⁵ Memorial of Margrave Hermann of Baden-Baden to the Emperor Leopold I concerning the foundation of an East India Company in Germany, Vienna, 19 August, 1661. Quoted in Becher, *op. cit.*, 912.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 918.

²⁸ Heyck, *op. cit.*, 149.

²⁹ Text in German in Becher, *op. cit.*, 941.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 956.

³² Redlich, *op. cit.*, 103-104.

³³ Hildebrandt, Philipp, *Die kirchlichen Reunions- verhandlungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 40, Rome, 1922.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Whatever progress might have been registered by 1662, in the end it was the death of the King's favorite Don Luis de Haro in 1661 that proved the real cause for the unfavorable termination of negotiations in Spain. After the dismissal of the powerful minister, the Count-Duke of Olivarez in 1643, Philip IV had tried for a time to rule Spain himself, without the aid of a first minister. As time went on, however, Philip lost interest in governing and relied increasingly upon his favorite, or *privado*, Don Luis de Haro, a nephew of Olivarez. Since the King had little taste and virtually no talent for ruling, Haro gradually gained the status of first minister in fact, if not in title.³⁵ At first this was fortunate for Rojas, for he counted Don Luis among his personal friends, and was assured of his support and cooperation at court.³⁶

Although King Philip IV himself felt strongly his obligations to the Austrian branch of his family, he was not the master of events in Spain during the last years of his reign. An anti-Austrian party was forming at court around the handsome, young Don Juan de Austria. Don Juan, who bore proudly the name of another royal Spanish bastard, was the illegitimate son of Philip IV and the actress Calderona. Whereas the King was always unfortunate in his legitimate issue, Don Juan was vigorous and intelligent. There were many in Spain who would have preferred to see him on the throne after the death of his father. A legitimate heir, Philip Prosper, had been born in 1661, and died the same year. The birth of another son would still have meant a royal minority and a regency, presumably under the unpopular queen, Maria Anna (Marianna) of Austria. Don Luis de Haro and Don Juan de Austria were always at odds, but the antagonism between the two was resolved suddenly at the end of the year 1661 when Haro died.³⁷ The death of Don Luis was a serious blow to Rojas and his project, as well as to all hopes of the Austrians for substantial support from Spain. The King was no longer guided by ministers so sympathetic to the interests of the House of Austria as Haro had been.

Even before Rojas, hopes for success dimmed in Spain the Elector of Brandenburg retreated from his earlier commitments. Evidently anticipating that his proposals would meet with serious resistance in Madrid, on account of the religious issue if no other, he turned toward the northern maritime powers and concluded a naval and commercial treaty with England.³⁸ Although this must have caused some anxiety for Rojas in Spain, he continued to negotiate with the King and his ministers. In 1662 he was finally invited to turn the project over for consideration by any of the

Spanish ministers whom he might choose.³⁹ This in itself was a considerable achievement for Rojas, for he could thereby avoid submitting his proposals to those ministers whom he knew to be unfavorably inclined toward the project. For the moment there was still some hope of success for his mission in Madrid.

The original concept of the oriental company was in fact shattered by the treaty between Brandenburg and England. The commercial agreement which Frederick William signed with the restored Stuart monarchy offered Brandenburg more certain and immediate advantages than the vague proposals for a German trading company. The Elector was not anxious to jeopardize the advantages he gained thereby by competing in the oriental trade with his new allies. Since van Lier's original scheme envisioned using Portuguese ports in the Far East, the project would have been distasteful to the British who were allied with the newly independent Portuguese monarchy.⁴⁰ In November, 1661, Frederick William decided to withdraw completely from negotiations between Austria and Spain. A letter sent to Rojas from Cologne instructed him to take no further action on behalf of Brandenburg. Rojas was still accredited by the Emperor, however, and continued to act as his agent in Spain.⁴¹

Rojas worked intermittently through the summer of 1662 with the committee of Spanish ministers whom he had selected to work with him on the East India Company plan. He was still in Madrid in October, 1662, at which time he was able to show Cardinal Bonelli the text of a commercial agreement which was nearly completed.⁴² The draft of the treaty proposed beginning the company with a much smaller capitalization than Rojas had originally outlined to the Emperor, and starting operations with only five ships. The remainder of the proposals were similar to those which Rojas had earlier set forth in his memorial to the Emperor. The religious issue remained unsettled, however, for the Spaniards were unwilling to have any but Catholics in the armed contingents or on the ships of the company. Such a reservation made an agreement with the Protestant princes of Germany unlikely.

The only solid accomplishment of this mission was the granting to Rojas by the Spanish ministers of power to negotiate the religious issue with the German princes. He had gained as much as he could have expected, but the East India Company was no nearer to being a reality than it had been two years before. The time had not yet come when commercial diplomacy could overcome the uncompromising zeal of Catholic Spain or the mistrust of the *corpus evangelicorum*.

While these commercial negotiations were drawing to an unsatisfactory conclusion in Madrid, Rojas became involved in the perennial diplomatic maneuvers

³⁵ Hume, Martin S., *The Court of Philip IV*, 379f., London, 1907.

³⁶ Becher, *op. cit.*, 969.

³⁷ Hume, *op. cit.*, 487.

³⁸ Hassinger, *op. cit.*, 46.

³⁹ Heyck, *op. cit.*, 180.

⁴⁰ Bog, *op. cit.*, 206.

⁴¹ Quoted in Schück, *op. cit.* 2: 63.

⁴² Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 18-20.

concerning the succession to the Polish crown. King John Casimir had died without male issue, and, when the succession of an Austrian prince was suggested, the Russians resisted the idea.⁴³ At that point the French intervened through the Polish queen and attempted to establish a relationship between Poland and France similar to the one that existed between the houses of Austria and Spain.⁴⁴ As an alternative to a Bourbon candidate, the Habsburgs proposed Rojas' colleague Margrave Hermann of Baden. Along with his other chores in Madrid, Rojas undertook to secure support from Spain for the Margrave's candidacy. In this, at least, he was not disappointed, for the Spanish agent Uzeda, who was sent to Poland, was instructed to use his influence on behalf of the Margrave.⁴⁵

The frustration of the main object of Rojas' visit to Madrid led him to concentrate even more on a plan for the reunion of the Catholic and Protestant confessions. As he returned to Germany by way of the Netherlands in 1662, more urgent problems forced Rojas to relegate his schemes for a commercial alliance and religious unity to a secondary position. The resurgence of Turkish power in eastern Europe had created a crisis in the Empire, and Rojas was charged with many missions on behalf of the King of Spain as a member of the Reich. His overt mission was to negotiate with various German princes concerning the commercial treaty, but his real task concerned the more urgent business of neutralizing French influence in the Empire.

After more than a century of comparative quiet in eastern Europe, the Hungarian frontier between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires erupted violently in 1660 as the Turkish armies again moved into the Danubian basin. In August the fortress of Grosswardein fell, and with it the key to Hungary. Emperor Leopold sent urgent summons to his German vassals, and as early as July, 1661, troops from Bavaria began to arrive in Hungary to augment the weak imperial forces there.⁴⁶ Small volunteer contingents could not stop the invasion, however, and the Emperor summoned all the rulers of the Empire to assemble in Regensburg for a Reichstag. The Diet which convened at Regensburg on January 20, 1663, had been summoned by the Emperor to meet a special emergency. It was kept in perpetual session until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.⁴⁷

Spain was represented in the imperial Diet through its possessions in the Spanish Netherlands, which formed the largest part of the Burgundian Circle of the Empire. Leopold demanded military assistance

from the King of Spain as a German prince and member of the Empire. Spain was engaged in a war on its own frontiers at the same time, however, and demanded Austrian aid against the Portuguese. In this situation the French did what they could to widen the growing breach between the two branches of the Habsburg dynasty.⁴⁸ Whatever the eventual outcome of the wars might be, the French stood to gain substantially from the situation.

Rojas appeared again in Germany as an agent of Spain. He was directly responsible to the Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands, through whom his reports were transmitted to the Council of State in Madrid. Both the commercial negotiations and his ecclesiastical status provided good cover for his more serious diplomacy, but the latter at least was more than just a pretext. Acting as Visitor General for the Franciscans in the province of Thuringia, he was able to take time from his other duties to visit the Franciscan cloisters in that province, and to effect some improvements in the educational work of the order.⁴⁹

It is probable that Rojas had several tasks to perform at once, but the immediate occasion for his urgent mission to the Diet was a claim published by Louis XIV to possession of the Franche Comté.⁵⁰ This small but strategically important area bordered on the Empire, but was not part of it like the other Spanish possessions in the area. The French had been bargaining for some time over the Free County, but in 1663 they broke off negotiations and threatened war. The only solution the Spaniards could think of was to have the small state incorporated into the Empire, thus bringing it under the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia which France had guaranteed.⁵¹ Rojas' mission was to stir up support for this move among the lesser princes of the Reich.

In this instance Rojas decided to focus his attention on the Elector of Mainz. The electorate of Mainz was by tradition one of the most important principalities of the Empire, and the incumbent prince-archbishop was also the Chancellor of the Empire. In 1663 the elector was Johann Philipp von Schönborn, a man of remarkable talent and energy. He had worked continually in the interest of European peace since the later years of the Thirty Years' War, and since 1658 had been the leading figure in the French-subsidized alliance of Rhenish princes.⁵² Rojas presumed, quite rightly, that if the Prince-Archbishop of Mainz would support the Emperor and Spain, then those other princes of

⁴³ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 104-105.

⁴⁴ Menge, P. Gisbert, *Zur Biographie des Irenikers Spinola, Franziskanische Studien* 2: 5, 1915.

⁴⁵ Hansitz, 9310: 136, and 9313: 54.

⁴⁶ Haselbeck, P. Gallus, *Der Ireniker P. Christoph Rojas y Spinola, Der Katholik*, fourth ser., 11: 389, 1913.

⁴⁷ Mentz, Georg, *Johann Philipp von Schönborn, Kurfürst von Mainz, Bischof von Würzburg und Worms, 1605-1673*, Jena, 1896.

⁴³ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 86.

⁴⁴ Pribram, Alfred F., *Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola, 1613-1674*, 232, Leipzig, 1894.

⁴⁵ Hildebrandt, *op. cit.*, 41.

⁴⁶ Doeberl, M., *Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns* 2: 33, Munich, 1908.

⁴⁷ Bühler, *op. cit.* 4: 181.

the Reich who were not completely sold to France would follow his lead.

At the time of his election as Emperor in 1658 Leopold I had signed an agreement in which he bound himself not to make war on France or any ally of the French.⁵³ This "Capitulation" was the cornerstone of French policy north and east of the Rhine. The Turkish invasion presented the French with a most difficult problem. The Turks were not their allies, and hence capitulation could not be made the basis for French objection to the Emperor's attempt to raise troops in the German states for the defense of the Empire. On the other hand, the French knew that the Austrians would use the opportunity to increase their own influence in the Empire and to impose further greater unity on the German states. The interests of both Spain and Austria would be served, but only by creating a potential danger for France.

When Rojas appeared at Mainz in February, 1663, to discuss "commercial affairs" with the Elector, he found that the French had inadvertently helped him to win his case. Seeing that the capitulation could not be raised as an objection to the Emperor's plea for aid, the French had resorted to the dangerous policy of playing off the lesser princes against the members of the College of Electors.⁵⁴ This enraged the Elector of Mainz, and Rojas was able to report to the Duke of San Lucar with some satisfaction that Johann Philipp was more and more inclined to favor the Emperor's cause against the wishes of the French.⁵⁵

If the Turkish threat meant a need for increasing Habsburg influence on the Rhine, the designs of the French against the Franche Comté and the Spanish Netherlands gave Spain good reason to support the same cause. For once, Rojas could serve two masters and pursue a single policy. Having done what he could at Mainz, preparing the ground for favorable reception to more specific proposals later, Rojas hired some courtiers to provide him with information, and prepared to move on to Cologne.⁵⁶ Nowhere in Germany was French influence more firmly entrenched than in the electorate of Cologne. That powerful ecclesiastical state was dominated by the Fürstenberg family, and the Fürstenbergs were firmly tied to France. If Rojas did in fact visit Cologne, it is unlikely that he was ever given the opportunity to bring up the main issues behind his mission. By late June or early July he was back in the Spanish Netherlands

occupied with business of the Franciscan order and preparing reports on his work in Germany up to that time.⁵⁷

In Brussels, Rojas proposed to the Spanish officials a program for further work in Germany. He suggested that he return to the Rhineland, not as an agent of Spain, but rather as a Franciscan working for the cause of peace, "which is a proper office for a priest."⁵⁸ A Spanish agent might be sent openly to Cologne, but not to Mainz. Rojas feared that the appearance of such an official embassy at Mainz would so compromise Johann Philipp with the French that the opportunity of gaining his support for the Habsburg cause would be lost. The French saw the danger implicit in Rojas' missions in Germany and tried to bully Johann Philipp into line. An angry scene was precipitated by the French envoy in Mainz, during which he accused the Elector of "treating of affairs of state of the Empire and a new company designed to augment the power of the house of Austria."⁵⁹

Brusquely accused of betraying the alliance with France, Johann Philipp replied politely, only to be treated to another burst of anger. This tactlessness gained the French nothing, however, for though Johann Philipp denied any intention of betraying his alliance with France, he was more convinced than ever that an understanding with Spain and Austria was desirable if he were to maintain independence of action. Thus with the unwitting assistance of the French, Rojas had succeeded in making a breach in the French alliance system on the Rhine. He immediately took what advantage he could from the situation and proposed to go to some monastery situated conveniently on neutral ground between the electorates of Cologne and Trier. There he proposed to use whatever leverage his favor in Mainz might give him to influence either or both of the other ecclesiastical electors.⁶⁰

The Spanish Council of State moved with unprecedented haste in urging the King to follow up the good results which Rojas had achieved.⁶¹ A special code had already been sent which he might use in his reports, hopefully keeping the French in the dark about the specific details of his conversations. This was followed by promises of money for judicious bribes at the court of Mainz.⁶²

Throughout the early months of 1663 Rojas found invaluable support in the person of his friend Mar-

⁵⁷ AGS. Estado, legajo 2102. Copia de carta del P. Fr. Christoval de Roxas escrita al Marques de Caracena en 10 de Julio de 1663.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.* Report of the Council of State dated August 11, 1663. The letters had been forwarded to Madrid from Brussels by the Marques de Caracena on July 12. It usually took between three and four weeks for communications to go from the Netherlands to Spain.

⁶² *Ibid.* Also AGS. Estado, legajo 2375. Letter of Rojas dated Antwerp, July 24, 1663.

⁵³ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 56-57.

⁵⁴ Spain. Archivo General de Simancas (cited hereafter as AGS.) Estado, legajo 2375. Copia de carta del Pe. Fr. Xtoval de Roxas para el Sr. Duque de San Lucar de Maguncia de 3 de Marzo de 1663.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ AGS. Estado, legajo 2375. Report of the Council of State dated April 24, 1663. At Rojas' request the Council recommended that a letter of credit for 1,000 silver ducats be sent to Rojas to enable him to maintain himself with dignity at Cologne.

grave Hermann of Baden.⁶³ By getting Spanish support for a project to marry the Margrave's sister to Archduke Sigismund of Innsbruck, he was able to do a favor for his friend, and gain an important voice in the Diet favorable to the Habsburg interests.⁶⁴

By summer, 1663, the Turkish invasion overshadowed all other considerations. Rojas appeared briefly at Regensburg where he attended deliberations in the Reichstag and conferred with Austrian ministers. By October he was in Vienna, reporting to the Spanish ministers his most sanguine hopes for the success of Habsburg plans,⁶⁵ envisioning a new unity for the Empire growing out of the war against the Turks which could be turned against the French as well. It was a moment of great peril for the House of Austria. The Turks had swept through Hungary and nearly reached the city of Vienna. The Ottoman armies did not invest the city when they had the opportunity, however, but took up winter quarters in Hungary.⁶⁶ This gave the Austrians the time they needed to complete their work at the Diet and to prepare for the campaign the following spring.

On October 26, 1663, Rojas received from the *Reichshofrat* official credentials ordering him to negotiate with "the three ecclesiastical electors, Saxony and Brandenburg" concerning the proposed East India Company.⁶⁷ Actually, as Rojas himself later admitted, this was nothing more than a convenient disguise and cover for his real purpose, which was to obtain military assistance against the Turks from the Rhenish princes.⁶⁸ Almost immediately thereafter, early in November, Rojas accompanied the Emperor and Prince Portia to Regensburg.⁶⁹

The French still objected to the Austrian demands for aid, but, in view of the real peril of the situation, their reliance on the capitulation of 1658 carried little weight in the deliberations of the German princes. Elector Johann Philipp of Mainz had already thrown his support behind the Austrian demands for aid.⁷⁰ Rojas used the money he had been sent from Spain to bribe men who could be expected to keep Johann Philipp in this favorable mood. With uncanny subtlety, Rojas sought out men who would be satisfied with

modest sums and yet who could exert enough influence to make it worth the price. The brother of the Elector's confessor received a thousand ducats, as did each of the Elector's secretaries. Other members of the Elector's household, who might have been offended by direct offers of money, had their living expenses graciously paid for them while they were in Regensburg.⁷¹ A final tour of Rhenish courts, including Cologne and Trier, concluded Rojas' mission. The ceaseless travel in cold weather damaged his health, and he was forced to remain in Frankfurt-am-Main for several weeks to recuperate.⁷² His mission was completed, and he could reflect with considerable satisfaction on his success.

In December, 1663, troops of the League of the Rhine began marching toward Hungary.⁷³ Even the French, who had sought by every means to destroy the new unity of the Empire, sent a token contingent which joined with the imperial forces in Hungary and participated in the decisive victory over the Turks at St. Gotthard early in 1664. Enthusiasm for the campaign against the Turks in the east checked French designs on the Spanish Netherlands. For another year the Spanish Council of State could avoid facing the resumption of war with France.

While the destiny of Austria was being contested in Hungary, the question of the eventual fate of the Spanish throne again became a major concern of both French and Austrian diplomacy. The Habsburg succession was doubtful, and by 1663 Philip IV was growing noticeably feeble. His death without heir would give both Austria and France a claim to the whole inheritance. No one feared a war between these two antagonists more than Johann Philipp of Mainz. His sprawling lands lay directly between the Bourbon and Habsburg powers, and a war between them would inevitably involve his state in the devastation that accompanied military actions in the seventeenth century. To save his own state, and much of Europe, from the destruction of war, Johann Philipp advanced a plan for a previous agreement between France and Austria to divide between them the whole of the Spanish Empire should the Spanish dynasty end at the death of Philip IV. Tentative discussions of this possibility, in which Rojas was involved, took place in Regensburg as early as the autumn of 1663.

The Elector of Mainz explored the idea of dividing the Spanish Empire between France and Austria, approaching first Rojas and then Prince Portia. Further conversations with the Emperor were held in absolute secrecy.⁷⁴ All agreed to the reasonableness of the plan, but Leopold was unwilling to take a personal hand in the matter until all arrangements had been made for

⁶³ *Ibid.* Report of the council of state dated August 26, 1663.

⁶⁴ AGS. Estado, legajo 2375. Letter of Rojas dated Brussels, August 9, 1663.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Letter of Rojas dated Vienna, October 12, 1663.

⁶⁶ Doeberl, *op. cit.*, 2: 37.

⁶⁷ HHStA. RhR Judicialia Latina, Indica Compagnia 1663. The three letters and the covering note are all signed by Prince Portia. Menge and other biographers have maintained that Rojas was named Austrian delegate to the Reichstag, presumably confusing these instructions emanating from the Reichshofrat with the real purpose for which they were but a cover. See Menge, *op. cit.*, 5.

⁶⁸ Bog, *op. cit.*, 206.

⁶⁹ AGS. Estado, legajo 2375. Letter of Rojas dated Regensburg, November 15, 1663. This document is poorly preserved, and is legible only in part.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² AGS. Estado, legajo 2375. Letter of Rojas dated at Frankfurt, December 14, 1663.

⁷³ HHStA. 16. Spanien Varia, Folio 4. Memorial of 1665.

⁷⁴ Pribram, *op. cit.*, 329.

his proposed marriage with Margareta Theresia, the second daughter of Philip IV of Spain.⁷⁵ Johann Philipp, entering into direct negotiations on the subject in Spain, offered to save the Emperor further embarrassment by acting on his own behalf.⁷⁶ The suggestion was pleasing both to the Emperor and to Prince Portia, for it gave them the opportunity to have the matter sounded out for them in Madrid without prejudicing their other negotiations with Spain. Rojas was the only logical person to undertake this delicate mission.

In April, 1664, Rojas again set out for Spain, carrying with him credentials from the Elector of Mainz. With him went a young man, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, later to become one of the greatest of the Austrian cameralists, now serving Rojas as private secretary.⁷⁷ This mission which began so well in Germany, was quickly shattered in Spain. While Johann Philipp was still in Regensburg, his chief minister, Johann Christian von Boyneburg, betrayed the whole plan to the French. Boyneburg was one of the greatest statesmen in Germany at the time, but he was falling from favor at Mainz because of his adherence to the French policy in the League of the Rhine. Angered at the Elector for what he considered ill treatment, Boyneburg spitefully used his great diplomatic talent to destroy his patron's project. First, taking advantage of intrigue in Vienna, he informed Prince Auersperg of the secret conversations at Regensburg. Auersperg, who coveted Prince Portia's influential position and saw here a means of bringing him down, informed the papal nuncio Cardinal Caraffa, who forwarded the information through ecclesiastical channels.⁷⁸ To make doubly certain of his work, Boyneburg also took a more direct approach to the French court. As early as May 4, 1664, a report reached the Spanish Council of State from the Marques de la Fuente, Spanish ambassador in France, containing a circumstantial account of the mission Rojas was performing.⁷⁹ Thus the rumors Boyneburg had planted in diplomatic circles in Paris worked quickly, and the whole plan was known in Madrid at least two months before Rojas arrived there to undertake discussions on his own terms. Since the information reached Spain from unfriendly sources, the Spanish ministers quite naturally imagined the worst and were prejudiced against Rojas from the beginning. Johann Philipp of Mainz was furious when he learned of Boyneburg's betrayal, and the minister was imprisoned when the

Elector returned to Mainz. The damage, however, had already been done.

Rojas arrived in Madrid toward the end of July, 1664, and was summoned at once to appear before the Council of State.⁸⁰ During what must have been a heated interview Rojas firmly denied that the Emperor Leopold had any personal knowledge of the matter. He was forced to admit, however, that some knowledge of the plans had doubtless come to the attention of the Viennese court. Even this admission, though already confirmed by the information from Auersperg and Cardinal Caraffa, gave the cautious new Austrian ambassador Count von Pötting many grave doubts.⁸¹

In the circumstances Rojas' continued presence in Spain could only embarrass the men whom he sought to represent there. At the demand of the Spanish ministers he wrote a full report on his activity at the Diet and on his negotiations with Johann Philipp von Schönborn. In discussing the projected division of the Spanish Empire, he was careful to omit any reference to the Emperor's participation in the conversations at Regensburg. More than that he could not deny. The sequel to this fiasco indicates that the King of Spain and his ministers had to appear to be more indignant than in fact they were. No public figure in Spain could afford to appear to favor the division of the Empire, but there were doubtless some, perhaps the King himself, who saw in this the only way to avoid another costly war with France.

Philip IV did not dismiss Rojas outright, although this course of action would have been the logical one given the alarm Rojas' mission had aroused in Madrid. Instead, Rojas received a royal letter of credence and was sent politely out of Spain. In part the letter read: "Since to give you any demonstration now of my gratitude for the great finesse with which you have served me would embarrass the negotiation on which I send you. . . ." ⁸² And again: "As you leave this city, I hope you may be certain of the favor which your zeal and attention to our service have merited you." ⁸³ Specific details of Rojas' new mission are not mentioned in the letter, and presumably he was instructed orally, probably by the King himself. Since it was a personal matter between Philip IV and Emperor Leopold, it most likely concerned some details of the marriage between the Emperor and the Infanta Margareta Theresia. This last link between the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs was Philip's greatest concern, and the last service he could do his Austrian cousins.

⁷⁵ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 108.

⁷⁶ Pribram, *op. cit.*, 329.

⁷⁷ Posch, Fritz, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung* 61: 338, 1953. Von Hörnigk was attached to the court of Mainz in 1663 when Rojas visited there twice; they may have become acquainted with each other at that time.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 330.

⁷⁹ AGS. Estado, legajo E-K, 1388-1389, F-57. Letter of the Marques de la Fuente dated Paris, 20 April, 1664.

⁸⁰ Pribram, Alfred F., and Moritz Landwehr von Pragenau (editors), *Privatbriefe Kaiser Leopold I. an den Grafen F. E. von Pötting, 1662-1673, Oesterreichische Geschichtsquellen: Diplomataria et acta* 1: 69, 72. (Cited hereafter as *Privatbriefe*.)

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 1: 72.

⁸² HHStA. 16. Spanien Varia, 1664, Folio 4. Memorial of 1665. A copy of this final clause of the royal instruction is included on the covering sheet.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

Rojas left Madrid in October, 1664, but his trip was interrupted near the small border village of La Junquera in the Pyrenees where he was severely injured in an accident on the road. There he was forced to remain, unable either to return to Madrid or go on to Vienna.⁸⁴ It was several weeks before he could resume his journey, and even then he had to be carried in a litter the whole way.⁸⁵ Through the winter of 1664–1665 Rojas continued his painful journey, not arriving at the imperial court until late February. There he was received by the Emperor with many indications of special favor and consideration. He was even accorded the unheard-of privilege of being carried into the august presence seated in a chair.⁸⁶ The Emperor noted that Rojas was still “all smashed up (*alle zerschmettert*),” but added that he would still be able to use him to the advantage of the House of Austria.⁸⁷

III. FROM CAMERALIST TO IRENICIST

The ceremonious reception at the imperial court signified Rojas' emergence as an important public figure. His early missions were only incidental to the broader issues which concerned Habsburg diplomacy, but after 1665 his ideas began to represent a definite line in that policy. Already the previous year Leopold I had offered to make Rojas Bishop of St. Stephen (Stephania), a Hungarian ecclesiastical dignity with no temporal duties or income.¹ Rojas was unwilling at first to accept the episcopal dignity, apparently moved by a sincere attachment to the cloistered life and a firm adherence to the rules of self-denial which governed his order. For nine months he temporized, and accepted finally only upon repeated urging from both the King of Spain and the Emperor. From their point of view, protocol required their representatives to carry sufficient rank and dignity to reflect the prestige of their courts. If Rojas were to be useful to them, he must be able to command the respect given to those with a high position or title.

Although Rojas had mastered at least the rudimentary elements of public and international finance during his commercial negotiations, his private purse was notoriously ill-managed. His personal habits were still those of a simple friar, and what money came to him personally, aside from that granted him for carrying out his diplomatic missions, he gave away with

a generous hand to any who appealed to him when he had means.²

Upon his arrival in Vienna, Rojas learned of the death of his former friend and patron, Prince Portia.³ All the factions at court intrigued busily to fill the vacancy left in the very center of the government. Leopold was strong enough to avoid a palace revolution, and decided finally, in the fashion of the seventeenth century, to be his own *primado*. Dr. Johann Paul Hoher he named court chancellor, a position of great importance since the Emperor no longer had anyone closer to him in the inner councils of state. The choice of Hoher displeased most of the court, for Hoher was a bourgeois who had risen in the world through his own efforts, but the Emperor firmly defended his choice.⁴ From Rojas' point of view it was a good appointment. Dr. Hoher was a close friend, indebted to Rojas, and a strong supporter of the pro-Spanish policy of the late Prince Portia.

During the sordid quarrels, the airing of jealousy and ambition which followed Portia's death, Rojas came in for his share of attacks from those who desired to discredit Hoher and with him all of Portia's associates. In order to impose his will on the court, Leopold was forced to show even more extraordinary marks of his favor to the Spanish party, and to Rojas as well. The Emperor had nothing better to give Rojas than a titular episcopacy, and he asked Philip IV to provide a suitable bishopric in Spain or in Belgium, preferably the latter, which would be more adequate compensation for Rojas' services. The Spanish monarch recommended Rojas to the wealthy see of Ghent, but Philip IV died before papal confirmation could be obtained, and the recommendation was withdrawn.⁵ Rojas himself seems to have made no effort on his own part to secure this favor.

Less than a month after his arrival in Vienna, Rojas was sent off again with several diplomatic missions to perform at the Reichstag in Regensburg and elsewhere in the Germanies. The first of these missions was outlined in an imperial instruction dated March 9, 1665, which gave Rojas the task of negotiating, concluding, and ratifying an alliance between the Westphalian and Burgundian circles of the empire.⁶ Subsequently he was to conclude a treaty of peace and, if possible, a mutual defense and commercial pact between Austria and Sweden.⁷ These letters of credence were sup-

⁸⁴ *Privatbriefe* 1: 95.

⁸⁵ HHStA. 16. Spanien Varia, 1664, folio 2. Letter of Rojas to von Pötting dated at Junquera, November 9, 1664.

⁸⁶ HHStA. 17. Spanien Varia, 1665, folio 1. Letter of Rojas to von Pötting dated Vienna, March 6, 1665.

⁸⁷ *Privatbriefe* 1: 111–112.

¹ Cf. Menge, *op. cit.*, 6–7 and Posch, *op. cit.*, 338. Posch alludes to a bishopric of Stephaniaka in Albania. Since there is no indication that the see was *in partibus infidelium*, Menge's description, which is followed here, must be the correct one. See also Hansitz, 9313: 1.

² Hansitz, 9310: 138. Johann Paul Hoher, later court chancellor, borrowed the sum of three thousand Reichsthaler from Rojas. Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 1: 392.

³ HHStA. 17. Spanien Varia, 1665, folio 1. Letter of Rojas to von Pötting dated Vienna, March 24, 1665.

⁴ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 112–113.

⁵ Hansitz, 9310: 139 and 9313: 130.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9313: 1. Plena potentia tractandi cum ordinibus Westphaliae de mutis confederationibus data Christophoro Ep. Stephan. March 9, 1665.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 9313: 2. Plenapotentia pro Christophoro Ep. Stephan. ad tractandum cum ordinibus Imperii de pacis de-

plemented on March 29 with a secret instruction outlining the mission in more detail.⁸

As the Turkish menace subsided, the Emperor could attempt to seize the occasion provided by the war to strengthen his position in the Empire. The object of his policy at the time was to form an alliance system including Austria, Spain and various German states which would bind the Empire to the Habsburg family. Such a program was certain to meet with determined resistance from France, but the moment was a favorable one for Austria. The French had interfered too much in local affairs, and had made themselves thoroughly unpopular with both Protestants and Catholics by their high-handed seizure of the city of Erfurt.

Rojas left Vienna on Palm Sunday, 1665, and proceeded to Regensburg to fulfill the first part of his mission.⁹ In spite of efforts to maintain secrecy, something of the nature of his mission became known as he passed through Munich early in April. Franz von Mayr, a Bavarian official, wrote to Hermann von Fürstenberg of Cologne to inform him of the Bishop's activities. "The well-known Padre Rojas, now Bishop of St. Stephen, has passed through here on his way to the Empire," he wrote. "His commission is reported to consist in gaining the affection of the Protestants for the House of Austria." Von Mayr was aware of the favorable atmosphere for such work, and added in a candid aside that "the French have made themselves odious to the non-Catholics because of Erfurt."¹⁰

After preliminary talks with Swedish diplomats at Regensburg,¹¹ Rojas traveled on to Mainz to report to Johann Philipp von Schönborn on his mission to Spain. He had to inform the Prince-archbishop that any plan for a preliminary agreement concerning the Spanish succession would be impossible for the time. He had no permission either from the Emperor or from the King of Spain to discuss the matter further.¹² The whole problem had become essentially an academic one, however, for the last son of Philip IV, Don Carlos, was still living in spite of many signs of congenital weakness of mind and body, and so long as he lived the Spanish state could totter along under the regency.

While Rojas was still in Germany arrangements were completed for the marriage of Leopold I with the Infanta Margareta Theresia. The young bride

fensionis et commerciorum communicatione, praefertum cum Rege Suecia. March 16, 1665.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 9313: 3-4. *Secreta Instructio Sacra Caesarea Maj. pro Christophoro de Rojas Episcopo Stephaniensi.* March 29, 1665.

⁹ HHStA. 17. Spanien Varia, 1665, folio 1. Letter of Don Diego de Prado to von Pötting dated Vienna, May 22, 1665.

¹⁰ Franz von Mayr to Hermann von Fürstenberg, April 23, 1665. Quoted in Doeberl, M., *Bayern und Frankreich vornehmlich unter Kurfürst Ferdinand Maria*, 271, Munich, 1900.

¹¹ All negotiations with the Swedes were carried on with the representatives at the Reichstag in Regensburg. Hence Rojas did not have to travel to Sweden.

¹² Pribram, *op. cit.*, 331.

was sent with great ceremony by sea to northern Italy whence she was to travel over the Alps to meet her impatient young groom.¹³ The Emperor left Vienna early in the autumn to meet his bride, and in mid-October he was at Innsbruck where Rojas joined him.¹⁴ There they received news of the death of Philip IV. Uncertain as to the political outcome of the changes in Spain, Leopold wrote von Pötting, his ambassador in Madrid, urging him to give his enthusiastic support to Rojas' projects at the Spanish court. He also wrote the widowed Queen urging her to provide a suitable benefice.¹⁵ If Leopold were to establish a Habsburg hegemony in the Germanies through alliances and commercial projects, he needed the declared support of Spain.

Communications were slow, and while the Austrian court tensely awaited news of developments in Spain, Rojas and Hoher went to Munich to negotiate a commercial alliance between Austria and Bavaria. Relations between these two states had been severely strained following the Turkish campaigns of 1664. The Bavarians were incensed at the fact that the Emperor had signed the treaty of Vasvar with the Turks without first consulting his allies. Old quarrels over customs barriers between Bavaria and the Habsburg crown lands were exacerbated. A dispute over salt tariffs between Bavaria and Bohemia provided the occasion to begin negotiation on a larger program of economic cooperation.¹⁶ The idea of a commercial alliance between Bavaria and Austria, a program which would include agreement on tariff policy as well as a plan for commercial expansion into the East Indies, came directly out of the proposals which Rojas had negotiated on behalf of Brandenburg four years earlier. In this instance the intention was to draw Bavaria into an alliance with Austria and Spain through the implementation of an extensive commercial agreement.¹⁷ Rojas' plenipotentiary powers to negotiate for Spain in commercial matters were still valid, and he could speak for Spain as well as Austria.¹⁸ Although the plan which Rojas presented at Munich was to begin with a bilateral agreement between Bavaria and Austria, he envisioned from the first a commercial union embracing all the German states. The East India Company which he proposed in conjunction with the tariff agreement was to be formed by German

¹³ HHStA. 17. Spanien Varia, 1665, folio 1. Letter of Rojas to Count von Pötting dated Brussels, May 27, 1665.

¹⁴ Menge, *op. cit.*, 9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* See HHStA. 17. Spanien Varia, 1665, folio 1. Letter of Rojas to von Pötting dated Innsbruck, October 18, 1665.

¹⁶ Doeberl, *Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns* 2: 38-39.

¹⁷ Although these negotiations were conducted in secret sessions, the truth about them became generally known. The Electress of Bavaria wrote her brother Max Emmanuel of Savoy that "a certain Hungarian bishop" had been in Munich to effect a union between Austria, Bavaria and Spain. See Doeberl, *Bayern und Frankreich*, 272.

¹⁸ Hassinger, *op. cit.*, 39.

princes and operated by German merchants, with all goods carried on German ships to German ports.¹⁹

In its essence the commercial alliance project of 1665 was nothing less than an attempt to achieve a form of unity in the Empire through commercial ties between the German states and the Habsburg patrimony. While the Austrian mercantilists saw national power arising from commercial and industrial independence, Rojas went beyond this and conceived a revived Christian Empire, seeing the House of Austria as the instrument intended by God to fulfill the highest destinies of the German nation. Although the division of Germany into hundreds of independent sovereign units was not merely an accident of history, these divisions were not simply political, but were fortified and intensified by religious differences. Any movement against the local autonomy of the various princes would have to fight also against both the natural inclinations of the petty princes and against a century and a half of religious hatred and bitterness.

In the case of Catholic Bavaria the problem of religion was of less importance than it had been in the negotiations with Brandenburg. The Bavarians, however, refused to act independently in the matter. They insisted that such an alliance could be made only through regular constitutional procedures of the Empire or, if that should be impossible, by forming a union through separate treaties between all the states simultaneously so that each state might ally itself with others as it chose, but would not have to enter into an alliance with any formal union imposed on the whole which might impair the individual sovereignty, or "liberties" of the allied princes.

The main reason for the reluctance of the Bavarian ministers was their fear of France. Bavaria was already deeply involved with France, and could not afford to make an enemy of Louis XIV by joining an alliance with both Spain and Austria. The plan was submitted to the Bavarian ministers in the form Rojas had outlined, but it was not acceptable as it stood. Out of prudence the Bavarians did not discontinue negotiations completely, however, and the conference was adjourned in Munich to be reconvened in Vienna later. Negotiations resumed in Vienna in December 1665, but with very little hope of much success.²⁰

In Munich, Rojas failed to achieve what he set out to do. In a larger sense, however, his proposals represent a new and more positive course in Austrian policy. Posing once more as the defender of Christian Europe against the Turks, Austria regained some of the prestige which had been so badly damaged during the religious wars of the first half of the century. The high-handed diplomacy of Louis XIV offended many of his German allies, creating a situation from which Leopold I could drive great advantages if only he

would. Rojas offered a program designed to do just this. The opposition he encountered both within Germany and from the French indicate how seriously the matter was taken.

Two men shared with Rojas the work on economic aspects of his plans for the House of Austria: Johann Joachim Becher and Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk. Becher was married to von Hörnigk's sister, and doubtless the two men knew each other before they came together in Vienna under Rojas' patronage in 1665. Becher, five years older than his brother-in-law, was the first of the two to gain prominence as a writer on political economy, but it was von Hörnigk who eventually created a systematic statement of mercantilistic ideas applicable to the Austrian state. Both owed much to Rojas both for their ideas and for the patronage he gave them at Vienna.

Becher, a recent convert to Catholicism, was a man of great intellectual curiosity who lacked the capacity for organization and the tact to achieve his ends by diplomacy. One early biographer wrote of him that from his works it was difficult to decide whether he was "more a philologist or a mathematician, a chemist or a cameralist, a physician or a merchant."²¹ His intellectual restlessness made him seem all of these at various times and several of them at once. He went to Munich in 1665 hoping to find a better position at the brilliant court of Elector Ferdinand Maria than he had been able to obtain in the service of previous masters at Mainz and Mannheim. He was one of the negotiators on the Bavarian side when Rojas presented his commercial project, and was selected to go with the Bavarian delegation to Vienna in December, 1665, to continue the talks. Becher was disappointed in his connection with Bavaria since most of his proposals had been rejected. In Vienna, Rojas recruited him for the imperial service and introduced him at court.²² As early as January, 1666, Becher was commissioned to undertake the establishment of a silk factory under imperial privilege. He undertook some diplomatic missions in Holland, advised on various economic policies and worked closely with Rojas and von Hörnigk in their plans to establish a "commercial college" (*Commerciencollegium*) in Vienna, an institution designed to serve as the central clearing station for all imports into Austria, to supervise the distribution of manufactured goods from new industries, and to provide the state the means of supervising economic activity to the advantage of the state. Little came of these projects at first, for Rojas and Becher found little enthusiasm or understanding among the courtiers who associated themselves with the projects as patrons.

While Rojas continued to take a leading part in economic affairs, his attention was drawn increasingly toward religious problems. Routine duties could not be neglected either. His knowledge of Spanish and

¹⁹ Doeberl, *Bayern und Frankreich*, 273.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 277.

²¹ Hassinger, *op. cit.*, 4.

²² *Ibid.*, 40-41.

his friendship with the late King Philip IV made logical his selection as confessor to the young Empress Margareta Theresia.²³ In July, 1666, Rojas was nominated to the bishopric of Tina (Knin),²⁴ a diocese *in partibus infidelium*.²⁵ It was a more prestigious title than the one he held previously, but it did not provide him with any more revenue. The imperial treasury could not afford to maintain its diplomatic agents abroad, and the only source Rojas could draw upon for the expensive traveling his diplomatic missions required would be a church benefice of some nature. The bishopric of Tina did not provide any income at all, and the small pension he received from the Emperor, although sufficient for his needs at court, could not cover his frequent trips to the Empire. The crippling accident he suffered in Spain in 1664 added to his problems, for he was still unable to walk unaided. He was forced therefore to maintain a fairly large staff of lackeys to carry him around and chamber servants to provide his personal necessities. A benefice had to be found if he were to continue his diplomatic work.

In October, 1667, such a position was made available when the death of the incumbent priest left vacant the parish of St. Martin in the Styrian village of Hartberg.²⁶ Although Hartberg was small, it was prosperous, and the parish church of St. Martin received the income from extensive lands and vineyards. As early as 1596 it had been described as the best and richest parish of lower Steiermark. Leopold I nominated Rojas for the position on December 3, 1667.

The appointment immediately caused a political storm, for the parish was under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Salzburg, and his confirmation had to be obtained. Cardinal Thun, the aging and crochety Archbishop of Salzburg, had tried once already in 1665 to neutralize Rojas diplomacy by slandering him in letters to Spanish ministers. When Emperor Leopold wrote Cardinal Thun requesting confirmation of Rojas as priest of Hartberg, he indicated that the revenue was to be used to maintain his candidate "in a manner fitting his episcopal dignity."²⁷ Cardinal Thun was quite willing to confirm Rojas in the benefice, but he refused to grant a dispensation

from the requirement of residence in the parish.²⁸ The Archbishop was entirely within his rights in insisting that Rojas reside in the parish in order to enjoy the revenues from it, but this was not at all what the Emperor had in mind. Such a settlement would have effectively canceled out Rojas' usefulness to the Emperor. In view of Cardinal Thun's known animosity toward Rojas, it is not difficult to imagine that he appreciated so simple an expedient to rid himself of this diplomatic annoyance by removing Rojas to a small mountain parish and keeping him there.

In May, 1668, Rojas' secretary, von Hörnigk, was sent to Salzburg to induce the Archbishop to withdraw his demand that Rojas reside in his parish.²⁹ Cardinal Thun died before anything came of it, and with the archepiscopal see vacant, the consistory refused to do anything. Finally on July 3, 1668, the Salzburg consistory confirmed Rojas' nomination, but under conditions which Cardinal Thun had insisted upon.³⁰ At the same time a letter was sent to the Vice-archdeacon at Graz ordering that Rojas be invested with the office.³¹ Early in September, Rojas went to Hartberg to be confirmed in the benefice in spite of the conditions imposed by the consistory. He had already sent an urgent appeal to Rome, seconded by the Emperor, for a papal dispensation to override the restriction. On September 7, 1668, Sebastian Parth, the administrator of the Archbishop of Salzburg in Graz, confirmed Rojas in the benefice at the parish church in Hartberg. The little ceremony gave rise to an amusing incident. Cardinal Thun had apparently intended to humble Rojas while he had the opportunity, and before his death he had instructed his representatives in Graz that the titles *parochii* and *presbyter* be used throughout and no notice taken of the fact that Rojas was also a bishop. Rojas was taken by surprise by this maneuver, and did not want to accept the two titles at first to the exclusion of his title as bishop, suspecting that Cardinal Thun was attempting to humiliate him even from his tomb. Apparently his accustomed tact smoothed over the situation, for the rest of the ceremony was carried off without incident.³² Although a papal dispensation releasing Rojas for five years from the requirement of residing in his parish arrived on November 24, 1668, he remained in Hartberg through the winter devoting himself to his duties and carrying out his

²³ It has been a common error among historians to assume that Rojas came first to Vienna in the entourage of Margareta Theresia. The normal confusion about spelling of names in the seventeenth century was perhaps responsible, for Rojas' contemporaries often did not recognize his name when written Rochas, Royas, or some phonetic variant on Roxas or Rojas.

²⁴ The original decree is preserved in the Diöcesanarchiv at St. Pölten, Austria. A copy may be found in Hansitz, 9313: 5. *Decretum Leopoldi Imp. quo Christophorus de Roxas confertur Episcopatus Tiniensis*.

²⁵ Menge, *op. cit.*, 11.

²⁶ Graz, Fürstliche Seckauer Diöcesanarchiv (cited hereafter as DA), V-F-2/b, 4. The incumbent Pfriem, died on October 16, 1667. See also Posch, *op. cit.*, 341.

²⁷ Posch, *op. cit.*, 342.

²⁸ DA, V-F-2/b, 20. Schreibens abschrift an Herrn Bischofen zu Tiniens sub 8 Feb. 1668.

²⁹ DA, V-F-2/b, 24-27. Correspondence between Rojas and von Hörnigk, May 24-28, 1668.

³⁰ DA, V-F-2/b, 35-36. *Confirmatio Rmi. D. Christophori de Roxas Epi. Tiniensi, ad Parochiam S. Martini in Hartperg. Salzburg, Sede vacante*, 3 July 1668.

³¹ DA, V-F-2/b, 37. Order to invest Rojas with the benefice, dated Salzburg, July 3, 1668.

³² DA, V-F-2/b, 39-42. Report on the installation ceremonies dated Graz, September 7, 1668.

responsibilities personally.³³ When Rojas finally left Hartberg in May, 1669, he left behind him two chaplains to carry on the spiritual duties of the parish and also his private secretary, von Hörnigk, who was given power of attorney to represent Rojas in all matters concerning the administration of the property of the church and its revenues.³⁴

While the little comedy of the parish of St. Martin took place, new and more serious events strained the relations between Austria and Spain. Leopold I was worried by the threatening attitude of the French and, with the Turks still a potential menace in the east, he concluded in 1668 a treaty with Louis XIV agreeing to the partition of the Spanish Empire between the two powers.³⁵ Even though this treaty, so favorable to France, was never put into effect, it damaged Austrian policy for years, discrediting the Habsburg dynasty in the eyes of Spanish patriots.

Upon the death of Philip IV in 1665, the widowed Queen Maria Anna had become regent for her four-year-old son, Charles II. The real power behind the Spanish throne during the following three years was her confessor, the German Jesuit Neithard, a man cordially hated by all the Spaniards. This unhappy situation intensified the quarrels among court factions and paralyzed the government.

The troubling news from Spain and disappointment over the treaty with France focused attention on the old proposal of a commercial alliance between Austria and Spain to overcome the rift. Once he returned to the Court, Rojas pestered the Emperor with memoranda on the subject until finally, in May, 1669, Leopold agreed to permit him to travel to Spain, but only *in suis privatis*.³⁶ The Emperor did not wish to disturb the already troubled situation, and refused to give any specific instructions. He wrote his ambassador that Rojas would have only two letters of recommendation, one to the Queen Regent and another to von Pötting himself. It was made abundantly clear to the Austrian ambassador that Rojas had no particular commission from the Emperor, but rather was working on his own initiative. "He has," wrote Leopold, "one of the true *spiritum itinerantum*."

The Emperor's promised letters of recommendation were never sent, but in their place was one from the Empress Dowager Eleanora, which recommended Rojas in the warmest terms.³⁷ Eleanora Gonzaga of

Mantua was the third and last wife of Emperor Ferdinand III; a vivacious and restless personality, she could not abstain from mixing actively in dynastic politics, and many archives bulge with bundles of her extensive correspondence. Leopold I felt great affection for his stepmother and always put up with her interference in politics with great patience.

Count von Pötting had serious misgivings about the advisability of Rojas' visit to Madrid at that time. The pro-French party at court had gained the upper hand for the moment, and its leader, Count Peñeranda, hated Rojas referring to him as a "rogue in a monk's habit." It was unlikely that Rojas would find a better reception in Madrid than greeted him when he came in 1664 with a plan to divide the Spanish Empire between France and Austria. Rojas did not help matters by keeping his plans secret and surrounding his intentions with an aura of mystery.³⁸ When he arrived at the Spanish border, he was detained on orders from the capital, but was finally permitted to pass on in spite of the fact that the border station had been instructed not to permit him to enter Spain unless he had credentials from the Emperor. By the time he arrived in Madrid in September, 1669, the Jesuit Neithard had been banished from the court. Rojas then tried to get himself appointed confessor to the Queen Regent.³⁹

In October, Don Blasco de Loyola, the Secretary of State and one of the few important ministers surviving from the reign of Philip IV, died, and Rojas was deprived of a friend at the court when he most needed one.⁴⁰ There followed a palace uprising of minor importance, which succeeded, nevertheless, in establishing the anti-Austrian faction even more firmly in the government. By this time Leopold I had apparently written off any assistance from Spain in his alliance system. Commenting on the bad news from Madrid, he uttered a pious "Gott stehe uns allen bei," and added that if Rojas did not succeed in getting what he expected out of his mission to Spain, it was too bad that he had traveled such a long way for nothing.⁴¹

From the moment of his arrival Rojas plunged into court politics in Madrid, but the situation was unfavorable for the House of Austria. His presence, though well meant, was a source of great embarrassment for the Queen Regent. Maria Anna was trying desperately to save what she could in the situation by co-operating with the new ministers, and hence she requested that Leopold I recall Rojas.⁴² This plea became even more urgent when Rojas insisted on taking a hand in the dynastic question, proposing, without specific authority from the Emperor, a marriage between the young King Charles II and Archduchess

³³ DA, V-F-2b, 95-96. Copia de Ao. 1668 Brevis Apl. D. Epo. Tiniensi de non residere penes para. in Hardtperg ad quem quennia.

³⁴ Posch, *op. cit.*, 342-343.

³⁵ Redlich, *op. cit.*, 119. The treaty was drawn up by Prince Auersperg, who favored the French against the traditional family alliance with Spain. Largely as a result of this inept treaty, which would have given France the Spanish Netherlands and all the Spanish strongholds in the Empire, Auersperg was banished from the court the following year, and replaced by Prince Lobkowitz.

³⁶ *Privatbriefe* 2: 29.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 2: 30-31.

³⁸ HHStA. 25. Spanien Varia, folio 2. Letter from Rojas to von Pötting dated Brussels, July 17, 1669.

³⁹ *Privatbriefe* 2: 51.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 2: 54.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 2: 50.

⁴² *Ibid.* 2: 72.

Maria Anna. Leopold I feigned surprise and indignation when he heard that Rojas proposed this alliance, and denied any complicity.⁴³ Far from recalling Rojas, however, he shrugged the matter off by implying that it was perhaps the work of the Empress Dowager, and suggested that Maria Anna of Spain do as seemed right to her.

Actually von Pötting himself had a similar mission from the Emperor and was attempting to make a marriage alliance between Charles II and the Emperor's half-sister, but Rojas mixed himself in the project uninvited. The Queen Regent again requested in April, 1670, that Rojas be recalled, astonished that he should make such proposals without the specific approval of the Emperor.⁴⁴ Leopold I finally caught the drift of the matter and realized that his stepmother, Eleanor, was working around him in an attempt to secure a favorable marriage for her daughter. "If the widowed Empress has done this without my knowing about it," Leopold wrote to von Pötting, "she held the Emperor's diplomatic ability in poor account. Patience. This could easily be, for you know how she is."⁴⁵ Rojas' position was impossible. Caught between the intrigues of Madrid and Vienna, he could only accept the Emperor's dismissal. Leopold cut Rojas off kindly, urging that the Queen Regent be induced to give Rojas a good bishopric.⁴⁶ Rojas was recommended for the diocese of Pamplona, but the competition was too great and his chances were poor. At the Emperor's request Rojas withdrew from the marriage negotiations,⁴⁷ and Leopold continued to urge the Spanish court to provide a suitable bishopric in Spain "or in Belgium or in the Indies from which he could have a respectable income."⁴⁸

Rojas did not accept his dismissal without complaint.⁴⁹ To his own misfortune he had failed to make calculation for a certain lack of coordination within the Emperor's own family. Through the winter of 1670-1671 Rojas remained in Madrid, apparently uncertain as to his next move. He hoped to be useful to the Austrian party at court, but he was so unfavorably received that his presence was an embarrassment to those he sought to help. Emperor Leopold understood Rojas' good intentions, and tried to be helpful in the only way he could. In the summer of 1671 he was still urging the Queen Regent to provide a good bishopric. "I want to see Rojas accommodated," he wrote, "for once he did me no small service."⁵⁰

Then, about the end of August, 1671, Rojas disappeared suddenly from Madrid. He took leave of no

one, gave no intimation of his whereabouts.⁵¹ What his personal feelings may have been is difficult to suggest. He had previously told von Pötting that he was disgusted, and considered himself misused. Possibly he withdrew from Madrid angered at what he regarded the injustice done him in his negotiations concerning the projected royal marriage, and sought a respite from public life with his relatives in Spain. His notarized copy of the family records recorded at Cadiz in 1672 is the only documentary evidence of his movements. Presumably he spent a good bit of time in that southern port, for the governor of the city, Don Fernando Gonzales de Cubas, was his second cousin, and his mother's sister, Meriam de Rojas, was Abbess of the Monastery of the Immaculate Conception in Cadiz.⁵²

By September, 1672, Rojas was back in Madrid where he wrote the Archbishop of Salzburg requesting an extension of his release from the residence requirement at Hartberg.⁵³ Not until 1672 had a regular substitute priest been found to take over the duties of the parish in Hartberg, and the citizens were complaining, not without justice, that the income from their parish was being used to support a peripatetic priest, and a foreigner at that, who was not looking after their spiritual welfare as he should.⁵⁴

Rojas left Madrid finally in July, 1673, and started another long trip back to Vienna where he hoped to interest the Emperor in new projects for imperial reform. Leopold I was not unhappy that Rojas was returning, though he was disappointed that he had not been given a good bishopric.⁵⁵ The Bishop of Tina had little to show for his four-year sojourn in Spain, and the balm for his family pride provided by the patent of nobility obtained in Cadiz could have been but poor compensation for the unfortunate course of the negotiations which he had conducted at Madrid. He never again returned to Spain.

As the land-greedy French monarch Louis XIV pushed out his boundaries toward the Rhine and his "natural frontiers," he precipitated a constitutional crisis within the Holy Roman Empire. The Empire had a body of tradition within which it sought to function, but this constitution consisted mostly of clearly defined limits imposed upon the Emperor. There was consequently no cohesive force binding the states together between emergency sessions of the Diet, no permanent means of implementing a common policy except through tedious diplomatic negotiations.

The Turkish campaign in the 1660's had served to

⁴³ *Ibid.* 2: 71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 2: 84.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 2: 75.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 2: 83.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 2: 86.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 2: 87.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 2: 116.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 2: 168.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 2: 198. Letter of von Pötting to Leopold I dated Madrid, September 30, 1671. Rojas had left Madrid about four weeks before this letter was written.

⁵² HHStA. Klopp Nachlass, 13: 47.

⁵³ DA, V-F-2/b, 50-52. Letter of Rojas to the Archbishop of Salzburg dated at Madrid, September 28, 1672.

⁵⁴ Posch, *op. cit.*, 343, 350.

⁵⁵ *Privatbriefe* 2: 347.

bring the Diet into permanent session, but the confederation which that body represented was so loose that nearly all of its members were at one time or another openly allied with the sworn enemies of the Emperor. The ultimate humiliation of the Empire came in 1670 when Louis XIV seized Lorraine. Bound by its own military weakness and the capitulation of 1658, Austria could do nothing but protest and accept the unwelcome role of a neutral. With much of the land over which he claimed suzerainty lying under the domination of the Ottoman Turks, Leopold I could not draw upon the resources of a well-organized monarchy to oppose the French. Nowhere save perhaps in the north was the Austrian state anchored on a stable, defensible frontier. Its statesmen had to face all directions at once; east into Hungary, west into the empire, and south toward Italy and the Adriatic. Conflicting interests constantly inclined the state toward one or another of these directions seeking fulfillment of their ambitions for Austria. Not until 1684, with the collapse of Turkish power after the last siege of Vienna, did the monarchy turn its entire attention toward building an empire in the east. The ill-advised treaty with France in 1668 represented a push toward Italy, the French seeking to replace Austria in the Empire by forcing her to expand into the Spanish possessions in northern Italy. Conversely, the Spanish faction at the Viennese court sought to draw Austria closer to the Empire to act as a counterweight to French expansion toward the Rhine and the Spanish Netherlands.

The Spanish faction increased its influence in Vienna from 1671 onward as French claims to the areas south and west of the Rhine grew more extravagant. By 1673, when Rojas returned to Vienna from Spain, this party under the leadership of Johann Paul Hoher had gained the upper hand. It counted among its adherents Prince Schwarzenberg, the great general Count Montecuccoli, Margrave Hermann of Baden, the Spanish ambassador Burgomainero and others.⁵⁶ Through skillful propaganda this group succeeded in gaining attention for its demand for far-reaching reform of the imperial constitution. Austria alone could not stand against the threat on two fronts. Only the reorganization of the Empire could prevent the French and the Turks from succeeding in their designs against it.

In the end, it was Rojas who provided a specific program which offered some prospect for real reform. A curious blending together of his own religious and economic ideas with Becher's new concept of indirect and direct taxation, Rojas' plan was taken up at once by the Emperor.⁵⁷ In 1673 and 1674 Rojas made a long tour of the German states, discussing informally

his proposals for reform.⁵⁸ First he proposed the formation of a league of German states for the preservation of the security of the Empire against the Turkish menace.⁵⁹ The Emperor was to have the privilege of determining the number of soldiers to be contributed by each member state, and his decisions regarding the length of service, the time, place and manner in which the troops would be used would be final. No prince of the Empire was to maintain an army separate from the forces he contributed to the league.⁶⁰

To support this imperial army a general tax would be levied throughout the empire. Specifically Rojas proposed an inheritance tax as being the easiest of all taxes for the citizens to bear as it touched only the dead. The rates could be small, but increase on estates inherited outside the direct line of primogeniture up to a maximum rate of twenty per cent. In addition to this form of direct taxation, further economic support for an imperial army would be forthcoming through the implementation of Rojas' previous mercantilistic plans. Although no mention was made on this occasion of a specific overseas trading venture, he proposed to give tariff advantages to the manufactured goods of German industries, and tax benefits to new enterprises. If necessary, foreign goods competing with German goods of the same type should be excluded completely from the German market area by imperial decree.

The religious problem also occupied an important place in these negotiations, though Rojas apparently did not make any specific theological approach to the points of controversy at this time, but contented himself with suggesting means by which the religious bitterness might be overcome through negotiation on the subject of reunion of the Christian churches. He proposed that theologians from both the Protestant and Catholic states of the Empire should meet in a general conference to discuss the points of controversy to the end that a solution to the questions which divided them might be found.

A feeling of resentment was growing rapidly in the Germanies as a result of the French campaigns on the Rhine. Leopold I found unexpected friends and allies in the Empire as Turenne's troops occupied the Palatinate. Spain, Denmark, Brunswick, Hesse-Kassel, and Trier allied themselves with Austria against France in 1673. England and the Palatinate joined after the fall of Bonn in the same year. By the time Rojas had returned to Vienna in May, 1674, the French atrocities in the Palatinate in revenge for Karl Ludwig's desertion of the French alliance had united nearly all the German states in opposition to Louis XIV. Bavaria alone of all the German states remained firm in its alliance with France and refused to send its contingent to fight with the imperial armies under Montecuccoli.

With the successful conclusion of the alliances in

⁵⁶ Bog, *op. cit.*, 202-203.

⁵⁷ For Becher's ideas on direct and indirect taxation in Austria see Hassinger, *op. cit.*, 177f.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Hildebrandt, *op. cit.*, 173-175.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

the Empire accomplished, Leopold I again turned his attention to fiscal reform within his crown lands. Johann Joachim Becher submitted a detailed outline for an indirect excise tax on all manufactured articles in Austria. The idea of indirect taxation was becoming fashionable at the time as a means of centralizing the state and avoiding the obstruction of local estates and their traditional power over the monarch's purse. Becher's proposal was manipulated in such a fashion that he expected each ten journeymen laborers, who had previously been subjected to no direct tax whatever, to be able to support one soldier in the field. Rojas had already sponsored this project in 1673, and when he returned in 1674 he found that no action had been taken. Rojas succeeded in having it turned over to the *Commerciencollegium* for study. He welcomed the opportunity to revive the *collegium* as a base from which to launch his reform proposals. In the end, however, the long series of conferences only convinced Rojas and most of his associates, with the exception of Becher, that the plan was impractical. The state could hardly support the immense bureaucratic machinery which would be required to collect the tax, and the police organization of Austria could not bear the burdensome task of supervising a general price and wage regulation which would have to accompany the tax if it were not to be made ineffective by inflation.

While advising the *collegium* in its discussions of tax reform and economic controls, though Rojas kept alive his interest in commercial affairs, he was becoming ever more absorbed in the religious aspects of his broad plan for imperial reform.⁶¹ Bitterness increased rapidly after the bloody suppression of an uprising of the Hungarian magnates in 1671. Although the rebellion had started as an attempt to main local privileges against Leopold's effort to centralize the monarchy, the persecution of the rebels became a religious crusade.

In spite of intermittent persecution, the Protestant community in Hungary had suffered from no concentrated effort on the part of the imperial authorities to destroy it completely. The uprising temporarily silenced the counselors of moderation, however, and the Hungarian Catholics urged the Emperor to cease his toleration of the Protestants.⁶² In February, 1672, a group of radical Hungarian Catholics had demanded the destruction of all Protestant churches in Hungary. In spite of the intercession of diplomatic representatives of Saxony and Denmark, they succeeded in getting imperial consent for their demands. The Lutherans resisted, and the Hungarians brought in armed forces to back up the Emperor's orders. Pressburg became

the center of a bitter street-war between the Lutherans and imperial troops. The Protestant ministers were given the choice of converting to Catholicism or leaving Hungary.

An extraordinary court was set up in Pressburg to try the Protestant ministers after letters were discovered which implicated a few of them in treasonable correspondence with the Turks. In January and February, 1674, some 330 cases were tried by this special court, those found guilty given the choice of conversion or death. Of all those brought to trial, about two-thirds were found not guilty or accepted conversion. Ninety-three stood by their convictions and were condemned to death. Leopold I exempted them from the sentence of execution, but they were put into confinement in various strongholds in Hungary. A final act of persecution which caused an uproar in Protestant Europe was the sale by the Hungarian Catholics of some forty of these prisoners as galley slaves to the King of Naples in 1675.

The fanaticism of the persecutions in Hungary, and the furor they caused elsewhere in Europe convinced Rojas of the necessity for arriving at some solution to the religious problem quickly if the Habsburgs were to achieve the position of eminence they sought in central Europe. Some of the exiled Protestants went from Hungary to Saxony, where they stirred popular feeling against the Emperor, endangering the alliances against France. With the newly won unity in the Empire seriously endangered by the religious bitterness roused among Protestant states by these refugees, Rojas found it possible to get a favorable hearing from the Emperor for his proposal to negotiate with the Protestants on religious reunion.

Other pressures were mounting in support of the same general attitude. A letter from the King of Sweden in December, 1674, urged negotiation for religious peace. The King went so far as to state that so far as he was concerned the differences between the two confessions were only superficial.⁶³ The papal Nuncio in Vienna, Cardinal Alberizzi, urged that these discussions be undertaken.⁶⁴ In July, 1675, Leopold agreed to send Rojas to Saxony to discuss with the leaders of the *corpus evangelicorum* the problem of the Hungarian Protestants, giving him permission to suggest the removal of the ban on the Lutheran preachers as a possible *quid pro quo* should the Protestants be willing to enter into negotiation on the question of reunion.

Rojas hurried to Saxony in August, and succeeded in persuading John George II to declare his readiness to discuss the religious issue with Catholic theologians. This was particularly fortunate for Rojas' plans, for the Elector of Saxony was generally regarded as the leader of the *corpus evangelicorum*, a kind of unofficial chair-

⁶¹ Hassinger, *op. cit.*, 181.

⁶² Redlich, *op. cit.*, 278. The Hungarian Catholic party was particularly violent on the issue, though not simply for religious reasons. Many of the Protestants were the descendants of German immigrants.

⁶³ Menge, *op. cit.*, 14.

⁶⁴ Haselbeck, *op. cit.*, 394-395.

man of the whole group of Protestant princes. The Elector's reply was sent on August 12, 1675; in it he promised to have his court theologians prepare a mild statement of the points of controversy, which he would then force the Hungarian refugee preachers to accept if they wished to return to their homes. Leopold replied that the Protestants had not been evicted because of their religious beliefs, but rather for political subversion; but he still agreed to let them return if the Elector fulfilled his promise. John George lost his resolve when, after attempting to get the theologians to approve the measure, he was bitterly attacked by the "orthodox" members of his council. In a second letter to Leopold he suggested that perhaps this was a matter for all the Protestant princes of the Empire to decide among themselves, and insisted politely that he could do nothing further in the matter alone.⁶⁵ Thus Rojas' first direct attempt to bring the religious question out into open negotiation between the theologians of both parties accomplished nothing more than to bring up the subject for discussion at the political level. It was, however, a beginning, and from that point on Rojas' commercial and political reform programs receded into the background, and the rest of his life he devoted single-mindedly to achieving religious peace for Germany particularly and, hopefully, for all of Europe.

Meanwhile, Rojas had again to concern himself with his income from the parish at Hartberg. Von Hörnigk was no longer representing him in the parish, being concerned exclusively with his secretarial duties in Vienna and his important statistical work for Becher and the *Commerciencollegium*. In December, 1673, Rojas had obtained a three-year renewal of his privilege to remain absent from the parish.⁶⁶ Before this term was spent, however, he was nominated by the Emperor for the parish at Hainburg on the Danube. He could not take actual possession of the new parish and its revenues, however, until March of the following year.⁶⁷ After considerable negotiation with Maximilian Gandolf, the new Archbishop of Salzburg, Rojas obtained permission to retain the benefice at Hartberg until he acquired possession of the Hainburg benefice, this in spite of a fact that a successor had already been appointed to Hartberg.⁶⁸

The new parish which Rojas received finally in 1676 was ideally situated. It included several villages in the vicinity of Hainburg, which itself was located on the Danube near the site of ancient Carnuntum, across the river from Pressburg where the Danube flows through a small spur of foothills from the Carpathian Moun-

tains and enters the broad Hungarian plain. The parish was convenient to Vienna, being only a few hours' journey even with slow transportation. With his personal affairs settled to his satisfaction, Rojas prepared once again to set out on an extended tour of the German states.

IV. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS FOR CHURCH REUNION

Until 1673 it is clear that Rojas' interests were directed along many lines but that date may be taken as a convenient dividing point in his career. By this time he had come to regard himself as a permanent servant of the German Emperor and his aims veered more definitely toward the specific end of church reunion. Four years before took place the event which was to create the background for positive need to reconcile hostile religious groups within the Empire. Sometime in 1669 the Hungarian magnates revolted and at the Imperial Court the cause for the insurrection was seen in the Protestant ministers who were, for the most part, Calvinist. Persecution followed the crushing of the uprising. Many Protestants went to Sweden, even more to Saxony.¹ By 1675 feelings were in such a state of alarm that John George II of Saxony wrote the Emperor and begged that the imperial policy of banishment be ended. The Emperor replied that it was faithlessness to the House of Austria and not the religious persuasions of his fractious subjects that troubled him. On the other hand practical politics forced the hand of the Viennese government and by 1677 the Habsburg was so harassed by revolt, fear of French gold for the rebels and the invading Turkish host that a policy of force simply had to be abandoned and some more flexible solution discovered. Meaningful in this context, too, is the fact that in 1676 began the pontificate of Innocent XI who was to cooperate more fully than any other pope of the century in church reunion. In short the conditions in Europe were more than ever ripe for some kind of irenic endeavor on a widespread scale.

The immediate promoter of the diplomacy which led Rojas to devote his entire time to the business of making overtures to the Protestants came from the Viennese Nuncio, Cardinal Alberizzi who had suggested even before 1671 to Rojas that the interests of the Catholic Church would best be served by working full time on irenic schemes. In 1671 (July 9) Rojas wrote to the Cardinal and submitted to him a series of documents which dealt with his Protestant contacts. They had evidently been studied with care for they

¹ For the role of French agents in inciting and supporting the Hungarian and Transylvanian rebels see Picavet, C. G., *La diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV, 1661-1715*, Paris, 1930, particularly Book 3: chapter II. Also see Sagnac, P., and A. de Saint Léger, *Louis XIV (Peuples et Civilisations 10)*, 141-142, Paris, 1949; cf. previous chapter.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ DA, V-F-2/b, 101-105. Letter of Pope Clement X dated December 18, 1673.

⁶⁷ Maurer, G., *Geschichte der landesfürstlichen Stadt Hainburg*, 141, Vienna, 1894.

⁶⁸ DA, V-F-2/b, 109-113. Herr Bischoff zu Tina wegen widerbehaltung der Pfarr Hartperg. Also 198, resignation of Rojas from the benefice of the parish of St. Martin at Hartberg.

were annotated by the Bishop's own hand.² Rojas indicates that he has constantly considered the problem of ecclesiastical property and the changes in ownership thereof which might come about as a result of church reunion. This was a difficulty always in the forefront of these negotiations and Rojas' greatest difficulty was not the harmonizing of religious differences but simply the question of reassuring the Protestants that they had nothing material to lose by adopting the religion of Rome. In the same letter he submits the opinions of non-Catholic doctors (probably Calvinists under the jurisdiction of the Elector of Brandenburg in the Duchy of Cleves) with whom he was agreed on the matter of justification and works on the basis of the Walenburg explanation.³ He protests that his preoccupation with raising supplies for the Turkish war and with the efforts to establish an India company for the Empire has prevented engaging the Protestants for converting them or dividing them amongst themselves. Obviously this is not quite what would be known as irenicism in modern times but it was the only preliminary approach known to the seventeenth century by any religion, save possibly the Quakers.

Alberizzi was the guiding figure at the beginning. He secured from the Emperor a commission for Rojas in 1674 and in the following year took further steps to solve the problem of the Hungarian exiles. In August, Rojas went to Saxony to secure statements from the Protestants concerning their intentions for the future. The Protestant theologians were advised to moderate their language in the interests of harmony; the Emperor by this time conceived the matter in more general terms and wrote the Saxon Elector that measures should be taken for complete church unity. The Elector was, for the moment, unwilling to act without prior consultation with the other Protestant princes. Buonvisi succeeded Alberizzi in Vienna in 1676, but this marked no interruption, for Buonvisi had equally active interest in the business and sent representatives to many German courts to open negotiations.

The brief mission which Rojas performed in Saxony in 1675 had a direct bearing on the question of religious reunion. Shortly thereafter a diplomatic mission to Berlin gave him the opportunity to present his ideas to the Elector of Brandenburg. Apparently the main reason for Rojas' voyage to Berlin in the late winter of 1676 was to urge the marriage of Eleanore, widowed Queen of Poland and a sister of Leopold I, to the

Crown Prince Frederick.⁴ The letter of credence, signed by Leopold I on February 27, 1676, was written in vague terms, naming no specific subject for discussion, but rather inviting the Elector to favor all the proposals which the Bishop might place before him.

Whatever political discussions Rojas may have conducted in Berlin were soon set aside, and he submitted his plan for reconciliation of the Christian faiths. On March 28, 1676, he presented a document to the Elector Frederick William which outlined the ten "Principal points" embodied in his proposal.⁵ On the whole Rojas' propositions avoided the specific items of controversy, and concentrated on means whereby a favorable atmosphere for peaceful discussion might be created.

Bishop Rojas first asked that the Emperor be given the privilege of forbidding the publication of books which sharply attacked either faith. It was imperative to remove first the source of any minor irritations which could cause another religious war. War was the greatest danger, for the resulting loss of life and property subjected Germany even further to foreign influence.⁶ On the other hand, books which supported reconciliation and contributed to religious peace were to be subsidized and recommended.

Noting that the Protestants and Catholics alike complained that their doctrines were being inaccurately described, Rojas recommended that the Emperor select two or three "learned, modest and peace-loving" theologians from each religious group to correspond on the points of difference or controversy.⁷ Through conferences and correspondence these theologians were to arrive at a clear and acceptable statement of doctrine and the exact nature of the controversy between them. The declarations of the theologians would be submitted to their respective university faculties for approval before they became the basis for further negotiation. The result of these preliminary discussions, published in a book, would provide the official statement of doctrine on both sides of the controversy. On this basis the theologians then might go on to formulate a list of those items which could be surrendered to the other side "in good conscience."⁸

The specific points concerning religious reunion included no discussion of the theological problems involved in the religious controversy. What Rojas sug-

⁴ Landwehr, Hugo, *Spinolas Unionsbestrebungen in Brandenburg, Märkische Forschungen* 20: 236, 1887.

⁵ Menge, "Spinola," 17. Also Landwehr, "Unionsbestrebungen," 236. "Prinzipalpunkten, zu welchen der Herr Bischof Rojas v. Spinola soll cooperieren und bei Ihro Kais. Maj. unterthänigst supplicieren."

⁶ Although it may be an anachronism to refer to the "nationalism" inherent in both the commercial and religious projects of Bishop Rojas, it is, nevertheless, impossible to avoid the conclusion that all these various proposals were based on a belief that the Holy Roman Empire represented the German nation.

⁷ Menge, "Spinola," 230 *et seq.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 237.

² Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 34-36. Letter from Rojas to Cardinal Alberizzi.

³ The views of the Walenburg (Walenchurch or Wallenchurch) brothers are set forth in their treatises, *Tractatus de Controversiis Fidei*, Cologne, 1671, and *De Unitate Ecclesiae et schismate Protestantium Aliorumque*, Cologne, 1656. Their fundamental approach lies in attempting to harmonize the Tridentinum with the Formula of Concord on the question of faith and works and their relative merit in man's salvation.

gested in Berlin was no more than a means toward the reduction of tension between the Catholic and the Reformed churches in their particular states. The final point of this document contrasts vividly with the vagueness of the foregoing. Rojas concluded with an appeal for the establishment of a common commercial policy for the Empire along with the formation of a tighter confederation of the German states which would enable the Empire to stand against its enemies.⁹ The addition of this attack on the sovereignty of the individual states may be taken as an indication of the importance which Rojas ascribed to political unity, for such a statement could only have the effect of inclining the Elector of Brandenburg against the program.

Frederick William did not, in fact, give his unqualified approval to Rojas' "Principal Points," though he did not completely reject them either. The obvious attempt to restrict the power of the lesser princes to the advantage of the Emperor could hardly have been calculated to appeal to the ambitious Elector of Brandenburg, but it was not so easy for him to react unfavorably to the proposals concerning religious reunion. His own Lutheran consistory was resolved to pursue the matter further, and some statements concerning the clarification of doctrine were actually prepared.¹⁰ The French envoy in Berlin gave the Elector his excuse for withdrawing from the negotiations, insisting that Brandenburg could not act individually, but would have to consult all the other Protestant states and could act only after unanimous approval had been obtained.

Elector Frederick William dismissed Rojas with the excuse that he could do no more without agreement from the Protestant courts, but he personally assured him that he would use his own influence to secure a favorable consideration of the "Principal Points." Rojas again let his optimism overcome him, and he left Berlin convinced that his mission had been an unqualified success.¹¹ From his own limited point of view, that may very well have been the true situation, for his long experience in the Austrian diplomatic service should have led him to expect a less favorable hearing than he had actually received in Berlin.

Bishop Rojas returned to Vienna in April, 1676, where his secretary, von Hörnigk, joined him after turning the affairs of the parish in Hartberg over to his patron's successor.¹² Rojas contacted the representative of the Elector of Brandenburg in Vienna, Lorenz von Crockow, and tried to work through him to interest the Elector further in his proposals.

Crockow was, if anything, even less inclined than his master to favor Rojas' proposals.¹³ Crockow could not believe that Frederick William would accept such a proposal, and consequently put Rojas off by insisting that intolerance was not one-sided, referring to the fact that the Catholics had recently managed to have two churches taken from the Protestants in Silesia.

Convinced that he could no longer hope for any tangible results from bilateral discussions with the individual states, Rojas decided finally to take his proposals to several courts and eventually to the Diet for general discussion. Crockow, for one, was most dubious about the reception which Rojas could expect at Regensburg.

In late May or early June, Rojas undertook his next circuit tour of the German states. In June he was in Munich negotiating with the Bavarian ministers on commercial problems, specifically on the linen trade between Upper Austria and Bavaria.¹⁴ He could not register any success on an attempt to detach Bavaria from its alliance with France, however. From Munich, Rojas traveled during the summer to Osnabrück, Calenberg, Celle, Wolfenbüttel, and Hanover. It was in Hanover that he found the warmest support for his religious reunion plan, and through his favorable acceptance there he was able to correspond further with Celle and Wolfenbüttel.¹⁵

Of all the smaller German states Hanover was the most receptive to proposals for religious peace. When Bishop Rojas arrived first at Hanover, the reigning duke was John Frederick (1665-1679), who had become a convert to Catholicism. His son and heir, Ernst August, husband of the free-thinking Sophia of the Palatinate, interested himself also in the idea of religious reunion.¹⁶ John Frederick and his son were both anxious to follow the lead of the House of Austria at that time, expecting to gain thereby the coveted electoral dignity.

The sources throw very little light on the precise details of Rojas' visit to Hanover in 1676. His approach to the problem was essentially the same as he had used on his previous missions in Saxony and Brandenburg. He took his point of departure from the question of the exiled Hungarian Protestants, using this as a means of introducing his "Principal Points," which he had reworked after his visit to Berlin, but which retained the same outline of the method of negotiating.¹⁷ Duke John Frederick was impressed, and went beyond the modest beginning which Rojas suggested, urging the discussion of several theological questions not considered in the "Principal Points."

Encouraged by his reception at Hanover, Rojas con-

⁹ *Ibid.* ". . . einer beständigen näheren Konföderation gegen den gemeinen Erb- und andere Partikularfeind fester vereinigt."

¹⁰ Haselbeck, "Der Ireniker," 398.

¹¹ Landwehr, "Unionsbestrebungen," 237-238.

¹² Posch, Fritz, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, *Werdejahre und österreichisch-steirische Beziehungen, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 61: 335-358, 1953.

¹³ Landwehr, "Unionsbestrebungen," 238.

¹⁴ Bog, Ingomar, Christoph de Royas y Spinola, *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung, Festgabe Anton Ernstberger* 14: 208, 1954.

¹⁵ Haselbeck, "Der Ireniker," 398.

¹⁶ Rommel, *Leibniz* 1: 223.

¹⁷ Menge, "Spinola," 16.

tinued his tour of the German states visiting the Palatinate, Anhalt, Ansbach, and Württemberg.¹⁸ In every instance his proposals met with serious consideration. In the Palatinate, the stronghold of Calvinism in Germany, he negotiated with the theologian Fabritius and the Elector's private secretary, von Schmettau. Both wanted somewhat less than Rojas with regard to the authority of the pope and the church council, but in the end it was the question of the sequestered church properties that led to the breaking off of negotiations.¹⁹

The Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig,²⁰ and the Duke of Anhalt, both Calvinists, thought the matter of church reunion ought to be given more publicity, and the Duke of Ansbach and officials in Württemberg, of the Lutheran confession, gave their blessing to the series of negotiations. The Elector thought more should be informed of the details of the affair, but Rojas, fearing that premature publicity would wreck everything, would have nothing to do with this approach.²¹

In both the Palatinate and Anhalt, Rojas was hampered by the fact that he had no authority to discuss the reunion of the churches in concrete terms. His only authorization came from the Emperor's vague instructions concerning his general political mission in the Empire. The negotiations were conducted in secrecy throughout 1676 and it was not until the following year that Elector Karl Ludwig of the Palatinate and others began urging the Emperor to make the negotiations public in order to frighten the Turks, who had relied previously on the religious disunity of the Empire to favor their military ambitions in Hungary and Austria.²² At this point it became clear to Rojas that he could go no further without the backing of the Roman curia.

The issues which were talked over during these visits to Protestant courts are very clear. An attempt was made to give reassurance that temporal possessions and ecclesiastical dignities would be respected in any general adherence to Rome. The power of the Roman pontiff was explained in such a way that in the eyes of the Protestants it would cease to be, or so Rojas hoped, a tyrannical institution which would deprive the Evangelicals of their freedom of conscience. More than

this the hope was held forth for a national council in which all problems, not already settled in theological colloquia, would be resolved.²³

More details are furnished by a letter sent from Vienna (August 14, 1677) to some theologians in Belgium.²⁴ Rojas' optimism (perhaps his dominant characteristic) comes to light once more. He reassures his correspondents that the Protestants with whom he has spoken are of the best intention and admit all the substantial points of the Romans and do not desire church promotion, nor, indeed, have they asked that an ecumenical council be held. More than this, they deplore the schism for which they personally, at least, are not responsible.

The theologians with whom conversations have been held are prepared to begin the difficult task of creating an atmosphere favorable to church reunion²⁵ and are not like the little foxes (*velpeculae*) with whom the Belgian theologians are accustomed to deal. The evils of schism are so great that if one method fails, then others should be used. The Catholics should consider that the neophytes in the early church did not possess doctrine in all its perfection and that Christ had said to his disciples, "multa habeo vobis dicere, quae non potestis portare modo." It is better that Christians have some pastors than none at all. The object here on Rojas' part is, of course, to suggest a partial ordination of pastors who declare their adhesion to Rome. All this should be put in the hands of a general council as the Apostles did and as the Pope, despite his infallibility, did at the Council of Lyons to quiet the spirits of the Greek people. It might be objected that even this was fruitless because the Greeks went back to their schismatic ways soon after Lyons and Florence-Ferrara but this is not to be considered in evidence because there have always been those who rejected the decrees of every ecumenical council. It is not our business to judge the success or failure in such positive terms because it is for "God alone to water what we plant and to bring up and mature what we sow."

The Belgians have objected that it would be a great

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

¹⁹ Haselbeck, "Der Ireniker," 398.

²⁰ The family of the Winter King stood at the heart of church reunion, perhaps because they were so confessionally divided amongst themselves. Karl Ludwig, Calvinist, was Elector Palatine; Elizabeth, the third child, was Calvinist Abbess of Herford; her sister Louisa Hollandina, R. C., was superior of the French Abbey of Maubuisson; while her younger brother Edward was a convert to the Roman Church. The youngest daughter was, of course, Sophia wife of Ernst August of Brunswick-Lüneberg, the successor to John Frederick; Sophia belonged more to the eighteenth century in religion because of her marked deistic tendencies. Nominally she was Calvinist, but religion with her was chiefly a means of advancing the cause of her numerous family. For more details on this family cf. Gindely, *Frederich v. der Pfalz*, Prague, 1884.

²¹ Hansitz, 9310, 147 et dorsum.

²² *Ibid.*, 399.

²³ Hansitz, 9310, 148. "... videlicet ostendendo commoda etiam temporalia, sacerdotiorum, aliarumque dignitatum: ad deliniendum autem populum, presso tantis per imperio et auctoritate Romani Pontificis, cujus vel mentionem, exulcerati tyrannidis ostento, animi haudquaquam ferant, spem secisse generalis aut certe nationalis Concilii, in quo reliquae omnes dissidiorum exhauriendae essent."

²⁴ Hansitz, 9313, 8. Responsio Christophori Ep. Tiniensis ad nonnullorum Theologorum [sic] Belgarum.

²⁵ It is not without sound reason that Rojas begins by attempting to create what might be known as an ecumenical epistemology. In our times this is one of the main aims of the World Council of Churches, and both Catholics and Protestants are aware that they must first learn to think and speak in similar categories simply because all their efforts for the most part have been directed toward doing exactly the opposite. For an intelligent Catholic view of this problem see Henry St. John, O. P., *Essays in Christian unity*, London, 1955, particularly chapter 7.

danger to guarantee Protestants, whose allegiance to the Church of Rome was not absolutely sure, of a valid episcopal succession. Rojas agrees but adds that, if the neophytes are sincerely obedient, then no danger can result (*praejudicium inde nullum subsequetur*). He is not able to say that the Church can yet be sure of such obedience but the character of the colloquia in which he has been engaged is reassuring on this point. Ordinary Christian folk will be assured of valid sacraments and absolutions, things of which they have so long been in doubt. In order to bring this about probably only a national council will be required instead of an ecumenical and it will also be likely that no elevation to the episcopate will be necessary, thus eliminating the possibility of granting valid succession to a religious group not fully convinced of Rome's claims. All those who are granted orders and who already possess wives should be allowed to keep them with the understanding that such an arrangement cannot be extended to the universal Church.

If dispensation from celibacy is so restricted and there is no need for granting the episcopal office and no necessity for an ecumenical council, then why speak of such matters at all? It is fitting to do so because the best approach to complete reunion is a combination of persuading the Protestants by argumentation and by promising them promotions of a more important character than simply the priesthood. Besides the princes with whom he has spoken have constantly held that the only way of giving complete satisfaction to the people would be the promise of a universal council. If the people understood that toleration would be the Church's policy until the holding of such a council much progress could be made. If, however, the Catholics began by insisting that the pope is the infallible and only judge, that councils are no longer possible and useful and that the Church has no broad powers to dispense from human laws, then all will be in vain from the onset. The Church must now follow the example of the Apostles who permitted much that an ultimate and secure victory for the Christian religion could be had and certain precedents in modern times (Rojas obviously refers to the steps taken in Hungary by Cardinal Pázmány) where parishes were provided with imperfect pastors, rather than suffer from a total want of spiritual leadership and no sacraments at all.

He is soon to be in Rome where he can present his case "integre et sincere." He has disclosed his own and final opinion to no living person much less has he subscribed to anything and he would be in mortal fear if anyone other than the Reverend Father Provincial knew of his real feelings in the matter. Nevertheless, he will outline his program at Rome and will attempt to convince the authorities there of the necessity of taking certain steps. *Fiat voluntas Dei!*

It became increasingly obvious to Rojas that more direct contact with Rome was essential and with this

dominant thought he set out for Rome only a few days after he completed his reply to the Belgian theologians. A Spanish nobleman—and Rojas was that before he was anything else save perhaps a man of God—did not wager his reputation lightly. In order to carry out his purpose, he needed the authority which only the Pope could give him; and if he must sacrifice his reputation, then let it be done in Rome where answers at least are final.

Leaving Vienna in August, 1677, Rojas went south by way of the Dalmatian coast, where he visited the towns of Zara and Sabenico, two parishes in his episcopal see which were not occupied by the Turks and therefore were accessible to him. On September 27, 1677, he arrived in Rome.²⁶ Almost immediately he was granted a long audience with the newly elected Pope Innocent XI.

The death of Pope Clement X in 1676 had been followed by a long interregnum and the traditional conclave of the College of Cardinals. At the conclave, the Spanish-Imperial party, though small by comparison with the French and Italian factions, was particularly strong because it was supported by some of the most able of the cardinals. One of their number, Cardinal Odescalchi, had the best chances of being elected to the throne of St. Peter because of his great reputation for holiness.²⁷ The actual election took many weeks, however.

Cardinal Odescalchi was finally elected, and he assumed the name Innocent XI. Although he enjoyed a wide reputation for saintly living, the new pontiff suffered from certain weaknesses in his character which made it difficult for him to act effectively in his exalted position. Habitually proceeding with extreme caution in everything, he came to a decision only with great difficulty; and when he had made up his mind, nothing could induce him to change it. Unlike most of his colleagues in the College of Cardinals, Innocent XI had never served as a nuncio anywhere in Europe; hence he came to the papal throne with very little first-hand knowledge concerning European affairs.²⁸ His one political conviction, that the best solution to European problems was peace and unity against the Turks, worked to Rojas' advantage.

The important office of Secretariat of State was

²⁶ Pastor, Ludwig Freiherr von, *The history of the popes from the close of the Middle Ages*, translated by Dom Ernest Graf O.S.B., et al., 40 v., 32: 477, London, 1891-1953. Pastor maintains that Rojas came to Rome early in the year, and bases his argument on a letter which Cardinal Buonvisi, the nuncio in Vienna, sent to Rome on February 12, 1677. Menge and Haselbeck both follow Hansitz, 9310: 151 and give September 27 as the date of Rojas' arrival in Rome. Since Rojas' "Responsio" to the Belgian theologians was dated in Vienna in August of that year, I have followed Hansitz, believing that he gives the most logical date. Rojas perhaps intended to go earlier, but may have postponed the trip to such a time as he would know more about the attitude of the new pope.

²⁷ Pastor, *History of the popes* 32: 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 32: 17-18.

conferred on Cardinal Alderano Cibo in September, 1676. Cibo was intimately acquainted with the complexities of European diplomacy, but the Pope never trusted him completely. Throughout his pontificate, Innocent XI placed more confidence in his Secretary of the Cypher, Agostino Favoriti (died 1682), and his successor Lorenzo Casoni. Although the Pope was unaware of the fact, his Secretary of State, Cibo, was receiving a substantial pension from Louis XIV.²⁹ Cibo gradually lost influence in the inner circles of the curia, however, since he was unable to remain comfortably in the overheated rooms in which Innocent XI had read to him the full texts of official correspondence.

The information which Innocent had received concerning Bishop Rojas' religious plans before the arrival of their author in Rome would hardly have done much to insure a favorable hearing for them at the papal court. The papal nuncio in Vienna, Cardinal Buonvisi, had reported earlier in 1677 that he had encouraged Rojas, armed him with good advice, and seen him off on his mission to the Empire. Buonvisi did not, however, consider any positive results likely. In his report to Rome the nuncio expressed his own opinion that Rojas was indulging in extravagant hopes.³⁰ The Bishop's first interview with the Pope could hardly have changed this attitude, for Rojas obviously gave his program the best face he could, and succeeded in producing the impression that most of the Protestant princes of the Germanies were ready to accept the ancient principles of the Church and to reunite with the Catholics.

Innocent XI first set up a commission to study Rojas' proposals from every conceivable angle. Included on the panel were the Cardinals Cibo, Spinola, Alberizzi, and Pio, plus three theologians, Laurea, Ricci, and Bishop Rojas himself.³¹ When the special commission set out to explore its task, the Pope wrote secretly to Cardinal Buonvisi in Vienna requesting further information. Buonvisi's reply was in the same vein as the previous report, and he told the Pope quite clearly that he did not like to discuss such church reunion plans as those proposed by Rojas, since he regarded them as impossible of execution.³² Buonvisi was anxious to take good care of his own reputation.

The meetings of the special commission in Rome lasted intermittently over a period of six months. Although the representatives of the curia included on the panel could not bring themselves to give unqualified approval to Rojas' suggestions, the bishop was able, nevertheless, to overcome many of their objections. The commission worked over various other irenical

ideas which had come up in the past, including certain articles which modified considerably the Catholic position on the doctrine of grace.³³ In the end the commission could make no more specific report than to recommend vaguely that Rojas be permitted to continue his negotiations with the Protestants in the German states on the subject of reunion.

The exact nature of the official support given by Rome to Bishop Rojas' project of religious reunion has become the subject of considerable debate. The question can be resolved only by viewing the nature of the plan which Rojas submitted. First, Rojas was not given permission to grant any specific concessions to the Protestants. This is obvious, and it is unlikely that Rojas wanted so much as that, for what he proposed was a method and not specific agenda of theological discussions. Rojas was given permission, however, to treat with the Protestant princes of the Empire concerning both the Turkish war and the Catholic religion.³⁴

The extent to which Rojas could carry out his proposed mission with only this vague support from Rome was left for time to decide. He was forbidden to treat in the name of the Holy See, and admonished to negotiate only under some other pretext than religious unity. To make certain that this part of his instructions were adhered to, the Pope wrote the nuncios ordering them to observe the reunion negotiations and to pay particular attention to that specific item. On the other hand, Innocent XI had sufficient interest in the matter to give Rojas the code which would enable him at any time to correspond secretly with Rome.³⁵ And, while Rojas was unable to act as an official representative of the Pope, he was given verbal permission to inform those with whom he was negotiating that "His Holiness was informed of the matter and he approved the attempt at reunion."³⁶

Two papal letters were written for Rojas, both of them recommending his reunion plans in the most favorable terms. One of the letters was dispatched to the Emperor through Cardinal Alberizzi and Rojas; the other, to Duke John Frederick of Brunswick-Lüneburg, was sent directly to Hanover.³⁷ In the letter to Duke John Frederick, Innocent XI indicated quite clearly that he did not necessarily share Buonvisi's pessimism concerning the possibility of reuniting the Protestants with the mother church. The pontiff recommended Rojas warmly, and in reference to his proposals for reunion he said: ". . . we fervently desire a happy issue in this (. . . *felicem exitum vehementur optamus*)."³⁸

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 32: 18-19.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 32: 478.

³¹ Pastor does not name Pio as one of the commission, but Hansitz includes Cardinal Pio and also gives the names of the theologians. See Haselbeck, "Der Ireniker," 399; also Hansitz, 9310: 151.

³² Pastor, *History of the popes* 32: 477.

³³ Haselbeck, *Der Ireniker*, 399.

³⁴ Pastor, *History of the popes* 32: 478.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Haselbeck, "Der Ireniker," 400.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Pope Innocent XI to Duke John Frederick of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Rome, April 20, 1678. Quoted in Foucher de Careil ed., *Œuvres de Leibnitz* 1: cxxxiv.

Undoubtedly the fact that John Frederick had already supported the reunion project contributed to the good results which Rojas achieved during his first visit to Rome. Since the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg was a convert to Catholicism, and as such was accorded special treatment by Rome, Innocent XI would have been most anxious to avoid alienating him. In spite of this, however, it is apparent that Innocent was actually anxious to let no opportunity slip by which might conceivably lead to a reconciliation and the realization of his dream of European unity against the Moslem threat in the east.

On the occasion of Rojas' visit in Rome in 1677 and 1678 there is no evidence that the French were even aware of what was going on, hence there seems to have been no serious attempt to sabotage his undertakings, though Cardinal Cibo appears to have been less enthusiastic about the proposals than was Cardinal Alberizzi. Alberizzi had been the first nuncio in Vienna to give Rojas encouragement in his aspirations toward religious reunion, and since he had been replaced in Vienna by Cardinal Buonvisi, he was able to support Rojas on the scene during the discussions in Rome. When the papal letter for the Emperor was ready, it was Alberizzi who forwarded it to Rojas on April 23, 1678, along with the papal diplomatic cypher.³⁹ Among the propositions which the papal letter permitted Rojas to discuss were the theological questions of justification, confession, and the absolution of sins.

By allowing discussion with the Protestants of some of the most essential elements of Catholic dogma, Innocent XI had gone most of the way to agreeing to the full-fledged negotiation of reunion with the reformed confessions. Indeed, the very inclusion of theological questions among the propositions went far beyond Rojas' original program, which included no more than a proposed method of negotiating peacefully once the nature of the controversy had been examined and elucidated by the respective theologians. It is no wonder, then, that Rojas was in good spirits when he left Rome at the end of April, 1678.⁴⁰

Accompanied by his faithful secretary, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, who had broken off his tour of Germany with Becher in 1677 to join his patron on his voyage to Rome, the Bishop of Tina retraced his steps, arriving in Vienna in late May or early June,

1678.⁴¹ In his negotiations with the curia he had gained a substantial victory for his proposals, and he could now face both the Emperor and the German Protestants with limited but, nevertheless, official approval by the Holy See. While he may not have accomplished as much as he might have desired, he certainly had as much success as he could possibly have expected. With his credentials from Rome safely in his hands, he turned next to an even more grandiose program of religious, political, and economic reorganization for the Holy Roman Empire.

Back in the Empire the foreign situation was increasingly governed by the threat of war with the French and the advance of the Turk. The Peace of Nymegen (1678) was merely another step in the direction of war because it gave the French king false confidence and led to the organization of the Chambers of Reunion which turned French interests once more toward whittling down imperial territory in Alsace. The Emperor's chief concern became, therefore, the collection of money for defense and Rojas once more set out to collect the sinews of war for his master. First to Electoral Saxony, then to the Palatinate, Brunswick, Hesse, Bayreuth, Nürnberg, Ulm, Frankfurt, and Augsburg. Two quite different aims were pursued in this mission, that of preparing for war and that of continuing the talks on church reunion: fourteen reigning princes promised their cooperation in the latter and five of them, Hanover, Zell, Wolfenbüttel, Ansbach, and Anhalt, all Lutheran, subscribed to a public formula written by Rojas in which they agreed in substance to reunion proposals. At this point a plague intervened to complicate the situation, but the Bishop continued to travel and correspond with interested parties. Alberizzi acted as patron of the affair in Rome and transmitted to the Pontiff news of developments. The Pope himself showed great interest and went so far as to write a letter of recommendation for Rojas to John Frederick of Brunswick.⁴²

Putting aside for the moment the general methods and convictions of the Bishop, it is possible to give an illustration of his approach in a number of particular cases during these years. In a letter to Cibo, Cardinal-Secretary of State, he describes how he acted in Bayreuth, Mannheim, Hesse-Cassel, the Abbey of Herford, and Hanover.⁴³ He negotiated with the Prince of Bayreuth but declared that he had not had an opportunity at table or in the library to disclose *le mie intentioni secreti* or to examine the controversy closely. A friar, Zoccolante, had already laid the groundwork in Catholic exposition and had the Prince in such a state of mind that he was ready to believe *ciocamente* certain features of Catholic faith and was prepared to do this publicly in return for an

⁴¹ Posch, "von Hörnigk," 354-355.

⁴² Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 57-58.

⁴³ Leibniz Handschriften (Nieder-Sächsische Landesbibliothek), Irenica, 10: 280-281. Hereafter cited as L., Irenica, etc.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 1: 23-34. "S.E. il Cardinale Albritio a Msr. Vescovo di Tina, Roma, 23 Aprile, 1678." Alberizzi had also written an encouraging note to Rojas in January, 1678 during the deliberations of the papal commission. *Ibid.* 1: 21.

⁴⁰ Pastor, *History of the popes* 32: 478. Pastor refers with some disdain to the "joyous optimism of his (Rojas') trusting nature." Many Catholic writers, including Menge and Hiltebrandt, could only visualize two possibilities for reunion: either the Protestants must convert to Catholicism, or the Catholic Church would be destroyed. Haselbeck has taken great pains to point out that Rojas proposed neither course, but rather a means whereby reconciliation might be accomplished, with a subsequent release of tension in the religious controversy.

impiego. In turn the Prince would act as an agent for the promotion of reunion. Rojas asked that this *impiego* might be granted the Prince. Without wishing to be too cynical in judging the Bishop motives, it is pertinent to suggest that the information would seem to indicate that one reason the Prince wished to leave his lands and circulate as a Catholic agent was that he was growing weary of his consort and wished to escape her if possible.

In Mannheim he met with theologians from the Palatinate (probably Calvinists from Heidelberg) who, after an hour-long meeting, gave him *intera sodisfattione* with the exception of two problems, to wit, an agreement on the issues of temporal and ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the restrictions which might be placed on ecclesiastical property in case of reunion. Apparently Rojas had no mandate of any kind from the Holy See to treat of such matters because the Heidelberg theologians were cautious enough to demand a *plenapotentia da parte di S. Santa*, a favor which Rojas certainly requested while in Rome.

He moved on to the court of Hesse-Cassel where he found the Landgrave "tractable" and then to Herford where the Abbess, a member of the celebrated family of the Winter King, promised him to enter into the matter deeply and enlist the services of the Elector of Brandenburg in the cause of reunion. He brought the Abbess to the point where she determined

di credere il purgatorio, l'invocatione et culto dei santi et dell'imagini et reliquie, come anche tutti li principi generali dai quali s'inferisce necessariamente la riunione et soggettione alla S. Sede et chiesa Romana.

He praises the life of the Abbess who, he declares, feeds herself and her community upon the mystical theologians of the Catholics.

In Hanover, where the Guelph princes brought together their theologians for a colloquium with Rojas, again complete satisfaction was had. Doubtless, considering the extreme *catholisant* position of Molanus and Barkhausen, this is a more accurate analysis of the facts than the "intera sodisfattione" which he had from the Calvinists in Mannheim. It is clear that Rojas would like a mandate, equivalent to a *carte blanche*, from Rome for he ends his report by stating that nothing can be accomplished, Caesar cannot be won over, no amount of energy or zeal in the cause, nothing, in short, will be conclusive without the Apostolic blessing. He characterizes his own part in all this as nothing more than that of a "vermicello della terra."

Nothing illustrates better the influence of politics on religion during this time than the attitude of the Court of Hanover toward the Bishop's plans. John Frederick, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, (1665-1679) had been converted to the Roman Church as early as 1650. He was married to a daughter of Louise Hollandina, Abbess of Maubuisson, and was eager, not only from personal conviction, but from the point of view

of family solidarity, to convert the Protestant members of the Winter King's numerous and talented brood. His chief theologians, Molanus and Barkhausen, were from the irenic school of Helmstedt and were more than willing to enter into negotiations with Rojas. Innocent XI personally recommended the Bishop to the Duke⁴⁴ and there is every reason to believe that the important negotiations of 1681-1683 might have begun earlier but for the death of John Frederick in 1679. All of the principals were in correspondence or on the verge of it. Bossuet was in communication with Leibniz, official librarian to the Hanoverian Court, and if he had not been, there was always Louise Hollandina and her secretary Madame de Brinon, both prolific letter writers, friends of important people at the French Court, and eager for the conversion of Sophia, wife of John Frederick's successor, Ernst August. Rojas certainly read at this time Bossuet's *Exposition de la foi catholique*⁴⁵ and was sent a copy of it through the hands of Leibniz.⁴⁶

Irenicists are like other people in not being in absolute command of their destinies and once again exterior events served to bring to an end, for the moment, the good designs of the church reunion people. From 1680 on Bossuet was more and more occupied with the struggle between Louis XIV and Innocent XI. John Frederick, who was cooperating with Rojas in an effort to bring together Lutheran theologians for serious discussions,⁴⁷ died on December 28, 1679, at Augsburg, a plague broke out in the Empire⁴⁸ and forced a curtailment of travel and, finally, the Turkish menace in Hungary forced the Emperor to concentrate all his resources on the problem of frontier defense.

Having his international projects temporarily suspended, Rojas withdrew to his parish at Hainburg. Apparently he made a good impression there by his visitations and parish work and gained the name of a saintly man.⁴⁹ It is uncertain how long he personally exercised his charge. It is certain that his administra-

⁴⁴ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 57-58. Rome, April 20, 1678.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 1: 61-62.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 1: 62-64. Bossuet to Leibniz. St. Germain, May 1, 1679. For a comparison of the methods of Rojas and Bossuet see chapter VIII. Cf. Weidemann, Heinz, *Gerard Wolter Molanus, Abt zu Loccum*, 2 v., 1: appendix 9, 174, Göttingen, Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929. In a memorandum to Anton Ulrich of Brunswick-Lüneburg, March, 1710, Molanus indicates that he conferred with Rojas throughout a period of four months. "Ante hos XXX annos, jussu Principis mei Catholici, res mihi fuit per integros IV menses, nullo Ministrorum status, etiam Secretissimorum conscio, cum Revmo et Illustrissimo Episcopo Tiniensi, sub Patris Rockas nomine sic satis noto, Viro certe Doctissimo moderatissimoque, super uno hoc problemate: An sine revocatione praetensorum errorum, non solum salva conscientia, sed et salvis utriusque partis principiis, hypothesibus et reputatione, pax utrique litigantium Ecclesiae acceptabilis sperari possit?"

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1: 75. John Frederick to Rojas, Hanover, 20/10 June, 1679.

⁴⁸ Hansitz, 9310: 156.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 156, verso.

tion in Hartberg (1668–1676) was carried on through the agency of Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk, but there is no evidence which points to a similar situation in Hainburg of which the Bishop had control from 1676 until 1685.⁵⁰

By way of summary, it might be said that but for the reasons already cited above the great reunion negotiations of 1681–1683 would certainly have come three years earlier. Minds were prepared on both sides and for a short time there were no political deterrents. In point of fact, the Court of Versailles was, if not in favor, at least indifferent to the course of internal religious events in Germany. There is little point in shedding vain tears over the course of history, but it seems a great pity that France and Germany in the persons of their most irenic bishops, Bossuet and Rojas, could not have treated the problem of church reunion at this time as a European affair and not as a strictly local concern.

V. THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1682–1683

It is almost impossible to determine exactly the precise movements of Rojas throughout the years 1682–1683. He made at least one other trip through Germany visiting the princely courts and also went to Hungary. It is also difficult to clear up the matter of the emphasis which was placed on any given set of negotiations, that is, whether they were primarily political, economic, or religious in character. From Rojas' own testimony it is evident that he acted as an imperial agent to bring together the German states for defense against the Turkish menace, but this does not exclude the possibility that he kept many irons in the fire. For example, sometime in 1681 he reported to Baron Johann Paul Hoher, Chancellor of the Archduchy of Austria, and described his movements. He has had conspicuous success in Ulm, Nürnberg, Frankfurt, Cassel, and Halle in getting promises of money for the Turkish war and has also gained more adherents for church reunion.¹ He is not completely optimistic because after four years of negotiations real progress is almost negligible. Moreover, the affair should not be left to backstairs diplomacy but should be handled directly by the Pope and the nuncios. The heretics promise much but withdraw their promises and charges are made in all quarters that Rojas deceives and is deceived and that he goes beyond his instructions. It is difficult to keep this Franciscan down, however, because he goes on to say that ultimately his work will result in the conversion of millions, the glory of

God, the Pope, and the Emperor, and that as he becomes more conversant with the princes and their ways his work becomes correspondingly easier.²

From the year 1681 there exists a memorandum which indicates that the primary concern of Rojas, as well as of the Empire, was to prevent a two-front war in which the Turks and French would strike the German states. Avoiding this situation was a real problem, particularly in view of the fact that the Rhenish states were often more inclined to ally themselves with France than with the Emperor and that Rojas' actual patron in Hanover, John Frederick, followed consistently a pro-French and anti-imperial policy. In view of these conditions it is not surprising that the Bishop considers German military unity of the utmost importance and that everything depends upon a concerted plan of defense in Hungary "as soon as peace shall have been made with the French." The memorandum, actually more a pious hope than anything capable of realization, has it that the Emperor shall have command of the monies raised, shall determine the number of recruits, decide upon the place, time and manner of sustaining the soldiery, in short, act as the generalissimo of the army. But in the seventeenth clause of this document a familiar note is interjected. In order to prepare for attack in Hungary it is essential that religious peace be established, that the Protestant ministers, expelled for their part in the rebellion of 1663, be restored, and that they abstain from abuse of the Roman Church. To be effective this is to be accomplished through colloquia of theologians "under the direction and authority of the Apostolic See and by authorization of the temporal authority of the Emperor and the princes of the whole Empire."³

The eyes of Europe were fastened on the struggle between Moslem and Christian in the Danube area but this is of greatest concern to the military and political historian. It was further to the north and west that the ecumenical strivings of the seventeenth century were to be centered, to be precise, at the court of Ernst August, Bishop of Osnabrück and Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Lord of Calenberg-Göttingen-Grubenhagen and husband of that precocious Palatine Princess Sophia. The Duke was a Lutheran but not so committed to any religious position that he could

² *Ibid.*, 17. Rojas also declares that he intends to go to Tina and spend the remainder of his years amongst his flock after the completion of his work in Germany. This letter also shows that, although Rojas did not generally look upon his work as a means of personal enrichment, he still felt obliged to say that he had kept less than a third of the benefices offered him, and likewise asked for the fulfillment of a vow made to the church of the B. V. de Rosario by Ferdinand III.

³ *Ibid.*, 19–20 and verso. Evidently invitations were actually issued for a colloquium in Hungary; see "Invitatio ad tractationem Concordiae," November 8, 1681, issued to the leaders of the Lutherans and Calvinists for the purpose of freeing Germany from "civil war, rapine, rebellion, and most cruel death." *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵⁰ See the article by Posch, quoted in note 12 of this chapter.

¹ Hansitz, 9313: 16. "Apud reliquos vero oretenus detectos Principes et Theologos: cum quibus jam saepe a quadrennio correspondere sum jussus: non solum circa omnia illa generalia fidei principia, ex quibus reliquae veritates catholicae necessario inferuntur; verum, etiam circa plures ex specialibus difficilioribusque quaestionibus consensum obtinui."

not change it in the interests of uniting the Guelph patrimony and becoming the eighth elector of the Holy Roman Empire. There was, quite frankly speaking, to be a "deal" in which the *spiritualia* of Osnabrück would be turned over to a Catholic bishop, canonically elected, and the *temporalia*, including the rights of taxation and advocacy, were to be retained by the Duke who did not promise to become a Catholic if these steps were to be realized.⁴

It is possible that discussions between the Duke and Rojas began as early as 1676⁵ but they certainly took a more serious turn when the Duke succeeded John Frederick in 1679. Rojas agreed to represent the matter to the Emperor and in return he was to discuss with Molanus and Barkhausen plans for an overall approach to church reunion. In all this the Duke was to have the same control over the Church (whether Lutheran or Catholic) as the King of France had over the Gallican Church and, far from restoring to Rome the property secularized since the Reformation, such property was to be left in the hands of the civil authorities and in all probability increased at the expense of the hypothetical Catholic bishop of Osnabrück.⁶

Sometime at the turn of the years 1680-1681 Ernst August asked some favor of Rojas which was probably to get imperial support for the Osnabrück scheme. That Rojas was willing to cooperate is no matter of doubt. He was only interested in acting quickly and circumspectly and in involving as few parties as possible.⁷ He realized that there was no necessary connection between the jurisdictional settlement and Lutheran-Catholic reunion but it was his dearest wish that the two advance *pari passu*. Ernst August would commit himself no further than to promise that Molanus and Barkhausen had his permission to treat with Rojas whenever the opportunity arose.⁸

In the summer of 1682, after a partial recovery from an illness which forced him to travel by chair, Rojas once more traveled from court to court. One of the principal centers visited on this trip was Berlin where Rojas was commissioned to arrange a marriage between the widowed Queen of Poland and the Elector

of Brandenburg.⁹ He also presented to the court preachers Stosch and Bergius a document *Concordia Christiana* which contained his general plans for reunion. The preachers replied that it was first necessary to investigate the cause for the rupture between Catholics and Protestants and to bring an end to papist persecution in lands such as France. For the rest, the Austrian's attempt to explain the Catholic tenet on justification was regarded as having a double meaning. Many questions were not considered at all, notably the very important one of the position of the pope in the Church. In August the Vice Chancellor, Lucius von Radhen, held a theological colloquium in Stosch's dwelling and from this meeting the Bishop received the answer that "in these matters no private interpretation could be given, for whatever the point of view of an individual might be, it must be in harmony with the whole Reformed Church."

He conferred with Molanus and Barkhausen in Hanover preparatory to more extended conversations in the following year.¹⁰ Again the political program of Ernst August goes hand in hand with church reunion. The Duke's brother, George William, still stood in the way of establishing the rule of primogeniture for the succession to all the Guelph lands, but he was won over in 1682. There still stood the unrealized objective of the electorate and this was intimately allied with questions of religion. Ernst August first discussed the matter with the princes of the Corpus Evangelicorum and this step having led to nothing, he saw no other way to achieve his goal than to appeal directly to the Emperor. In January of 1683 he contracted in Vienna to raise 10,000 men from his lands for imperial defense in return for an imperial promise that Vienna would be friendly toward a policy of creating an additional electorate.¹¹

From January 28 until June 30, 1683, Rojas remained in Hanover. The determining factor in this long stay was a serious illness but in a way it was a blessing for it gave him time to consider his plans more thoroughly and to enter into detail in discussions, measures most desirable in view of the hit-miss-and-run tactics which characterized so much of his activity up to this time. It gave him the leisure to associate intimately with Molanus, Barkhausen, and probably Leibniz, with Hildebrandt, Obersuperintendent in Celle, Johann Fabritius of the Helmstedt Theological Faculty, and with the ducal family upon whose approval hung the success or failure of any project either ecclesiastical or political.

To determine the places visited by Rojas on any one diplomatic mission is thorny enough but to say

⁴ Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 33.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 33, note 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 34-35. Letter from Sophia to Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, March 9, 1679.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 153-154, 2nd appendix. Letter from Rojas to Ernst August, January 2, 1681.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 154-155. Letter from Ernst August to Rojas, Hanover, April 13, 1681. See *Nunziatura di Colonia* (Vatican Archives)/52: 589, hereafter cited as Nunz. Col. Report of Nuncio Ercole Visconti for his attitude toward and understanding of Rojas' efforts. "Ducissa Hanoverani mihi desuper ad duas fere horas locuta fuit, tantum autem pro secta sua zelum vim olim non ostendit, et inter alia mihi discit. . . . Episcopum insinuas quasi . . . dispensaturus foret ut SS Eucharistia sub utraque specie passim sumatur, ecclesiasticis, si velint matrimonia ineant, et ut pro articulo fidei non habeatur Purgatorium esse; Ego valde incertum existimo utrum S^{ta} Sua in huic consentiet.

⁹ See Landwehr, *op. cit.*, 234, 238-239, 240. See also Bittner, Ludwig & Lothar Gross, *Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder seit dem westfälischen Frieden*, 2 v., 1: 126, Oldenberg & Berlin, 1936.

¹⁰ Weidemann, *op. cit.*, 37.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

definitely what topics were treated is an even more difficult task and before considering these discussions of 1683 some idea should be given of the permanent and shifting factors which governed his actions. In the first place he was an ambassador who had very little liberty of action. He was dependent upon a political master (usually Leopold of Habsburg) and an ecclesiastical one, the pope. He was no theologian in the proper sense of the term but he could not have been completely ignorant or naive or blinded by a utopian optimism in this discipline as some would have us believe.¹² It is not impossible that his program changed from year to year in detail and that he sometimes attempted to be “all things to all men” but the broad outlines of his system remained constant. The basic formula for reunion was that of the Jesuit François Veron (1575–1649);¹³ each party proposed formulae in which their personal views were concealed or dressed up in the best possible light for the other side and then an effort was made to convince by suasion and explication. The exception to this in Rojas’ case is that he always insisted that he made no proposals whatsoever. He merely met with Protestant theologians, accepted the proposals they made, and then attempted to formulate a synthesis from the total number of items offered him.¹⁴

Whether his method or his ideas were orthodox is quite another question from what Rojas actually believed. He certainly never considered himself to have gone beyond the regulations of Trent or the specific instructions of the Pope and the Viennese nuncio or, indeed, beyond the fundamental truths of the Catholic faith, no matter how they may have been transmitted through the centuries. He was a Spanish diplomat to the end, and he used the normal means of seventeenth-century diplomacy, but he did not compromise his own faith or that of the Church. This is precisely where the paradox lies, that is, between the sometimes amoral, even Machiavellian tactics of European courts in his time, and the objectivity of Catholic principles. Suffice it to say at this point that Rojas, although relaxing his personal beliefs no more than did Bossuet in the *Exposition de la foi catholique*, now and again was obliged by particular circumstances or by his hope for surrendering a lesser good for a greater to involve himself so deeply that he was open to the charge of duplicity and, more serious, caused it to seem that the official Catholic position was made up of a vast

complex of logomachies which could all be solved in a sense favoring Lutheran or Calvinist formularies.

A preponderant factor in any research is always the accessibility and quantity of documents. In the case of Rojas there is another element which is of the utmost importance. Most of the parties with whom he treated were nervous about publicity and he no less than the others. For the most part the governing idea was to keep the negotiations as secret as possible and to confine them to theologians and reigning princes. All the participants were eager to keep information from the general public for fear of charges of heresy, syncretism and duplicity and to prevent a general undermining of sound doctrine no matter by whom it might be held. It has already been seen how Rojas got the papal cipher in 1677 so that secrecy could surround his correspondence with Rome and at the very end Leibniz took the greatest precautions to see that the documents preserved in the Wiener-Neustadt archives did not fall “en des mauvaises mains.”¹⁵

Although there is not always a sure way of saying what Rojas proposed in particular instances his proposals contained an element of constancy which can be outlined with relative accuracy. Perhaps the best way to begin is to summarize the contents of a *Casus*¹⁶ written for Innocent XI by the Bishop himself. It is a compact document consisting of an introduction and four questions, followed by a quantity of *censurae* (as it now stands in the Leibnizhandschriften) from various Catholic doctors in Vienna, Mainz, and Cologne.

In the *Casus* this question is posed. There is given a non-Catholic people of one realm. They are persuaded to reunion by their chief spiritual leaders in the form of union and obedience to the See of Rome and an acceptance of the articles of faith defined by Trent and the other ecumenical councils in so far as these articles are in conformity with Scripture and the truth. At the same time these people doubt that Trent was free and fulfilled all the conditions of a legitimate council. Despite their doubts they are ready to submit to the decisions of a general council called by the pope at which time their preachers will receive a full hearing. There will be an interim, pending the ecumenical council, during which all judgments about the said doubts will be suspended. These people will then pledge full obedience to the pope. One other condition is to be realized, that is, the ministers, despite their married state, will be ordained by a Catholic episcopacy.

¹² Veit, L. A., *Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Individualismus*, 1648–bis sur Gegenwart, 1: 30, Freiburg-im-B., Herder, 1931.

¹³ Veron’s chief work is *Règle générale de la foi catholique séparée de toutes autres doctrines*, Paris, 1646.

¹⁴ For descriptions of particular methods of action see Hansitz, 9313: 80 et seq., “Systema generale concordiae seu sincera Relatio circa statum Reunionis Ecclesiasticae inter Romanenses ac Protestantas per ulles Moderatos Protestantas qui Principium usorum jussu cum Rei Procuratore egerunt ex originalibus et authenticis utriusque partis documentis deducta probatuque per subjectam doctorum catholicorum censuram.”

¹⁵ L., Irenica, I: 12: 107, Letter from the Vicar General Vlostorf to Leibniz, Neustadt, May 5, 1695. A Pichler, *Die Theologie des Leibniz*, 2: 490, Munich, 1870; probably Leibniz to Oberg, Brunswick’s representative in Vienna, May, 1695. See also Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 2: 98. Vlostorf to Leibniz, Neustadt, Oct. 17, 1695.

¹⁶ L., Irenica, 1: 9: 254 et seq. Further development of Rojas point of view is to be found in “Quaestio theologica, an dispensatio aut saltem tolerantia aliqua ad Protestantium reductionem requiratur et expediat. Sanctitatis Suae correctione humille subiecta.” *Ibid.* 1: 9: 315–326.

The first question asks, "Are these non-Catholic people formal or material heretics?" Should they be admitted to union and should they be temporarily provided with a legitimized priesthood and sacraments? Certainly he is a formal heretic who denies a point defined by the whole Church. On the other hand malicious obstinacy (*malitiae obstinatio*) and vincible ignorance are required to make a formal heretic. These two characteristics are to be discovered in many non-Catholic learned individuals, but in a rough and ready (*rudi et prompto*) people these two things are not to be found. Even doctors at Trent were of this persuasion. It is then concluded that these people, once having declared their subjection to Rome, should not be considered formal heretics but, like tender plants (*tenella plantula*) they should temporarily and carefully be watered by a legitimate priesthood.

The second question deals with the desirability of the promising and calling of a general council for a suitable time. To be sure, this would seem to indicate that the decisions of other general councils might be called into question. Besides, a general council would be difficult to assemble. On the other hand, questions which had been defined concerning the Greeks were considered at Lyons and Florence-Ferrara without doubting any other conciliar decision. All this was done that a greater good might be gained since it would be dangerous to force a people from one extreme to another. In destroying one set of beliefs too rapidly and in confronting people with another so quickly, religious leaders often produce atheism. The best way to persuade the non-Catholic people would be to tolerate their ways and allow their ministers to draw them gradually into the paths of truth. It should be understood, however, that any attempt to create doubts about the Trentine decision should be considered as worthless and heretical and that the concessions to the Greeks changed in no way any important doctrine. It is concluded that the matter of calling a council should be at the discretion of His Holiness. It is, however, obvious that Rojas desires the calling of such a council.

In the third question the problem of ordaining the Protestant pastors, despite their married state, is broached. The objection lies in this: once one group of pastors be permitted to marry, it will set a bad example for those who are celibate. The answer is that the law of celibacy would remain in its integrity and that the concession would apply only in specific cases. The good resulting from this, that is, the conversion of a large and intact realm (possibly the Guelph lands are meant), would be greater than the slight evil which might be caused by a relaxation of discipline. Point four poses the problem, "Should the new pastors, raised to sacerdotal and episcopal dignity, be given a seat in the forthcoming ecumenical council?" To seat or not to seat is a decision which must remain in the hands of the pope.

Obviously the *Casus* was meant for official eyes and before going on to the documents which resulted from Rojas' colloquia in Hanover, it throws more light on the situation to see what some Catholics, other than Rojas, thought of the proposals just outlined. The propositions were commented upon by numerous theologians whose opinions were requested by the Holy See. Two Jesuits in Mainz generally approved the project. In dealing with a simple people, questions such as the legitimacy of councils and other more subtle matters must not be brought to their attention. These matters are not even customarily expounded to a people Catholic from birth. It suffices that these non-Catholic people be brought to subscribe to the principal articles of faith found in the Catechism of Saint Peter Canisius¹⁷ and to obedience to the supreme Pontiff as a matter established by an infallible rule of divine faith. Given that these conditions exist, the Jesuits see no reason why the said non-Catholic people should be cut off from union or be deprived of a legitimate priesthood and valid sacraments. There should be no difficulty about the pope's ability to release the Protestant ministers from the necessity of a vow of celibacy, if such release is sought by outstanding monarchs and bishops.¹⁸

Three Viennese theologians were opposed. Nicholas Donallarius (Augustinian), Peter Singer, O.P., and Vincent Geiher, O.P., wrote a long commentary. To discuss such questions as those Rojas has posed requires such a sublime and rare atmosphere that their consideration should be confined to private doctors, alone, with the concurrence of the highest pastor, the pope. If one council is brought into question, this will result in all the others being brought into doubt and the hearts of the faithful will be troubled. A general council can frequently bring as much evil into the Church as good. In matters of doubt there is only one thing needed, to wit, the authority, decision and infallibility of the supreme pontiff. Tampering with the doctrine and administration of the Church is generally a dangerous business and causes a thousand confusions, schism, and sects, and is contrary to the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles. The pastors among newly converted people should be warned to teach only those things found in the Roman catechism and to avoid discussion of all controversial articles. On one point alone is this *censura* conciliatory; if there be sufficient demand from princes and bishops, the pope could grant freedom from celibacy without obstacle and without scandal.¹⁹

Other theologians took different views of the matter.

¹⁷ For the moderate character of Canisius' Catechism see Le Bachelet, "Pierre Canisius," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 2: 2nd Part, cols. 1525-1526.

¹⁸ L., Irenica, 10: 255 *et seq.* This *censura* is dated May 16, 1677, and was written by Conrad Breunig and Christopher Hauk. This *censura* and those which follow were evidently presented to Rome during Rojas' visit there in 1677.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 10: 255-258.

Marianus Schmitt, O.F.M., Franciscan Provincial of the Austrian Reformprovinz (missionary area among the Protestants) approved. Johann Schweitzer, Doctor and Professor Ordinarius of Cologne and an Augustinian, stated that “since without the Roman Church no man can be saved, then no opportune way should be omitted to bring back those separated from it and to reunite them in a bond of peace.”²⁰ Aegidius Morgatius, O.F.M., of the Dutch province said that he approved the plan, if the Protestants were willing to obey the Roman pontiff and to hear an explanation of the Trentine decrees in a council.

Indeed, since they only doubt about matters not necessary for salvation and are ready, during the interim to abstain from all censures against the Catholics . . . , I think that the supreme pontiff has it in his power to tolerate them, whilst they be more fully instructed, and he can free them from the penalties by which he bound them as pertinacious in the Council of Trent. . . . He can give them the power of voting in an assembled council. . . . As for celibacy the supreme pontiff is able to give dispensation to those ministers having wives, that they might keep them during their lifetime, as it has been done amongst the Greeks. Thus think I.²¹

Hilary Andreae, O.F.M., General Lector and Ex-Provincial of Austria was concerned about a legitimate priesthood and felt that the Protestants should be provided with a legitimized clergy by the council which was to be called. Other than that he was in agreement with Rojas.²² Friedrich Stummel, O.F.M., of the Thuringian Province gave his approbation. In 1682 four professors from the University of Cologne subscribed to the *Casus* along with two conventuals, one of whom was General Commissioner of the Cologne Province. Two of these men were Benedictine, two Augustinian, and two, Franciscan. As long as the Protestants did not obstinately and maliciously oppose the doctrines of Trent they should not be held bound by them but should be relieved of the anathemas, pending a general council.²³ In 1683 one Jesuit and two Augustinians gave a favorable opinion of Rojas' work, although they cautioned that difficult and subtle questions must not be brought at once to the attention of unlettered people.²⁴ On October 13, 1683, Frederick von Ludwigshausen (otherwise known as Wolff) gave a qualified approval.²⁵ These commentaries indicate that many representative men from many religious orders—and important men, too—were well disposed toward, and in many cases in full agreement with, Rojas on the matter of the suspension of the Trentine anathemas, providing, of course, that a people showed itself ready to accept the authority of the Bishop of Rome.

The lines of the *Casus* and its *censurae* are fairly clear. Rojas, himself, was certainly an orthodox Catholic. He says nothing about his personal opinion but only represents himself as a sort of agent who will advocate the case for the Protestants. He is clearly sympathetic with their point of view, but acceptance and sympathy are two quite different things. The Viennese theologians are actually the only ones who, with one exception mentioned, flatly oppose the Bishop. The others, although they surround their arguments with qualifications and cautions, are, nonetheless, supporters of the suspensory method of reunion recommended in the *Casus*.

The fundamental document around which all the discussions of 1683 centered is the *Regulae circa Christianorum omnium ecclesiasticam reunionem*.²⁶ As far as can be determined Rojas was not the actual author but he was the chief font of inspiration. Actually Molanus and Barkhausen were partly responsible for the phraseology, and probably the son of the great Calixtus, Frederick Ulrich, also a professor at Helmstedt, was consulted in the redactions of the *Regulae*, but the inspiration, the instruction, and the ideas came from Rojas, and they were in essence what he had already proposed to the Hungarian Protestants as the basis for religious peace.²⁷

The *Regulae* begin:

This reunion is possible and in itself is, in a temporal and spiritual sense, useful to each state and individual and this obligation is upon every Christian according to God, nature and the laws of the empire and according to the [Christian's] strengths, and his opportunities at any time. He who is bound by this precept and who speaks against it must be considered seditious and heretical. This rule is not ignored or neglected by any wise and discreet man.²⁸

Hereupon follow nine rules which should be observed in bringing about the reunion. For obtaining this peace no truth is to be denied and no source of investigation to be neglected. The opposing party (Protestants) ought not to have too much required of them initially because a violent change would undermine their faith. Just as the Jews were permitted to retain certain dietary

²⁶ Bossuet, J. B., *Oeuvres complètes*, “*Regulae etc.*,” 17: 361–374, Paris, 1885. Cf. Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 40–41, note 6. Weidemann seeks to show without doubt that Rojas was the actual author (see appendices 2 and 3); but the reading of these documents would seem to indicate that, if anything, the *Regulae* constitute a cooperative work. This is confirmed by Weidemann's own statement that the *Regulae* as they now stand in Bossuet's published works do not constitute the original text but are the result of many redactions. The question of the actual verbal authorship of the original cannot be settled because, to my knowledge, we do not possess the actual document which Hildebrandt states Rojas handed him. Cf. Weidemann, *op. cit.*, appendix 2, part b. The *Regulae* as published in Bossuet are followed by a translation from the Latin into French by Bossuet himself; the authorship of the Latin form is listed as being “a nonnullis professoribus, scilicet Hanovriae.”

²⁷ Krätzing, *op. cit.*, 255; see also Haselbeck, “Der Ireniker” 2: 16.

²⁸ Bossuet, *Regulae* 17: 360.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 259.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 258.

²² *Ibid.*, 258.

²³ *Ibid.*, 259.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 259.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 259.

practices, so must the Protestants be allowed their peculiar usages. At Lyons and Florence²⁹ no public retraction was demanded of the Greek bishops, but they were permitted to explain their positions privately. If they avowed their errors publicly, the simple people who trusted them would fall into a state of confusion and be in danger of atheism.³⁰ The two parties involved should submit themselves to all revealed and defined articles of faith and to a final judge. This ought not to be difficult, because few people know expressly or clearly all those things of faith revealed by God. If it be asked who is the judge, then the answer is, first, the interior direction of the Holy Spirit and the exterior word of God in conjunction and, second, the interpretation of the Word by the Universal Church.

The fifth rule deals with false worship. All this is idolatrous and should be suppressed and all Christians should openly break with those who deprive God the honor due Him. What are the capital errors against God's worship? Those are not errors that do not formally, directly, and immediately, attack the substance or properties of Jesus Christ.³¹ Errors not opposed to piety, charity, and the honoring of God deserve to be tolerated. All idolatrous practices must be denounced and abrogated at once by Catholics and Protestants alike. Doctrines tolerated by one religious body in exterior worship ought to be tolerated by all other communions who communicate *in sacris* with the first religious group. Grace and the concept of Grace gained by good works, if properly understood as a second degree of glory, may be acceptable to the Protestants. Kneeling before the Host, if honor to Jesus Christ rather than veneration of ordinary bread is meant, cannot possibly be repugnant to Protestant consciences. A case in which mutual toleration would be desirable is that which concerns, on the part of the Catholics, the doctrine of Permanency (*Permanentia Christi in Eucharistia*) and, on the part of the Protestants, ubiquity. Transubstantiation and the veneration of images are to be accepted by the Protestants, if the Catholics disclaim, expressly, the opinion that the sacrifice of the cross was not sufficient for the salvation of mankind. If the Catholics disclaim all the other accusations that are leveled at the Mass and explain their beliefs as to exclude idolatry, they should be accepted into full communion by the Protestants.

The rules which follow deal with the government of the Church. It is necessary for the Church to have a uniform government which is free from the influence of the state.³² The position of *primus inter pares* is

surely rightly claimed by the Bishop of Rome. Even the Confession of Augsburg and the Smalkald Articles admit this.³³ Infallibility is not to be attributed to the pope but, notwithstanding, "in these matters which have been defined by Scripture, his [the pope's] opinion [as it is owed to one's superior] is to be preferred to the opinions or writings of private persons, no matter who they might be."³⁴ The pope's decrees, however, ought not to be published in any state without the consent of the prince thereof.³⁵

It is clear that a general council must be called.

Outside of a council it will be difficult to reconcile such things as Transubstantiation, the permanent presence of Christ, communion under one kind, the infallibility of the Council of Trent and the supreme authority of the pope *de jure divino* which the Romans hold as articles of faith and as the apple of their eye. And so, for the love of peace, certain other things which disturb and will continue to disturb the Protestants will be submitted to the disputation and decision of a new council. On the other hand the Protestants, for the love of peace and union, will hold themselves subject to a council, as much for these things [objections to Catholic practices] as for certain others from the apprehension of which even the Romans cannot free themselves except by a council.³⁶

The Protestants must show a discrete subjection (*discreta subjectio*) to the pope and the council. The Catholics will repay them by not considering them as excommunicate and heretical. The Protestants will refrain from calling the Catholics idolaters. The discussion of all serious questions will be confined to qualified persons before the general council meets and ought not be discussed *in foro populi*. A warning is proffered that the consideration of these doctrinal points shows no suspicion of doubt about past or future conciliar decisions but merely suggests a hope for Christian concord.

To the Protestants then, the Roman See ought to grant the use of the chalice, leave to the princes their rights and to the pastors their wives and it ought to confirm their original ordinations. For their part the Protestants ought to return to a union with the Latin Church and the first patriarch, saving as explained above for their evangelical liberty.³⁷

infallibility and the current centralization of the church's administration in Rome.

³³ In both the only thing which is claimed is that the pope does not exercise his power *ex jure divino*; therefore by the argument of omission it can be said that he is still regarded as the *president* of the church in the Lutheran confessional documents. See Petzer, J. A., *Evangelisches Concordienbuch* Smalkald Articles, Article IV, "vom Papstthum," 332-335, Nürnberg, 1843.

³⁴ Bossuet, *Regulae* 17: 366.

³⁵ Rule VIII is a curious plea that sounds as if it could have been invented by an eighteenth-century rationalist. It holds that no agreement can be reached on rites or on legitimate ordination and, therefore, both sides should practice toleration. *Ibid.* 17: 366-367. In this matter, according to the Roman view, then and now, Rojas was a victim of loose reasoning.

³⁶ Bossuet, 17: 368.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 369.

²⁹ Note that the same reasoning is to be found in the *Casus* considered in this chapter.

³⁰ Bossuet, *Regulae* 17: 361.

³¹ *Ibid.* 17: 362.

³² It must be remembered that Rojas was capable of holding Gallican (or perhaps, anticipating the future, Febronian) views which were quite different from the present concept of papal

Finally the ecclesiastical and secular princes, both Catholic and Protestant, the pastors of the church, the nobles and lay people of any estate must be left in possession of their dignities, rights and emoluments (*praeminentiae, jura et emolumenta*), providing such are not in contradiction with divine law.³⁸ The reunion will immediately be satisfactory to all parties because the plague of internecine warfare will cease, the Protestant nobles will be able to possess prebendaries and ecclesiastical principalities, not only will the Protestant ministers hold their benefices, but their children will enjoy a *carrière ouverte* to ecclesiastical preferment, and the prelacy, without actually being obliged to reside in their holdings, will be able to administer a church office. The Catholics may lose temporal wealth but, by way of recompense, their patriarch will recover the dignity he once had amidst his former sons (*autem patriarcha a pristinis filiis suum resuperabit honorem*).³⁹

Ecclesiastical principalities will be joined to the prince's domain as a measure to prevent diplomatic juggling on the part of German *Kleinsouveranität* and the Most Christian King. The influence of Ernst August is seen in this proviso:

With respect to temporal things they [the Protestant princes] and their heirs and all men of dignity will be helped by all the means and occasions at the disposal of the Roman See in their reception of dignities both imperial and electoral⁴⁰ and of other ecclesiastical principalities more important than those they now possess.⁴¹

The princes who bring to success this religious peace will have the glory of saving the Christian world from the great peril [the Turks], to which it is exposed, by the suppression of schism in Germany and Hungary.

The *Regulae* are concluded with a statement of the fundamental rules of faith upon which all must agree to perfect the union of Christendom. Some of them have already been considered in the body of the *Regulae*. By way of summary, however, the rules may be stated in their final form and in this order: (1) The prime rule for determining articles of faith is the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and the Word of God. (2) A third rule for ascertaining what is actually of faith, to be sure a rule less significant and less binding than the first two, is the interpretation of the Scripture which is given us "by the common consent and practice, not only of the primitive and ancient Church, but also of the whole of present-day Christianity as comprised of those people under the five patriarchs of Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as by another and new ecumenical council which is legitimate and free."⁴² (3) All are in agree-

ment that councils are not necessary in themselves, but should be called only in case of great troubles, that the decision of a council is to be preferred to the decision of a particular person, not only according to the Catholics but according to the Confession of Augsburg, the Synod of Dordrecht (1618–1619), and the Synod of Charenton (1637), that no council is infallible *per se* and that acceptance by a greater part of the Church establishes a thing as infallible doctrine, that when a council proceeds legitimately its decisions have the support of the majority of the Church, perfect unanimity not being necessary for a proper decision in faith, and finally that each one is obliged overtly and in an interior way to submit to the decisions of a council and that a council cannot be legitimate if it does not follow rules of procedure observed by the Church in the first four councils. (4) To be legitimate a council should fulfill these conditions: (a) The bishops alone sit as judges; (b) theologians and doctors are admitted only as advisers; (c) neither the number of bishops nor their provenance has anything to do with the legitimacy of a council, it sufficing only that all the bishops be convoked; (d) one man may have a truer insight into matters than many, but in the case of matters of faith, the judgment of the majority is better than that of any one man; in general "that is regarded as a conciliar decision which is proposed and published by the presiding officer with the consent of the greater part of the council."⁴³ (5) All who are opposed to the decisions of the council are to be excommunicated.

The Protestants elevated to new dignities by proper ordination will sit as judges in the council and there will be no lifting of the session until reunion shall have been accomplished on the principal points. In the meantime, the whole of Christendom will raise its prayers for the healing of the wounds in Christ's Mystical Body. The bishops who are present will assure the faithful that all the rules of a legitimate council will be observed.⁴⁴

As has been seen, Rojas' authorship of the *Regulae* cannot be established in an absolute sense. The document represents a marked advance over the *Casus* in terms of the number of controversial points considered. The two documents are different in tone, the *Casus* being simply a *quaestio theologica* of a Catholic doctor considered after a Scholastic pattern, the *Regulae* being more in the form of an irenical treatise in which the author makes a decided effort to present a comprehensive plan for church reunion from what might be called a Protestant point of view. However, the ideas

Theologie und Kirchenpolitik, Wiesbaden, Steiner Verlag, 1961) which unfortunately came too late to be used in this biography of Rojas. Professor Schüssler gives abundant evidence in his book that all the main theses and propositions used by the theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, during Rojas' career were already well formed and in use during Calixtus' lifetime.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 387.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 370.

⁴⁰ Bossuet, 17: 370.

⁴¹ Ernst August did not realize his wish of becoming elector until 1692 and even then he was recognized only by the Emperor and the Catholic electors.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 371. Professor Pfarrer Hermann Schüssler has recently published a book on George Calixtus (*Georg Calixt*,

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 373.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 360–374.

in both treatises are sufficiently similar to make it a strong logical possibility that Rojas was the author of both. The difference lies in this; in the *Casus* Rojas is writing for a Catholic audience and in the *Regulae* he is presenting his ideas to the Protestants.

It may be inquired what the purpose of the *Regulae* was. It was not a statement of Rojas' private beliefs. It was, however, a statement of the method which could be used for bringing about religious reunion. If both sides would dispassionately consider the problems and the solutions suggested for them, a decisive step could be made toward unity.⁴⁵ Rojas' role was that of arbitrator and his method that of the presiding officer at a debate. The *Regulae* merely constituted the order of business. Rojas did not claim in this or in any other document to speak in any final way for the Roman Church. The *Regulae* were to prepare the ground for a more serious planting and in view of this the Bishop attempted to have copies of it distributed to people of influence.⁴⁶ A copy found its way to Bossuet through the agency of the Duchess of Hanover⁴⁷ and at the other side of Germany examples were distributed throughout Hungary and Transylvania as an irenic approach to the civil as well as religious antagonisms in those areas.⁴⁸

No matter what Rojas' part was in the composition and support of the *Regulae*, it is a badly organized document. No single topic is treated at once and in one place. For example, the problem involving the definition of a council's legitimacy is brought up time and again in more or less the tone of a propagandist than a theologian. The phraseology is vague and given to two or more interpretations. "We find excellent thoughts with distorted views, orthodox phrases with doubtful and completely heretical ideas, good exposition with excessively tortured explanations, joined together in a long document whose reading leaves the impression of a real (*waschechten*) syncretism."⁴⁹ The Bishop has been accused of heresy by the Catholics and of political and religious trickery by the Protestants. On the basis of the *Regulae* he can only be charged with suspicion of material heresy. If we accept the view that the *Regulae* were meant to represent only a method for an approach to religious unity, then Rojas was no more a heretic than is any other Catholic who, while remaining true to his dogmatic principles, refuses to identify essentials and nonessentials in the Church.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 1: 21-22.

⁴⁶ Krätzing, *op. cit.*, 255.

⁴⁷ Bossuet, *op. cit.* 18: 121; letter from Bossuet to Mme de Brinon, September 29, 1691.

⁴⁸ Haselbeck, *op. cit.*, 29.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 1: 20.

⁵⁰ Extreme judgments have been passed on the *Regulae*, judgments which are not justified in light of its purpose. See, for example, Crouslé, L., Bossuet et le Protestantisme, *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, 138, Nov., 1900, "Ce n'est plus [the general tenor of the *Regulae*], à vrai dire, l'Eglise romaine, c'en est une contrefaçon protestante."

One thing is certain. The *Regulae* in no way constitute a clear and explicit statement of Catholic doctrine as does the *Exposition* of Bossuet. The former is Catholic apology from a political standpoint, the latter, Catholic apology from the mind of a theologian.

Probably the *Regulae* constituted the working basis for discussion throughout the remaining months of winter and the spring of 1683. F. U. Calixtus was called from Helmstedt in April to give his opinion. He could not, in conscience, approve the *Regulae* in their final form, but his refusal to approve brought no end to the talks. In May, Gebhard Meyer, another Helmstedt academician, came to enter the forum which lasted from January until June 23.⁵¹ It is quite likely that the theological conferences comprising this series of negotiations took place in Loccum,⁵² Molanus' Abbey, which was not far from Herrenhausen and which provided the solitude and freedom which were necessary for mature reflection on the reunion business. Rojas left the cloister on June 13. Before he went away the *Methodus*,⁵³ a document composed by Molanus, and the *Regulae* with three glosses were bound together. Three copies were made, one for the convent, one for the Pope, and one for the Bishop.⁵⁴

Of all the theologians who conferred with Rojas at Hanover, Molanus came the nearest to arriving at complete acceptance of the *Regulae*. It was not by chance that the *Methodus* and the *Regulae* were bound

⁵¹ Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 58-60.

⁵² For a description of the Cloister as it now stands accompanied by excellent photographs see Lilje, Hanns [the present Abbot], *Loccum*, Nürnberg, Laetare-Verlag, 1952.

⁵³ The contents of the *Methodus* are analyzed in Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 52-58; the *Methodus* has also been printed, see *ibid.* 2: 52, note 3.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 2: 6-62. See also Hiltebrandt, *op. cit.*, 86 where some of the results of the meetings at Loccum are given. On March 14, 1683, Buonvisi commended the bishop's work to Cibo in Rome and it is probably from this commendation that Innocent XI was led to write to the Emperor as follows: "Venerabilis Frater Christopher Tyniensis episcopus fuse nobis exposuit ea, quae pro catholicae religionis incremento maiestatis tuae praesidio fultus per Germaniam egit. Commendamus sane nos eiusdem episcopi zelum meritisque laudibus prosequimur labores, quos in opere tam preclaro promovendo perpessus est. Quia vero propositiones, quas ad nos detulit, gravissimas continent difficultates, delecto filio nostro Francesco Cardinali Buonvisio inunximus, ut de iis diligenter doceat maiestatem tuam, minime dubitantes, quin pro sapientia, qua praestas, nequaquam eas ab hac sancta sede admitti posse intelligas." Cf. also *Nunz. Col.* 52: 62 *et seq.*, and p. 516 for Buonvisi's outline of what he *thought* Rojas was doing; see also Nunziatura Germania (Vatican Archives) (hereafter cited as Nunz. Ger. 38: 399-401, for Cibo's replies to the Viennese Nuncio; the chief problem was seen clearly by the Cardinal Secretary of State as the following indicates: "La difficoltà consistenano nel suggestione, de non si potenano mettere in dubio le decisioni particolarmente in materia di fede, fatte dal Concilio di Trento, onde non si poteva trattore di reverderle in un'altro Concilio, e de solo a mio debil guidizio, se havessero havuta difficoltà circa l'esplicazione dei Decreti, si sarebbe poterlo ascoltare i lori dubbii, es esplicarli, come continuamente si fa dalla Sacra Congregazione degl'Interpreti del Concilio."

together and sent to the Pope because therein lay the real hope for reunion. Molanus would have begun with the approval of the Emperor to a set of controversies resolved by theologians, gone on to the settlement of more controversies by colloquia of theologians expressly appointed by the princes for the end, and then considered remaining differences in a council.⁵⁵ Rojas would also use this method but would demand initially some kind of guarantee of loyalty to the Bishop of Rome from the Protestants. Of the other Hanoverian and Helmstedt theologians, Hildebrandt, Meyer, Calixtus, and Barkhausen, not one felt that much could be done along the lines recommended without surrendering their evangelical liberty, that is, using any other basis for determining doctrine than the Sacred Scripture.⁵⁶

VI. THE AFTERMATH

It was no doubt with high expectations that Rojas left Hanover in June, 1683. His perpetual traveling, diplomatic trading, being pleasant to all people and, more often than not, meeting reverses everywhere, would have destroyed most people long before, but he seems to have thrived on this type of life. It was probably the Turkish danger which drew him away from Hanover at last. On July 14 the Vizir, Kara Mustapha, besieged Vienna with 300,000 men.¹ The Imperial Court fled to Linz and it was there that Rojas joined them. Soon, however, he was sent away to Saxe-Gotha to get reinforcements for the army. Religious reunion was not sacrificed completely, for the Bishop was instructed to consider the matter of unity along with his requests for material aid.²

The Habsburgs were on the verge of being swamped with troubles, to be sure, not an unusual situation for this dynasty. Vienna was beleaguered; the *Chambre de Réunion* at Breisach was systematically hunting up arguments whereby France could steal more of Alsace. The Pont du Rhin had been lost to the French and in September, 1681, Louis had entered the "free, imperial" city of Strasbourg in splendid state. In the same month (September 30) the Duke of Mantua had been forced to surrender Casale to the French. The Pope, already embroiled with France, was now even more impotent to organize help for the Christian armies of central Europe, since any move he might make in this direction was automatically interpreted as hostility to France. The year 1682 saw the Four Articles of the Gallican Clergy and it might be said that, both militarily and religiously, the French were closing in on the western frontier upon the empire and papacy.

The next year saw no lessening of the tension and this international situation is to be remembered when one considers the handful of men of good will at Loccum. They were struggling against a *Machtpolitik*, whose aims they themselves were unable to understand, least of all, change, and which had little consideration for amicable means of settling disputes so long as force was triumphant.

The crisis came suddenly on the international scene in the summer of 1683. On September 12 the imperial armies under Charles of Lorraine, who counted among his forces Eugene of Savoy and the heir apparent in Brunswick, George Louis, later George I of England, descended from the heights of Kalenberg and decisively defeated the armies of the Vizir, put them to flight and took enormous booty, including the harem and menagerie of the Turkish commander. The French, who had invaded Luxemburg on September 1, slackened their offensive a little as a gesture to reassure Christendom that the Sun King and the Sublime Porte were not too closely allied. Moreover, the Pope had secured the services of John III of Poland for the imperial armies and the Polish troops had, by forced marches, appeared at Vienna in time for the battle of September 12. By the beginning of October the Turkish armies were in retreat. The pressure of immediate danger had passed and Rojas was once more free to resume his efforts.

In the meantime the *Regulae* had suffered severe criticism. Rojas attempted a discussion with Jacob Spener, the Pietist preacher at the Court of Electoral Saxony. Rojas was with him for three hours and of the meeting we have Spener's own account. The Bishop had to agree that no public account of the meeting would be written and that no names be connected with the conversation. Spener believed that trickery was involved and he participated with the utmost caution. Apparently Rojas wished him to acknowledge that the Protestants were responsible for the schism. The Protestants would be granted the use of the chalice, the right for their clergy to marry, and all decisions relating to whether or no the Council of Trent had been right or wrong in hurling anathemas at Protestant beliefs and practices would be left for determination to a future council. The Evangelicals should recognize the infallibility and finality of this council, but Spener holds this to be impossible because of the bad faith and subtle arguments of the Romans who would take away from the Lutherans and Calvinists their complete dependency upon the words of Sacred Scripture. Rojas tried to compromise by representing the papacy as a patriarchate *in pari potestate* with the other four patriarchates of Christendom. Spener considered this a snare and refused to recognize in Rome anything but the "Hertz dess Antichristentums." This account of the meeting was intended for the Elector of Saxony, who, although not a friend of

⁵⁵ Hildebrandt, *op. cit.*, 2: 56.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 2: 47-63, *passim*.

¹ Menge, G., *Zur Biographie des Irenikers Spinola, Franziskanische Studien* 2: 32-34, 1915.

² Bittner and Gross, *op. cit.*, 172.

Spener, would, nonetheless, accept his views on things Catholic.³

Trebbchow and Tergen, prominent preachers in Gotha, disapproved strongly and Nicolai and Carpzow, Protestant divines at Dresden, declared the whole of Rojas' ideas to be, "in effect a voluntary reassumption of the papistical yoke of Antichrist."⁴ Trebbchow and Fergen launched a furious attack upon Rojas' guiding principles and this drew from the Bishop a spirited reply. It was his intention to work upon the principle that there could be union between those of the Confession of Augsburg and the Romans and, if this union could be, then the Calvinists and Romans could also be reunited. Ultimately he states his final aim to be the reunion of all Christendom. The basis for the union is to be found in his *Concordia Christiana*, submitted earlier to the Brandenburg theologians, which is a commentary upon the declaration of the Diet of Thorn (1645), and he pleads with his opponents for only a quarter of an hour so that he might present his case more effectively.

The Romans, Rojas claims, believe nothing other than Holy Scripture and that which follows immediately and incontestably from it. As for the interpretation of Holy Writ the Romans are willing to accept the explanations of a general assembly of Christendom or the interpretations commonly given by the primitive Church. This is not only the standpoint of the church councils but also of the Synods of Dordrecht, Charenton, and others. The Catholics may feel perfectly free to adopt this procedure because they need not fear their traditions and councils have departed from the truth.

On justification and the eternal fate of man the Bishop assures the Evangelicals they have only to listen to him and they will see there is no gulf between their teaching and his. The Catholics believe that God's worship is immeasurably superior to the veneration of His creatures so that the Protestants cannot, in justice, oppose the Roman point of view on this issue. To the saints and to holy pictures only a narrow and incomparably small honor is paid.

On the power of the pope, Rojas is quite blunt and generous. In the governance of a state the pope has no civil power over the subjects of a prince. The description of the pope's power *de jure divino* bears much definition before its proper sense is understood. The infallibility of the pontiff is not an article of faith. However, a certain teaching norm is desirable in the Church and for this reason the pope's judgment in matters of faith should be accepted "mit christlicher

discretion." The Roman pontiff, himself, has no species of authority over his subjects except that *de fide tenenda*, an authority which is claimed and exercised everyday by the Protestant consistories. Besides—

It is known to the entire world how, at the beginning of the Reformation the Bishop of Rome did entirely too much and how the reformers went to such excesses. Now it is too late and altogether unnecessary to decide [on this question] for people seek to complain of no party but, on the other hand, to unite all in Christ.

The anathemas of Trent will not be binding upon those who show themselves ready for reunion under Catholic conditions. The authority of the territorial princes and of the clerics of these states will not be damaged or weakened. The cadets of princely houses, far from being deprived of their rights and dignities, will have even more. The Protestant clerics will be ordained and given the "gewalt der Schlusel" and be considered as celebrating valid sacraments. Finally, Rojas reassures the preachers that the thought furthest from the Catholic irenicists is to take away what the Protestant calls "evangelical freedom."⁵

In Frankfurt three Protestant ministers arrived at this conclusion:

We conclude that the dogmas of Rome proposed by the Bishop and mitigated and softened in substance and in their true character, remain and are the same as those which were proposed and decided upon in the Council of Trent and that they are repugnant to the faith of the orthodox.⁶

From these examples it becomes clear at once that the main stumbling block, as far as the Protestants were concerned, was the Council of Trent. Rojas in his letters to Gotha preachers makes a much more unqualified statement about the Trentine anathemas than he does in the *Casus*. This confirms to some extent the accusation that he sometimes gave a vague and ambiguous meaning, but it does not go far to indicate that he was an unscrupulous politician who would torture any text to make it mean the expedient thing. On the other hand, with the exception of this matter of Trent, the letter to the preachers contains nothing more sensational than that which is to be found in Bossuet's *Exposition*. It is, by and large, a sound program for the beginning of unity talks which takes into account most realistically the political conditions which obtained in Germany of the seventeenth century.

Rojas' opponents were not confined to the theologians. Among the princely antagonists the Landgräfin Elizabeth Dorothea of Hesse-Darmstadt fired the most effective broadsides against the Bishops' efforts. On October 29, 1683, she sent warning letters to Württemberg, Baden-Durlach, Ansbach, Saxe-Gotha, Eisenach, and to the Courts of Brunswick and Electoral Saxony. At the same time she asked for a criticism of the *Regulae* from the theological faculty of Giessen.

⁵ Hansitz, 9313: 47.

⁶ Haselbeck, *op. cit.*, 17.

³ Spener, P. J., *Theologische Bedenken* 4: 141-144, Halle, 1702. A brief account is given in Biedermann, K., *Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands im 18. Jahrhundert* 2: 283, Leipzig, 1854-1858.

⁴ Haselbeck, *op. cit.*, 17; Cf. Hansitz, 9313: 38, 41, 42 for declarations of Trebbchow and Fergen. Incidentally they accept the Walenburg explanation of justification as acceptable to Protestants, but denominate transubstantiation as a fundamental error, idolatry, in fact.

The faculty was not long in replying. The document bore the title, "Roma reformata reformat mundum; Roma deformata deformat mundum." Rojas was accused of having no mandate either from the Pope or the Emperor—a charge which was not strictly true, but which was sufficiently correct, considering the secrecy which surrounded the negotiations, to give it credit.⁷ According to Giessen, the Pope would never bring into question any council, least of all that of Trent, and he would never surrender his claim of infallibility. There is a tendency to feel that the whole business is a Roman trap because it is impossible that one part of the Church can be so gentle when Protestants in Silesia, Hungary, and France are so persecuted.

The end to which this [Rojas' plans] is directed is manifest upon careful consideration. It is a project and a means, not so much intended for ecclesiastical peace as for the reduction of the Protestants to the Papacy and the [business] of an henotic council, which the Bishop spreads about among Christians as a specious pretext of cementing peace and looks forward to no other thing than that the Trentine decrees, all cloaked about with honey, be received, that the wound inflicted upon the papal tyranny and idolatry by the just and necessary secession from the Roman See again take on a scar by their voluntary return, that they humbly pray for indulgence toward schismatics and that the Evangelicals abjure their doctrine . . . and bind themselves by oath to the pontiff and the councils.⁸

"Roma Reformata" was sent to the Landgräfin and Dr. Schäfer, the Consistorial President of Hesse-Darmstadt. The copy sent to Schäfer suggested that Rojas' work was based entirely upon *Staatsraison* with Machiavelli's personal beliefs as its inspiration.⁹

In her letter to the Elector of Saxony, John George, Elizabeth Dorothea talked of the glorious victory gained against the Moslems but she was, nevertheless, quite ready to stir up trouble of a more serious sort in the religious sphere. She censured Rojas for confusing religion and politics. His projects would generate nothing but confusion amongst the adherents of the Augsburg Confession. The Bishop's activities would probably serve "to introduce . . . a risky business and a fatal cleavage (*Verfänglichkeiten und verderblichen Zweispalt*)" among the faithful. This was the Princess's opinion. She asked advice from her distinguished Saxon kinsman.¹⁰

The Elector replied (December 26, 1693) that Rojas had been at his court a year ago and that all these matters had been discussed. His opinion was that

. . . through these things shameful divisions and difficulties could arise among the Protestants, and, although we from the bottom of our heart might wish that God enlighten those in error with His Holy Spirit that they discern the errors disseminated within Popery and the brightness of God's Word, in the present case nothing but evil can result from the Roman party.

Besides, the Bishop of Tina has no authorization from the Emperor or the Pope. The Roman Church simply could not give him authority to treat as he has because of her constitution and her rules of faith. The Elector has forbidden his university people to enter into conference or exchange of letters with Rojas unless they have specific permission to do so.¹¹

Earlier (November 7 or 8, 1683) Elizabeth Dorothea had had a reply from the Duke of Saxe-Eisenach and Gotha. The burden of his opinion was even more unfavorable than that of the Saxon Elector. Nothing good could come from the negotiations. Rojas had no commission from the Emperor. The Duke forbade his theologians to communicate with the Bishop in any way or to receive his writings. If henotic activity was to take place, it had to be between those of the evangelical communion.¹²

To these attacks and to those made against him by the Catholics, Rojas answered as best he could. His answers took the form of a vigorous apology which concentrated more on concession than explanation. However, his activities had again drawn so much unfavorable criticism, even as far as Rome, that he left Würtemberg, where he was conferring with the Protestants, in December of 1683 and traveled to Vienna whence he went to Rome. He carried a recommendation from the Emperor and was accompanied by Father Wolff, S.J., Rector of the Jesuit House in Breslau.¹³

At the time of this visit to Rome an apology was presented to the Pope; it bears the title *Secreta Relatio status, quem negotium religionis a novena ultimis annis in Germania obtinuit*.¹⁴ It is a résumé of the unity talks up to that time, and it represents many important trends both in its thought and its description of the manner of negotiating. It contains a summary of the proposals from both sides and, barring the fact that its author was sometimes wont to exaggerate on the optimistic side, it gives a fairly accurate idea of what Rojas had proposed and what had been and could be sanctioned at Rome.

He notes that the first mention of the willingness of certain Protestants to return to Roman obedience came from Alberizzi, the Apostolic Nuncio in Vienna in 1675. The Nuncio advised him to get the patronage of the Emperor and treat with the Protestants. He was further encouraged in his work by Buonvisi, the next nuncio after Alberizzi, and was indirectly assisted

⁷ See the letter from Innocent XI to Leopold I cited in Hildebrandt, *op. cit.*, 86-87. Cf. Hansitz, 9313: 11-12. Mandate from the Emperor dated July 8, 1678. Whether this particular mandate was continuing or no remains a question but the Giessen faculty maintained that Rojas had *never* had a mandate of any kind.

⁸ Hildebrandt, *op. cit.*, 87.

⁹ Krätzing, *op. cit.*, 265-266.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 256-257. Letters from the Landgräfin to the Elector, Oct. 29, 1683, as well as the letters to other princes.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 260-261.

¹² *Ibid.*, 258-259.

¹³ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 2: 17.

¹⁴ L., Irenica, 10: 297-310.

by John George of Saxony who pleaded with the Emperor for a policy of toleration or concession toward Hungarian Protestants who came to Saxony in force after the uprising in their country.¹⁵

The events of 1676, the visit to Hanover under the auspices of Buonvisi and John Frederick, are mentioned. The Bishop declares that the imperial mandate to carry on his work was received in 1677 and that Innocent XI, while warning that the affair should be conducted "cum summo secreto," appointed a committee to examine the possibilities of reunion and pass judgment on Rojas' particular proposals.

The papal committee of investigation discovered that Rojas had acted rightly in those matters which dealt with ecclesiastical property, communion under both kinds, the celibacy of the clergy and the delicate problem of conformity in doctrine not beyond ordinary inconstancy, falsehood, and schism. Doubtless this elaborately stated fourth point refers to the suspension of the Trentine anathemas.¹⁶ His Holiness then assured the Bishop of a certain measure of protection and sent him back to the Emperor with a favorable note but also with the warning that the papal name was, in no circumstances, to be used in the negotiations. The Emperor then gave him a commission to go to the German princes and treat of ecclesiastical reunion and supplies for meeting the Turk.

There follows a brief description of the political and religious measures taken in order to insure a united front against the enemy on the Danube. Action was taken in the Diet; no will was to be valid unless it left something to be used for protective measures; anyone who died without closely related heirs would be obliged to leave one-fifth of his property to the common cause of imperial defense. According to Rojas, eighteen princes swore to support these measures.

Sections 3 and 4 of the *Relatio* deal briefly with the Bishop's experiences in Hungary to see what could be done about bringing the rebellious Magyars and Protestant ministers back to their allegiance. However, the story turns at once to the relation of the irenic adventures of Rojas in Germany. He tells how his work has been slandered, how Doctor Spener and other "duriores Protestantium" have falsified his motives in saying all the Bishop cared about was to divide and ruin the Protestants.

Point 5 covers the method of procedure for the negotiations. It was difficult to find a method because it had been customary for both sides to indulge in mutual abuse, to call the Pope antichrist and the

Protestants heretics. More difficult yet was the fact that the Romans were not permitted to offer conditions and the Protestants were not allowed to accept them. But the Bishop has struck out along different lines. He has pointed out what ruin has come about since the secession of the Protestants from the Roman Church and how necessary it is to observe divine and natural law which point toward unity in ecclesiastical administration as well as in the implementing of the decrees from the Imperial Diet. The princes have been shown what credit will come to them from the Emperor if they assist in reunion undertakings and what will be granted them, if they acknowledge their full obedience to the Pope and the councils. Rojas reassures the Pope that all this has been carried out without mentioning the pontiff's name, that is, as an official supporter of the plan. Five Catholic schools (doubtless those in Mainz, Cologne, Louvain, Baden, and the *Reformprovinz* of Austria)¹⁷ have declared themselves for reunion and many outstanding Catholic theologians have acted in like manner.

There are an infinite number of obstacles to the Bishop's plan. Attacks have been made against his reputation. Illness has plagued him incessantly. For twenty-four years he has been about the Emperor's business, has traveled to a multitude of German courts and has made journeys to the Holy Father, himself. He has suffered the jealousy of those who resent his Hungarian *démarches*, his discussions with Protestants whose doctrine is known to be unacceptable, his suggestion for a general council and the great difficulty involved in its being assembled, the celibacy of the clergy, the use of the chalice by the laity and the fate of ecclesiastical property in the case of church reunion.

Next he dwells on the remedies for disunity which have been proposed by interested parties (*zelosi Germani*). It is their opinion that any question of unity ought to be considered as quickly and among as few people as possible. This manner of action will not necessarily lack a representative character since the ground for reunion has already been prepared in secret and private discussions.¹⁸ These Germans urge that their doctrine, imperfect as it may be, should be treated in the same manner in which the Apostles granted broad concessions to the Jews and their dearest prejudices in order to bring them into Christ's fold. If they declare themselves ready to accept obedience to Rome, they ask that the decisions made at Trent against them (*poenae tridentinae*) be relaxed and that they not be called upon to accept those degrees until another general

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 297.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 297. The actual wording is: "Postquam vero hi munus suum circa praefarorum opinionem catholicam explicationem peregrissent, Episcopusque obstacula negotii propter bona ecclesiastica communionem subtraque, coelibatum cleri, imperfectionem conformitatis circa doctrina nec non propter ordinariam inconstantiam, falsitatem, ac schisma quod inter ipsosmet Protestantibus invenitur, Verbo ac Scripto fideliter exposuisset."

¹⁷ These "schools" refer in the cases of Mainz, Cologne and Louvain to universities while the other two have reference to seminaries which were important in European Catholic education. Their names come from the *Censurae* which follow the *Casus* mentioned in Chapter V.

¹⁸ There is, of course, here no talk of making anything known to the people. It is merely a question of informing more *princes* and *theologians* than are already *au courant*.

council. At this point the Bishop pleads that toleration for Protestant doctrine be granted because,

... surely many [Protestants] are resolved upon some beginning of definite negotiation with the Roman religion and it must be hoped therefore that many of the remainder of the above-named princes will be influenced by the Grace of God and that they begin [to treat] seriously and definitely, and that the confession of one or another of the principal articles of controversy will become known to the people. In this way the authority of the Roman See will grow among the people and the princes. They will, in this manner, despise the motives of separation so that they will submit more fully without any strong claim for their prerogative. Concerning this, it is important that the Bishop [Rojas], even this year, has heard some princes murmuring against their right to treat with the Bishop and they have said, "We ought to free ourselves from this tyranny and this policy of antichrist." Let it be hoped therefore, that they who are divided so greatly might day by day through the concept of Apostolic Succession be moved and be fully subject [to the Roman Church].¹⁹

The pope was given the right at Trent to grant the chalice and so that concession is a relatively easy matter since it is entirely in the hands of the bishop of Rome. This sentiment indubitably represents the hard experience of a diplomat who was accustomed to deal with a multitude of fickle German princes. Such a grant would be no more unusual than Paul's decision concerning the circumcision of Timothy. There could be no possible harm result from granting a thing that neither Christ nor the Church definitively took from the laity. Ecclesiastical property could be surrendered, even whole bishoprics, just as has been done for the French King in Metz, Toul and Verdun and for the Duke of Neuburg and many others inferior to him. Celibacy could be relaxed for the Protestant ministers just as it was for the Greeks; to be sure, it should be done delicately so that the Catholic bishops and theologians would be prepared for the step. Actually none of the difficulties which existed for many years after the Protestant revolt from the Church exist any longer.

Now after the punishment for these sins [of schism] have lasted for almost two centuries, we [irenically minded people] conclude that the time of divine mercy has come that the Protestants begin to cry out openly for reunion with the Roman See. Would not the Shepherd who left ninety and nine sheep to lead back a single little sheep care for those thousands and millions who cry out to Him and who lack the nourishment which He holds in His hand? Would not He, at any price, cause that those, ignorant for no reason of their own, accept the [idea] that henceforth their priests be ordained by Catholic bishops in such fashion that they might receive valid absolution from their sins—a thing of which they are now deprived?²⁰

¹⁹ L., *Irenica*, 10: 303.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 305.

It is hoped by the Bishop that the reunion will come through the following steps. The spiritual guidance and training of those engaged in the reunion project will be placed under the control of Buonvisi while the Emperor will be assured of the Pope's approval by a new letter of recommendation from Rome. It is clear now that Rojas thought like Bossuet on the matter of secular support of the reunion scheme. They both considered it absolutely necessary that the secular princes give their assent in order that their plans might have the slightest chance of success.

The final section of the *Relatio* bears the title "De Regulis fundamentalibus quas pro reunione cum Ecclesia Romana bene intentionati Protestantes existimant, licite ac necessario adhiberi." This is a crucial passage for it shows what Rojas wanted to be considered as a basis for reunion and precisely how far he could go, given the condition of contemporary Catholicism and Protestantism, the attitudes of the papacy and the widespread concern for Reason of State in every part of Europe. It is proposed

That all obey the Roman pontiff and the Church governed by him; and whatever this Church, summoned as a general council in accord with the legal conditions of former councils and in keeping with those things which Cardinal Bellarmine recounts (*recenset*), approves; and it is requested that before the [future] council it be defined and be approved by a well known pope whether he be held as infallible or no. If [his authority be not defined as infallible] then let it be held that [his claims to infallibility] be null and void.²¹

Rojas evidently wanted to see some sort of showdown between the Ultramontanes and the Gallicans in terms of a serious series of conferences where the problems of infallibility would be thoroughly discussed and settled with comprehensive finality. It is also fairly obvious that Rojas' views would probably not have been with the majority of bishops at the Vatican Council of 1870!

Rojas agrees that a council cannot be held at once but he makes the plea that those devoted to irenic endeavor should engage in conferences and contribute writings so that points centering about minor disputes could be settled before the ecumenical council. *Ad interim* the Pope will take under his protection those princes who are ready to have their people subject to the Roman See. At the same time it is recognized as impossible for coheirs of princes to be led back to the Roman communion unless the ecclesiastical property of the said coheirs be secured. It is also seen to be impossible for the grant of the chalice to be of any value in conversion, if violence is done to the present beliefs of non-Catholics. As a matter of fact, it would now be out of the question to convert anyone by force as has been proved in the case of the Elector of Brandenburg, the Elector Palatine, and the Landgraf of Hesse, who attempted, ineffectually, to bring their people

²¹ *Ibid.*, 306.

around to Calvinist beliefs for political reasons. In these cases there always appeared a neighboring prince to protest and to act as a protector for the oppressed people.

Finally is given a résumé of what outstanding German theologians and some of the Catholic hierarchy think necessary for the Protestants to be received by Rome. There are only three simple steps. The Protestants should (1) desire reunion, (2) observe silence on matters relating to the papacy, and (3) reflect that their good conduct will serve as an excellent example for Catholics who have been molested by militant Protestants. The remainder of the document is an attempt to develop a number of minor points in detail. The parable of the Apostles who cast their nets all night in vain closes the *Relatio* and suggests that the success of the project requires equally as much faith and patience as did the fishing venture of the Twelve.

Von Hansitz is unfortunately reticent about what took place in Rome at the time of this visit, but a general picture can be got from other sources. Even if the Pope had wanted to take up Rojas' suggestions on a European scale, his hands were tied. The Cardinal Secretary of State, Cibo, was in the pay of France²² and Cardinal d'Estrées, the watch dog of Louis XIV at Rome, seeing in Rojas the advance agent of German political unity, proclaimed to the Italian Cardinal

that all the Church would be scandalized if it knew that the Pope wished, not only to listen to such a project, but to permit the discussion of it. It was not to the credit of the Holy See to nourish this matter any longer. The agent ought to be sent back with a sharp correction.

To the everlasting credit of Innocent XI he, although fearful of schism with France, did not take orders from the French representative.

The pontiff, orally and by way of a verbal message to the Bishop, assured the Emperor that he would regard the project favorably. He cautioned, however, that in the meantime, he [Rojas] would have to act with [no other official support] than his own enthusiasm because of the French faction.²³

The Pope was not the only Roman in favor of the project. The most influential group of the era, the Society of Jesus, was impressed by Rojas' efforts. The General of the Society wrote to Christopher Stettinger, S.J., in Vienna in August, 1684.²⁴ He had spoken

²² Hansitz, 9310: 174 verso. Von Hansitz cites Cibo along with Julius, Cardinal Spinola, and Cardinal Bona as one of the supporters of Rojas' projects.

²³ Berthier, J. J., *Innocentii, PP. XI Epistolae ad Principes* 2: 183-184, Rome, 1891-1895.

²⁴ Hansitz, 9313: 29; printed in Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, German Academy of Science edition, first ser., 5: 675, Berlin, 1954. Hereafter cited as Leibniz, S. S. etc. Charles de Noyelle to C. Stettinger, Rome, August 19, 1684. For the opinion of the Augustinian General, Dominico Valvasorio, the following letter is cited in Menge, *op. cit.* 2: 145. D. Valvasorio to the German Provincial, August 20, 1684. "Es kehrt zu

well of the matter to Roman theologians, the Master of the Sacred Palace, and to cardinals and other eminent people. He promised the assistance of his confreres and assured his correspondent that Rojas' praiseworthy struggle would be remembered in his prayers.

In Germany there were lesser princes who gave encouragement. The Prince of Catholic Saxony congratulated Rojas upon his return from Italy and asked for advance information about the things that took place at Rome.

I would be very content, if it might be hoped from all this that the difficulties could be surmounted—difficulties which up to the present in this matter have appeared to me as absolutely insuperable.²⁵

The Prince of Anhalt was not as receptive but he was not entirely hostile either. He refused to allow certain of his pastors to meet with Rojas because it would arouse suspicion but he suggested that the affair be approached on a broader scale with a meeting of pastors from the Palatinate, Holland, Hesse, Brunswick, and other important Protestant states.²⁶

There were a goodly number who did not approve and this group ultimately succeeded in shouting down the moderates. We have seen the reaction from Hesse-Darmstadt, Electoral Saxony, and Saxe-Gotha. It is established that the charge of syncretism plagued Rojas

euch zurück der erlauchte und hochwürdigste Herr Christophorus von Rochas, Bischof von Tina. Möchte seine Rückkehr, das ist unser Herzenwunsch, freudebringend sein, die Siegespalmen, die er heimträgt, überstrahlen weit die Lorbeerkränze, die alten Cäsaren auf das römische Kapitol gebracht haben. Kein sterblichen kann es ganz fassen, welche Mühen er auf sich genommen, welches Ungemach er ertragen, um das Unternehmen, das er begonnen, zu einem glücklichen Ende zu führen. Mit einem Worte, wenn eine dreisache feindliche Kriegsschar nicht leicht durchbrochen wird, er hat über drei Feinde gesiegt, wie die Sache selbst spricht und wie Du auch von ihm selbst vielleicht erfahren kannst. Von neuem steigt er jetzt daselbst auf dem Kampfplatz hinab, um endlich ein Heiligtum unseres heiligen Glaubens die Sie gestrophae unsterblichen Ruhmes niederzulegen. Er bedarf der Kampfgenossen, da er entscheidende Würfel noch fallen muss. Wie wollen, dass Du mit ihm zusammenkommst und Deine und unseres Ordens Hülfe ihm anbietest, ja wir befehlen es, dies zu tun. So werden wir nicht als unnütze Arbeiter der römischen Kirche dastehen und, die wir infolge unserer Geburt durch den Treueid dazu verpflichtet sind, dem erhabenen Hause Österreich unsere Ergebung recht deutlich beweisen können. Sodann werden wir jede Mühe gern auf uns nehmen, um sowohl unsere Pflicht, wie sie allen Dienern der Kirche obliegt, zu erfüllen als auch um Beweise unseres schuldigen Eifers und unserer Treue zu geben. Nachdem Du dem erhabenen Kirchenfürsten Deine und unsere Verehrung kundgegeben, unseres ganzen Ordens Ergebenheit gegen ihm zum Ausdruck gebracht hast, werden wir hingeben unsere Unterstützung Dir nach Kräften angedeihen lassen. Lebe wohl und sei überzeugt, dass wir hier beiden unsterblichen Siegen unseres erhobenen Kaisers nicht wenig uns treuen. Möge Gott uns gnädig sein und alles Gute senden."

²⁵ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 105. Frederick of Saxony to Rojas, November 22, 1684.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 1: 104-105, Prince of Anhalt to Rojas, Berlin, November 7/17, 1684.

wherever he went. He was also considered a spy and an agent of Rome who sought to bring dissension into the ranks of the Protestants. John Frederick Leibniz wrote to his celebrated brother on February 20/March 1, 1684, that Rojas had been received cordially in Hanover but this was no reassurance to John Frederick.

The Bishop of Tina, by birth and gravity of bearing a Spaniard, in slipperiness a Frenchman and in drinking capacity a German, is said to be admitted and treated no more intimately in any court than in that of Hanover and Osnabruck. From the letters of a certain theologian I have learned wherein the best of his proposals are syncretic. From other theologians from whose courts he was nearly thrown out, I learned that he was, as it were, a spy.²⁷

Leibniz who, with the exception of Molanus, represented the best of the irenical trend in Protestantism,²⁸ replied to his brother in what constituted a strong defense of the Bishop:

I have often spoken familiarly with the Bishop of Tina whom you mention. . . . There is not to be remarked in him the Spanish haughtiness which you write is attributed to him. It is foolish to believe him a spy at the princely courts, just as if the Emperor had not enough envoys everywhere or as if it be not desirable that the Emperor know our affairs better than we know his in order that the mutual mistrust and false ideas which the French spread about so skillfully be dissipated. I wonder who they are who sing the old song about syncretists! If he be a syncretist who loves the peace of the Church and thinks he must do whatever he can, with a clear conscience, to obtain that peace, then it is a wonderful thing that he be a syncretist.²⁹

In April, 1684, an attack guaranteed to be recognized on a European scale was made in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*.³⁰ A letter from Calixtus is summarized in which the essence of the *Casus* and the *Regulae* is exposed. Calixtus seems, in general, to be favorable but his attitude is fundamentally Fabian.

There are some who say that there is a serpent hidden under sheep's clothing, that he [Rojas] is truly a ravaging wolf who seeks nought but our ruin. Others hold that he is not at all sufficiently authorized to promise things in the Pope's name as he has done. Time will show whether this be true or no.³¹

²⁷ Leibniz, *S. S.*, first ser., 4: 664.

²⁸ Leibniz's *Systema theologicum*, written in 1683 or 1684, comes as near to a formal admission of the fundamental truths of Roman Catholicism as any document of the time. In this respect it is far more *catholicizing* than anything Molanus ever wrote. The *Systema* is printed in Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 531-652.

²⁹ Leibniz, *S. S.*, first ser., 4: 666.

³⁰ —, *Nouvelles de la R. des Lettres*, 187 et seq., April, Amsterdam, 1684. Although Bayle was the editor at this time it is not certain that he was the author of the polemic. Judging from Bayle's own syncretic views it would be more reasonable to regard him as a supporter of Rojas' plans.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 186. The *Nouvelles* also give a letter (original in Latin) from a certain M. Wagenseil in Nürnberg to a M. Allix, dated February 5, 1684. The burden of the letter is that Tina is circulating again; he has had conferences with Calixtus in Helmstedt. Then Wagenseil quotes from a letter he has received: ". . . les Protestants n'amoient osé demander ce que l'Evêque de Tina leur offre de la part du Pape. Le

There follows a scathing denunciation of the Bishop's intentions by the editor of the *Nouvelles*.³² It has been demonstrated time and again that the Roman party cannot change; they are ready for violence at any time as the persecution of Protestants in all lands indicates. Rojas' real aims are to destroy Protestant unity by appealing to the Lutherans and to sound out "safe" men for the bogus council which will be held under the most extravagant circumstances. The chief conspirators are the Jesuits of France and Prince Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels. A council cannot be held because Protestants and Catholics could not partake of a common Eucharist at the first plenary sessions. The Pope is said to have disassociated himself from these matters. Moreover, the Roman Bishop, despite his fine words and his support of such irenical works as the *Exposition* of Bossuet, still supports that monstrous thing, the Inquisition. Singular perception is shown in the item that deals with the reason for Innocent XI not granting power to Rojas. The answer to this is seen in the papal quarrel with France and the French rejection of papal infallibility. Finally, Rojas' whole series of negotiations must be a fraud since it has not been approved by a Congregation at Rome and nothing, "even minutiae, is ever decided upon without [the approval] of a Congregation."³³

Rojas saw the article from the *Nouvelles* while still at Rome, but he was rendered self-confident by the

principal de l'affaire roule sur la tenue d'un concile Universel, pendant laquelle les anathèmes du Concile de Trente demeureront en suspens, et si on le juge à propos après avoir bien examiné le fond de la cause, on les abrogera entièrement. On veut donc soumettre le Concile de Trente à un nouvel examen, et à l'autorité du prochain Concile, dans lequel nous ne parôitrons pas en qualité d'accusez, mais nous aurons séance parmi les Juges. Et parce que des Hérétiques dignes d'anathèmes ne peuvent point tenir rang dans un Concile, le Pape doit solennellement par une Bulle, qu'il ne faut point regarder les Protestans comme des Hérétiques de cette espece. D'ailleurs comme l'Antichrist ne peut point avoir plus de place dans un Concile que les Hérétiques, les Protestans déclareront à leur tour, qu'à l'avenir ils ne tiendront le Pape pour l'Anti-christ puisqu'il en aura dépouillé les marques, qu'il aura renoncé à sa tyrannie accoutumée, et qu'il aura repris l'esprit des Evêques de Rome qui étoient d'une vertu excellente, mais qu'ils le consideront comme le Supreme et le premier Patriarche de la Chretienté, auquel est due une Primauté d'ordre, et non pas une Primauté de Juridiction. On permettra à tout le monde la Communion sous les deux especes, non pas comme de droit Divin, mais comme de droit Ecclésiastique et humain, on permettra pareillement aux gens d'Eglise le Mariage même pour plus d'une fois. Par le droit des Princes Protestans nous conserverons en leur entier les choses son venues en notre puissance, et l'Eglise Romaine nous cederà à perpetuité tous les biens Ecclésiastiques dont nous sommes en possession. . . . C'est une chose étrange . . . que nos Princes écoutent un tel homme, et qu'ils ne s'apperçoivent pas qu'il y a quelque mystère d'iniquité la-dedans. Ce Prelat a eu des Conférences dans la Cour de Wirtemberg avec M. Osiander, et avec un autre Docteur en Theologie."

³² The article is written by an anonymous person who could, of course, have been the editor himself.

³³ *Nouvelles*, 190.

Pontiff's gracious reception and, for the moment, attached no great importance to the accusations. It was a grave error in tactics for him to act so, for the *Nouvelles* had a widespread circulation and came to the attention of many irenically-minded Protestants who began to doubt the advisability of treating with a man who appeared to have no more official support than did the Bishop.³⁴

In 1685 the reward for many years in the imperial diplomatic service came. Rojas was elevated to the see of Wiener-Neustadt. After fruitless missions, diplomatic wanderings, empty promises of bishoprics in Spain and Belgium and two sees in *partibus infidelium* came the relative security of Neustadt, and for the next three years Rojas devoted himself to interior administration centered about two objectives, the reintroduction of proper observance of the canonical hours in the cathedral and the attempt to establish a house of common living and studies after the pattern of the Bartolomeus Holzhauser Institute in Mainz. Naturally this diverted, for the time being, Rojas' attention from the European scene but he was to return to it in 1688. However, before considering his personal supervision in Neustadt and his reentry into the diplomacy of the Empire, another subject must be introduced, namely, the precise nature of Protestant theological and philosophical thought on the question of Christian unity. Obviously this has already been treated in a broad way but to show what Rojas thought and proposed is only one side of the picture. To make it clear how very near in thought some of the Protestants were to Rojas' point of view it is useful to see how Molanus and Leibniz reacted to the Bishop's proposals and to see how far they had already gone in their thinking before the events of 1683, toward reunion with Rome.

VII. MOLANUS, LEIBNIZ, AND ROJAS

1. MOLANUS AND ROJAS

Leibniz was tremendously important as an exponent of the Protestant, Lutheran position. His role as a diplomat in the irenic negotiations is even more historically significant for he certainly knew of the Molanus-Rojas talks in 1683.¹ But Leibniz was basically not a

theologian, nor a priest, and it is questionable that he took his visible religious duties seriously. If attendance at divine worship is any indication of strong spirituality, then Leibniz had none, for he rarely communicated in the Lutheran Church after becoming librarian to the Duke of Hanover. He held no ecclesiastical office and certainly felt no strong compulsion to act in a fixed way in disputes concerning dogma. In brief, he was syncretistic without being cynical and without being burdened with the limitations that would have been placed upon a man who held church office in the capacity of an ordained priest.

Quite different was the position of the Hanoverian colleague Molanus, Consistorial Director of Hanover and Lutheran Abbot of Loccum. He is of greater importance than Leibniz in his dealings with Rojas and Bossuet, for it was he who put his theological views down in writing in such form that they could be read and discussed as a formal basis for treating between Lutherans and Catholics.² Unfortunately, he was no diplomat and had a certain timidity of character and joy in his own bed and table which prevented him from daring things which might have resulted in a permanent union between the Protestants in Hanover and the Roman Church.³

Molanus' theology came from Helmstedt where he was a student of George Calixtus. He was trained as a Lutheran pastor in the liberal, Catholic tradition of this University. The Academia Julia, known for convenience sake as the University of Helmstedt, was established by Duke Julius of Brunswick in 1575. Very early it became a center of moderate Lutheranism as opposed to Jena, Wittenberg, and Leipzig where a rigid interpretation of the Formula of Concord obtained. Grotius' work for international peace was known and respected at the University and his *Votum*

apud utramque partem sollicitatorem. Nil ergo pro vel contra ullam partem Me concepisce, invenisse, cessisse, aut obtulisse praetendo; sed hoc unicum ut quaelibet pars indies vicinius sibi in quantum potest appropinquet. Proiecta quae exhibeo, et illa quae in his asseruntur, cedique ac concedi postulantur; Protestantium nomine (prout titulos inspicienti semper patebit et a Theologis cum quibus egi declarabitur) ac iuxta principia sua noniuxta nostra procedunt. Ego vero illis nil aliud polliceor quam quod (sicut in primariis locis incepti) ego theologicam et tam favorabilem ac principia nostra patiuntur approbationem procurabo laborare."

² Leibniz set down his opinions in the *Systema theologicum* but this was kept such a secret that the real author of it was not discovered until the nineteenth century.

³ L., Irenica, 10: 268. This contains a letter from Molanus to Rojas in which the Abbot declares that he cannot sleep anywhere except in his own bed at Loccum and that even the gnawing of a mouse keeps him awake. Obviously sleeping in one's own bed is thought desirable by most people but, considering the universal proclivities of mice and the ordinary human reaction to their labors while one is attempting to sleep, the second objection appears to be stating what would be rather obvious in any case. Molanus was so fearful of thunder that he had one side of the ambulatory at Loccum covered with glass so he could walk there during a storm with the protection which glass would presumably afford.

³⁴ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 2: 22.

¹ Leibniz, S. S., first ser., 4: Rojas to Leibniz, Hanover, March 1/11, 1683. Apparently at this time the two had not met personally for Rojas says he would be happy "si liceat hic in loco personaliter videre" but adds that he already feels a certain intimacy with him, "Quia scio coniunctionem vestram cum meis Krafftio et Kornigko." See *ibid.*, 567 where Leibniz informs Rojas that he has sent a letter from Rojas to Bossuet and declares, "Nam perique qui antea Irenico studio se dedere, aut ignorasse aut dissimulasse videntur principia cuiusque partis, aut ea petivere, quae dari sibi ab aliis non poterant, nisi tota cause cadere vellent." *Ibid.*, 568. See *ibid.*, 576-577 for Rojas' last letter to Leibniz in this series where he outlines his function as he sees it. "Placebit per occasionem addere quod ego nullibi causa susceptae agam Doctorem, sed simplicem

pro pace had wide circulation among its theologians.⁴ One might say that the traditions of Erasmus as represented amongst the Lutherans had its stronghold at Helmstedt.

The most important irenical theologian of the mid-seventeenth century was George Calixtus who appeared in Chapter I. Calixtus had studied in an atmosphere permeated by Melancthon's thought. He had as patron August, father of Anton-Ulrich of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, but he was cried down and damned by his more orthodox Lutheran colleagues who kept control of Lutheranism until the eighteenth century victory of rationalism routed formal religion in many areas. Calixtus and his associates of like opinion were convinced that there was a possibility of union between the Lutheran and Roman Churches and that this possibility lay in considering their differences on the bases of the early creeds of the Church, the Vincentian Canon, and the consent of the first five centuries of primitive Christianity (*consensus quinque saecularis*).⁵

Frederick Ulrich Calixtus, son of George, and Molanus were both students at Helmstedt around 1656. Both were impregnated with their master's ideas. They were associated with Johann L. Fabritius, who was also a disciple of Calixtus. Some were less irenical than Molanus, but none was more so. A concise statement of their minimum reunion program would be as follows: the pope and his followers should not be considered as damned; communion under both species should be granted to groups who desired it and such a form of reception should be represented as the ultimate ideal in the Eucharist; the Helmstedters were also ready to recognize the pope as supreme patriarch and the greatest of bishops and to render him obedience in all things spiritual.⁶ After the death of Rojas in 1695 and the cessation of the second Bossuet-Leibniz correspondence (1701) it was at Helmstedt that the

notion of religious reunion was kept alive in Germany.⁷

The liberal theology of Helmstedt continued in full force throughout the seventeenth century and well on into the eighteenth. One of the test cases which serves as a *mise au point* of Helmstedt ideas at the end of the seventeenth century is the marriage of Elizabeth Christina of Brunswick, daughter of Anton Ulrich, to the Archduke Charles, later Emperor Charles VI. The Princess was Lutheran, the Habsburg Prince, of course, Catholic. In view of this, there were two questions that had to be answered before the Princess could abjure Lutheranism, become Roman, and marry the Archduke. The two questions were: (1) does the Roman Church err on grounds of faith and salvation and (2) is it permissible to pass from Lutheranism to Catholicism without danger to one's soul?

To both these the faculty of Helmstedt answered affirmatively.⁸ Leibniz did likewise. The *vox clamantis in deserto* was Anton Ulrich's Court Preacher, Johann Niekamp, but he was drowned in the chorus from Helmstedt.⁹ The reasoning of the Lutherans is interesting because it shows how far along the road to concession the atmosphere of Helmstedt could take its theologians.

The *Gutachten* on Elizabeth's marriage begins with the statement that the Roman and Protestant Churches have a certain confession of faith in common, as is to be found in comparing a Protestant and Catholic catechism. The catechism of St. Peter Canisius is specified as the one which should be used for purposes of comparison on the Catholic side. Both Luther and Melancthon recognized that heresy and schism were unnatural conditions, as can readily be seen from their writings.¹⁰ From this it follows that salvation is possible within the Roman Church and that a Protestant princess may marry a Catholic prince with perfect assurance that her husband will have as good a chance

⁴ Klopp, O., *Verhältniss von Leibniz zu den kirchlichen Reunionsversuchen*, 3, Hanover, 1861.

⁵ Calixtus, *Judicium de controversiis theologicis quae inter Lutheranos et Reformatos agitantur*, 43, Frankfurt, 1650. See also Stead, S., Leibnitz' letters on reunion. *Contemporary Review*, 56, May and August, 1867. This is actually a review of the collection of Foucher de Careil, mentioned frequently above, but Stead has also introduced much important material by way of interpretation. For an excellent brief account of Calixtus see Hans Friedrich, *George Calixtus der Unionsmann der 17. Jahrhunderts*, Anklam, 1891. There has recently appeared a fine book on Calixtus by Professor-Pfarrer Hermann Schüssler of Heidelberg University. Schüssler, *George Calixtus, Theologie und Kirchenpolitik*, Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1961. Professor Schüssler makes it clear that the very heart of the Helmstedt program came from the mind of Calixtus and that, in general outline, none of the Lutheran irenicists who followed him departed substantially from the basic ideas of Calixtus' irenicism.

⁶ Hoeck, Wilhelm, *Anton Ulrich und Elizabeth Christine von Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel: Eine durch archivalische Dokumente begründete Darstellung ihre Übertritts zur Römischen Kirche*, 72, Wolfenbüttel, 1845. Contains an outline of a reunion program of 1694-1696.

⁷ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 2: 123-130.

⁸ Precht, Max, *Gutachten der Helmstädter-Universität bey der einer protestantischen Prinzessin angesonnenen Annahme der Katholischen Religion*, 5, Sulzbach, 1815.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 41-42. Actually there was a Hofdiakonus, M. Knopf by name, who also opposed. They were so intolerant that they deprived Anton Ulrich of the Eucharist for a time. Cf. p. 11. See also Hoeck, *op. cit.*, 96, where he says of Niekamp, "Niekamp sieht in seinem Gutachten den Übertritt zum Papstthume für eine 'Verlangung Christi' an. Er hält die römische Kirche für die 'allerverderbteste,' für das 'Babel' der Offenbarung Johannis. Zu ihr dürfe man nicht freiwillig übertreten, sich auch keineswegs dazu zwingen lassen, sondern lieber alles leiden, ja das Leben selbst lassen. Wenn nun, meint er, die erste Frage von denen verstanden werden solle, welch in der römischen Kirche geboren und erzogen waren und aus Unwissenheit irreten, so könne sie unter des darin angegebenen Bedingung mit Ja beantworten werden. Trete aber ein Lutheraner zu den Lehrsätzen, der Lebensart und dem Gottesdienste der römischen Kirche, so sei das ein Abfall von wahren Glauben. Der wahre Glaube könne bei solchen Uebertritt nicht 'prasupponirt noch konditionirt' werden. Für diesen Fall nun wird auf beide Fragen ein 'rundes Nein' geantwortet."

¹⁰ Precht, *op. cit.*, 57-58.

for salvation as any other Christian. Moreover, it is obvious that the marriage is meant to be, since it constitutes a definite step toward peace in the Church.

To be sure the Catholic Church contains errors, but every error is not heretical. There is an agreement between Protestants and Catholics on the basis of their common belief in Holy Scripture and Apostolic Tradition. The only question remaining unanswered is that centering about Apostolic Tradition. This is treated under specific headings. For example, Protestants object to invocation of the saints, but there is no barrier here, because the Council of Trent says that no one is obliged to call upon the saints; it is merely stated that such invocation is good and useful. The Helmstedters skirt the issue of Purgatory by saying that many of the Church Fathers believed in it. The Mass is always well-intentioned and only criticized by those who do not understand it. Above all, according to the Hildesheim Catechism (Catholic), it is a "memorial of the bitter suffering and death of Jesus Christ"—an interpretation acceptable even to Calvinists. The question of two, three, or even seven sacraments depends upon what is meant by sacrament. In any event the Catholics recognize that Baptism and the Eucharist are the greatest of the sacraments.

Finally, the decision of all of us is that the disputes which are not resolved are very few between us and the Papists. I hope that pious and God-fearing hearts can probably agree in all things. God grant that such may take place and that the marriage redound to the glory of His name and to that of the high-born persons and their royal and princely houses and that it may come to pass for the everlasting glory of Christ, our common Savior.¹¹

Fabritius was the warmest defender of this statement. He answered Niekamp that the Roman Church had equally as much evangelical freedom as the Protestant churches. The marriage was meant to be and would be blessed by heaven.

Many things which are brought forward to show the Romans in error are not found to be valid. If there are errors, they will not be expounded nor defended in the presence of the Princess. She will remain fast in her Christian faith and leave the priests (*Pfaffen*) and long-mantels (*Langmäntel*) fight among themselves.¹²

The Romans who wish can read the Bible and therein is contained the truth. Just as among Lutherans all do not believe every word Luther wrote, so in Roman Catholicism is there much room for latitude in belief so that objectionable practices are not forced upon Catholics. Luther's Catechism was not invented by him but was brought with him "aus der Römischen Kirche" and "diese hat ihn genommen aus Gottes Wort."¹³

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

¹² Hoeck, *op. cit.*, 108.

¹³ Odelem, J. P., *Allerhand auserlesene curiose Rechtsachten*, 2nd part, 93, Brunswick, 1730. Fabritius wrote at least eight treatises to justify his position in this marriage question. Their titles and dates of publication are given in Hoeck, *op. cit.*, 128-131.

Molanus' position on this issue is ambiguous. From his Helmstedt background it might be expected that he would reason along lines similar to those of Fabritius. Such was not the case. Actually he declared himself against the position of the theologians. Contrary to his usual approach he held that reunion with the Roman Church was impossible, that unfortunate practices spoiled Catholic worship in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Bavaria. However, those who were born and reared in Catholicism had as much chance for Heaven as all good Christians because they were victims of invincible error (*unüberwindliche Irrthum*). Besides those who were victims of such error, there were many learned men and Jesuits who were in possession of the Gospel in the Roman Church. Despite this Molanus considered it imprudent to convert to Catholicism. But then he makes a Scholastic differentiation. It is dangerous for those who have a proper conscience (*conscientia recta*) to convert from an Evangelical religion to Catholicism but it is not dangerous for those of an incomplete conscience (*conscientia dubia*). He ended with the question, "Is he guilty of sin who from a doubtful state of mind, does or omits to do what he should otherwise have done or omitted to do?" To this Molanus gave no definite answer. He wrote voluminously on the subject but what he said was simply a variation on the theme of invincible ignorance. He refused to go further. The practical result of what he wrote was to leave Anton Ulrich to be the one to decide who had *conscientias rectas* and who had *conscientias dubias*. If a *conscientia dubia* were involved, then the Princess had a perfectly clear path opened to the Austrian marriage. Anton Ulrich lost no time in deciding that both he and the Princess had "doubtful consciences."¹⁴ The marriage took place. Elizabeth went joyfully to Vienna and became a devout Catholic.¹⁵

Despite what might be called equivocation in the Austrian marriage, his opinions were usually more decisively Catholic than were those of his colleagues. On celibacy he was orthodox in the Roman sense. He never married and he reintroduced the vow of chastity among the monks at Loccum, an act that provoked a witty comment from the Duchess of Hanover.¹⁶ In accord with Lutheran tradition he recognized that Holy

¹⁴ Hoeck, *op. cit.*, 113-115. Molanus' opinions are known from writings of Fabritius, Molanus' originals not having survived. Hoeck builds this analysis on Fabritius' work and on the following sources: *Fortges*, *Samml. v. alten und neuen theol. Sachen*, 566 ff., 1722, and Moser, *Patr. Archiv*, 2: 38 ff.

¹⁵ Elizabeth was the mother of the Empress Maria Theresa.

¹⁶ Bodeman, E., *Correspondence de la duchesse Sophie de Hanovre avec son frère Charles Louis etc.*, Leipzig and Paris, 1886, Vol. XXVI of Publicationen aus den K. Preussischen Staatsarchiven, p. 409. Sophia to Charles Louis, Osnabrück, Feb. 15, 1680. "L'Abbé Molanus n'a point de femme et a introduit le voeu de casteté parmy tous ses moines pour l'avenir; puisqu'il y en a de mariés asteure; ainsi il n'aurait point de s'accomoder avec Rome en ce point, si on y accordait le reste qu'on en demande."

Scripture, the Formula of Concord, and the Confessions of the Church were bases of exact theological knowledge, but he did not dismiss tradition as worthless. He accepted it in the Melancthonian sense. From his Third Theological Disputation we have this statement of his definition of Tradition.

. . . quod ecclesia primitiva, hoc est, quod oecumenica concilia, symbola, confessiones et declarationes, quod sancti patres priorum V. saeculorum unanimi consensu tanquam ad salutem necessarium aplectuntur, id minime rejiciendum est.¹⁷

If Molanus condemned particular Roman practices, he held consistently that there was hope for salvation within the Roman Church. He denied his capacity to pass judgment on any of his Catholic brethren who lived justly, piously, and soberly.¹⁸

There is no reason to think that Molanus' opinions changed greatly between 1680 and his death in 1722. As will be discussed elsewhere the political factor caused him to emphasize or deemphasize specific aspects of his thoughts but at base he remained very catholic and irenic. His most active participation in the negotiations took place between 1681 and 1683 where he may be considered the chief Protestant negotiator in the conversations in Hanover. Never since the Reformation had the two parties been so much in harmony on so many different and seemingly insoluble differences. The real agreement of this period becomes all the more evident when contrasted with the real and insurmountable problems which characterized the later period of reunion activity (1699–1702), when Leibniz and Bossuet were fighting the battle of scriptural canonicity as defined by Trent with little expectation that either side could ever see the merit in his opponent's argument. Molanus' patron, Ernst August, was favorable, Innocent XI had given his tacit blessing, and the Emperor would have supported almost any movement which promised to placate the Hungarian rebels and provide him with a united front against the Turk on one side and Louis XIV on the other.

It has already been seen how Rojas presented the Protestant theologians with the *Regulae*. Molanus' contribution to this period is the *Methodus*. Both works contain many similar ideas but, as Weidemann says, the *Regulae* represent a reunion-minded Catholic observing Protestantism and the *Methodus* an irenically intentioned Protestant viewing Catholicism. The *Methodus* was evidently printed and copies distributed because Valentin Alberti, a Lutheran theologian from

Leipzig, was able to buy a copy of it at the Leipzig Fair in the fall of 1683. He could not believe that Lutheran doctors had written a thing so prejudicial to the followers of the Confession of Augsburg. He accused the authors of falsifying when they stated that the Smalkald Articles recognized in the pope a superiority among the bishops. According to him, Melancthon was the only one who had supported this; all the others had dissented unless, of course, the pope admitted a superiority of the Gospel in ascertaining divine truth, a condition which (according to Alberti) would probably never exist. Alberti concluded that the whole matter was a great lie and that Rojas had actually been the author of the *Methodus*.¹⁹

Molanus and Rojas had worked on a common plan for reunion during the winter of 1683²⁰ and there are no grounds for asserting that their ideas were hopelessly antipathetical, although Weidemann holds that there were two points in the *Regulae* upon which Molanus and the Bishop were not in complete harmony and that these points were crucial. These two issues were the matter of the pope's primacy and the binding character of an ecumenical council. Rojas would have first from the Protestants an oath of allegiance to the pope; Molanus placed as first step the pope's recognition of the Protestants as true members of the Church, and this to be followed by the resolution of controversies in theological colloquies and the subsequent ventilation of all unsettled matters in an ecumenical council.

Molanus and the other Hanoverians might approve the *Regulae*, but there were Lutherans who, like Alberti, were shocked. Hildebrandt, Obersuperintendent in Zell, rejected them because he held he was a true theologian and not a politico-theologian as was Molanus. Specifically he objected to numbers VII and X, that is, the primacy of the pope *de jure humano* and the acceptance of tradition and the canons of an ecumenical council as *de fide*. He accepted them but only as rules of discipline of a very inferior order without any permanency. According to him no reunion was possible "nisi illa [Ecclesia Romana] erroribus Tridentinis et immensae auctoritate Papae renuntiet, i.e. pontificia desinat." "Freedom from pope and popery I consider the best and surest way."²¹ He did, however, hope for reunion in the distant future.

Please God that at the beginning we may maintain only a mutual tolerance in brotherly charity, given the condition of schism, until God might grant His Grace for the reunion at

¹⁷ Quoted in Weidemann, *op. cit.* 1: 24–25.

¹⁸ Leuckfeld, J. G. (ed.), *Michaelsteinensis et Antiquitates Ameluxbornensis de Leuckfeld*, 113, Wolfenbüttel, 1710. Letter from Molanus to Fabritius (Schmidt). "In Romana Ecclesia natis et educatis, dummodo conscientiae suae nihil profiteantur adversum abnegataque, et praecepto apostoli, impietate et mundanis concupiscentiis sobrie juste et pie vivant in praesenti saeculo, absit ut salutem aeternam abjudicare seu possim seu velim."

¹⁹ Leibniz, S. S., ser. I, part 3, 586–587. Alberti to Leibniz, Oct. 20/30, 1683. See also Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 97, 100–101 for Leibniz' answer. The philosopher talks as if he knew nothing of the *Methodus*, but praises Rojas and the Hanoverian theologians highly for their irenic work and argues that Melancthon would have been in favor of the opinions which Alberti declares are in the *Methodus*.

²⁰ Hering, C. W., *Geschichte der kirchlichen Unionsversuche seit der Reformation bis auf unser Zeit* 2: 214, Leipzig, 1836–1838.

²¹ Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 47–48.

some more distant time. But at the present moment, it seems to me that the reunion of your church [the Roman] and mine cannot possibly take place without difficulty, indeed, without great harm to both churches.²²

Despite what others may have thought Molanus gave his support to the *Regulae*. He went further in this than had George Calixtus. The latter had considered a *mutua tolerantia* the only practicable course for many years to come. Molanus foresaw the possibility of a *unio actualis*²³ but his outline of the order to be followed in bringing this about was more explicit than that found in the *Regulae*. According to the Abbot, the pope should be recognized as highest patriarch and the first bishop *de jure ecclesiastico positivo*, but only after the pope has recognized the Protestants as true members of the Church. This agreement having been struck, the emperor should give his approval. As in the *Regulae*

. . . the pope calls the council, yet the final authority is neither pope nor council, but Holy Scripture. If the pope claims God-given law for himself, let him prove it out of Holy Writ. If the council wishes to settle upon a decision over a question of faith, let it cling to Writ and thus, the interpretation of the pope will, in no way, be preferred to that of any other Christian, but the measure of truth will be the explanation of the consensus of the primitive Church and the great patriarchs. Concerning the greatest and last principle, it is also to be understood . . . that the future council shall not be allowed to fall back upon the anathemas of Trent.²⁴

Another version of the *Methodus* apart from those cited in Weidemann²⁵ exists in a letter from Molanus to Leibniz with a document attached entitled *Summa totius Methodi Irenicae*.²⁶ This *Summa* was knocked together in a hurry and does not have the ponderous and reasoned character of the *Methodus*, but it is actually the work of Molanus whereas the *Methodus* probably represents the opinions of F. U. Calixtus and Barkhausen as well as Molanus.²⁷ Molanus shows fear that his part in the talks with Rojas will be exposed and asks that his communication not be made public.

Without fear I beg this one thing, that you make no mention of me in this writing of yours, not that I wish to escape the responsibility of its composition. I would not be able to do that. Indeed, among our posterity it will mean very great honor for me. But I don't wish [to be exposed] since it will result in a series of quarrels among men over the questions concerning the peace of the Church.²⁸

The *Summa* begins with the statement that peace between the Lutheran and Catholic Churches is pos-

sible without damaging the honor or principles of faith (hypotheses) of either party. All should begin with Calixtus' assumption that neither the Catholics nor the Calvinists err in matters of faith, since all believe in the Apostles' Creed, the other time-honored creeds and the ecumenical councils. Secondly, all controversies which separate Catholics and Protestants are of three classes. With respect to the first the Protestants cannot cede, but the pope can, without surrendering anything contrary to his principles of faith, grant these graces to the Protestants. These graces are

communion under both kinds, public disapproval of private masses, certain concessions with regard to sinful man before God [obviously an interpretation of man's justification in the sense of the brothers Walenburg], the marriage of priests and bishops, the validation of our [Lutheran] orders, the concession that our pastors are true priests and our superintendents true bishops, and finally the recognition of the episcopal rights of the Protestant princes.²⁹

If the pope desires reunion, then he must grant these things as a preliminary measure. The third class of controversies center in *modum loquendi* and can be solved by discussion. Here Molanus includes the following: Are there seven sacraments? Are some sacraments of lesser importance than others? Is the sacrifice of the Mass properly known as a sacrifice? Does the minister's intent invalidate a sacrament? Is Christ a mediator according to both natures? Are good works properly said to be meritorious? Was the Virgin conceived without mortal sin? Is the pope antichrist or no? A second class of controversies is of greater moment. This group includes the issues of Purgatory, transubstantiation, the authority of the pope, the canon of the Scriptures, indulgences, the cult of relics, the invocation of saints and auricular confession. All the questions in the second class should be decided upon in a free and ecumenical council in which the Lutheran superintendents sit as judges with the Roman Catholic bishops. The presence of the evangelical superintendents will make the council free and universal. "Given then, that the council will be legitimately called and be infallible in decision by force of the promise of God, then nothing can remain that anyone can hesitate to accept by law."³⁰ That this is the essence of the *Methodus*, at least, as Molanus wished Leibniz to know it, cannot be doubted, for there follows hard upon the above exposition the following:

This *Method* with a response to all objections which can be suggested by either side, was written at the instance of our Most Serene Prince by four of his theologians and it was transmitted to our Prince the Lord Bishop.³¹

The *Methodus* represents Molanus' thought on the possibility of arriving at an understanding with the Roman Church up to 1683. It also goes as far as

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 504.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 505.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 506. Printed in Bossuet, *Œuvres complètes* 17: 394-431.

²² *Ibid.* 2: 157. Quoted from a letter from Joachim Hildebrandt to Rojas, Zell, May 5, 1683.

²³ *Ibid.* 2: 51-52.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 2: 56-57.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 2: 52, note 3.

²⁶ Leibniz, S. S., first ser., 4: 504-505.

²⁷ Bogen A., Rom und Hannover, *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, 32: 249, 1862.

²⁸ Leibniz, S. S., first ser., 4: 503 et seq.

the Abbot could go in a semi-public way in explaining Lutheran theology in a Catholic sense. Privately he was much closer to Rome than he could openly admit and probably, therefore, the *Cogitationes Privatae* written in 1691 for Bossuet's consideration give a more accurate picture of what he actually thought.³¹ They were, of course, not intended for the public but only for the Bishop of Meaux.

The *Cogitationes* begin with the assumption that reunion is not only possible between Catholics and Protestants but that it is every Christian's duty to work toward this end.³² This reunion can be effected without injuring the principles of either side by "distinct explanation, gentle declaration, and moderate concession" (*explicatione dilucida, declaratione commoda, mitigatione moderata*).³³ The pope will recognize as members of the Catholic Church those Protestants who are ready to submit to the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the decisions of a future council. Communion in two kinds will be granted. The Protestants will not be pressed to receive private Masses, they will be allowed to keep their doctrine of justification, marriages already contracted will be recognized as legitimate for the clergy, Protestant ordinations will be recognized as valid, and the property rights of the German princes will be recognized over ecclesiastical holdings.³⁴

The Protestants will grant three things to the pope. He will be recognized as having the first place in order and dignity among all the bishops of the Christian world and he shall be regarded as having a primacy and a patriarchal jurisdiction over the Latin Church *jure ecclesiastico*. The Protestants will consider the Catholics as brothers in the fullest sense of the word despite the persistence of communion in one kind in the Roman fold. The ecclesiastical system of priest subject to bishop and bishop subject to archbishop will be accepted in its entirety by the Protestants.³⁵

When an agreement shall have been reached on these matters the emperor shall call upon the electors, princes, and other estates of the Empire, Protestant as well as Catholic, to send deputies to a conference where reunion will be discussed. At this meeting all problems for which no answer has been found by the expository method will be settled.³⁶

A first and second class of controversies will, of necessity, be taken under advisement at this conference. In the first class come the following items: (1) In what sense is the sacrament of the altar a sacrifice? (2) Does the intention of the minister vitiate the sacrifice? (3) Are there seven or two sacraments? (4) Are sins really taken away by justification? (5) Can one be justified by faith alone? (6) Can one be assured of justification? (7) Can one fulfill the

Decalogue? (8) Are venial sins contrary to the Law of God? (9) Are the good works of the just perfect in themselves and free from all sin? (10) Are the good works of the regenerate agreeable to God? In the second class of controversies Molanus includes the following controversies: (1) May one legitimately pray for the dead? (2) May the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin be accepted by Protestants? (3) Will the Catholics embrace the doctrine of Scotus, acceptable to the Protestants, on good works? (4) Are good works necessary for salvation? (5) Will the Catholics agree that the adoration of the Host ends with Jesus Christ? (6) Will the Protestants reject ubiquity (and Molanus suggests that they should)? (7) Will the Catholics agree that the Protestants need not accept the Vulgate?³⁷

A third order of controversies is still to be settled. Among these are questions relating to the invocation of the saints, the cult of images and relics, transubstantiation, the permanency of the actual Presence in the Host, the enumeration of sins in the confessional, Purgatory, the exposition of the Host, the perfection of Scripture and of unwritten tradition, the Mass in the vulgar tongue, the primacy of the Pope *de jure divino*, ecclesiastical fasts, monastic vows, indulgences, and the Council of Trent and its anathemas.³⁸ Molanus then proposes methods for settling these disputes, many of which, if acted upon, would be distinctly favorable to Roman belief and practice.

If the preliminary conference cannot settle all the disputes then a council must be called. The pope will summon this council and it will be as general as possible. The council will not base its work on the anathemas of Trent. Seven conditions should obtain before the council is summoned: (1) All the items posed as disputed ones in the *Cogitationes*, or the principal ones at least, should be settled and accepted by both parties. (2) The preliminary assembly must be called by the emperor. (3) The Protestants must be accepted into the unity of the Roman Church, notwithstanding the fact that they will not surrender the Eucharist *sub utraque*. (4) All action at the council shall be according to the canons of the Church, the bishops alone shall have a decisive vote, and the Protestant superintendents shall be recognized as genuine bishops. (5) The basis for decision of this council shall be Holy Writ, the consent of the first five centuries of the Church, and the approval of the five patriarchal sees, in so far as possible. (6) The doctors will dispute in this council but the bishops will cast the decisive votes. (7) After the cloture of the council and the publication of its decrees both parties will be bound to observe them under pain of the penalties provided for in the council.³⁹

The *Cogitationes* were written after the pattern of

³² *Ibid.*, 394.

³³ *Ibid.*, 395.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 398-404.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 404.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 406.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 406-423.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 423-429.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 429-430.

the *Via Pacis* of Denis Werl, a Capuchin at Hildesheim, and the two are so closely related that the same wording is sometimes used in both.⁴⁰ They were designed to put the Lutheran position in the very best light to the eminent author of the *Exposition de la foi catholique* and they made an impression. Bossuet in his *Réflexions*⁴¹ on the *Cogitationes* looked upon them as very useful because they contained the "reconciliation of the most important controversies."⁴² To Bossuet the expository method employed by Molanus was the soundest approach to reunion.

In a later document of Molanus called the *Explicatio Ulterior*⁴³ he showed a somewhat less yielding point of view. It contains high praise for Bossuet's *Exposition* but faces clearly the difficulties which remain, and there were many of them. Some of these difficulties are developed *con amore* in such wise that at times the *Explicatio* appears radically opposed to an earlier and more irenical review.

He [Bossuet] examines in the initial parts of the [*Réflexions*] the method which I propose, which appears to be subject to many difficulties, and to be impracticable on many points. That does not surprise me; on the contrary, I am astonished that we are so perfectly in agreement, not on all the principal things (something I could never hope for), but on a great number.⁴⁴

The political reason for the irenical movements then appears.

The Most Serene Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg, John Frederick, Roman Catholic, to whom I wish all sorts of good things, was the first to give me occasion to enter into this career. Following this, I was enlisted in this work by the orders of my Most Serene Sovereign, Ernst August of B.-L. and Elector. . . . And I discussed these matters with an illustrious German prelate [obviously Rojas].⁴⁵

According to the Abbott of Loccum, the method of exposition used by Bossuet has served to clarify many points but it is not equal in excellence to his own. If anyone understood the Trentine anathemas in a sense that would smooth the path for Lutheran return to Rome, then it would be a positive wrong to accept them because

there would be no more requests to make, assemblies to hold or secret negotiations to treat with the pope, with the emperor and with the more powerful princes. There would be no necessity of speaking of suspending the anathemas of Trent nor of assembling a new council. All that would become useless as soon as [the Catholics] could prove clearly that our doctors have taken the decrees of Trent in a false sense and they would have falsely imputed to the Catholics errors which never entered their minds.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Cf. Dionysius Werlensis, *Via Pacis*, Hildesheim, 1686.

⁴¹ Bossuet, *op. cit.* 17: 548–615 where the *Réflexions* are printed entire.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 548.

⁴³ *Ibid.* 18: 54–70.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.

All difficulties, however, cannot be settled by way of exposition. Bossuet brought many into harmony; Molanus himself found a concordance between fifty seemingly irreconcilable propositions which he sent to Vienna for Rojas, but serious differences persist. The conciliar question is one which cannot be settled by explanation. It is true that Christ will not permit an ecumenical council to err; abuses and errors can, nevertheless creep in. The Council of Trent may have decided in favor of the Scotist doctrine on good works,⁴⁷ but that of Vasquez has become the most common. M. de Meaux, Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels, and other enlightened Catholics may venerate saints in a moderate and desirable way, conformable to that prescribed by Trent, but this does not prevent terrible abuse from existing everywhere in the Catholic Church on this count.

At this point Molanus lashes the air with perhaps the vainest argument of the entire *Explicatio*. He insists that the Protestants cannot accept Trent, because it would do violence to their consciences. The greatest violence would be to insist that the Protestants accept the Trentine decision that communion under both kinds is not *de praecepto* (explicitly stated in Scripture) when it is every single Protestant's conviction that it is *de praecepto*. Of all the things which could be granted the Protestants' communion in two kinds would probably have been the easiest.⁴⁸ To Bossuet in particular, although he argued that it was best to receive in one kind, the use of the cup was quite permissible, if received under regulated circumstances. But Molanus pursues the argument doggedly:

An agreement would be much more easy, if the Catholics could prove by the method of exposition that the anathemas of Trent do not fall upon the Protestants, but it is a vain thing, if they give a favorable sense to the greater part of the articles, if there remains a single one that the council orders to be believed under pain of anathema. We do not believe that we can admit in conscience, be it that we are right or that our conscience be invincibly gone astray, such a thing as the article on communion under two kinds, a thing which we believe to be *de praecepto*. Good sense dictates that in this case all projects will go up in smoke, if they don't put aside the Council of Trent. In fact, if the authority of the Council of Trent cannot be suspended with regard to the Protestants, they must then believe conformably to its decrees that Jesus Christ did not order communion under two kinds and that those who think otherwise are struck with anathema although they are firmly convinced that Christ has ordered the communion in this fashion and that it is better for them to die in schism for which they are not guilty than to renounce this known truth and the friendship of God, who relies upon this perseverance to defend it, following His word: "You are my friends, if you do what I command you."⁴⁹

⁴⁷ The doctrine of Scotus on the method of justification is considered to be more in harmony with the Protestant solifidian conception than that of any other Scholastic. For a Catholic interpretation cf. Forest-Steenberghen-Gandillac, *Le mouvement doctrinal du ix^e siècle au xiv^e siècle*, 336 et seq., Paris, 1951.

⁴⁸ Bossuet, *op. cit.* 18: 60.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 61. St. John, xv, 14. (S.R.V.).

According to the Abbot, the Trentine decrees have never been received in certain areas. They may have been accepted by the bishops and clergy, but that is something quite different from the approval of public authority which, Molanus, as an Erastian, would naturally assume to govern every church. To him a conciliar decree can be accepted only "per decretum regis, in archiepiscopatibus et episcopatibus per synodem provinciale, minimum diocesanam."⁵⁰ Operating on this basis he proves to his satisfaction at least that the Council of Trent is not at all received as ecumenical or as legitimate.

Arguments in the *Explicatio* run parallel to those used by Leibniz in his correspondence with Bossuet. Exposition is an excellent method for beginning the settlement of controversy, but it does not go far enough. Suspension is the real solution to the problem and by this Molanus means not only the anathemas of Trent but its canons as well. If Trent in its entirety cannot be suspended with regard to the Protestants, the delicacy of their consciences will not permit them to accept its decrees which are contrary to those beliefs which they hold as *de praecepto*. The only way out of this dilemma is to recognize that Trent is not accepted in a number of Catholic lands, France no doubt being the chief one, and, in view of this, not to place the Protestants under any obligation to accept the offensive canons. The high hopes of 1682–1683 for an *unio actualis* have been replaced by a second best, merely a mutual toleration with no expectation in the near future of anything more positive.⁵¹

As has been noted Molanus' relations with Rojas were much less formal than those with Bossuet. Molanus wrote confidential letters to the Bishop of Neustadt which are models of candor when compared with the ponderous theological arguments of the works discussed above. With Rojas the Abbot attempted to conceal or, at least, gloss over his Lutheranism. A typical example is a letter addressed to Rojas at Vienna, March 22, 1694. It sounds like an apology from a crypto-Catholic.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁵¹ Barozzi and Berchet, eds., *Le relazioni degli stati Europei lette al senato degli ambasciatori Veneziani nel sec. xvii*, ser. 2, 3: 524, Venice, 1857–1863. Pietro Venier to the Doge Silvestro Valier, 1694. The Venetian envoy thinks the project is virtually hopeless. "Si introdusse del 1691 commercio di lettere tra il vescovo di Maut [Meaux] vivente, ed il sig. Pelisson convertito, che morse con l'abate Molanus, e il sig. Liebevichz Lutherani dello stato di Anniver per convenire alcuni punti contenziosi della religione cattolica con quella della credenza di Luthero, ma pero sinora senza frutto." Bossuet, *op. cit.*, 69. To give some idea of the contrast between the Lutheranism which came before and followed Molanus it should be noted that the *Explicatio* was begun during *Lent* at his *Abbey of Loccum* and was finished during *Holy Week* on the *Vigil of Easter*. The final prayer of the work is drawn from a vesperal office out of the *Cistercian breviary* for *Holy Saturday*.

The [reunion business] will show that no other theologian from the beginning of the Reformation up to present times has spoken out his opinions so candidly as I; you can be absolutely sure that in the future I shall show myself similarly disposed. I write this letter in my cloister at Loccum during the middle of Passion Week, while I do sincere penance by abstaining from meat and undergoing other mortifications of the body, not excepting the hair shirt that I, God willing, shall wear on Good Friday and Holy Saturday. Meanwhile do I implore God, according to the Cistercian breviary (to whose daily use I am accustomed), that he look down kindly upon your episcopal family and my cloistered community for whom His only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, had no hesitation in delivering Himself into the hands of the enemy and in accomplishing the death of the Cross.⁵²

But despite Molanus' admiration for the efforts of Rojas, he was from the beginning more certain that all that could be done was to achieve a *tolerantia mutua* rather than a *unio actualis*. He was never carried along by the buoyancy which permeated all of Rojas' proposals and activities. In short he probably saw more clearly the political, social, and historical factors which made for disunion and realized more fully the limitations which the times imposed on any project for church unity.

Nevertheless, he cooperated more fully with the Bishop's activities than did any of the other Protestants with the exception of Leibniz. Molanus and Rojas were in correspondence as early as 1683, and it was in Loccum and Hanover that the reunion discussions of that year took place. The Abbot promised to assist in every way possible and declared that he had always admired the outstanding learning and eloquence of the Bishop of Tina.⁵³

2. LEIBNIZ AND ROJAS

If Molanus could be called the major Protestant theologian with whom Rojas worked, then Leibniz was the chief Protestant philosopher of the Lutheran-Catholic irenic movement. Both were dependent upon the Elector of Hanover and had to consider first what His Serene Highness of Brunswick thought about a matter before they could act. In a sense, however, Leibniz was more free to act than his ecclesiastical colleague because he did not have university faculties, consistories, and the common people to placate before he spoke or wrote. Hence one can expect a greater liberty of speculation and action from him. On the other hand his decisions were more likely to remain in the realm of philosophical discussion than were those of the Abbot because he had no power to bind and loose and could only hope to implement his thoughts by indirect persuasian and diplomatic negotiation.⁵⁴

⁵² Menge, *op. cit.* 2: 56–57.

⁵³ Hansitz, 9313: 125. Molanus to Rojas, June 27, 1683. Printed in Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 1: 19.

⁵⁴ Secondary works on other aspects of Leibniz' career are numerous. A very general but excellent monograph is that of

Eastern Europe produced two notable irenicists during the seventeenth century, Comenius and Leibniz. Comenius⁵⁵ was almost as widely traveled and had almost as great international renown as Leibniz and both are still very much in the minds of modern irenicists because of the invaluable spade work which they did. They were both specimens produced by political and ecclesiastical conditions in the Empire. Political division had begun as early as Frederick II in Germany and with Luther came religious separation. Germany was then, and still is, the country *par excellence* where natural or imposed divisive tendencies have caused thoughtful men to consider the benefits of compromise and to suggest schemes of reformation leading to unity in all phases of human existence. It is not then simply by chance that Leibniz early formed the resolution to devote his life to German and religious reunion.

His irenic career began when he met Baron von Boyneburg who was in the service of Johann Philipp von Schönborn, Elector of Mainz. Leibniz was taken to Mainz in Boyneburg's suite and there he circulated in an atmosphere touched by most of the political, intellectual and theological currents of the times. The Brothers Walenburg, Volusius, and even Rojas at times were members of the Court at Mainz and problems relating to European and German politics and questions concerning church reunion were much discussed and very ably, too, and always with the view in mind of bringing Protestants and Catholics closer together and breaking down the walls of confessional polemicism which were elsewhere considered as normal.

This is not the place to analyze the philosophical tenets of Leibniz except in one respect, namely, those which have direct bearing on his theology and his relations with the Roman Church. In his *Systema Theologicum* he came as near to presenting a successful program for settling theological strife as did any Protestant in the seventeenth century, so much so, in fact, that the author of this work was long believed to have been Catholic. It might well be argued that Leibniz considered himself above sectarian controversy and merely turned out the *Systema* as a series of suggestions for other people to work upon but, despite his positive tendencies toward

eighteenth-century rationalism and his obvious disregard for the formal ceremonies and church life of Lutheranism, the *Systema*, supported by evidence from his correspondence with Molanus and Rojas, indicate that he regarded church unity as the *sine qua non* of a reborn and strong Germany and they cannot be dismissed as the work of an amateur who needed diversion in his leisure time.

Philosophically it may even be suggested that Leibniz was closer to modern Roman Catholicism with its philosophy rooted in Thomistic thought than was the celebrated Bishop of Meaux. In a certain sense this is true. Thomism is the recommended philosophy of the Roman Church today⁵⁶ and there is no doubt that the Leibnizian concept of the monadal structure is more in harmony with the Scholastic conception of matter and form than is the sharp dualism which follows the Cartesian view of substance and which was the *dernier cri* in the thought of seventeenth-century France. But the verification of this idea depends upon the consideration of only one aspect of philosophy in isolation from all others and upon the assumption that Bossuet lived in the twentieth century rather than the seventeenth. Bossuet, although moderately enthusiastic about the Cartesian *method*, foresaw great danger in Descartes' ideas as a completely developed system and pronounced against it as strongly as did Leibniz.⁵⁷ True, Leibniz was quite in the Aristotelian tradition and, as such, he was, from a purely philosophical point of view, clearly more in harmony with original Scholastic thought and its modern counterpart, Neo-Thomism, than was anyone who adopted Cartesianism unreservedly. We must, however, take into account that Bossuet scorned philosophy and struck out clearly as a guardian of theology. He may have momentarily seen much good in Cartesianism, but he was primarily subject to dogma and only secondarily to philosophy. To him philosophy was a tool to be abandoned as soon as it came into conflict with Revelation. To Leibniz philosophical speculation and private judgment based upon it were values which, in the last analysis, transcended dogma.⁵⁸

Leibnizian philosophy is essentially one of compromise. Given his primary aims of unity in the field of politics and religion, it is clear why he avoided that which divided. Probably the only two principles which

André Cresson, *Leibniz, sa vie, son œuvre*, Paris, 1947. For Leibniz as a political figure there is F. W. Dafert, *Leibniz als Deutscher*, Vienna, 1883; for philosophy see Kuno Fischer, *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* (Geschichte der neuen Philosophie) Heidelberg, 1887. Leibniz as a mathematician is treated extensively in C. I. Gerhardt, *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften* from a collection of the Philosopher's works under the editorship of Pertz. For the theological aspects of the problem consult A. Pichler, *Die Theologie des Leibniz*, Munich, 1869. The recent essay and collection of letters by Ludwig A. Winterswyl, *Über die Reunion der Kirchen von G. W. Leibniz*, (19th vol. from the series), Freiberg, Herder, 1939, is of considerable interest because it places the problem of church reunion in a modern and very Germanic setting.

⁵⁵ As testimony to the modern interest in Comenius his *Angelus Pacis* was translated and published by the Pantheon Press in 1944.

⁵⁶ The teaching of Thomism is governed by Canon 1366 #2. "Philosophiae rationalis ac theologiae studia et alumnorum in his disciplinis institutionem professores omino pertractant ad Angelici Doctoris rationem, doctrinam et principia, eaque sancta tenent." See *Codex Iuris Canonici*, 389, Vatican, 1949.

⁵⁷ Bossuet, *op. cit.* 26: 396. Letter from Bossuet to a disciple of Malebranche, Versailles, May 21, 1677.

⁵⁸ For the accounts of the influence of Scholastic philosophy on Leibniz' thought see Nourrisson, *op. cit.*, 34 and 347-351. See also Fritz Rintelen, *Leibnizens Beziehungen zur Scholastik*, 8-9, Berlin, 1903, and Guhrauer, *G. W. von Leibniz* 1: 24, Breslau, 1846, and the edition of Leibniz' work by Janet, *op. cit.*, 29 and 257.

stand out clearly in his work are his concept of substance (*Monadology*) and his critique of Cartesian mechanism.⁵⁹ In philosophical and confessional differences he personally could see nothing but logomachies. It was ever a source of amazement to him that the Roman Church could embrace such diverse philosophies as those of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas and yet exclude large groups of people from their communion who were seemingly in harmony on all the principal articles of faith with Rome. In a manner of speaking each Church was a sort of monad and, in as far as it was this, it partook of divine truth.⁶⁰

Closely allied with Leibniz' philosophy were his theology and ecclesiology. As the philosopher grew older, he was observed less and less in formal attendance at divine service but this was no indication that he had abandoned the theological system which he continuously advocated. More likely it was a result of preoccupation with the work imposed upon him by his Prince and by his general disillusionment with the abuses in the visible organization of both the Lutheran and Catholic churches. He was, in actual fact, neither Protestant nor Catholic; he was a syncretist who could never quite dispossess himself of the notion that all formal Christians would be better off if they adopted Leibnizian philosophy and theology and composed their differences on a syncretistic basis.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Jalabert, J., *La théorie Leibnizienne de la substance*, 268 et seq., Paris, 1947.

⁶⁰ Schrecker, *op. cit.*, 214.

⁶¹ Kirchner, *Leibniz' Stellung zur Katholischer Kirche*, 3-4, 85-86, Berlin, 1874. Kirchner summarizes Leibniz' doctrinal position as follows: "Wir haben gefunden, dass Leibnitz, wie er ja die Rolle eines Katholiken spielt, zum grossen Tiel die Sätze der römischen Kirchenlehre wörtlich anführt. So oft wir aber näher zusahen und sonstige Aeusserungen von ihm heranzogen, konnten wir seine Abweichungen von jener bemerken. Denn selbst die Ausdeutung, die er, um die Protestanten zu gewinnen, den Sätzen des Tridentinums gab, untergruben dieselben merst so, dass diese würdige Versammlung solchen Freund wahrscheinlich mehr gefürchtet haben würde, als einen Gegner. Wir erinnern and die Lehre von Offenbarung, Tradition, Concilien und Papst, and den Locus von der Rechtfertigung, den guten Werken, der Intention und Transubstantiation, von der Suhnkraft der Eucharistie, von der Ehe, vom Cölibat und Bussacrament. Freilich leugnen wir keineswegs, dass er auf Seiten der Katholiken steht, wenn er z. B. die römischen Ausschauung von der Bekehrung und Rechtfertigung, vom Bildercult, von Busse und Cölibat beredt vertheidigt. Ziehen wir aber die Missbräuche ab, die er alle zu rügen findet, so bleibt von der tridentinischen Praxis wenig genug übrig. Aber noch viel öfter liegt seine Abweichung von der römischen Doctrin am Tage. Er lehrt über Urstand und Ursünde; er tadelt den Mariencult wie die Unfehlbarkeit von Papst und Concilien; er leugnet, dass die römische Kirche allein die katholische sei und die Priester über die Laien erhaben; er zweifelt, ob die Tradition einstimmig und das Fegfeuer sinnlich zu fassen sei. Anderseits vertheidigt er rein protestantische Lehren, wenn er behauptet, die Kinder seien nicht verdammt und Laien konnten im Nothfalle jedes Sacrament verwalten; indem er leugnet, dass die Concupiscenz vom Tridentinum richtig ausgelegt oder dass dem Menschen irgendetwelches Verdienst beizulegen sei; indem er endlich die unsichtbare Kirche von der Sichtbaren, diese hinwieder von der welt-

In his dealings with Rojas two of Leibniz's paramount ideas should be emphasized. In the first instance he distinguished between fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs and in the second between formal and material heresy. His notion of fundamental dogmas consisted of two, (1) the belief in the necessity of baptism and (2) the acceptance of the Apostles' Creed.⁶² Naturally he supported Rojas' plea for reunion on the acceptance of the procedures and decrees of the first four ecumenical councils but this, if dogma, was certainly dogma of an inferior order.

To whomsoever God gives His love, to him He gives sufficient knowledge of His Son for salvation and whoever cultivates this act of love cannot be a formal heretic or schismatic. It is, however, dangerous for salvation to be outside the visibly constituted Catholic Church.

This is Leibniz' notion of the difference between formal and material heresy.⁶³ What constitutes the visible Church never appears quite clear in the philosopher's mind, but, in any event, he felt that one ought not change the religion into which he had been born without grave cause. He who separates himself from a church which belongs to a particular Church would in consequence be separated from the Universal Church.⁶⁴ In fact, Leibniz' beliefs on what constitutes a proper ecclesiastical structure were much more narrow than his concept of the prerequisites for salvation. He was always in favor of an hierarchy, of the recognition of the Roman primacy *de jure humano*, of the acceptance of the conciliar decrees, the Church Fathers and the canonical decrees, but to him the only rule which distinguished a heretic from a non-heretic was that the former did not love God. "Nemo sine vero Dei amoris justificari potest."⁶⁵

Like Rojas and Molanus, Leibniz was convinced that church reunion could not be brought about by theologians or by groups of ardent, religious enthusiasts. His idea was that the *brachium saeculare* was the only

lichen Macht zu scheiden verlangt. . . . Leibniz hat nicht nur diese, sondern viele andere Punkte bezweifelt oder gelehnet. Steht es aber so, wie wir nachzuweisen versucht haben, so wird niemand mehr, am wenigsten ein guter Katholik, unsern grossen Philosophen zu einem heimlichen Katholikenstempeln wollen." The maxim "nulla salus extra ecclesiam" was repellent to Leibniz and he spoke out strongly against it. He says this, for example, in his *Theodicée* (edited by Jacques), p. 383, "C'est pourquoi ceux qui sont hors de l'Eglise (oi 'eśw), auxquels la seule prédication externe a été refusé, il faut les remettre à la clémence et à la justice du Créateur, sans que nous sachions du reste lesquels Dieu secourt ni quel moyen il y emploie." A contemporary note should be added here. During the month of Jan., 1951, Yves Congar, O.P., gave a lecture on Luther in Strasbourg. In this lecture he repeated virtually the same words here used by Leibniz. For another statement on the *nulla salus* theme see Grua, Gaston, *Inédits de Leibniz*, 206-207, Paris, 1948. Letter to the Electress Sophia, Sept. 10, 1697.

⁶² Schrecker, *G. W. Leibniz; Lettres et fragments inédits* (1699-1704), 23, Paris, 1934.

⁶³ Grua, *op. cit.* 1: 170.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 1: 170.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 1: 171.

possible way to implement ecclesiastical reunion. Without political support the irenicist might as well save his breath and effort. In the correspondence with Bossuet he was eager to attack the problem with a lay official and disengage himself from the trammels of theological argument.⁶⁶ He always appealed first to the secular heads of states when he became interested in irenic plans—to Louis XIV, to Ernest George, to Frederick I, to George Louis, to Peter I—and, in this sense, his aims were realistic and were like those of the eighteenth century in which a ruler, from an argument of reason (common sense), felt that all logomachies (into which category all theological disagreements were automatically placed) could be ended by a governmental fiat.⁶⁷ In brief, although Leibniz cannot be accused of being completely actuated by political motives,⁶⁸ it is clear that he did not place the proper emphasis on the real necessity for having harmony among theologians and the great body of the faithful before any schism or heresy could rightly be said to have ended.

Although Leibniz must certainly have met Rojas at Mainz he seems to have become interested in the prelate's work only during the spring of 1683. His correspondence with the Landgraf Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels⁶⁹ enables us to follow the development of Leibniz' opinion. Very early he seized upon the idea of a suspension of the Trentine anathemas as the most hopeful approach which had ever been suggested for composing Lutheran-Catholic differences. Throughout Leibniz wanted an explanation of the Trentine canons which would be pleasing to the Protestants and a total suspension of the anathemas of this Council, but his primary emphasis at the beginning was on explanation rather than suspension. This suggests that Rojas' stress followed the same lines and it was only later that both he and Leibniz gave a greater importance to the suspensory rather than the expository method.

In March, 1683, after Rojas had been in Hanover for months, Leibniz wrote the Landgraf an account of the transactions between the Bishop and the Lutheran theologians. Leibniz admits that he has high regard for the tradition of the Roman Church.

I thought, however, that it would be important, not for everybody, but for those who seem suitable, to join to it an

⁶⁶ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 2: 255–257. Leibniz to George Louis, March, 1699.

⁶⁷ Schrecker, *Lettres et fragments inédits*, 53.

⁶⁸ It is not uncommon for the authorities to accuse Leibniz of having acted from purely political motives in his correspondence with Bossuet, a point of view which is only partially true. See Guhrer, *Leibniz' Deutsche Schriften* 2: 82–84, Berlin, 1838–1840. See also Tabaraud, *op. cit.*, 152–153 and Lescœur, *De Bossuet et Leibnitii epistolarum commercio circa pacem inter Christianos conciliandam*, 35, Paris, 1852.

⁶⁹ Insofar as it has been published the Prussian Academy edition of the letters between Leibniz and the Landgraf will be used here. Where this is not adequate the older edition of Chr. von Rommel, *Leibniz und Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels*, 2 v., Frankfurt-am-Main, 1847, is used.

exact discussion of matters, so that there would be nothing for anyone to regret, and to act with complete sincerity and all the precision possible, without hiding or dissimulating things. In many things which I have examined, I find that this discussion would be more advantageous than harmful to the Church and that the dogmas of the Catholics, explained in a manner which I think conformable to the Council of Trent, are the most reasonable thing in the world.

Only the Catholic doctrines of transubstantiation and of Grace contain certain difficulties as explained by the Scholastics. However, if these doctrines were properly explained, they would be approved or, at least, judged tolerable by the moderates on the Protestant side. An exposition more detailed than that of the Bishop of Condom (Bossuet) should be made on these points.⁷⁰

Despite his satisfaction with many things, there are still matters which trouble Leibniz. Faith is made subject to tradition and human reason by the thinking of the Landgraf. There are many things approved in the practices of the ordinary Catholic that a wise and honest man could not accept. Moreover, the Landgraf can do and say things as a rational and tolerant Catholic which would not be tolerated for a moment in the ordinary mortal. If the "Discreet and Sincere Catholic"⁷¹ could have papal approbation as Bossuet's *Exposition* has had, then reunion would be accomplished at once, but Leibniz argues that such an approval could never be had. The projects of Rojas, like those of the Landgraf, could be possible, if affairs in civil life were different. As things are "it would be necessary to presume among the generality of mankind, and principally among theologians, more equity and reason than one can attain." Even Rojas himself does not look for immediate success. Leibniz is hesitant to speak because the Bishop [Rojas] exhorted him to hold silent in the matter.⁷²

Evidently adverse rumors had been coming to Ernst August's ears for he commented on Rojas' work in his usual vigorous, if not always prudent and restrained, style.

I don't wish to believe in, or even hope for, such a thing [Rojas' proposals] for that would be more fitting to recommend him for one of the Inquisition's dungeons than for a good bishopric or the purple.⁷³

Leibniz himself was not too sanguine in his hope for Rojas' success. The contingent problems were enormous and he saw no immediate solution for them. The Protestants had no right to refuse reunion even upon the basis of the denial of the cup to the laity, but the Roman Church was equally as guilty of schism, if by

⁷⁰ Leibniz, S. S., ser. I, part 3, 279. Leibniz to the Landgraf, Hanover, March 14/24, 1683.

⁷¹ A work by the Landgraf designed to make Catholicism more palatable to Protestants.

⁷² Leibniz, S. S., ser. I, part 3, 288. Leibniz to the Landgraf, Cassel, April 27/May 7, 1683.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, ser. I, part 3, 297. Landgraf to Leibniz, May 21/31, 1683.

obscurity in teaching and explanation, it did nothing to heal the breach between confessions. Objectionable practices were so great in the Church that they amounted, in some cases, to idolatry.

If it is true, as I really do believe, that St. Jerome would have difficulty in recognizing the Church at Charenton [Calvinist], it is also true that he would be yet more surprised to see the tragic-comic processions of Holy Week, the Novenas of St. Anthony of Padua, the Carmelite scapulars, and a quantity of other pious baubles. I hold there is nothing in the world so harmful to true devotion than this finery which cultivates superstition. If they [the Catholics] encourage the devotion of some simple folk, they scandalize an infinite number of people of good sense, who, not being sufficiently instructed to distinguish the true from the false, mingle all together in the same contempt.⁷⁴

While this correspondence with the Landgraf is doubtless a candid summary of Leibniz' real opinions of the Hanover conversations, it should be noted that he was in direct contact with Rojas himself.⁷⁵ In the spring of 1673⁷⁶ he set forth his views on the elementary conditions necessary for reunion along with the news that he had sent to Bossuet a letter from Rojas. According to Leibniz the Protestants could not in conscience accept all the dogma of the Roman Church and particularly that of the Council of Trent. However, they should be willing to submit to the decrees of a council held legitimately where the major difficulties would be resolved. Meanwhile the Roman Church would accept non-Romans into the unity of the Church and the Protestant clergy would receive its ordination from the same source. More important the Protestants would recognize that the very basis of salvation was to be found in the historic Church and would acknowledge the deposit of ordinary power residual in the bishops by divine law (*ordinariae potestatis depositum in Episcopis divino jure residens*). According to the manner in which the Greeks had been handled by Rome, they would retain a married clergy governed by the example of the primitive Church and communion in both kinds. The major remaining difficulties concerning the manner of the Real Presence in the Eucharist, Purgatory, and other matters of difference would be defined in the projected ecumenical council. In this council made up of bishops and presided over by the Roman pontiff the newly created and canonical bishops created from amongst the Protestants would have a legitimate place and all decision would be governed by a two-thirds majority of those present.

Rojas was equally as cautious as Leibniz about an all-out commitment to any position from which there was no withdrawal and both of them warned that their correspondence should be kept as secret as possible and attempted to develop a cipher which would further

conceal their real intentions. More than this Rojas declared his position to be nothing more than that of a go-between. He offered nothing and he accepted nothing on his own account. He was grateful to Leibniz for having represented his cause in a favorable light to the Landgraf but

. . . It is fair to add at this point that I have not represented myself anywhere in the matters under consideration as a doctor but simply to each party as a solicitor (*solicitorum*). I do not claim to have thought myself for or against either party or contrived anything, ceded or obtained anything from either side. This one aim I have had from day to day, to bring all sides as closely together as possible. . . . Indeed I promise nothing more than I did initially, to wit, that I shall endeavor to procure as favorable a theological approbation for their views as our principles will suffer.⁷⁷

Between 1683 and 1688 there was no communication between Rojas and Leibniz but the question of reunion with Rome remained a lively issue in the philosopher's letters to the Landgraf. The concessions he made in his private thoughts were more than generous. If the evils which afflict the Church can be brought to an end by recognizing the primacy of the Roman pontiff, then by all means the Protestants should do so.⁷⁸ If the pope would give official support to Rojas' program it would work a veritable revolution in religious affairs, particularly if he would recognize that the ecumenicity of Trent was still *de facto* rather than *de fide*. All that would be necessary then for the Protestants to be considered true Catholics would be for them to show their willingness to submit to the decision of a future council.⁷⁹ Reunion might not be possible immediately but with a tractable pope (Innocent XI), reasonable theologians, and a well-intentioned prince (the Duke of Brunswick) efforts should be made to prepare the soil for a more fertile planting at a later time. To be sure Rojas was not quite the ideal negotiator because

I would have wished that the Bishop of Tübingen might have been more informed concerning the details of the controversies and the affairs of the Protestants, for it seems that he did not enter into these matters until he had begun to conceive his design. Likewise I would have wished that he had acted in a little less worldly manner which has scandalized many people for in his talk he has made too much of the temporal advantages of the Catholics, the nobility, of families, even of princes which they would find in a change. This arises in part from the fact that he does not know the Protestants well enough, imagining perhaps that the most intelligent amongst them are attracted to their religion only by temporal aims which is not the case.⁸⁰

When Rojas became Bishop of Wiener Neustadt in 1685, the general impression at Hanover was that he had already caught the desired fish and had hung

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 576. Rojas to Leibniz, Hanover, July 4/14, 1683.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, ser. I, 4: 324. Leibniz to the Landgraf, Hanover, first half of March, 1684.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, ser. I, 4: 341. Leibniz to the Landgraf, Hanover, Dec. 24/Jan. 8, 1685.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 353. Leibniz to the Landgraf, Hanover, March 4/14, 1685.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, ser. I, part 3, 310. Leibniz to the Landgraf, Aug. 4/14, 1683.

⁷⁵ The first letter in the correspondence dates from March 1/11, 1683. See Leibniz, *S. S.*, ser. I, part 3, 562.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 567-568. Leibniz to Rojas, middle of April, 1683.

his net on the wall, but this was not the case. The Diocese required the Bishop's presence but he kept his oar in the reunion business and corresponded regularly with the Capuchin Denis Werl at Hildesheim on just this topic.⁸¹ He also remained interested in the general difficulties of the Empire as did Leibniz and it was in 1687 that new efforts were once more made to reactivate a general approach to the solution of these difficulties. Mingled with considerations of ecclesiastical policy were the familiar issues of strengthening the imperial constitution, reforming the coinage, and initiating mercantilist schemes to strengthen the economy and the armed forces against the French and the Turks. With these views in mind Leibniz set out on a trip which was to take him to southern Germany, Vienna, and finally Italy. His avowed purpose was to gather material for his history of the House of Brunswick and to inform himself on any intellectual or scientific question which might attract his interest, but his chief aim, at least in Vienna, was to talk over with the Bishop of Wiener Neustadt the issues which had been ventilated in Hanover in 1683.

Indicative of Leibniz' frame of mind and the type of thinking Rojas had found amongst the most *catholisant* Protestants is a Promemoria written for the Landgraf of Hesse-Rheinfels.⁸² It is particularly significant because it shows just how far the Protestants were willing to go, and at the same time indicates very clearly the exact theological issues upon which the whole matter was to result in failure. It is a rather briefer statement of the principles which Leibniz was later to develop so tirelessly in his correspondence with Bossuet.

The method of the Bishop of Tina is the best possible one yet proposed for ending the Great Schism of the West and by his terminology Leibniz clearly considers the Protestants to occupy the same status as the Greeks in relation to Rome. But nothing will come of it unless the political forces in western Europe are sympathetic. To be precise it will necessitate great resolve, immense zeal and extraordinary lights from a pope, an emperor, and important princes both Catholic and Protestant. The minimum basis for beginning the work of religious pacification is mutual tolerance and the end of civil strife but this must be followed by even greater efforts. The way of suppression (*voye de la rigueur*) is hopeless (possibly he had the Edict of Nantes in mind) and the way of dispute or discussion is almost as bad because it more often than not results in exacerbating opinion and starting new controversies.

Even the way of accommodation has its weaknesses. There are some controversies which result from misunderstanding but there are others defined in such precise terms that nothing can be done to bring together

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, first ser., 5: Introduction, xxix. This part of the introduction is written by Kurt Müller.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 10-21. Also printed in Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 2: 1-21.

opposite parties by any kind of *distinguo* and it is equally unthinkable to pass these matters by in silence. The way of condescension has the same weaknesses simply because it can be carried only to a certain point and then dogmatic definition offers an insuperable barrier. Precisely because of this latter approach some who have suggested that all be recognized as brothers in Jesus Christ who recognize the decisions of the first ecumenical councils have wasted their time and are even considered to be a new sect.

There remains another way. It has all the strengths of the others without their weaknesses but it, too, may never be realized except speculatively and under the Providence of God in the fullness of time. This way centers about the Catholic principle that one is in internal communion with the Church and cannot be considered heretical or schismatic when one has a spirit of submission and is prepared to believe what God has revealed not only in the Sacred Scripture but in the Church's interpretation of the *depositum fidei*. This interpretation comes chiefly from an ecumenical council held legitimately and here is the key to Leibniz' belief. He never admitted that the Council of Trent was legitimate within the meaning of the term legitimate.

To refuse to recognize a doctrine or a legitimate pope, even to support an antipope, does not make a schismatic and certainly not a heretic, because such beliefs or conduct come from an error in fact rather than one in law. Even if someone rejects the decisions of an ecumenical council and thinks his reasons well founded and is persuaded that the council's error is morally invincible, then he is no heretic provided he acknowledges in good faith the power of councils and the Catholic Church in general. Examples are not lacking because Constance and Basel are recognized in France and Germany, but the Italians are not convinced of their ecumenicity whereas Lateran V is recognized in Italy but not everywhere. Even the Council of Trent was opposed in France and although it is recognized now *quoad fidem*, it was opposed by the Third Estate and the Parlement.

From the Protestant point of view it is necessary to accept a statement of doctrine for purposes of negotiation which is generally accepted by all Lutherans. This statement is to be found in the Confession of Augsburg, particularly because therein the Lutherans declare their intention to submit to the decision of a legitimate council and so have the right intention which makes them Catholic. And this is precisely what Rojas has done, to wit, visited the Protestant princes and theologians to ascertain whether they hold the same opinions as their fathers and are still willing to submit to a general council which Rojas has promised to urge upon the pope. He has done more; he has planned a preliminary union for the subjects of the Emperor whose primary condition is that the Protestants will not be obliged to subscribe to all the canons and anathemas

of Trent but will be permitted to wait for a further definition by another ecumenical council. They will not, according to Leibniz' interpretation of Rojas' position, be obliged to change their rites and discipline so long as they do not do so out of sheer disobedience but on the basis of a *de facto* rather than *de jure* conception of Rome's position. On the other hand they must recognize in the pope the chief bishop of the Church and render him filial obedience and recognize in the Catholic Church and the ecumenical councils the teaching authority by virtue of the promise of the Holy Ghost that Christ's Church shall not err until the consummation of time.

Leibniz has been convinced by Rojas that eminent Protestant and Catholic doctors have judged that this method of reunion is possible in view of the submissive spirit of the Protestants who, nonetheless, are not convinced that the Trentine council is legitimate; however, Leibniz foresees that there is a possibility that the Trentine decisions will have to be accepted and also that this must be brought about by degrees of acceptance. In other words he accepts what Rojas always had in mind, namely, that Trent would have to be accepted ultimately by the Protestants but that this would be effected gradually so as not to harm consciences in the process.⁸³ This would be in the tradition of Saint Paul who permitted circumcision to Timothy although the Council of Jerusalem had judged this unnecessary for salvation.

That the pope can release the Protestants from an explicit recognition of Trent is in Leibniz' mind unquestionable because the pontiff has *tempore inter-conciliari* the valid administration of the Church. Here he sees a possible difficulty; the Gallicans will insist that the pope does not have this power because of their theory of conciliar supremacy, but when there is no council the law remains deaf and dumb without a living judge and that judge is certainly the Roman pope. It is true normally that the decisions of one council are never cast in doubt by those of a later, but there is always the example of Florence where the Latin Church discussed with the Greeks matters which had been discussed and condemned in earlier councils. More significant as far as the Catholics are concerned there is no doubt that any council will merely confirm the *Catholic truths* of any previous council because the Church is under the constant safeguard of the Holy Ghost. It should be noted, however, that Leibniz' view of what Catholic truths were was not quite the same as that of the Roman Church, although there was much similarity.

A married clergy and double communion will be granted by Rome and the Protestant clergy will be ordained as bishops and priests and questions of rite will be as liberally interpreted as possible. Those

who already accepted the decrees of Trent will be considered as full members of the Church. This latter is an extraordinarily large concession because it would seem that the said decrees in Leibniz' scheme were certainly not to be looked upon by non-Romans as being positive error which led to schism and/or heresy.⁸⁴

With this position of Leibniz in mind it is at once possible to see how close he was to the Roman (and Rojas') position and yet how far removed. In broad outline it appears to smooth the path to reunion and yet it contains a vagueness of terminology which leaves all manner of doors open for retreat if Rome should be adamant in insisting on a complete acceptance of Trent. It is the position of a philosopher much impressed by the order and unity of Rome but not at all prepared or even willing to make an act of faith to further the cause of reunion. Rojas went as far as anyone could without papal authorization to make the Church palatable to Protestants such as Leibniz but when the philosopher took up the cudgels with a professional dogmatist and theologian such as Bossuet the terminological abstractions of philosophy were shown to be hopelessly incompatible with the position of all the major authorities of the Roman Church in the seventeenth century.

Leibniz was also a participant in the renewed steps for church reunion between 1690 and 1695, but before this can be treated of in a more general way it is fitting to turn back to the proper subject of this work and see how Rojas' irenic career was prey to political interests and how he governed his diocese in Wiener Neustadt. In summary of his relationships with Leibniz between 1683 and 1690 the most that can be said was that the time was then ripe for dogmatic understanding between Catholics and Protestants. The Pope, the Emperor, the Duke of Brunswick, an impressive array of German princes both Evangelical and Catholic and great and small, even the French King up to a certain point and the Bishop of Meaux were favorable. A high degree of theological understanding had been achieved at least between Molanus and Rojas. But as the seeds of decay are to be observed in all human situations at the moment of their greatest flowering so was it in the case of this remarkable attempt to restore the constitutional unity of the Church. The Edict of Fontainebleau was not guaranteed to reassure Protestants that all Catholics meant well, the menacing attitude of the French just prior to the War of the League of Augsburg, the unrealistic approach of James II to the religious situation in England and the extremely narrow and tenuous basis of theological understanding between the two religious groups were the chief factors which made reunion impossible.

On the other hand if there is any merit in speculating on what might have happened had certain factors been

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 16. "De sorte qu'il faudra les mener par degrés, pour obtenir sur eux ce qu'on desire."

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-21. The remainder of the Promemoria is merely a summation of the *Methodus* of Molanus and Barkhausen.

other than they really were, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a reunion might have been brought about with the support of Innocent XI, Leopold I, Ernst August, Leibniz, Rojas, Molanus, and the Bishop of Meaux to say nothing of a host of lesser luminaries who were genuinely hoping for an accommodation.

As far as Leibniz is concerned he acted primarily as a politician. Despite his *Systema Theologicum* and his generous admissions of the rectitude of the Catholic position in his letters to the Landgraf Ernst, he was blind to the necessity for doctrinal harmony when he saw a quick way to reunion, or what he thought to be a quick way, through the fiat of a civil ruler. First it was Louis XIV who was to do this, then it was Ernst August of Brunswick, and finally it was to be Frederick I of Prussia or Peter I of Russia.

Even his fond desire that Rojas would commit himself entirely to sacrifice everything, that Rome might withdraw the offensive decrees of Trent, was never based on any specific declaration from the Bishop of Wiener Neustadt. As has been observed, Rojas no doubt talked loosely on occasion and left a false impression as to the magnitude of the concessions which could be expected from Rome. Very pointedly, too, in his appeal to Rome and his fellow theologians in the *Casus* and elsewhere in his writings did he recommend the suspension of Trentine anathemas and a period of grace for the preparation of minds and hearts for an ecumenical council, but he never gave a definitive promise that this would, or could, be done.⁸⁵ Quite the contrary! For Leibniz himself recognized that the Bishop's ultimate aim was to have the Protestants accept the decrees of Trent and the Bishop consistently represented himself as a *porte-parole* (mediator) between Catholics and Protestants and promised no more than to present as favorably as possible the Protestant position at Rome.

The significant thing about the Rojas-Leibniz relationship merely indicates that the temper of religious thought was more favorable to an understanding between the churches separated by the Reformation than it had ever been before or, perhaps, has ever been since. The nearest thing comparable to it in modern times was the Malines Conferences (1921-1926) and that was limited to the Anglican and Catholic Churches whereas Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anglicans were participants in the movement between 1680 and 1690.

⁸⁵ Knöpfler, the biographer for Rojas, in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 35: 203, suggests, as others have done, that Rojas' irenic attempts honor his sentiments rather than his intelligence and sagacity. This opinion appears in Pastor, *History of the popes* 32: 476, note 1. I cannot follow this judgment despite the honor due Pastor, for too much careful knowledge of theology is demonstrated in the *Casus* and the *Secreta relatio* to classify Spinola as more fertile in enthusiasm than brain.

VIII. THE POLITICAL SCENE

From the point of view of doctrine or theology, reunion would have been possible only through absorption in the seventeenth century. Stating the problem in its rawest form and always being mindful of the broad concessions which could and can be made by the Roman Church and which Rojas advocated to their fullest degree, absorption is the only course open to reunion today between Rome and other Christian groups.¹ This is particularly true since the Councils of Trent and of the Vatican. Prior to 1870 and 1950 it would have been more to the taste of Protestant groups to submit to absorption. That has been made perfectly clear by the opposition raised in Protestant quarters against the dogmas of papal infallibility and the Virgin's Assumption. The fact remains, however, that enormous dogmatic difficulties were also existent in the seventeenth century. Much of the talk between Rojas, Molanus, and Leibniz was based on wishful thinking and downright blindness to two factors, namely, that the primacy of the pope, according to Romans, is *de jure divino* and that Trent was and is an ecumenical council and that no sufficiently informed Catholic can presume to disobey its decrees without incurring the charge of schism and heresy.

This statement, dogmatic though it is and certainly offensive in its baldness, obviously does not stand in the way of reunion in an absolute sense because we are promised scripturally that the *Una Sancta* will be one day a reality. In modern times the Anglo-Catholics and the Romans did much good at Malines² by their discussions and frank proposals. In recent years there has grown up a school of writers, represented by the French Dominican Yves Congar and the Jesuit Henri de Lubac and the Anglo-Benedictine Dom Gregory Dix, who explore the possibilities of reunion through historical-theological scholarship which is, in many ways, merely a continuation of the expository method of Bossuet.³ There are religious institutions such as the

¹ Despite the quite legitimate hopes and efforts on the part of men of good will in the Roman Church that there be some immediate consequences of the ecumenical movement in modern times, there is much loose thinking on the problem based on false hopes and inadequate information. Therefore, it is good from time to time to have a little book such as Todd, John M., *Catholicism and the ecumenical movement, et seq.*, London, Longmans, 1956, to remind us that the very real problem cannot simply be ignored or wished away and that church reunion is not of our time but the work of generations and ultimately that of God.

² Saudé, J. de Bivort de la, *Anglicans et Catholiques*, Paris, 1949, and his *Documents sur le problème de l'union Anglo-romaine (1921-1927)*, Paris, 1949, is the most complete work on the Malines talks.

³ Congar has dealt directly with the problem in his *Divided Christendom*, London, 1939, and de Lubac more indirectly in his *Méditation sur l'église*, Paris, 1953. De Lubac does not, to be sure, consider ecumenism as such but does much to explain the advantages and disadvantages of the Roman view of authority. Dom G. Dix in *The shape of the liturgy*, London and

Benedictine monastery of Chevtogne in Belgium, to say nothing of the numerous Protestant communities such as Taizé and Iona, where participation in study and Christian monastic life is resulting in a more sympathetic understanding of cloistered vocations as they are now and as they have developed in the Greek and Roman communions. The flourishing liturgical movement which makes the Catholic Church in France and Germany the admiration of thoughtful Catholics the world over is doing much to show Protestants that the Roman Church has not forgotten the principle of the universal priesthood of all believers and is growing out of the ghetto mentality created by the Reformation and the necessarily rigid definitions of Trent.

Much has been said in these pages about the political influences which encouraged or hindered the irenic projects which have been discussed. In many cases notice has been taken of the political influences and their incidental relationship to the whole picture. This may leave a false impression of the seventeenth century where any plan for church reunion first had to search out the temper of the territorial prince whereby the plan stood or fell. This necessitates bringing into more precise perspective the relationship between church unity and politics than has hitherto been done. The manner of thinking of the territorial princes of Brunswick has already been sufficiently outlined. The purpose of this chapter is, then, to bring into focus the connection between the general irenic trends already discussed and the politics of the era. This can best be done by a brief consideration of the most powerful sovereigns concerned, the Pope, the King of France, and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

A. INNOCENT XI (1676-1689)

Benedetto Odescalchi was a model pontiff in his private and public life. He opposed religious persecution and was much more fearful of the Gallican Church than of the Huguenots.⁴ He was, in no way, pleased with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, probably the most serious blow to irenicism within the limits of the century. He made his displeasure evident in his intimate circle.⁵ His lack of agreement with the Revocation was known in France where Vauban cited him as one of the staunchest opponents of this ill-guided move.⁶ On Camus, Archbishop of Grenoble Westminster, 1947, has given us a work of great illumination of the Hebraic origins of the Mass.

⁴ Gérin, Charles, *Le Pape Innocent XI etc.*, *Revue des Questions Historiques* 20: 387, 1878. When in 1683 Cardinal Sachetti praised the increasing number of conversions in France, the Pope remarked, "Che importa di dimolire tanti tempîi, se sono tutti i vescovi schismatici. Faranno come in Inghilterra?"

⁵ *Ibid.*, 418. Gérin holds that Christina of Sweden wished the Pope to condemn the revocation at once, but he refused, saying that such a condemnation would bring greater evils than the persecutions, themselves.

⁶ Vauban (ed. Read), *Pour le Rappel des Huguenots*, IIe Réflexion, *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme*

who had protested the restrictions placed on the Protestants, the Pope bestowed the purple.⁷ He congratulated the King, but not at once, on the revocation. The Edict of Revocation (Fontainebleau) was promulgated in September and it was not until November 13, 1685, that a congratulatory letter arrived from the Pope.⁸ It is known that Queen Christina, a personal friend and pensioner of Innocent, was violently opposed to the revocation, and Klopp conjectures, probably not without partial justification, that the Supreme Pontiff shared the opinions of the Swedish Queen on this matter.⁹

The pontiff was in general severe with himself and his household.¹⁰ His nephew was so neglected that the Romans began to say that the unhappiest man in the world was Livio Odescalchi. Despite this, the Pope's thought was fired by charity. His private wealth was used to recoup the treasury of the Papal States. Whatever money was needed by a Christian prince for the defense of Europe against the Turk, it was Innocent XI who provided it.

The principal diplomatic aim of his reign was the formation of a league of Christian princes and the declaration of a crusade against the Moslems. By 1680 the Grand Vizir of the Sublime Port, Kara Mustapha, had supervised the taking of Candia and Dalmatia and his troops were entrenched in Hungary and were threatening the realm of the Holy Roman Emperor. With this situation in mind it is not difficult to see why the Pope wished a league between France and the empire for the defense of Christendom.¹¹ In September of 1676 during the first year of his pontificate, Innocent pleaded with Louis to grant the Habsburg a truce, cease his depredations in the Rhine area and turn his armies against the common enemy. Almost at the same moment of the papal appeal, Louis' ambassador in Warsaw induced John III (Sobieski) to conclude a peace with the Turkish invaders. This, of course, simply freed the Turkish armies for a concerted attack upon the empire.¹²

The Holy League, composed of all those parts of the empire for which Leopold I could actually answer, Poland and Venice and concluded in 1684, was not a

français 38: 204, 1899. "Le Pape Innocent XI prit si peu de part aux conversions des Huguenots, qu'il y a beaucoup d'apparence que son successeur n'en prendra pas davantage à leur rappel."

⁷ Pastor, *History of the popes* (translated by Graf), 341-342, London, 1950. See also Barozzi and Berchet, *Le Relazioni degli stati Europei lette al Senato degli ambasciatori* (Venice), 3 v., 3 (Francia): 468, Venice, 1857-1863. See also Max Immich, *Papst Innocenz XI*, 64-65, Berlin, 1911.

⁸ Lünig, *Litterae procerum Europae* 3: 126, Leipzig, 1713. Cf. Gérin, *op. cit.*, 429-430.

⁹ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 3: 104-105.

¹⁰ F. de Bojani, *Innocent XI, Sa correspondance avec ses nonces* 1: 14, Rome, 1510-1512.

¹¹ Immich, *op. cit.*, 14-15.

¹² Gérin, *La disgrâce de M. de Pomponne*, *Revue des Questions Historiques* 23: 14, 1878.

peripheral part of the pontifical policy but the very essence of it. He never ceased to exhort the princes of Europe to put an end to their internecine strife and his strongest appeals were generally directed toward the realm of France whence came his smallest success. Louis XIV was the Pope's most formidable enemy because the King was not only the leader of a strong and restless national Church, but also the proponent of a foreign policy which resulted, for the most part, in the vitiation of the Pope's designs. The details of this relationship with Louis XIV can best be considered under the policies of that monarch and their effects upon church reunion projects. For the time being suffice it to say that Innocent XI did achieve the defeat of the Turks by way of the Holy League, but it was in spite of France that this was accomplished.¹³

From the beginning of his pontificate Innocent was at swords points with the French King. Louis, the young and ambitious prince of a strong kingdom bulwarked by Gallican sentiments, was a real menace to the papacy. The ignominy which the French King caused to be showered upon Rome we shall presently see. At the moment it is apropos to glance at the relations between the chief French irenicist, Bossuet, and the Pope.

A survey has already been made of the main characteristics of Bossuet's Gallicanism. As a Gallican he was a powerful auxiliary to Louis' anti-papal policy. The Bishop surely did not oppose Rome on doctrinal grounds, but he was a Gallican and a Gelasian and where matters lay and spiritual were in question, if it was not clearly a matter of faith or dogma, then Bossuet was a supporter of the King. Such was the case in 1682 when the Bishop composed the Four Articles. He was probably loath to see the principles comprising the Four Articles come to a test between King and Pope, but he saw nothing in them contrary to the truths of the Roman Church. Nay, he viewed them as the very expression of the truth, itself. The Four Articles cannot be condemned in light of conditions at that time, since the most controversial point, the questioning of papal infallibility (Article IV), was not proclaimed a dogma until 1870. The most unhappy thing about the Four Articles and Bossuet's support of them is the fact that it was just at that moment (1682-1683) that Rojas, with the tacit consent of the Pope, was about to open negotiations for bringing northern Germany back to the Roman communion.¹⁴ This unfortunate concatenation of events may be regretted, but it cannot be altered, least of all by the historian. The only wisdom which may be drawn from the situation is that when Rome is ready for reunion and demonstrates her willingness to work toward that end, Catholics in every part of the world should be prepared to surrender local

interests as best they can and act with their Catholic brethren, who are similarly minded, in all other parts of the world.

Bossuet was a victim of his time and place as, indeed, all human beings are to a lesser or greater degree. Given his background, breeding, training, and his position at court, it is surprising that he acted as independently as he did in many cases. His correspondence with Molanus and later with Leibniz indicates that he believed in keeping up the dialogue and, if any apology be needed for his loyalty to the Holy See, one need but read his "Sermon sur l'Unité de l'Eglise" and remark the favor with which Innocent XI received his *Exposition*. Bossuet's program for training the Dauphin was highly approved by the Pope and there was no opposition to his being created Bishop of Meaux.¹⁵ Three days before the opening session of the Clerical Assembly which was to formulate the Four Articles, Bossuet wrote to Rome concerning the papal corroboration of his appointment to the Diocese of Meaux. No language could be more abject.¹⁶

In brief there were nominal good relations between Rome and Meaux. The Bishop was never regarded at Rome as an irenical figure except by way of his *Exposition*. If anything, he was considered with some suspicion and probably because of this never became cardinal. Ultramontane influence made Gallicanism almost as objectionable as Protestantism at Rome during the seventeenth century. The Pope usually saw in Gallicanism a dangerous force and Bossuet, as the representative of Gallicanism, could never be considered a "safe" man. During his long career he never once went to Rome. His provincialism was like that of the modern Frenchman. He saw no need to leave the finest land in Christendom, for all that could satisfy

¹⁵ Urbain and E. Levesque, Bossuet, *Correspondance* 2: 257-258, Paris, 1906-1912. Innocent to Bossuet, Sept. 24, 1681. "Venerabilis Frater, s. et a. b. Animo sane perlibenti remisimus Fraternitate tuae jura quae pro expeditione Ecclesiae Meldensis, ad quam promovendus es, exsolvere debuisses. Praeclara enim ingenii tui monumenta, ingentiaque merita, quae in excolenda praestantissimis artibus ac disciplinis lectissimi Principis Ludovici Galliae Delphini eximia indole, apud Christianam rempublicam tibi comparasti, prorsus id a nobis reposcere videbantur, cum praesertim speremus te, pro perspecta pietate ac virtute tua, eamdem Ecclesiam magno cum animarum fructu administratum."

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 2: 265-266. Bossuet to Innocent XI, Paris, Nov. 6, 1681. "En iterum ad me pulverem et cinerem ab alta Petri Sede paterna vox, omni reverentia gratiae animi significatione prosequenda. Me vero jam excipiat Meldensis Ecclesia tanti Pontificis gratia et beneficiis illustratum, totque firmissimus Sedis apostolicae munitum praesidiis. Neque enim alia sub coelo est potestas, sanctissime Pontifex, qua metuendum angelis pastoralis officii onus sublevetur, et copiosior volentes per populos evangelicae praedicationis decurrat gratia. In partem ergo vocandus sollicitudinis, plenitudinem potestas omni obsequio venerabor, et, Romanae matris affixus uberibus, lac certe hauriam parvulis propinandum, tantumque Pastorem Principi assiduus precibus commendabo. Accedat apostolica benedictio, vestrisque pedibus advolutum beet, Beatissime Pater, Vestrae Sancitatis devotissimum filium et famulum."

¹³ Immich, *Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems von 1660-1789*, 117, Munich and Berlin, 1905.

¹⁴ Gérin, *Recherches historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de 1682*, Paris, 1868.

his desires was there. His *Exposition* was a powerful weapon for the papacy, but his real fame at Rome rested upon his polemical works such as the *Variations des Eglises Protestantes* and his scorching attack upon the Quietists.

Rojas' career in light of his relations with Innocent XI is somewhat different. From the early days of his pontificate the Pope simply accepted Rojas as the chief negotiator for religious peace in Germany. Buonvisi, the nuncio at Vienna, in 1676 had learned from his predecessor of Rojas' activity and Buonvisi had, in turn, transmitted his information to Rome.¹⁷ The nuncio, one of the most expert Italian diplomats of the era, regarded Rojas as an eminently useful instrument in furthering the Pope's dream of an alliance of Christian princes against the Turk and as a subtle diplomatic agent who could restore peace among German Christians with his plans for church unity.¹⁸

Innocent XI was not free to act on Rojas' proposals. The height of the Gallican crisis (1682) came just as Rojas arrived at some very important agreements with the German princes and theologians. The Pope wished, at any price, to avoid schism with France. He showed as much courtesy and generosity toward Leopold I and the Bishop as he possibly could. An open espousal of the religious or political aims of the empire would have caused serious trouble in France and might have resulted in a pattern of events comparable to those in England under Henry VIII. Besides, the Pope had great hopes that Louis XIV would see the error of his ways and become a real bulwark against the enemies of Christendom in the East.

The Cardinal Secretary of State, Alderano Cibo, was in the pay of the French. Cardinal d'Estrées and his brother in Rome kept sharp watch to see that nothing would be done contrary to their real master, the King of France. D'Estrées advised the Pope to send Rojas away with a sharp rebuke. In 1684 the Pope actually wrote the Emperor and made it clear that the Holy See favored the ideas of Rojas, but that Rome could give no official support because of the French faction.¹⁹ In Berlin, Rébenac, the French ambassador to the Electoral Court from 1684 to 1688, exerted all his influence to counteract the Rojas plans for Germany.²⁰

The Pope might pray for the success of reunion in Germany but he could give no official stamp to that matter. He could help and did help by permitting his

subordinates to interest themselves in the project as much as they possibly could, but formal confirmation he could not possibly give.²¹ Rojas had to act under his own name and scrupulously avoid any mention of the Supreme Pontiff. Innocent XI was, however, much concerned with the fate of the irenic movement. As an important testimonial to his personal interest in the matter he decreed in 1684 that the anathemas of Trent should no longer be read on certain public occasions, as had theretofore been done. He wrote to the Emperor that all things possible should be done "ad viam concordiae cum principibus acatholicis faciliorem quoquo modo sternendam."²² It is not without importance that the Pope spoke of dealing with princes rather than with Protestant peoples! Irenicism, like government in the seventeenth century, was no concern of the masses.

The most effective French agent at Rome was Cardinal d'Estrées. He was assisted by his brother, the Duke d'Estrées, who was the permanent French ambassador at Rome, but the Cardinal was more powerful than his brother. The Cardinal declared the ideas of Rojas incompatible with the purity of the Catholic faith. In a dispatch to the French Court on July 10, 1684, he held forth on the vicious character of the Bishop's designs.

I discovered that this Bishop of Tina, who proposed such plausible means for the reunion of the Protestants to the Holy See, after having flattered the Pope in a three hour audience on the admiration which the heretics have for the [pontiff] (just the same way Capara assures him the Turks are full of veneration for his person), obtained from His Holiness an examining committee (*congrégation*) for his propositions. . . . This committee met two times with Cardinal Ottoboni in great secret. . . . I could not refrain from saying to Cardinal Cibo that the whole Church would be scandalized, if people knew that the Pope not only desired to give ear to such a project, but ordered that there be discussions about it. I also told him that it would not redound to the honor of the Holy See to give any lengthy support to this affair and that they ought to make an end to it and send back the mediator with a sharp rebuke.²³

Such was the French attitude. Michaud, the hopelessly nationalistic historian of relations between Louis XIV and Innocent XI, contends that certain propositions entitled "Articuli fidei praecipui ad unionem utriusque ecclesiae romano-catholicae et lutheranae" were condemned by the Congregation of the Inquisition on August 30, 1685, but he only conjectures that these propositions were identical with the Rojas proposals. More significantly still, he does not explain how Rojas was able to become Bishop of Weiner Neustadt in 1686 and pursue his aims so vigorously in Hungary in subsequent years while under

¹⁷ Levinson, A., *Nuntiaturberichte vom Kaiserhofe Leopolds I*, *Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte* 106: 702, Vienna, 1913 and 1915, document 235. Buonvisi's opinion to Rome, Vienna, October 10, 1677.

¹⁸ Sayous, *Le Cardinal Buonvisi nonce du pape, et la croisade de Bude, 1684-1686*, *Sciences et Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 31: 254, 1885.

¹⁹ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 1: 98. See also Berthier, J. J., *Innocentii PP. XI Epistolae ad Principes* 2: 183-184, Rome, 1891-1895.

²⁰ Kiefl, *op. cit.*, 120.

²¹ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: preface, pp. xvii-xix. See also Haselbeck, *op. cit.*, 89.

²² Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 2: 21.

²³ Michaud, E., *Innocent XI et Louis XIV* 4: 483, Paris, 1882-1883. Quoted in Michaud from *Correspondance de Rome* 290: 257-293.

the watchful eyes of the Inquisition. It seems incredible, had the Pope been actually hostile to Rojas, that the Bishop would have had the honor of preferment from both Rome and Vienna.

As long as Innocent XI lived, Rome and its dependents did many things in support of Rojas' life work. Alexander VIII and Innocent XII were French-minded.²⁴ They had little concern for church reunion in Germany. During the brief pontificate of Alexander VIII, the Cardinal Secretary of State was not once aware that the Bishop of Tina and the Bishop of Wiener Neustadt were one and the same person.²⁵ In 1693 Innocent XII secured a qualified retraction of the Four Articles. Conditions then were favorable for reunion on a European scale. However, the Pope had no active interest and Rojas' personal efforts to call a conference of Protestant and Catholic theologians at Frankfurt had come to nothing and he was unable because of age and illness to go to Rome to present his case in person.

With the accession of Clement XI in 1700, the papal throne was once again occupied by a man favorable to the empire rather than to France. The Pontiff took up the cause of the Archduke Charles of Austria and supported his candidacy to the Spanish kingdom in such a way that it brought nothing but discredit to the Pope. Clement renewed the efforts for conversion in Germany and enlisted the assistance of Bossuet who submitted the "De Professoribus Confessionis Augustanae ad repetendam unitatem catholicam disponendis"²⁶ for the Pope's consideration in 1701. The purpose of the document was to present Catholicism in such a light that the Duke of Saxe-Gotha would adopt the Roman religion. The Pope's aims were much more limited than those of Innocent XI and not much came of this project.

Clement XI gave his support with great joy to the diplomatic negotiations for the conversion of individual

²⁴ Immich, *Papst Innocenz XI*, 2. Immich considers the death of Innocent to be a major turning point in European affairs, "Das Jahr 1688, das Jahr vor dem Tode Papst Innocenz XI. bildete den entscheidenden Wendepunkt. Es eröffnete einen neuen Abschnitt europäischer Politik, der sich bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts erstreckte und durch den Niedergang Frankreichs und die Herstellung und Aufrechterhaltung des Gleichgewichts der Mächte gekennzeichnet wird. . . . Und alle diese denkwürdigen Begebenheiten hatten das eine mit einander gemeinsam, dass sie die römische Kurie in stärksten Grade in Mitleidenschaft zogen. Die Suprematie Frankreichs, die Trennung der französischen Kirche von der Hierarchie, die Ausrottung der Ketzer, die Besetzung des Kölner Erzbistums und der Ausschluss des katholischen Herrscherhauses vom englischen Thron berührten die Interessen des heiligen Stuhles nicht weniger als die Vorgänge im südöstlichen Europa, die Unterwerfung der protestantischen ungarischen Rebellen unter das Haus Österreich und der mit lebhaftem Eifer und ungeahntem Erfolge unternommene Kampf der abendländischen Christenheit gegen die Ungläubigen. Triumph und Niederlage der römischen Kirche scheinen in gleichem Grade mit dem Pontifikat Innocenz XI. verknüpft zu sein."

²⁵ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 2: 90.

²⁶ Bossuet, *Œuvres complètes* 18: 1-53.

Protestant princes, even as far as the Court of the Tsar. But he never seriously entered upon the path of reunion in an all-embracing way, because in it he saw no real prospects for success.²⁷

B. MARS CHRISTIANISSIMUS

Rome was definitely favorable to irenic trends during the pontificates of Innocent XI (1676-1689) and Clement XI (1700-1721). The intermediate pontiffs, Alexander VIII (1689-1691) and Innocent XII (1691-1700), were, if no active supporters of the trends, not hostile but indifferent. The real foe of church reunion is to be seen in the person of Louis XIV. In his domestic policy, by the quarrel over the *Régale*, the storm produced by the Clerical Assembly of 1682, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Sun King gave the papacy constant trouble and made any full-scale adjustment of political and religious factors quite impossible. In foreign policy Louis' activities in Germany and his relations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks contributed more than any other combination of factors to Rojas' failure to achieve anything positive from his activities.

Directly related to the problems of the *Régale* and the Clerical Assembly of 1682 is the whole matter of European irenicism. The principles of 1682 were generally thought of by Protestants as being a bridge between Protestants and Catholics in that they took away from the

. . . ministers of the R.P.R. the pretext which they take from the books of some authors for rendering odious the legitimate power of the visible head of the Church and the center of ecclesiastical unity.²⁸

Leibniz for one hoped that the French Church would bridge the gap between the extremes on both sides and William Wake as Archbishop of Canterbury in the early part of the eighteenth century expressed similar views in his correspondence with the Sorboniste Ellies Du Pin.²⁹

From the irenic point of view the examination of Louis' quarrels with the Pope and his machinations in European politics leads to these conclusions. Both influential Protestants and Catholics in the seventeenth century had a tendency to see in Gallicanism a possible compromise between Romans and non-Romans. In actual fact it proved to be just the opposite. The papacy, frightened that worse schism than that which already existed would result from being too adamant in the face of the demands made by the French King, refrained from giving full support to any comprehensive program of church reunion, notably to that of Rojas, because such support might have resulted in a perma-

²⁷ Kiefl, *op. cit.*, 127.

²⁸ Hanotaux, G., *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française* 4(II): 78, Rome and Paris, 1883. Instructions to the Duc de Chaulnes, 1689-1691.

²⁹ Sykes, Norman, *William Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury*, 2 v., Cambridge, 1957. Cf. vol. 1, particularly chapter IV.

nent schism between France and Rome. It is doubtful, in light of what is now known, that Louis could have been driven into schism, but the important factor in the seventeenth century was that the Court of Rome thought he might.

Second only to Gallicanism in its malign influence upon church unity is the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Hearts and minds were prepared for reunion by the groundwork of Rojas, Leibniz, and Molanus, and the cooperation of the House of Brunswick in Germany. The Pope was sympathetic. Even in England a Catholic king with absolutist convictions showed moderation during the initial months of his reign (February to November, 1685) and it is possible that a policy of moderation on the continent might have made it possible for England to be drawn into the continental church union movement. In any event Rojas was invited to England by the King to see what could be done there to bring different religious groups to a more reasonable point of view.³⁰ Nothing came of the invitation but it serves to show how widespread was the intelligence of what Rojas had been doing.

It is fairly obvious that union by force in France was an insane step in the eyes of the few who hoped for religious accommodation in Christendom. On the other hand there were few in the seventeenth century who considered the French Monarch as having gone beyond his legitimate power. Those responsible for the Edict of Fontainebleau can be assigned to the number of unfortunates who, in all ages, have distorted the Gospel and interpreted the Augustinian maxim *compelle intrare* in its most rigoristic sense. The perpetrators of the revocation Edict probably did as much harm to the cause of irenicism and the peace of Christ's Church as did the most iconoclastic revolutionaries of the sixteenth century.

As we know, it is difficult to fix the blame for the revocation. In a general way it is better to avoid attempting to fix personal responsibility and blame it on principles instead. It may be said that *raison d'état*, supported by a school of politico-theological thought (Gallicanism) and a monarch who assumed the role of God, probably saw a means of mollifying the papacy and destroying an internal source of resistance at one blow.³¹ As the Habsburgs drove the Turks back along the Danube, Louis and his advisers saw the French *Eroberungspolitik* cracking. They determined upon the extermination of the Huguenots as a counter to the Austrian defeat of the Turks and the pacification policy toward the Protestants which Leopold I had begun at the Diet of Ödenburg in 1681 and which was carried forward by his representative, the then Bishop of Tina.³² Louis XIV did not, probably could not, rise above

the current. He was offended that the Pope did not fall down and worship him for the Revocation.³³ But the King was as much a victim of the system as any of his counsellors. The French state was to be preserved at any cost and if its preservation depended upon harrying the Huguenots out of the land, so much the better, for in this act there seemed to be complete harmony between divine and human purpose.³⁴

The effects of the Edict of Fontainebleau were widespread. Catholics of a wise and moderate mind protested this unnecessary outrage. Le Camus and Vauban in France,³⁵ the Pope, Queen Christina of Sweden, and Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels³⁶ were opposed and shocked by the violence done the Protestants. The ordinary Catholics rejoiced as the masses of any adherence do at any violence, and the ordinary Protestants, of course, simply considered it a continuation of the policy which had produced the Catholic reaction in Bohemia on the eve of the Thirty Years War and the

³³ Gérin, Innocent etc. 20: 420, 1878. Dispatch to d'Estrées at Rome, November 1, 1685. "Si la conversion d'un si grand nombre de mes sujets de la R.P.R. et la juste esperance que j'ai de donner dans peu la dernière perfection à ce grand ouvrage, n'est pas capable de desiller les yeux de Sa Sainteté, on ne doit plus attendre qu'aucune insinuation étrangère lui puisse faire convenir que, comme notre religion ne peut troubler son agrandissement que dans la puissante protection qu'elle reçoit de moi et dans le bon exemple que je donne à tous les princes chrétiens de ce qu'ils ont à faire pour ce sujet dans leurs Etats." See also Londorp, *Acta Publica weltlicher Stände Khur-Fürsten Gräfen, Herren und Städte* 14: 346-347, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1708, where a letter from Louis to d'Estrées is quoted in German. The King never felt secure with Innocent XI on the papal throne because of what he considered to be an excessively friendly policy toward Germany on the part of the pontiff. Louis wrote to d'Estrées in 1688 with regard to this. "Se. Heiligkeit mag auch wohl glauben dass ohngeachtet des attachements so ich vor den H. Stuhl habe und allezeit haben werde, ich mich doch nicht länger enthalten kan die Beschaffenheit des Hauptes der Kirchen von der Beschaffenheit eines weltlichen Printzen zu unterscheiden der sich öffentliche meiner Feinde Interesse annimmt."

³⁴ Barozzi and Berchet, *op. cit.* 3: (Francia) 466-468. The Venetian Ambassador Venier in a letter to his government states very clearly that the edict of Revocation was designed to restore French favor with the curia. "Doleva l'ozie in tempo che tanti principi erano in azione per la christianita e che la Francia era in acri dispute colla corte di Roma, onde irritata l'ambizione e svegliato un emulo desiderio a far qualche cosa di grande per la religione, si impegno la corona alla distruzione totale degli Ugonotti."

³⁵ Vauban (Read), *op. cit.* 38: 186, 1889.

³⁶ Ernst wrote to Arnauld, "Quant à la persecution que depuis quelque temps on fait souffrir en France aux Huguenots, je vous dirai que pour moi qui suis comme vous savez de la sentence qu'au christianisme il n'est pas licite d'user de la rigueur externe pour contraindre les consciences et leur ôter consequemment l'exercice au moins en privé de leur religion, vous pouvez aisement penser et faire votre comte que donc je me saurais guere approuver de telles methodes et voies violentes desquelles on se sert contre eux, qu'en cas pareil nous ne voudrions pas qu'on fit à nous et, autant que je me connais ès histoires de France et à l'état des choses du temps, quand l'édit de Nantes fut fait." Ernst to Arnauld, ed. by G. Lewis in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques* 35: 425, 1951.

³⁰ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 3: 200.

³¹ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 6: 232 and 3: 89.

³² Prutz, Hans, Die Köhlner Wahl und Frankreichs Friedensbruch 1688, *Historisches Taschenbuch*, 6, Folge, 9, Jahrgang, 165, 1890.

Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Eve. The exceptional Protestants such as Leibniz were horrified and cruelly disappointed that France, the golden *via media* to church unity, had now become a land in which church reunion, except by force, was but a prayerful memory. It was a death blow to the irenical movement which had shown much promise between 1678 and 1683. The German Protestant princes were alarmed at the desperate things perpetrated against the Huguenots and the émigrés to other lands did not fail to advertise the fact that there could be no compromise with the dragonnades. Within Germany irenical plans proceeded much as before, but the Revocation made it utterly impossible to enlist the aid and example of France in a reunion plan which would include all of Europe.³⁷

French foreign policy was no less disastrous to the peace of Europe and Christendom than the internal policy of the French King. Louis' insatiable ambitions in Germany, his traditional policy of friendship with the Sublime Porte, his subventions to the rebellious subjects of Leopold, and his nearly successful alienation of Sobieski from the Imperial Crown were all part of the timeless Bourbon-Hapsburg rivalry. Between 1679 and 1700 the French preponderance on the continent and in the Mediterranean upset any balance that might have resulted in peaceful political conditions, forced the Pope to temper support of ecclesiastical reunion and opened the way to what might have been a disastrous Turkish advance which would have overrun the whole of Germany.

After the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) France emerged as the strongest nation in Europe and its monarch was considered the *arbiter rerum* of European affairs.³⁸ It possessed a nobility which rejoiced in war as its metier and was eager for that dangerous ideal known as *la gloire*. It was a divided Germany which provided the chief playground for these diverse elements. The death of Ferdinand III (1657) occasioned the first French influence seriously felt in the empire after the Peace of Westphalia. At the Diet held at Regensburg for the election of the new emperor, French money bought German consciences right and left and it was thought threats and corruption had gained what was presumed to be a majority of the Electors for France. The German princes sold themselves at high prices, however, and Mazarin, still in charge of affairs, was hard put to it to discover money enough to satisfy their poverty and their greed.³⁹ Moreover, the Electors finally proved true to their German character and elected Leopold of Habsburg in preference to the French King.

³⁷ The letters of Sophia of Brunswick to Leibniz while she was in Berlin, fall of 1688, describe her reaction to the Revocation. See Leibniz, *S. S.*, first ser., 5: 222.

³⁸ For a good study of French diplomacy see Picavet, C. G., *La diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV*, Paris, 1930.

³⁹ Valfrey, J., *La diplomatie française au xviii^e siècle*, 84-85, Paris, 1881.

At the Peace of Nymegen (1679) Louis emerged supreme. From this date on Germany was in real danger from France. The French speeded up the Richelieu-Mazarin policy of Gallic hegemony on the Rhine and there followed the seizure of the free, imperial city of Strasbourg and other areas in Alsace which had formerly provided an entree for German troops into France.⁴⁰ Early in 1683 Denmark and Brandenburg were brought anew into the French orbit and Louis concentrated troops in Alsace and on the Flemish frontier precisely at the moment Kara Mustapha was advancing up the Danube on Vienna⁴¹ and exactly at the time Rojas and the German Protestants had come to a working agreement on church reunion.

It was not only the bellicose Rhineland policy and the corruption of the German princes which threatened the religious and civil peace of the empire. The design of French politics hemmed in the Habsburgs from Poland south to Turkey. The avowed aim of French agents in this area was systematically to undermine the power of the Emperor and, if possible, make local kings Gallic puppets. The concept of Christendom in the minds of French politicians was completely subordinate to *Staatsraison*.

The Hungarian revolt against the Emperor is an extremely complex thing. All that can be done is indicate the main directions it took under French influence. The basis of German trouble in Hungary developed along these lines. The Emperor, like all contemporary princes, was attempting to consolidate his states politically and religiously under an ordered and centralized administration dominated by Austrian Germans or a supra-national civil service to which P. W. Hörnigk and Rojas belonged. The Hungarians resented this keenly and in their deep-seated resentment toward German rule they found an ally in Louis XIV. From 1665 the Zrinji and Rakoczy families, who represented Hungarian patriot spirit more than any others, were subsidized by Grémonville, the French ambassador in Vienna.⁴²

In 1671 a serious conspiracy against the imperial government was discovered and crushed with lamentable results. The Protestants who were deeply involved suffered cruelly from Viennese reprisals. As a result there appeared a national hero in the person of Emery Tököly who led an army of rebellion composed of both Catholics and Protestants, supplied with funds by the emissaries of Louis XIV.⁴³ Louis had no desire

⁴⁰ Platzhoff, W., Ludwig XIV das Kaisertum und die europäische Krisis von 1683, *Historische Zeitschrift* 121: 377, 1920. See also G. Zeller, Politique extérieure et diplomatie sous Louis XIV, *Revue d'histoire moderne* 6: 135-136, 1931.

⁴¹ Platzhoff, *op. cit.*, 401.

⁴² Baumstark, R., *Kaiser Leopold*, 112, Freiburg, 1873.

⁴³ Flassan, Gaetan de Raxis, *Histoire générale de la diplomatie française* 4: 57, Paris, 1811. There exists a letter from Pallavicini, the nuncio in Warsaw in 1683 which illuminates the manner in which the French payments were made. See Augustin Sauer, *Rom und Wien im Jahre 1683*, 172, Vienna,

to subsidize a popularly led movement in Hungary but he was not loath to give assistance on other occasions, when political expediency dictated, to an enemy of the Emperor, whether it be Protestant, Catholic, Christian, or Turk.⁴⁴

By 1681 Leopold had seen the folly of using force in Hungary and he reestablished the constitutional freedoms of the Magyars at the Diet of Ödenburg and permitted the practice of the Protestant religion in certain specifically designated portions of western Hungary.⁴⁵ At the same time Rojas was journeying from court to court in Germany to sound out opinion there on the possibilities for settling religious difficulties. It is not hard to see that the Diet of Ödenburg and Rojas' diplomacy in Germany were coordinated in Vienna. France was the immediate cause of the failure of both these moves. Tököly was kept in money in Hungary by the French and at Rome d'Estrées was sowing seeds of suspicion about the Bishop's maneuvers. Louis persecuted Protestants at home, subsidized them in Hungary, and stood directly across the path of reunion in Germany. It has already been observed how Vienna was informed that the French faction kept the Curia from openly supporting Rojas' plans.⁴⁶ Louis, himself, held the Rojas negotiations to have no other end than "to entertain the Protestant princes of Germany and Hungary by vain hopes of finding *media* suitable for the conciliation of religions."⁴⁷

The imperial and papal interest in church reunion did not diminish as the Moslems drew near Vienna, but it naturally took second place to the immediate problem of Vienna's defense. Here again the blame falls upon France for obstructing not only church re-

union, but also the defense of western Europe. France, since the days of Francis I, had had some sort of alliance with Constantinople. The protection of its national commerce in the Mediterranean was an integral part of French foreign policy and this, of course, entailed a constant interchange of ambassadors and diplomatic courtesies. This was carried somewhat further when Louis' ambassador in 1681 suggested to the Grand Vizir a dual action against the empire from east and west simultaneously. This was not Louis' personal wish, however. He scrupulously refrained from giving anything in writing to the Turkish government so that it could not be said of him that the Most Christian King had allied himself with the Infidel at this crucial time. But the King's policy was, nonetheless, a fatal one. It was reasoned in the King's council that it would be better for the Habsburg lands and Germany to fall prey to the Turk than for Austria to start another war—a real sophism in view of the fact that Mars Christianissimus had proved the most bellicose monarch Europe had seen for many years. It was also France's policy to alienate any country, be it Transylvania, Hungary, or Poland, as soon as there was the slightest hint that an alliance with Austria was in view. It seemed, too, that as French money and *agents provocateurs* grew even more numerous, the greater became the danger to the Danubian Christian civilization with the Moslem invasion.⁴⁸

The main problem from the French point of view was this. How was it possible to keep Germany down by using the Turks as a perpetual menace and yet escape the odium of being responsible for a full-scale Turkish invasion of Europe? This problem the King never satisfactorily solved because its integral parts were mutually contradictory and the lack of a solution resulted in a policy which kept Vienna and Rome in desperate fear throughout 1682 and 1683. In March, 1682, French troops were withdrawn from Luxemburg with the announcement that this was to give the empire and Spain freedom to act in defense of Europe's eastern frontier, but Louis wrote on April 8, 1682, to Guilleragues, his ambassador at Constantinople, as follows:

I want to tell you for your particular information that, although I wished very much to have it believed that the resolution which I took to assure peace in the Low Countries, in having my troops withdrawn from the environs of Luxemburg and in agreeing to the arbitration of the King of England on the differences which remain between me and Spain, I had no other motive than to permit the Emperor and the princes to defend themselves against the Turk; nevertheless, my chief aim was to be able to employ all my forces against the Emperor and the princes of Germany who do not wish to accept the propositions which I have made [namely that the Emperor recognize the legitimacy of the French *Rauberpolitik* along the Rhine].⁴⁹

Innocent XI, aware of the real danger, did all in his power to organize Europe for battle. He secured

1683. Pallavicini to Cardinal Secretary of State, Warsaw, July 14, 1683. John III took steps against the Danzig bankers who handled the subsidies and the nuncio remarks, "Sara da quattro settimane, che da Francia e giunta una rimessa per i rebelli Unghari di sette mila et in oltre dodeci mila Tallari. Così si è scoperto, sendosi intercette nuove lettere; Sara Maesta procura di sopprimere in danaro nel mandarsi, e di far partire di Dansica Monsieur de la Verne, che e l'instrument di questo commercio e communicatione, o vogli passare per Ministro e per privato; ma quel Magistrato difficilmente lo fara partire per timore del commercio, sendo minacciato dalla Francia."

⁴⁴ Picavet, *op. cit.*, 159. Louis wrote to the French ambassador in Warsaw in 1675, "Je vous ai déjà fait connaître . . . mes sentiments sur les mécontents de Hongrie . . . bien que je crusse tirer quelque utilité de nourrir l'inquiétude que l'on en peut avoir à Vienne, ce n'est pas jusques au point, de vouloir soutenir par une grande dépense une guerre . . . aussi peu réglée que le sont d'ordinaire celles qui sont appuyées seulement sur une révolte de peuples."

⁴⁵ Kosáry, D. 1941. A History of Hungary, 131, Cleveland. See also Pastor, *op. cit.* 32: 131-133.

⁴⁶ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 3: 98. Klopp quotes from his edition of Leibniz' works, 7: 123. "Pontifex per Episcopum ore tenus imperatorem de quibusdam gratiis concedendis assecuravit, praecepit tamen, ut interim quasi proprio zelo ageret, factionis gallicae causa." This is taken from Rojas' own account of his trip to Rome in 1684.

⁴⁷ Gérin, Innocent XI etc., 391. Letter from Louis to d'Estrées.

⁴⁸ Platzhoff, *op. cit.*, 404-406.

⁴⁹ Gérin, Innocent XI etc., 114-115.

the alliance of Poland and Sobieski by a cash sum paid to the Polish King, but he still cherished the notion that Louis XIV would also appear at the last minute as a valiant knight to uphold the Pope's cause. With this in mind the Pontiff wrote despairingly to Louis, his Queen, and the Dauphin on August 10, 1683, when Vienna was already beleaguered.

We do not doubt that you, aroused by these poignant feelings of uneasiness [over the siege of Vienna] will hurry to take up the common cause of salvation, which ought to be the concern of all Christian princes, and principally that of the Most Christian King, [and we hope] that you will take up the great work of saving Vienna with all your efforts, and that you will compel this most iniquitous enemy to desist from his undertakings.⁵⁰

Needless to say, the Pope's invitation went unheeded. The French probably had an idea that the Habsburgs were stronger than they actually were and consequently may have anticipated a long siege before Vienna with a last-minute opportunity for France to rush in and pretend to have saved everybody.⁵¹ In any event, on the last day of August, 1683, the Marquis of Grana, Governor of the Spanish Low Countries, was informed that 20,000 foot soldiers and 1,500 cavalry would invade the following day in order to execute a judgment made by the Chamber of Reunion at Metz.⁵² For the next twelve days Vienna's plight was grave. The House of Austria was set upon in the east and the outlook was grim indeed.

The most ironic touch to this situation is that on the day the French attack was launched on the Low Countries and Vienna was in mortal fear, Bossuet, who had done much, but not enough, for church reunion, pronounced the funeral oration of Queen Maria Theresa in Saint Denis. The oration speaks for itself.

Are we touched by the evils of a ravaged and desolate Hungary and Austria? Their inhabitants are given over to the sword and those who die by the sword are happier, for captivity means countless other evils for the body and the soul. These tormented people, are they not Christians and Catholics, our brothers, our own flesh, children of the same Church, and nourished at the same table with the Bread of Life? The word of God will be accomplished. Judgment begins within His house and the remainder of the house does not tremble! Christians, let your hearts be melted, do penance, appease God with your tears.⁵³

If Bossuet could have realized that his Prince was the chief agent of the captivity of Austria and Hungary, he might not have spoken with such conviction!

If Louis did not assist the Christians of central Europe in their severest hour of trial he could scarcely be expected to do much for them with the Turks in

retreat down the Danube. In 1684 he informed his ambassador in Vienna, Comte de Cheverny, that he would not consider himself at peace with the Austrians until the Emperor and the empire accepted a twenty-year truce which meant that his conquests in Luxembourg, Lorraine, Alsace, and the Franche-Comté would be recognized as legitimate. He refused any help whatsoever to the forces fighting the Crescent. Nay, he even commanded his ambassador "to look sharply that nothing be given in writing nor even by way of mouth that would enable the Court of Vienna . . . to make peace with the Turks, a thing which at present is the most pressing desire of that Court."⁵⁴

Louis's demands were met at the Truce of Regensburg (1684). The Emperor was in no position to bargain with his army, or the greater part of it, occupied along the Danube.⁵⁵ But the French king was not yet content. The succession in the Palatinate was in question. In 1685 Charles, Elector Palatine, died without male issue and the Duke of Neuburg, Philip William, father-in-law of Leopold I, took possession of the heritage. Louis protested in the name of the Duchess of Orleans, Elizabeth, the only child of the previous elector, and threatened to take possession in her name. Ranuzzi, the nuncio at Versailles, assured Cibo that the King had nothing but the most peaceful intentions,⁵⁶ but every act of the King belied this judgment and confirmed the opinion, held in the empire in general by this time, that Most Christian Mars would be content with no limits to his conquests.

What could have been the most pernicious policy of France with regard to the safety of central European Christianity was the attempt to keep the Poles in leading strings and give the Emperor, in addition to the Moslems, another formidable eastern enemy. Happily the King's envoys, the Marquis de Vitry and the Bishop of Beauvais, Forbin-Janson, failed completely in their efforts, largely by underestimating the cupidity of John

⁵⁴ Sorel, Albert, ed., *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs de France*, 101, Paris, 1889.

⁵⁵ Immich, *Nuntiaturberichte etc.*, 21-22. Ranuzzi to Cibo, October 15, 1685. From the contents of this letter it seems that Ranuzzi was equally as unaware as Bossuet of what was really taking place in the King's councils.

⁵⁶ Vandal, Albert, Louis XIV et l'Égypte, *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 31: 283-284. Vandal shows how the French profited economically from the Austrian advance against the Turks. "La France fut plus heureuse dans ses tentatives pour fortifier sa position sur les bords du Nil, ou les autres nations n'avaient point encore reparu. Des 1683, la Porte avait consenti à la réduction des droits de douane de 20 à 3%, en restreignant ce privilège aux seuls français; ce succès capital fut accompagné de beaucoup d'autres. Pendant les années 1686 et 1687, marquées pour les Turcs par de nouveaux désastres en Hongrie, le Divan se laisse arracher une série de concessions en faveur de nos marchands du Caire et d'Alexandrie; il rend en un jour jusqu'à onze firmans destinés à améliorer leur sort, et l'ensemble des actes émanés de la Porte durant cette période compose ce que l'on pourrait appeler la charte d'affranchissement de notre nation aux d'Égypte."

⁵⁰ Berthier, *op. cit.* 1: 116. Innocent XI to Louis XIV. The letters to the Queen and the Dauphin carry essentially the same message.

⁵¹ Platzhoff, *op. cit.*, 408-409.

⁵² E. Lavissee, *Histoire de France* 4(ii): 361, Paris, 1911.

⁵³ Bossuet, *Œuvres complètes*, Oraison funèbre de Marie-Thérèse d'Autriche, 11: 532.

Sobieski and his French Queen, Mary Casimira.⁵⁷ On March 1, 1683, the Polish King, by his personal interference, cowed the Diet and paved the way for an alliance with the Emperor. It was this alliance which put new fire into the defense of Vienna and probably resulted in the lifting of the siege on September 12, 1683.

French diplomacy in Poland, in addition to being based on the ability to buy out one's enemy, was established on the principle that French prestige could compensate for a maladroit series of political maneuvers. The French envoys at Warsaw were given instructions not to show too much enthusiasm for a war against the Turks "into which he [Louis] sees plainly that no prince of Christendom cares to enter wholeheartedly and which can only end by disturbing the peace which His Majesty had with the Grand Turk by ruining the commerce of his subjects in the Levant."⁵⁸ The King was misinformed by Vitry who, in his profound ignorance, assumed that Poland would not deliberately enter a war with the Turks with whom Sobieski had entered into a working agreement on the Dnieper in 1681.⁵⁹

The Polish King offered his mediation between Louis and the Emperor so that the Christian west could present a united front, but Louis rejected it as an artifice, proposed and paid for by the House of Austria.⁶⁰ No care was taken by the French to placate the injured pride of the Queen whose father had been refused a French title of nobility, and she exercised much influence over her husband. Finally Sobieski himself saw the wisdom of an alliance with his Christian neighbor. The Austrian pact seemed better to him than one with France which country, although Christian, gave aid and comfort to the Porte.⁶¹

France's policy failed in Poland, Hungary, and with the Porte. Ultimately Louis' *Machtpolitik* in Germany failed as well. The use of force against the Pope resulted in a fiasco and the persecution of the Huguenots had sinister consequences that did an incredible amount of harm to the French and, on a larger scale, to the cause of Catholicism in general. The total picture leads to the conclusion that *raison d'état*, Gallicanism, the incipient forces of French nationalism, the threat of schism on the part of France and the iniquitous eastern policy of Louis XIV made any settled conditions in Europe impossible. It set prince against prince and so weakened the authority of Rome that any chance for Rojas' reunion plans to succeed was thereby swept

away. It rendered communication between Bossuet and Hanover difficult and set an example of brutality and egotism to which Bossuet, as a Gallican and a Frenchman, could do nothing but acquiesce.

Surely there were deeper causes than the will, character, and ideas of princes for the failure of the seventeenth-century projects for church unity. Franz Xavier Kiefl in his work on Leibniz⁶² makes it clear that the failure of reunion resulted from the "inner impossibility for reunion and the basically contradictory character (*Widersprüchlichkeit*)" of Catholicism and Protestantism.⁶³ The same forces are clearly evident today. Malines failed because of a dispute over principle and not because the Pope and the Kings of England and Belgium were unfavorably disposed.⁶⁴ There is, however, one remaining factor which stands out clearly. If all the princes of Christendom, or even a goodly number of them, say as many as Rojas had in support of him in 1683, had continued to adhere to the idea of church reunion for a continuous number of years and, the most important factor of all, if Louis XIV's dynastic interests, his sinuous foreign policy, his insatiable lust for glory and his brutal treatment of the Huguenots had been subordinated to the good of the Christian world, an irenic climate would have been created, particularly in Germany, which would have, in all probability, restored unity between Rome and large groups of German Protestants.

C. LEOPOLD OF AUSTRIA

Most of the influence exercised by the French King was pernicious for the ideal of church reunion. His reign began with a situation of accommodation between Protestants and Catholics and ended with the forcible suppression of the Protestants. In many respects the

⁵⁷ Leibniz und die religiöse Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands.

⁵⁸ Keiff, *op. cit.*, 302. See Thieme, Karl, *Gott und die Geschichte*, Leibniz und die Wiedervereinigung der abendländischen Christenheit, 148-149, Freiburg, 1948. Thieme holds that the basic differences would have resulted in nothing even if the princes had been favorable. However, see L. Winterswyl (ed.), *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Über die Reunion der Kirchen*, 10-11, Freiburg, 1939. Winterswyl thinks thusly: "Die in Frankreich einsetzende Verfolgung der Hugenotten, der Tod Innocenz XI. und Leopolds I., sowie die deutschfeindliche Politik Frankreichs liessen den ganzen Plan nicht zur Reife kommen." Fundamentally Winterswyl believes that, if political conditions had been propitious, there would have been a chance for reunion. This might reflect a change in German thinking on the matter since Winterswyl, writing before the Second World War, in the roseate glow of German might, probably put more trust in the ability of the state to achieve the impossible than would Thieme, writing in 1948.

⁶⁴ It is generally believed now that the separation of Church and State is a more comfortable atmosphere for irenic talks to come about than the throne-altar combination was. This may all be true. Certainly the Church in France has withdrawn from the sheeplike passivity it displayed under the Concordat and is probably, since 1945, the leader in the liturgical revival on the Continent. See Martin, *Le Gallicanisme et la Réforme Catholique*, 402-404.

⁵⁷ Zeller, *op. cit.*, 141.

⁵⁸ Farges, Louis, *Recueil des Instructions etc.* 1: 172-173, Paris, 1888.

⁵⁹ Kluczycki, F., *Acta historica res gestas Poloniae illustantia* 6: 26, Cracow, 1883. Vitry to Louis, January 8, 1683. De Vitry also felt that a good table and plenty of Hungarian wine would keep the Diet in leash and he assured his master that he was spending profusely for these indispensable aids to bribery and corruption.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 6: 21. Louis to de Vitry, February 18, 1683.

⁶¹ Zeller, *op. cit.*, 141.

reign of Leopold I (1658–1705) was a contrasting one. For the most part he sympathized with and supported Rojas' endeavors in a degree never approached by Louis XIV in support of Bossuet's irenicism. In point of fact the French King was scarcely aware that Bossuet was active in such matters. The reign of Leopold I began with an attempt at governmental centralization which resulted in a violent revolt in Hungary in which thousands of influential Protestants were involved and the reign ended with a policy of toleration that gave freedom of worship to large numbers of Protestant communities in Magyar land.

To place Leopold's part in the Rojas affair in the proper light it is best to glance at the general political factors which prevailed during the Emperor's reign. Not the least important among these factors is that Leopold was no different from the other monarchs of the seventeenth century who attempted to strengthen their power by improving and expanding central organs of government. He took as his model Philip II of Spain, personally signed more than 300,000 letters and was surrounded (much to his dislike) by splendid pomp, the rules of which were actually quite rigidly observed according to Spanish etiquette at the Hofburg. In contrast, Versailles and Marly saw considerably more freedom in relations between king and courtier. Leopold wished once more to govern the Spanish inheritance and to reestablish control in Hungary. In reality after 1683 his policies added greatly to the territorial extent of the Habsburg lands. From his uncle he inherited the Tyrol and by the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) the Turks were obliged to cede the greater part of Hungary. One of the Emperor's most talented ministers, Zinzendorf, effected an army reorganization after 1680 which resulted in the creation of a powerful instrument for centralization without the destruction of the enormously complex organic structure of the Habsburg crown lands.⁶⁵

Two of the most notable developments of the seventeenth century were the consolidation of the French monarchy at many points along the Rhine and the decline of Turkish power, followed by an effort on the part of the Habsburgs, partially a successful one, to create a well-organized and powerful state with its center the upper Danube.⁶⁶ In a sense the two monarchs, Louis XIV and Leopold I, represent similar trends and similar ideas, but there are striking fundamental differences between them. Leopold liked neither court life nor diplomacy as did his colleague at Versailles. The Habsburg was pious and devoted to his family life and considered the burden of state as a penance and not a métier.⁶⁷ The two monarchs were by tradition, inheritance, and temperament in opposition. Just as Francis and Charles V had battled, so

battled their successors, and, as the Valois had allied with Suleiman, so did Louis XIV lean strongly toward a Franco-Turkish entente. Over the imperial throne the Bourbon and Habsburg carried on their incessant rivalry. At his most ambitious moment the Sun King probably hoped for a crushing defeat to the House of Austria, a subsequent appeal to him from the German princes, and his assumption of the leadership of the empire and of Christendom.⁶⁸ At other times when he was truer to the traditional policy of France he merely sought Caesar's throne as a thing of nuisance value for his hereditary enemy.⁶⁹

During the greater part of Leopold's life he was at the mercy of the French. His candidature for the imperial throne was fought against French bribery and influence. During the period 1681–1683 the Emperor's position was rendered precarious by the French encroachments on the Rhine and by the perpetual danger to the Spanish Habsburgs from a French attack along the Flemish border. It has been argued (by a Frenchman in 1883) that Louis's demands for a truce in 1681 were not exorbitant, that all would have been well in Germany but for Spanish intrigue, that the German princes without Habsburg pressure would have immediately seen the moderation of the King's terms, and that the Emperor would have made peace with the Turk and left countless Christians under Moslem rule.⁷⁰ It is amazing that the author of this extraordinary piece does not ignore *all* the facts and argue that the Habsburg-Polish alliance was a pernicious thing not only for the Habsburgs but for the whole of western Europe and that Poland should have been poised to attack on the eastern frontier on September 1, 1683, when the French troops invaded the Spanish Low Countries.⁷¹

With this general background in mind consideration must now be given to Leopold's specific relations with Rojas under the following heads: (1) What was Leopold's attitude toward his Protestant subjects in Hungary? (2) What was the character of the relations between Leopold I and Innocent XI? (3) How did Leopold I act as a patron of Rojas?

The situation in Hungary prior to 1681 has already been outlined. The Emperor's abolition of the Hungarian constitution in 1671⁷² had brought on a revolution which was followed by bloody assizes in which Protestant ministers and their charges were either hauled into court or exiled. Thousands fled to Transylvania which was a Protestant state under Turkish

⁶⁵ Pr  clin, E., *Le XVII^e Si  cle*, (Clio) 7: 404–405, Paris, 1949.

⁶⁶ Immich, *Geschichte* etc., 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁶⁸ Bojani, F. de, *L'Affaire du Quartier    Rome    la fin du xviii^e si  cle*, *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 22: 350 et seq., 1908.

⁶⁹ Platzhoff, *op. cit.*, 391. See also Zeller, *Les rois de France candidats    l'empire: essai sur l'id  ologie imp  riale en France*, *Revue Historique* 163: 273, 501–502, 523, 531, 1934.

⁷⁰ Vachow, M., *La France et l'Autriche au Si  ge de Vienne en 1683*, *Nouvelle Revue* 23: 775–781, 1883.

⁷¹ For the terms of the Austrian-Polish alliance see Kluczycki, *op. cit.* 6: 68–69, 121, 381, 401–402.

⁷² Kos  ry, *op. cit.*, 130.

protection while many others, in cooperation with Hungarian Catholics, fought a guerilla warfare with the Austrian overlord. Tököly, the first real leader of the revolt, had Louis XIV as a crypto-ally. He was able to resist the imperial forces in part because of French subsidies, but also because Leopold desired a sincere and lasting religious peace and refrained from pursuing the war by terroristic methods. The Hungarian constitution was restored at Ödenburg on November 9, 1681. At the same time the free exercise of the Protestant cult (largely Calvinistic) was granted, except in those areas where there was a Catholic landlord. Protestant property rights were restored in certain areas; their churches could be rebuilt in specified cities. Protestant magnates were given permission to build chapels and hospitals as they had been in 1670. To culminate this general pacification, Prince Paul Esterhazy was named Palatine of Hungary and the Empress Eleanora was crowned as Queen of Hungary.⁷³ have been possible to pursue a policy of forceful conversion to Catholicism along with one of conquest, the Emperor did not do so. On January 12, 1684, a little less than two years before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Emperor issued a general amnesty to all the rebels who would give themselves up by the end of February next. The decisions of the Diet of Ödenburg were reaffirmed with specific emphasis on articles XXV and XXVI of the capitulation which permitted the free and open practice of the Lutheran and Calvinist religions and provided for the return of churches taken from the Protestants after the rebellion of 1671.⁷⁴ In 1711 the work of his predecessor was upheld by Joseph I (1705–1711) by the peace of Szátmar, according to which constitutional and religious freedom was promised all loyal subjects of the Habsburg ruler.⁷⁵

Relations between Vienna and Rome were, as near as possible, ideal. Certainly they were so in comparison with the constant hostility between Louis and Innocent. To a certain degree the ancient imperial constitution of the *sacerdotium* and the *imperium* was realized.⁷⁶ The nuncio Buonvisi, except for periodic quarrels over ceremonial and protocol, worked in harmony with the Emperor. In point of fact, he was given permission to levy special aids on the clergy on July 3, 1683, for the purpose of collecting military supplies.⁷⁷ He attempted to reassure Louis XIV, through the nuncio in Paris, that the imperial alliances were not designed to be offensive toward France,⁷⁸ and along with Fra Marco d'Aviano he was the corporate soul for Viennese defense in the siege. Later when the Turks were in

retreat the nuncio accompanied the German forces and urged them on to further offensive action. In brief, Buonvisi typified the generally cordial relationships that prevailed between Rome and Vienna. All this was merely interpreted by Louis XIV as an unseemly partiality toward his hereditary enemy.

By way of righting the historical balance it cannot be ignored that historical forces made it considerably easier for the Pope to support the Emperor rather than Louis XIV. With respect to the Turk, the Austrians and the Romans were of one mind. Leopold, unlike the King of France, had no Mediterranean commerce to protect. For Austria and for Rome enmity for the Moslems was solidified by centuries of continuous opposition. Although the Emperor certainly did not desire the reestablishment of any degree of papal control over his empire, his interests and those of the Pope happened to be in harmony a good part of the time.⁷⁹ It was to the interest of the Emperor to realize the religious reunion of the Germans because this would inevitably have meant a strengthening of the empire around its Catholic sovereign. It was to the interest of Louis XIV to keep Germany weak and as a consequence he was not likely to welcome any plan which would have resulted in ecclesiastical peace in the empire.⁸⁰

Rojas was a diplomatic agent for the Emperor long before he concentrated his efforts on church policy. For example there is a detailed series of instructions among the Leibniz papers in Hanover⁸¹ in which the Bishop is advised how best the German states, Spain, and Portugal can be organized into a league against the Turks and the French. This document dates from April 24, 1664. It says not a word about negotiations for church reunion. The troubles in Hungary induced the Emperor to select Rojas as something more than a clever diplomatic agent. Rojas had had experience in irenical dealings at the Court of Brandenburg and at Mainz and was a perfect candidate for dealing with religious trouble wherever it appeared. The Bishop may have been sent to Hungary earlier than 1680 but we do not know of it. He first appeared as an irenicist in western Germany. He was given a diplomatic mandate on July 8, 1678, to treat with the German princes concerning the boycotting of enemy goods and the establishing of religious peace. He was to go to the Reichstag at Augsburg and was from there to travel to Bamberg, Brandenburg, Brunswick and Lüneburg, Zell, Wolfenbüttel, Frankfurt-am-Main, Hesse-Kassel, Magdeburg, Münster, Nürnberg, and Electoral Saxony.⁸² The *Plena Potentia* given the Bishop in 1678

⁷³ Baumstarck, *op. cit.*, 126.

⁷⁴ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 3: 97.

⁷⁵ Kosáry, *op. cit.*, 137–138.

⁷⁶ Faure, *op. cit.*, 212.

⁷⁷ Berthier, *op. cit.* 1: 107. Innocent to Leopold, July 3, 1683.

⁷⁸ Sauer, *op. cit.*, 47. Buonvisi to Ranuzzi, Passau, August 25, 1683.

⁷⁹ Immich, *Papst Innocenz etc.*, 110.

⁸⁰ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 3: 198–199. Klopp gives an excellent account of the various political factors which influenced Louis XIV, Leopold I and James II in their feelings toward plans for religious reunion.

⁸¹ L., *Irenica*, 5: 75. Document entitled "Secreta Instructio S. Caes. Maestatis pro Patre Rojas."

⁸² Bittner and Gross, *op. cit.*, 123–148.

speaks of peace in general among the German princes⁸³ but it is clear that Rojas treated on a number of subjects, not the least of which was the irenical plan contained in the *Casus*.

In a letter to Innocent XI on September 1, 1683, during the crucial days when no man knew whether Vienna could stand or fall, Rojas' work held a sufficiently respectable place at the Imperial Court, then at Linz, that the Emperor commended the Bishop for having promoted a cause of orthodoxy throughout Germany. At the same time the Emperor requested that papal encouragement be given the Bishop in the hope that his efforts among the German people would result in the return of the whole Empire to Roman obedience.⁸⁴

It has been observed before how the Pope entered into the reunion plans by omitting the public reading of the Trentine anathemas.⁸⁵ On July 15, 1684, the Pope commended Rojas to the Emperor, but with careful reservation as the delicacy of the matter and French politics demanded.

The venerable brother Christopher, Bishop of Tina, explained to us at length what he, supported by the protection of Your Majesty, has done for the increase of the Catholic religion throughout Germany. We do indeed commend the zeal of this Bishop to you and we follow with deserved praise the labors which he has endured for the promotion of such an outstanding work. Because propositions which he reported to us contain very grave difficulties we have put upon our beloved son, Francis Cardinal Bounvisi, the responsibility of explaining carefully to Your Majesty things . . . which on no account can be permitted by the Holy See.⁸⁶

The Pope specified that the negotiations should be carried on under Rojas' own name and charged the Bishop to deliver, by word of mouth, the information that the Pope dared not enter into the business because of the French faction (*factionis gallicae causa*).⁸⁷

Innocent XI died in 1689 and the two popes who followed, as we have seen, were not enthusiastic for the German cause. Rojas died in 1695 but the Emperor lived on until 1705 and displayed his good will toward the cause of church reunion on many occasions. In 1691, while Rojas was still alive, Prince Paul Esterhazy and Paul Szecheny, Primate of Hungary and Archbishop of Gran, promised their cooperation, if Rojas would resume his efforts in Hungary. The Emperor promptly gave his *Vollmacht* and recommended highly the cause of civil and religious peace.⁸⁸ In 1698 Leibniz was invited by the Emperor to come to Vienna and

confer with Buchheim, successor to Rojas at Wiener Neustadt, and the nuncio Davia.⁸⁹ This conference had no substantial results, as all those before it had had none, but the Emperor's good intent certainly accompanied the invitation to Leibniz and the permission to hold the conference. Reunion attempts were renewed in 1701 and at this time Leopold, still faithful to the ideal which might have reestablished the political and religious unity to his empire, entered again into talks with Rome.

With Leopold died the interests of the House of Austria in church reunion. His successors, Joseph I and Charles VI, were preoccupied in territorial conquest on the Danube. They abandoned their interests in the empire more and more to concentrate all their resources in an attempt to consolidate their crown lands into a centralized and unified monarchy.

It was Leopold I who, along with Innocent XI, provided one of the continuing strands of the serious attempts at church reunion in the empire and it is now time to cast a brief glance at the episcopal administration of the Emperor's chief agent in Wiener Neustadt where Rojas at the age of sixty left his diplomatic activity for a brief moment and actually assumed the responsibilities of a resident prelate.

IX. ROJAS IN WIENER NEUSTADT

Wiener Neustadt was made a bishopric at the same time the Vienna diocese was established (1469), but its ecclesiastical organization stretches back much further than the fifteenth century. The district of Wiener Neustadt was part of the missionary territory of Salzburg. It was under the immediate jurisdiction of a pastor and there were a goodly number of monastic foundations, Dominicans, Cistercians, Capuchins, and, in the seventeenth century, Jesuits. Not far away to the southeast lay a Franciscan cloister at Katzelsdorf. The cathedral (*Liebfrauenkirche*) was dedicated in 1250. It is still one of the foremost examples of Romanesque architecture in Austria although the sanctuary has gone through numerous mutations with Gothic and Renaissance additions and a high altar which, of course, dates from the Baroque.

The pastors (the first being Walter, 1209) were distinguished by being notorious *Pfrundenjäger*. Part of this is explained by the fact that Wiener Neustadt was strictly a city diocese and the pastors were chronically short of funds as were the bishops later on.

During the reign of Frederick III the city achieved considerable importance because it was a favorite residence of the emperor, who not only gave material support to the Dominicans and Cistercians but also established a Kollegialstift with one Propst, one deacon, and eleven canons. This establishment did not have much success and eventually ceased altogether and an

⁸³ Hansitz, 9313: 11-12. Plena Potentia tractandi cum Electoribus et principibus imperii de confederatione et concordia mutua, data Christophoe Ep. Tiniensis, 1678.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 9310: 173. Leopold to the Pope, Linz, September, 1683. Pastor has it that Rojas was the Empress' confessor at this time.

⁸⁵ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 2: 21.

⁸⁶ Berthier, *op. cit.*, 183-184.

⁸⁷ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 3: 98.

⁸⁸ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* 6: 15-16.

⁸⁹ Pichler, *op. cit.* 2: 493.

attempt was made to re-establish it only in 1692 by Rojas himself. Frederick III frequently resided in the city for long periods because it was nearer the scene of the Turkish danger and problems of administration were better overseen there than in Vienna. As a result of the ever present Turk and the necessity for frontier defense the military Order of St. George received much support and privileges even beyond those possessed by the bishops. This gave rise to continual strife over questions of jurisdiction until Johann Fabri as coadjutor in Wiener Neustadt effected a separation of spheres of influence in 1533. Part of this settlement resulted in the bishop's gaining clear title to the cathedral and its properties whilst the knights were left in control of the Burgkappelle where Maximilian I lies buried.

The difficulties arising at the time of the Reformation were felt keenly in Wiener Neustadt, and it was only during the administration of Melchior Klesl (1588-1630) that serious efforts were made to restore the city to Catholicism. Most of the inhabitants had, however, become accustomed to communion under two species and a few insisted on remaining attached to the evangelicals and chose to leave rather than submit to a Catholic bishop.¹

Neustadt really had three rulers. The bishop was suffragan to the Archbishop of Salzburg, the Primate of the Habsburg archduchies, and it was only in 1722 that its spiritual superior became the Archbishop of Vienna. The temporal advocacy was the Emperor's prerogative. Beyond this the diocese was directly subject to the Holy See in questions of spiritual obedience and direction. Prior to Rojas the diocese had been occupied successively by Lawrence Aidinger (died 1669) and by Leopold von Kollonitz. Kollonitz was translated to Győr in 1686 and was created cardinal in the same year.

Compared with other dioceses in Austria and Hungary, Neustadt was neither rich nor poor.² It had, in 1695, 2,000 Christian inhabitants; there were seven benefices at the disposal of the bishop and the annual income was approximately 8,000 florins. By way of contrast Salzburg in 1687 had 11,000 inhabitants (most of them Catholic), 24 chantries, and an episcopal mensa of 240,000 florins. Vienna in 1669 had 100,000 Christians, 14 chantries, and an income of 10,000 florins.

Neustadt then could be considered a favorable diocese from an economic point of view. It had not suffered as much at the hands of the Turks as some of the neighboring Hungarian dioceses. For example Strigonia (Esztergom, Gran), the primatial see of Hungary, had in 1695 only 500 Christian inhabitants, 24 chantries and a mensa of 30,000 florins. But the

episcopal administration had moved to Visegrad (Tyrnavia), and the 30,000 florins represents the income from Visegrad. Veszprem had, in 1725, 3,000 inhabitants (a mixed population of Catholics and Protestants), 6 chantries, and an income of 12,000 florins. On the other end of the scale were to be found dioceses such as Pecs (Fünfkirchen, Quinque Ecclesiensis) with a Christian population of only 300. All the churches had been transformed into mosques and whatever income the nominal bishop had came from sources other than this diocese *in partibus infidelium*.

An inventory³ of the diocese compiled by Rojas, then Bishop of Tina, dates from June 24, 1685. It was made upon the command and wish of the Emperor.

Franz Anton von Losenstein was at first the preferred candidate for the bishopric because he was under the patronage of the previous bishop, Leopold von Kollonitz who received the Archdiocese of Raab in 1685. Kollonitz attempted to block Rojas' hopes for the see of Neustadt. Because of his poverty, his long service for Leopold and, doubtless, because of powerful friends at court Rojas finally got imperial approval. The main reason for his appointment was certainly that he needed some visible means of support as an imperial counsellor. It was simply a way of keeping him on salary so that he would be on call in the vicinity of Vienna. Twenty years before he had been considered as a possible candidate for Neustadt, but it was only in 1685 that the Emperor's consent was gained.

Hitherto he had had to be content with benefices such as Hainburg. To be sure he had once been regarded as a possible occupant for the sees of Valladolid and Ghent because of his achievements in his order and his outstanding merits as a supporter of the Catholic religion and the common cause of Christendom, particularly for his services in the crown lands of Austria, Hungary, and Transylvania. He had played an important role in the liberation of Hungary by his ability to form alliances, get money and troops, and his capacity to form personal alliances between the Emperor and the princes. Indeed, his aid was so important that without it Hungary would have totally fallen under Turkish domination.⁴

The double argument of poverty and past service convinced the Emperor and his counsellors that Rojas should have the place in Neustadt. Probably Ferdi-

¹ Most of the information on the background of Wiener Neustadt has been taken from Josef Wodka, *Kirche in Österreich*, Vienna, Herder, 1959.

² Fitzler, Remigius and Priminus Seifrid, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi* 5: 285, Batavia, 1952.

³ A copy of this inventory is to be found in the Haus-Hof und Staats Archiv in Vienna. The document is unnumbered and can only be identified by its title, "Inventarium/Alles und jedes Ligent" and its date, June 24, 1685. The bishopric then possessed thirteen spiritual benefices occupied by two-hundred and four subjects. Along with this went much woodland, many vineyards, a considerable number of livestock, farm equipment, household goods, linens, kitchen utensils, books (chiefly archival material), and pontifical rings and silver crucifixes. The document is signed by Rojas (Christoph Bischoff zu Tina) and notarized by Sigmund Friedrich von Wagram, Maximilian von Halla, and Johan Georg Hofenstrich.

⁴ Hansitz, 9310: 177 verso.

nand, Prince Dietrichstein, was the decisive element in the final decision. On June 20, 1685, he received the imperial consent and on June 24 he completed his inventory of the property and juridical rights which the Bishop of Neustadt exercised.⁵

One of the factors which stood in the way of his promotion was that he had acquired many enemies as well as friends, and chiefly amongst the Protestants libels were spread about in Hungary and Transylvania that the final object of the Bishop was to divide the non-Catholics and make conversion to Catholicism easier. Rojas, as usual, felt obliged to answer his detractors. He had been informed by Handel in Ansbach (August 17, 1685)⁶ about the rumors concerning indiscreet negotiations and syncretism. Handel was sympathetic and hoped that consolation for calumny would be found in the recently acquired bishopric. The matter was quite serious because Rojas felt obliged to write to Rome, speak of his devotion, faith, and obedience to the Holy See, and generally present his case in the best possible light.⁷

At this juncture the matter became a family affair. Julius, Cardinal Spinola, brought his influence to bear in the curia⁸ and this no doubt speeded up the confirmation from Rome which was given on January 19, 1686. Rojas was translated from Tina to Neustadt. The actual publication of the bull was delayed for over two months and it was only in March, 1686, that Rojas could rest assured that his position was guaranteed by the Pope.⁹

In Neustadt began a new phase in the Bishop's life. In the city itself he found his best companions among the Jesuits and was a close personal friend of the eminent Jesuit Maximilian Teuffl. In the sons of Ignatius he found good company and probably intellectual stimulation as well as advice on many problems which confronted him.¹⁰ Quite apart from the fact that the Jesuits were found almost everywhere in the seventeenth century in the councils of princes and bishops, Rojas as a Spaniard and a diplomat probably had a natural sympathy for the society. He praised them highly and assisted them in building their church which was consecrated by Cardinal Kollonitz in 1686.¹¹

One of the first things the new Bishop attempted in Neustadt was to introduce the Bartholomites and their

regulations into the city. Bartholomew Holzhauser¹² was a German priest who had a short but notable career in Bavaria, Austria, and Mainz (1613-1658). Gradually throughout his life he formed the ideal of forming some sort of institute, with strong resemblances to the Society of Jesus, in which secular priests would live, pray, and study together. At various times they would have the care of souls in neighboring regions. No women were to be allowed in the organization and no female servants were to be employed by the members. All were to live in apostolic poverty, all property acquired by members of the institute was to be held in common, and any surplus above the ordinary expenses of the society was to be distributed to the poor.

In 1642 Holzhauser presented a plan for his institute to the Archbishop of Salzburg. It was signed by Holzhauser and twelve other members of the society. As is customary in an affair of this sort, he declared he had no intention of founding a new religious order and certainly wanted no special liberties, but on the contrary unconditionally submitted his followers to the control of the ordinary.

In the Bartholomite rule faith is announced to be the basis of all salvation, a principle which must have rung sweetly in Protestant ears. All followers, however, are to believe as the Roman Church believes, to work for a common end, and each one is to submit his personal inclinations to the will of his superiors. High on the list of qualifications is that the Bartholomite must strive toward the development of inner virtue and is to be, above all, patient in the face of persecution, ignorance, and scorn. Excess in eating and drinking is to be avoided and when traveling the members should stay in the homes of fellow brothers. If they must stay in inns, then they should take the greatest precautions to avoid giving scandal on any count.

Idleness is the "Ruhkissen des Satans." Obedience to superiors is emphasized and frequent confession likewise. One half hour each morning is to be devoted to meditation on Christ's life or the saints or to a public reading from some pious work. Daily Mass is an obligation and weekly confession is to be practiced. It is desirable to read the Breviary together and Sacred Scripture is to be read and studied at least one hour in the day. A general retreat is to be held once a year and all contacts with the world, other than the *cura animarum*, ought to be handled by lay representa-

¹² Wildanger, Heinrich, *Bartholomäus Holzhauser und sein Weltpriestertum*, Regensburg, 1916. There is also a new edition, but a much shorter one, published in Munich, 1941. Holzhauser was also somewhat of a prophet and like most of the Mainz circle also interested in church reunion. There is an interesting document in the Vatican Archives, Nunziatura Vienna, 112: 61 in which Holzhauser's prophecies are used as a reference for Protestant-Catholic reunion. The document is entitled "Confessio Fidei secundum Unitarios/De Unione Lutheranorum et Calvinistarum cum Catholicis condonna di Galileo . . . Visiones et Prophetiae B. Holzhauser."

⁵ See note 3.

⁶ Hansitz, 9310: 178 verso to Rojas.

⁷ *Ibid.* 9310: 178 verso, Spinola to Cibo, April 8, 1685.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 178 verso, Cardinal Spinola to Rojas, January 26, 1686.

⁹ City Archives, Wiener Neustadt, document entitled "Inhalt der päpstlichen Bulla," unnumbered, given at St. Mary Major on March 5, 1686.

¹⁰ Hansitz, 9310: 180. Hansitz tells us that he found in the society the "fructum qualemque familiaris amicitiae religioso contubernio." The fact that Hansitz was a Jesuit and has nothing but praise for Rojas would seem to indicate that Rojas was remembered among the Jesuits as a patron of the first order.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 179.

tives. For example a suit in a law court must be conducted by someone other than a Bartholomite.

In daily life Holzhauser prescribed uniformity in dwellings, eating, clothing, and beds. No property left the society without the permission of the superior. If any members had dependents, they were to live so sparingly that their charges could be supported out of their surplus. Strictly private property was permitted but the ever present consideration should be the wants and needs of fellow members.

Two or three were sufficient to constitute a community but, if single posts were necessary, then they were to be occupied by absolutely incorruptible men. As much education as possible was considered desirable and, considering the capacity of modern Germans to suffer through hours of academic lectures and regard them as pleasure, it was probably not much of a burden for the Bartholomites to be constantly engaged either in giving or hearing lectures in theology. In all communities one Mass a week was to be offered for the pope, one a month for the bishop, and three Masses at least once a month for each deceased member.

The question of obedience occupies a full section of the rule. The bishop stands first in all things and then the superiors of the community. Benefice seekers are frowned upon but each should stand ready to accept a benefice if it is for the good of the community. If a member feels aggrieved, he has the right to appeal to his superior but he should avoid stirring up rebellion simply for the sake of creating excitement.

Their most important duty is the care of souls and they should follow this line with such zeal that their own lives count as nothing. They are obligated to give the Sacrament and religious instruction to all and are to carry the Host to the sick. Sharp words are particularly to be shunned, and when they teach it must be in line with the Church, the Fathers, and what the commentators have taught before them. Instruction for children is considered especially necessary and attempts ought to be made to establish schools for the countryside as well as the city. Talented boys can be taken for altar or house service with the idea in mind of teaching them Latin and Christian doctrine and, although it is not stated, eventually encouraging them to become priests. For all this no vows were required, but an oath to be loyal to the institute was demanded.

The government of the institute was entrusted to a general, then various diocesan presidents, then deacons, and, on the lowest rank, simply superiors (*Ober*). The generals were Gindel, Rottmayer, and Stephan Hofer during the greater part of the seventeenth century.¹³ Rojas was personally acquainted with Hofer. Certainly he was also favorably inclined toward the Bartholomites by his experiences at the Electoral Court of Mainz

where Johann Philipp von Schönborn was a special protector of Holzhauser. It is also significant that in 1685 the Reichstag took the society under its protection and likewise Pope Innocent XI gave it his special blessing.

The rule which Rojas tried to introduce into Neustadt was virtually the same as that summarized above. Its important sections deal with one's own spiritual life, community of property, fraternal living, separation from women, obedience to bishops and superiors, care of souls, teaching in city and countryside, preaching, administration of the sacraments, regular meetings of archdiocesan, diocesan, and deaconal members of the society. Stephen Hofer in Würzburg as Supreme President (*Generalober*) was appointed superior of the proposed community at Neustadt,¹⁴ and it had the patronage of no less distinguished people than the reigning Duke of Bavaria, Joseph Clemens, Bishop of Freising, the Archbishop of Mainz, and the Bishop of Würzburg.¹⁵

Rojas' efforts to introduce the Bartholomites into Neustadt were destined to have little success, and no permanent community was established.¹⁶ Probably because of Rojas' age and the inherent resistance of vested interests among the clergy, the plans were not fulfilled. Moreover, after 1690 Rojas was once more on his travels and neglected his strictly episcopal duties for his irenic ones. His biographer testifies, however, that he was assiduous in the performance of his diocesan responsibilities,¹⁷ and we also know from the Leibniz correspondence that Rojas was often found administering confirmation and preaching in his diocese in a period when the reforms recommended at Trent were only partially carried out because of the high degree of absenteeism amongst the bishops.¹⁸

Hand in hand with the attempt to introduce the Bartholomites went the effort to establish a proper seminary for the training of priests. Throughout all his career Rojas was a representative of the post-Trentine bishop who saw that one of the best ways to heal the problems of heresy was to produce a clergy which could not only act but which could also think. The center selected for the seminary was no other than the episcopal residence, the present Propsthof beside the cathedral in Neustadt. Prospective candidates for the priesthood were assigned rooms adapted to their particular needs. The costs for their education were to be borne partly by the episcopal treasury and

¹⁴ Hansitz, 9310: 180.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 180 verso and 181.

¹⁶ Raich, J. M., *Über die Verbreitung des Instituts des B. Holzhauser, Katholik*, 1879. Raich states that there was no community in Neustadt in 1700.

¹⁷ Hansitz, 9310: 179. "Nostris annalibus proditur, eum, nisi per valetudinem abstinere, stas Episcopis conciones per sese constantes executum esse."

¹⁸ Leibniz, S.S. 5: 183. Leibniz to Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels, Vienna, June 29/July 9, 1688. Cf. *ibid.*, 157, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, June 5, 1688.

¹³ Wildanger, *op. cit.* (new edition), 88. In 1941 the only community of Bartholomites still in existence was in Palermo in Sicily.

partly from collections. The moral and theological formation of the candidates was to be under the direction of priests from the cathedral chapter but the Jesuit fathers were given the responsibility of final supervision of consciences and education and they were to be the regular confessors of those destined for clerical status.

Another project dear to Rojas' heart was the restoration of choir duty to the cathedral canons. This was, like most of the projects of the Bishop, not a success because it fell through after his death.¹⁹ While he was trying to implement this reform, he had a constant fight on his hands. At the time he took over the administration of the diocese only compline was sung by the beneficed cathedral clergy and terce and vespers by the musical stipendiates. Money to support those chanting the hours had been provided by Frederick III and the duty was assigned to priests in the church of St. George. The money was wasted, however, and at the time of the Reformation, when many of the clergy became Lutheran, the whole business ceased altogether. Then came other calamities, chiefly the Turks and inadequate bishops. The bishop in 1535 made an attempt at restoration but with no success because he had a partly Protestant clergy and a city council which also in part had found the charms of a new profession of faith more attractive than the old. Then came the great Klesl, later Archbishop of Vienna, and he had taken the matter in a serious light and so had Rojas' predecessor, Cardinal Kollonitz, who was Bishop of Neustadt from 1670 until 1685. However, Kollonitz as an imperial counsellor was too busy with state affairs and efforts at self promotion and he left the problem much as he had found it.

Rojas called in theologians from Vienna and Würzburg to assist him, and they determined in council that it was not only his duty as bishop to see the reform through but that no particular privileges of beneficed clergy or any individual should stand in his way and that it was an abuse to allow the situation to remain as it was.²⁰ In many ways Rojas' ambitious reform program is reminiscent of his church reunion activities. Both were probably based on the optimistic calculation that men, having seen the right, would act in accordance with its principles.

The expenses for this undertaking were declared to be the responsibility of not only the bishop but of all the clergy in general. It was also decided that, economic conditions now being better after the expulsion of the Turks, the reform was possible. No one was to be relieved of responsibilities from which they were formerly excused because of the combined difficulties of Turk, Reformation, and constant war. Moreover, the bishop was empowered, if necessary, to use force to restore the choir duty established in the fifteenth century.

¹⁹ Hansitz, 9310: 182 verso.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 185.

The Bishop lacked money and in his need he appealed to the Emperor. The Emperor posed some embarrassing questions, the major one being just how all this was to be carried through. It is quite clear that Rojas had the same jurisdictional problems to solve against vested interests which many bishops had in the seventeenth century. On the one hand lay the decisions of Trent to be enforced and on the other the inherited dead weight of vested property and privileged interests inherited from the complex legal situation of the Middle Ages.

For the support of the canons who would be responsible for the choral office he promised the proceeds from the sale of salt (Klesl had organized this as an episcopal monopoly). For the expenses involved in feeding the choir he promised a careful supervision of the menu at his own table. To this were to be added fines drawn from the prosecution of clerical abuses and finally the proceeds from his own benefices.

Foreseen, too, were disputes which would inevitably arise over rights of presentation. Jurisdiction over this was to be lodged in the churches of St. Nicholas, St. Erasmus, St. Leopold, the Blessed Virgin Mary ad aram parvam, and three royal churches, namely St. George, Blessed Virgin Mary of the Wall, and St. Peter.

The Emperor's council was divided on the project. One has the impression that anything suggested between the years 1685–1697, other than subsidies for war against the Turks and for defense against the French, would have received a bad hearing at Vienna, particularly if it cost money. Moreover, dissenting voices came from the Bishop's own household where two of his chaplains started a conspiracy against him, echoes of which reached the city magistrates and the court at Vienna. The ringleader of the charges was Cornelius Zeppenfeld who was bold enough to bring personal charges against his Bishop.²¹ The Bishop's house was divided against itself. Curiously enough one of his supporters was Philip Jacob Galler who himself attempted to become Bishop of Neustadt in 1687 with the help of the city magistrates. Three others who proved loyal were rewarded with benefices on November 19, 1687.²²

Having laid down the major lines of his reforms, Rojas still had the difficulties of implementing them. To the senior clergy was assigned the duty of chanting matins and to the juniors the responsibility for the other hours. A report of the proceedings was trans-

²¹ A peace was sworn between the Bishop and Zeppenfeld in 1690. Unnumbered document from the Archives of W. Neustadt, bearing the seals of the Bishop and Zeppenfeld and entitled "Puncta circa quae D. Episcopus Neostadiensis cum Domino Zeppenfeld ratione mutationis circa officialem tum convenit."

²² Hansitz, 9310: 189. Hansitz gives the names of those who supported Rojas as Reiner Wlostorff, Vicar General, Wolfgang Adam Gotthard, Choirmaster, Sebastian Widman, Franz Xavier Praitenaicher, T.D., Ignatius Lechner and John George Klinkhart.

mitted to the nuncio in Vienna who sent it off to Rome with his approval. By 1688 the preliminary plans for the introduction of the Bartholomite rule, the foundation of a seminary and the restoration of the canonical hours in the cathedral had been perfected.

There is little doubt, however, that Rojas had no conspicuous success in carrying out his projects for internal reform. In 1693 he was still attempting to make his diocese a model one.²³ Moreover, his travels for the cause of church reunion began again in 1690 and he was frequently absent from Neustadt. When he did come back in 1693, it was only to prepare to die and to write tracts defending his ideas and beliefs against an army of calumniators.

X. THE FRUIT OF OPTIMISM

It has been suggested that Rojas was no irenicist in the proper sense of the word. It is true that he was unable to think outside the mentality of a Spaniard, a Franciscan, and a Roman Catholic. It is also true that he personally never advocated anything which could not today be regarded as a highly integralist Catholic point of view. He proclaimed loudly and practised absolutely a firm loyalty to the pope and the Roman Church. With regard to the suspension of the Trentine decrees nothing entered his mind except the suspension of the anathemas of this Council and, then, only eventually to have them accepted.¹ There was never any question of an abrogation of the dogmatic decrees. Moreover it is quite clear that Rojas advocated a *charitativum silentium* and theological colloquies simply for the sake of providing an irenic forum in which a favorable climate would be created for the conversion of the Protestants to Catholicism.

On the other hand it is not just to compare modern ecumenical thought with that of the seventeenth century and assume that the same conditions governed both periods. For one thing certain developments in philosophical and ecclesiological thought have made it even more possible for Protestants and Catholics to see eye to eye. A benevolent interpretation of Luther, such as that of Professor Lortz,² and a number of fair evaluations of the Roman Church by modern German,

English, and American Protestants³ show an advance in ecumenical thought which would have been inconceivable in the seventeenth century.

On the other hand, some factors were more favorable to irenicism in the seventeenth century than at present. The century beginning in 1600 was confronted with the rationalistic currents of thought and belief which made any established church a mockery but this party often found it wise to conceal its opinions and most responsible princes and church leaders found it at least expedient to profess some sort of Christianity. In brief the sense of the *corpus Christianorum* was not broken by the Reformation and had not yet been confronted with the optimistic rationalism, the sovereign rule of natural science, and the religion of Communism. Protestants and Catholics hated each other but despite themselves they spoke fundamentally the same language. Molanus and Leibniz were well acquainted with scholastic terminology and Rojas and Bossuet recognized the value in discovering similarities between the Council of Trent and the Confession of Augsburg. Princes, themselves, still had the power to force a whole nation into a certain form of belief and they were, unfortunately in many cases, quite willing to do so.⁴

Within the framework of the seventeenth century it can surely be said that Rojas was an irenicist. At a time when Protestants in France felt the heavy fist of royal authority and the Catholics in England suffered from civil and political disabilities, at a time when the stale polemicism generated by the Reformation was still being ground out, the Bishop of Neustadt was willing to use a terminology which left hope for understanding. He was zealous in the cause of explaining Trent with a gloss which sweetened it for Protestant ears and he was, above all, one of the forerunners of what is popularly known today as "keeping the dialogue going." There is also no doubt that he had some understanding of the Protestant mentality because, although he was a Latin and probably strongly Jesuit influenced,⁵ he had been reared in the Netherlands and Germany where Protestants and Catholics had to live in close proximity and therefore, unwittingly in most cases, shared forms of thought and social behavior which brought them together in spite of themselves. Finally it stands that Rojas was willing, given similar intentions at Rome, to see the assembling of an ecumenical council which

²³ Ibid., 198 *et seq.*

¹ Leibniz, *S. S.*, 5: 183. Leibniz to Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels, Vienna, June 29/July 9, 1688. Leibniz was, in his more thoughtful moments, also aware of the Bishop's intentions for he wrote the Landgraf, "Je m' imagine que son but est sans doute de faire recevoir un jour aux Protestans le Councile de Trente; mais il y va par degrés conformes à l'humeur et la portée des gens." Also see Hansitz, 9313: 4 *et seq.* Ap. to Trebbichow & Fergen, Court Preachers in Brandenburg. Oct. 25, 1683. Viertend die Projecta werden zeigen, was massen die jenige so sich den Generalen, und von Allen Christen approbiren regulem der auslegung göttlichen worts unter werffen von keinen Trientinischen anathemate gebunden oder gerührt werden.

² Lortz, Joseph, *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, 2 v., Freiburg, 1949.

³ For a very "Catholic" view of the Roman Church by Protestants, see Lackmann, Max, and Hans Asmussen, *et al.*, *Katholische Reformation*, Stuttgart, Schwabenverlag, 1958.

⁴ The most flagrant example is, of course, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685.

⁵ It is not fair to judge the Society of Jesus as being altogether integralist. We have the example of their experiment in China with a sort of mandarin rite adapted to the needs of the Chinese and cases of individuals such as Jean Dez in France who wrote a book based on the type of thinking popular at the Electoral Court of Mainz in which he attempted to explain Catholicism in a sense which would be acceptable to the Calvinists.

would, in his conception, have had a composition quite different from any ecumenical council now possible.

He was certainly more irenically minded than Bossuet despite the latter's talks with Ferry and the *Exposition de la foi catholique*. Both were Latin and had the deep-rooted prejudices of Latins toward Protestantism. But desire and grace can work miracles and apparently, as the situation is regarded in hindsight, both factors worked more strongly in the case of Rojas than in that of the Eagle of Meaux. It might be said by way of confirmation of this statement that contacts between Bossuet and the Protestants were peripheral to his real aim, whereas Rojas spent his whole life in seeking out Protestants and hammering out agreements with them.

If a true irenicist in the modern sense is to be found in the seventeenth century, then it is clearly Leibniz. Almost prophetically he foresaw the development of the anti-Christian factors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and at the same time worked and thought incessantly within the framework of Christian and historical tradition, both Catholic and Protestant, to prepare a Christian defense against disbelief. In many ways Leibniz thought as some modern Anglicans do who regard themselves as a "bridge church" between Rome and the Reformation, and no matter what one's personal criticism of this point of view may be, such people serve as a nurturing ground for ecumenical ideas.⁶ It cannot be that seventeenth-century ecumenical standards be judged by those of our day, and therefore Leibniz, at least in ecumenical thought, must be regarded as atypical and consequently more of a prophet than a person who actually influenced his time.

Quite apart from the problematic of the situation it is more rewarding to look at what Rojas actually did during his last years for the cause of church reunion. Having begun such ambitious projects at Neustadt, the Bishop had his hands full with them alone. In view of this his participation in the cause of political and religious reunion was reduced to a minimum. There were many, in fact the majority, who probably welcomed this interlude because it can never be said that ideas of compromise are generally widespread amongst most people. However, some noticed the slackened pace of ecumenical activity and criticized the Bishop for his withdrawal from active participation. Denis Werl, a Capuchin in Hildesheim, reported to Rojas the remarks of Molanus who in a conversation with Werl had said, amongst other things, "He [Rojas] is now Bishop of Neustadt. He has landed the fish he wanted and he has, like the pope, hung his net up on the hook."⁷

This was intended as a personal goad to get the

business underway again, but there were other motives and other prime movers which were, in the long run, to prove more important as incentives. For one thing war with France was a sure thing and this always could be depended upon to drive the naturally divisive German princes closer together and this meant inevitably a reconsideration of not only political problems but religious ones as well. Then, too, Leibniz had a facility for knowing everyone and having at his fingertips the threads of all negotiations for imperial unity and he saw in the Bishop of Neustadt the most practical and active instrument for continuing the reunion attempts. Probably, too, the Duke of Brunswick who wanted to become Elector of Hanover hoped that a real or even simulated interest in Catholicism would so impress the Emperor that the necessary patent for the creation of a ninth electorate would thereby be more quickly obtained from Vienna.

Leibniz was the person who once more aroused Rojas' interest in talking with the Protestants. In his mind lay the ever present ideal of state and church unity, as indeed, is the case with powerful groups of Germans still, and the two aims were so closely tied together that they always underwent simultaneous development. He hoped by subtle argumentation to win Rojas to a point of view wherein the distinction between formal and material heresy would be clearly acknowledged by Rome. This implied, of course, that the Protestants were to be recognized as only material heretics, at least so long as their intentions were good, and should therefore be received into full communion with the Roman Church. To Leibniz, Rojas was the ideal agent for convincing Rome in this matter because the Bishop had had infinite experience in Germany and Hungary, had been in Rome twice and apparently was in the pope's good graces.⁸

Leibniz was also the link which connected Molanus and Rojas⁹ but his interest was not altogether altruistic. The Bishop of Neustadt with his connections at Vienna where Leibniz hoped to become librarian would be invaluable as an entree to the Imperial Court.¹⁰ He also had other plans. The Duchess of Brunswick was to be won to the cause. Sophia was in Berlin in the summer of 1688 and her role there, as Leibniz saw

⁸ Leibniz, *S. S.* 5: 13 *et seq.* "Promemoria zur Frage der Reunion der Kirche," Rheinfels, Nov., 1687, Leibniz for Ernst von Hesse-Rheinfels. In this "Promemoria" Leibniz gives a sketch of Rojas' method as Leibniz understood it. But he makes the error of thinking that when Rojas talked about suspension he meant the totality of Trent. This is not correct because the Bishop at most thought only of a suspension of the anathemas of the Council and not of the dogmatic decrees themselves. Moreover, Leibniz thought basically that the *Methodus* could be used as a basis for reunion whereas Rojas never went further than the *Regulae*. Cf. *ibid.*, 63 *et seq.*, Leibniz to the Landgraf, Regensburg, March 15/25, 1688.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 109, Munich, Leibniz to Molanus, April 24 (?), 1688.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 134-135, Neustadt, Rojas to Leibniz, May 5 (?), 1688.

⁶ It is significant here that the leaders of the modern Ecumenical Movement were drawn chiefly from the American Episcopal and Anglican churches.

⁷ Hansitz, 9318: 61, Denis Werl to Rojas, Hildesheim, Oct. 27/Nov. 6, 1687.

it, was to convince the Elector that he should support an all-embracing plan for church reunion.¹¹

In the meantime events in other parts of the world put Rojas on the stage in another sense. The situation in England in 1688 was, to put it mildly, tense, and James II felt it necessary to take measures to strengthen his unsteady position. He proposed by way of some member of the Curia that Rojas come to England where his traveling and lodging expenses would be paid out of the royal treasury. Rojas replied that he could not very well travel because of ill health and the charge of domestic duties, but he offered James some good advice. Questions which irritated the Protestants should be clarified in such a way that would become less a bone of controversy. Such matters as the position of the pope in the Church, the infallibility of the Church, the Eucharist, the cult of the saints, the merits of Christ and of man in general could be discussed and given a sense acceptable to the Protestants. In point of fact the Bishop informed the King that this had already been accomplished in four German states. As a method of approach the Bishop suggested that he send plans to the English clergy and thereby start a discussion which might lead to greater understanding. Moreover, as a last resort Rojas would go to England and bring with him all his writings and all the professions of faith he had collected in Germany and there he would consult with competent theologians from the Anglican communion.

But then came the combined evils of revolution in England and French invasion in Germany. As James' power faded throughout the winter and spring of 1688-1689 the French columns pushed into Germany along the Rhine. A trip to England would have been impossible in any case because of the war but, in April, James went into exile and that closed this interesting chapter of the Bishop's career. The revolutionary settlement of 1689 and the emphasis on succession to the throne by a Protestant made any attempt at religious conciliation pointless.¹²

England was only a side issue. In Germany lay the real problem and for nearly a year Rojas in cooperation with Leibniz laid down the theoretical basis upon which the deeds of the following five years were carried out. Rojas may have met Leibniz at the village of Gutmansdorf, about half way between Vienna and Neustadt where Rojas had gone to administer confirmation (June, 1688).¹³ Most certainly they met in Vienna shortly thereafter and arrangements were made for Leibniz to visit Neustadt and have the leisure to talk over the matter at length. Leibniz made the visit and stayed for about a week and was shown the documents

which Rojas had collected. The Bishop also assured him that he was ready to take up the "*fil de sa negotiation*" and that his devotion to the house of Hanover was unbounded. He further suggested that now the Comte de Rébenac, the previous French envoy in Berlin and an inveterate enemy of any signs of concord among the German princes, was gone, the Duchess (Sophia) might bring the Elector of Brandenburg around to the point where he could be depended upon to support projects for church reunion.¹⁴ Rojas went along with Leibniz to the degree that he wrote personally to Molanus and the Duchess and agreed that the *sine qua non* of renewed negotiations should be a "Concordia Hanoverae et Berolini."¹⁵

Sophia had a certain interest in the affair, as indeed, she had a certain interest in anything which would excite her intellect, but her approach was strictly pragmatic. She thought of her children.

If the Bishop of Neustadt could get a good bishopric for my younger sons then their reunion with the Roman Church would be based on a solid argument.¹⁶

However, while in Berlin she spoke to the Elector, the Prince of Anhalt, and the two ministers who answered her "*sans crier*." The Elector emphatically declared that he would be master in his own lands, but Sophia countered with the argument that the King of France was Catholic and that did not interfere with his sovereignty in his own kingdom. She dismissed the Prince of Anhalt as a nonentity ("*il ne passe pas icy pour grand theologien*"), but the Hofprediger Anton Brunsenius and the Domprediger George Conrad Bergius were tractable and promised to open a correspondence with Molanus and explain their position.¹⁷

In view of events in England the Duchess decided that, with Germany full of French refugees fleeing Catholic persecution in France and with James blundering his way into exile through hasty and ill-advised attempts to reestablish Catholicism in England, the time was inopportune for peaceful overtures from Catholics or Protestants.¹⁸

The undertaking of the Bishop of Tina is also praiseworthy and his manner of reasoning is admirable. I will send them [Rojas' letters to Sophia] to the Prince of Anhalt, but the world does not take the trouble to reason nor to listen to reason. In this matter one must hope for

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 161 *et seq.* Leibniz to Sophia, Vienna, June 7/17, 1688.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 189-190. Leibniz to Molanus, Vienna, middle of June, 1688. The letters from Rojas to Molanus and the Duchess have not been discovered but are mentioned in the letter cited in note 13 above.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 161, Sophia to Leibniz, Herrenhausen, June 17/27, 1688.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 222-223, Sophia to Leibniz, Berlin, August 14/24, 1688. See also letter from Sophia to Leibniz, Herrenhausen, September 16, 1688, pp. 241-242, where the Duchess says she would have made her letters "*plus agréable*" had she known that the Emperor was going to see them.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 285 *et seq.*, Sophia to Leibniz, Hanover, Oct. 25/Nov. 4, 1688.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 154, Vienna, Leibniz to Sophia, May 20/30, 1688.

¹² Hansitz, 9310: 67 and verso. See also Leibniz, S. S. 5: 351. Leibniz to Rojas, Vienna, January 11, 1689. Leibniz confirms that James has fled with the Queen and their son.

¹³ Leibniz, S. S., 5: 157. Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, June 5, 1688.

an unusual revelation and just as Christianity came into the world through a woman it would bring glory to me if I could bring this about, but special influences are necessary to succeed.¹⁹

Meanwhile, Leibniz' residence in Vienna gave him the opportunity to contact Rojas frequently. There was a steady interchange of letters and documents. Leibniz was given a copy of the *Concordia Christiana*²⁰ and Rojas was sent documents which came from Molanus.²¹ As the winter drew on, Rojas was much in Vienna and even greater opportunity for familiar intercourse was possible. The Bishop had a stove brought from Neustadt to warm his lodgings and probably the fate of Protestant-Catholic reunion was often discussed over good eating and drinking.²² During this period Rojas requested a copy of the Augsburg Confession from Leibniz which would suggest that the Bishop took seriously Molanus' proposals that the Confession and the Trentine decrees should be compared article by article with a view toward their reconciliation.²³

While all this comfortable conversation was going on in Vienna and Neustadt, the French invasion and destruction of the Palatinate stirred Europe to reaction and this was felt in Vienna and Neustadt because it threatened to wreck peace on every count.²⁴ Rojas felt once more the ominous shadow of France and regretted particularly that one of the most Catholic nations of Europe should try to make such a work as his seem like merely a part of a gigantic conspiracy to divide the Protestants and force them into the Roman communion. How much better it would be to use his method!

Both parties, who have hitherto believed that they were in the right, must not omit in any way at this juncture, anything which would make them understand each other better. Indeed, they should constantly approach each other for a comparison of their views and move from a comparison to a sweet and quiet consideration of each other. For if nothing else comes out of this method than that in these conferences spirits become more mild and that God doubtless blesses in every way such Christian efforts, then it is certainly done with great profit.²⁵

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 402, Sophia to Leibniz, Hanover, Jan. 27/Feb. 6, 1689.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 205, Rojas to Leibniz, Vienna, beginning of August, 1688. The *Concordia* was the statement of the Catholic position which Rojas was to use later in Hungary in 1691-92.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 203, Rojas to Leibniz, Vienna, beginning of August, 1688. Cf. also 5: 205-206, Leibniz to Rojas, beginning of August, 1688; 208-209, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, August 7, 1688; 209, Leibniz to Rojas, Vienna, August 8, 1688; 211-212, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, August 11, 1688; 212, Leibniz to Rojas, Vienna, August 12 (?), 1688; 240, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, September 18, 1688; 289, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, November 9, 1688(8).

²² *Ibid.*, 307, Rojas to Leibniz, Vienna, November, 1688.

²³ *Ibid.*, 308, Rojas to Leibniz, Vienna, beginning of December, 1688; also 308 (another letter different from the one just cited), Rojas to Leibniz, same date, p. 348, Rojas to Leibniz, beginning of January, 1689, New Year's greetings.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 351-352, Leibniz to Rojas, Vienna, January 11, 1689.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 356-357, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, January 15, 1689.

Leibniz did all he could to thaw the ice on the Protestant side. He goaded Molanus on;²⁶ he wrote to Philip Jacob Spener in Dresden and told him he had seen the reunion documents in Neustadt and that the pope was ready to do all in his power to further the matter from Rome.²⁷ Spener was only slightly impressed. Rojas could talk and talk but in the end "Roma simpliciter irreconciliabilis est."²⁸

In the summer Leibniz left for Rome armed with letters of recommendation from the Bishop of Neustadt.²⁹ He left his horses and carriage in Neustadt under the care of the Bishop. He was busy with historical research in Rome for over half a year,³⁰ but in the spring of 1690 he was back in Vienna and once more in correspondence with Neustadt which can be called the nerve center of the moderate Catholic party. He interceded with Ernst August of Hanover and asked for a possible meeting between the Duke and Bishop in Leipzig or Carlsbad.³¹ Shortly thereafter Rojas, who apparently attended the Reichstag in Regensburg which elected Joseph Co-Emperor with Leopold, set out from Passau to Hanover where he hoped to spend one or two days and possibly have talks with both the Duke and the Abbot of Loccum.³²

Leibniz was not the only one who wanted to see the reunion business carried further. Rojas had sound reasons for not getting mixed up in the affair again. He was busy in Neustadt; he needed money to reform his own household; he was old and frequently had to travel by chair. But the Emperor encouraged him. The Vicar Apostolic and other Catholics in Lower Saxony requested he resume his work. He received letters from Protestants in Germany and France asking him to see whether anything could be done to quiet the new phase of militant Catholicism which had its model in the Edict of Fontainebleau (1685).³³ In the presence of what might in a limited sense be called a clamor, the Emperor's confessor, the Jesuit Siess, advised him to start all over again. Probably reluctantly at first, Rojas gave way but with the condition that he

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 109, Munich, April 24 (?), 1688; 189-190, Leibniz to Molanus, middle of June, 1688.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 294, Leibniz to Philip J. Spener, Nov. 11 (?), 1688. "Papa tanto affectu coram dicentem audivit, ut quicquid in potestate esset ad scissiones immunitationem collaturus videretur."

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 417, Philip J. Spener to Leibniz, Dresden, April 13/23, 1689.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 470, Leibniz to Christopher Gudenus, Rome, Aug. 6, 1689; 682, Rojas to Cardinal Azzolini, Neustadt, Feb. 11, 1689. Unfortunately for Leibniz, the Cardinal died before he was able to use Rojas' letter of introduction.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 424, J. M. von Hörnigk to Leibniz, Vienna, June 26, 1689. Rojas had a severe attack of the gout (podagra) in the summer and fall of 1689 and this no doubt cooled his enthusiasm for church reunion.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 578, Leibniz to Ernst August, Vienna, middle of May, 1690.

³² *Ibid.*, 585, Rojas to Leibniz, Prague, May 28/June 8, 1690.

³³ Hansitz, 9310: 192.

have the advice of theologians. Four were deputed to this end, two Jesuits and two Dominicans.³⁴

To make his position clear Rojas composed a *Secreta Relatio* (Neustadt, October 4, 1690) for the Emperor. He begins with a general review of events between 1675 and 1683. There follow the suggestions he has made to the Protestants and the principles which he still supports. The repetition is tiresome but it serves as an indication of two major points: one, that Rojas never thought of anything ultimately other than the conversion of the Protestants to the views of Trent and, two, that his method of bringing this about remained fairly constant from its inception to its end.

The inevitable start is a discussion between theologians of different confessions. Problems remaining unsolved after the theologians have dealt with them will be remitted to an ecumenical council, and in the meantime a *silentium charitativum* will be observed by all parties. Meanwhile all things in the catechism and hymns which are offensive to Roman doctrine are to be removed. The pope will refrain from tyranny and recognize the temporal powers of the princes, a married clergy, and communion in both kinds for the Protestant clergy and laity.

The theologians will go over all points of difference and arrive at agreement in an explicit sense on as many problems as possible. In those matters where no explicit understanding is possible, then let there be implicit understanding. But behind all this apparently loose approach lies Rojas' real point of view. First he thinks there is nothing in Protestant confessions (and he had principally in mind the Augsburg and Helvetic) which is contrary to the principles of salvation. Rojas should have known, because the production of concordances between the Tridentinum and the Augsburg Confession was the speciality of the circle to which he belonged. Explicit acceptance of the Trentine formulae is only necessary for learned men, doctors, and theologians. The common people need not be confronted with the necessity for accepting Trent but their leaders will agree to explain doctrinal matters in a Roman sense in the future. Sudden changes such as would result if all Protestants were obliged to accept Trent would probably result in general apostasy and here one is reminded of Rojas' earlier characterization of the ordinary believer as a tender plant which must be watered carefully.³⁶

That this can be done is proved by the history of the Council of Florence where the Greeks and Ruthenians promised "thereafter that they would explain matters publicly in a Catholic sense." Above all, trust is to be maintained between the bishop and his flock. If this trust is shattered, then atheism is the inevitable result. The bishops should use the method

of Christ and His Apostles who tolerated Jewish practices in the early Church so that a greater good might result, namely the creation of a breeding ground for the teaching of the complete Christian message.

Then come the steps by which this is to be implemented. The princes are to be won over so that they will use their "amicabili interventione" with the Protestant theologians. Catholic theologians, but only those who are "habiles," will teach the elements of Rojas' program; then those who are convinced will carry the doctrine further and then "sub congregatione solenni" all points agreed upon will be compared, subscribed to and then missionary work can begin amongst the people (*populisque persuadenda*).

In consistent form the Bishop, first on grounds of innate conviction and secondly on those of human expediency, sees the might of Rome without which nothing can be accomplished. Therefore he gives an account of his experiences in Rome in 1677 and 1684.

On one occasion he had a fourteen-hour long conversation with the pope and in 1684 no less distinguished people than the Master of the Sacred Palace, the pope's confessor, Buonvisi (then nuncio in Vienna), assorted cardinals, Generals of the Orders, the Archbishops of Mainz, Trier, Salzburg, the Apostolic Nuncio for the Rhenish area and various theologians throughout Germany were consulted and gave their approval to Rojas' ideas.

A notarial statement, signed by the four theologians appointed to assist Rojas, follows the *Secreta Relatio*.³⁷ They testify that all the documents used in the compilation of the *Relatio* are genuine and that there is no suspicion of double-dealing on the Bishop's part. They further give testimony that Rojas has no intention of dividing the Protestants and destroying their faith (as many accusations had read) but that he merely wants to hold discussions on the possibility of church reunion. The notarial statement concludes with proposals for carrying out the matter in question. All proceedings are to be worked out in an Imperial Recess and in preparation for this the Emperor should send explanatory letters to the German princes and the King of Sweden.

Thus fortified by a clear conscience and reassuring legal statements from competent theologians, Rojas resumed his negotiations. He made a three-day visit in Hanover in 1690 but probably succeeded in having contacts with neither Ernst August nor Molanus.³⁸ He reported later, however, to Leibniz that the Dukes of Hanover and Zell reassured him that they were still

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 55. The theologians were Miller, Eder, Winans and Angerer.

³⁵ L., Irenica, 10: 80 *et seq.*

³⁶ Reference is made to the *Casus*, L., Irenica, 10: 254-255.

³⁷ L., Irenica, 10: 84 *et seq.* The statement is signed by Baltasar Miller, S.J., Doctor of Theology and Confessor to the Imperial House, Joseph Eder, S. J., Guinandus Winans, O.P., Master of Sacred Theology and Prior Provincial of the Teutonic Province and Ambrose Angerer, O.P., Master of Sacred Theology and Prior in Vienna.

³⁸ Hildebrandt, Philipp, *op. cit.*, 88 *et seq.* See also Weidemann., *op. cit.* 2: 76 *et seq.*

interested. The Hanoverian theologian Hildebrandt also showed interest and, in Gottorp, Rojas appears to have transmitted some of his enthusiasm to theologians with whom he spoke. In Wolfenbüttel the princes reaffirmed their desire to be cooperative. The Duke of Gotha was so fired up that he wrote the Emperor and praised Rojas' work but asserted that nothing could be done in Germany unless simultaneous moves were made in Hungary.³⁹

It is interesting to note that, as Rojas began negotiations with the Hungarian Protestants, Leibniz at the same time extended the ecumenical frontier into France. Leibniz saw the possibility of interesting the French King in the cause and to this period belongs his correspondence with Mme. de Brinon, secretary to Louise Hollandina, Abbess of Maubuisson, and with Bossuet. To the highly impressionable Brinon he wrote and argued that just as France did not recognize the infallibility of the pope, which would impose an insupportable yoke upon them, so would it be equally bad for Germany to authorize or accept a council which would not be truly ecumenical. In other words, Leibniz knew that such an argument would kill two birds with one stone. It would relieve France of the fear that Germany would take an ultramontane view in an ecumenical council and it would at the same be an invitation to France to participate in a council which would reconsider what had been done at Trent and would possibly pave the way to a total alteration of that Council's decrees in favor of the Protestants.

I hope for the glory of the King and for a successful outcome of the matter, that France will take part in it. France is the country best suited to be the mediatrix of all nations in this affair and reconcile Italy with Germany. If the King takes a part in it, then it is already accomplished.⁴⁰

Rojas engaged from the other flank, namely in Hungary. He could not use the *Methodus* as a basis for negotiations but he could and did use his own *Regulae*. In 1679 some Protestant princes of Germany had declared themselves ready for reunion if a way could be found to carry it through in Hungary.⁴¹ To make the way safer, the Emperor expressly supplied the Bishop with a patent (March 20, 1691) for conferring on religious matters in all the imperial lands, particularly in Hungary and Transylvania. The patent states "that religious differences are based primarily on

lack of mutual charity and the patience necessary for understanding and sincerely explaining the true sense and opinion of each one and the different meanings which they give to terms and words which they use." Rojas was given plenipotentiary power to treat concerning reunion in matters of faith and the diminution of unnecessary controversies with the condition that all final decisions be left to the emperor and the pope. Safe conduct was promised all Protestants who would come to talk with Rojas. Everyone was ordered to give all help possible to this "holy occupation" (*de occasione sanctae suae sollicitationi*).⁴²

The place selected for the projected congress in Hungary was Kismarton (Eisenstadt) which was under the jurisdiction of Paul Esterhazy, Prince Palatine. Representatives from the towns of Rusti(?), Guns, and Odenburg (Sopron) were invited and the meeting was supposed to take place on June 25, 1691. Rojas explained what had already happened in Germany and the statements he had received from princes of the Augsburg and Helvetic confessions and promised that theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, would come to coordinate their efforts with the Hungarians. The Bishop intended that the Kismarton assembly should only be the preliminary to a general sweep of meetings.⁴³

Another meeting was organized for August 15 in the Transdanubian city of St. George (Possinium, the present Győr). Invitations were sent to nineteen communities.⁴⁴ But in the meantime Rojas fell into difficulties because of a dispute over episcopal jurisdiction. Rojas' powers were questioned by the Vicar of the Bishop of Waitzen. The Bishopric was at the moment under the jurisdiction of Cardinal Kollonitz, Bishop of Kalocsa, but it was being administered by a vicar. The vicar had it that Rojas was exceeding his powers and had no right to act as he was doing, particularly in the territory of Cardinal Kollonitz. Besides the whole business was useless because the Scripture tells us to let the bad grow with the good and on the last day God will take care of the separation.⁴⁵

Rojas replied from Neustadt in the same month.⁴⁶ He had been attacked unjustly. He was acting under imperial mandate and had unusual power because of this. His critics should take it into account, too, that he had served the Emperor for sixteen years. Besides, Rome was on his side because he had twice submitted his cause to the pope and both times he had received approbation from the Holy Father.

The vicar was still dissatisfied and reiterated his

³⁹ Leibniz, S. S. 6: 367-369, Rojas to Leibniz, Neustadt, January, no date, 1691. How closely the Hungarian and German situations were bound up comes out in a postscript to this letter. "Si obtenta pace Protestantes Hungari vellent esse tam dociles quam Hanoverani, horumque exemplum illos traheret facile esset occasionem magnam in maximo loco in vestrum favorem obtinere. Utinam brevi quiescat Transilvania ut sic ego a quiete vel potius otio liberari valeam" (pp. 368-369).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 231-237, Leibniz to Mme. de Brinon, Hanover, July 16/26, 1691.

⁴¹ Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 77. Cf. Hansitz, 9310: 194. "Sed jacienda primum erat alia apud Hungaros."

⁴² Leibniz, S. S. 6: 628-632. The original Latin text is given with a French translation.

⁴³ Hansitz, 9318: 64-68. See also page 196 for a letter from the people of Pressburg announcing their readiness to treat with the Bishop.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 9310: 195.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 9310: 9, 65. The letter is signed by Michael Duornikowicz and dated July 18, 1691.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 9313: 65a.

protest, said that his superiors had forbidden a conference in the jurisdiction of Cardinal Kollonitz, but he suggested that Rojas could make things right by getting the approval of the ecclesiastical officials in Pressburg (Pozony).⁴⁷ Despite the fact that favorable replies were received from Pressburg and Odenburg⁴⁸ the meeting planned for August never took place. Some were favorable but not enough and as Rojas explained to the Emperor there was no point to a meeting if some were prevented from coming by their ecclesiastical superiors. He had reference to both the difficulties in Waitzen and the objections of some Protestants that such an assembly as he planned was impossible because the Roman Church had no other intention than to turn the Protestants against one another.⁴⁹

The theological advice of Winans and Angerer was solicited and they proposed that two measures might be taken which would give the proceedings an official note. The Chancellor of Hungary should appear in the colloquium and a commission should be sent into Transylvania to propagandize that area in a sense favorable to what Rojas was contemporaneously proposing in Hungary.⁵⁰ On February 16, 1692 by way of a counterblast to Rojas' critics, the emperor issued another *plenitudo potestatis* addressed to the "Optimates Hungariae" and countersigned by Blaise Jaklin, Bishop of Neutra and Chancellor of Hungary.⁵¹

Appeals to authority are sometimes practical and in this case they proved to be so. Rojas fortified his case with another document⁵² in which he warmed over again the origins of the reunion plans.⁵³ He argued that the confessional books of the Protestants permitted the teaching of moderate papal authority "si ipse Evangelium permittat" [*sic*] and, again, Rojas believed that they did, if explained in the right manner.⁵⁴ Nine days later he received from the Primate of Hungary, George Szecheny, Archbishop of Esztergom

(Strigonia), a recommendation to the Primate's suffragans, and probably at the same time the way was cleared in the diocese of Veszprem to whose bishop, Paul Szecheny, a letter was sent asking that no spiritual or temporal impediment should be allowed to stand in the way of talks with the magnates of Hungary.⁵⁵

Rojas had his Catholic critics but there was also no general rush amongst the Protestants to drown their differences in mutual love. One community under the authority of its pastor⁵⁶ announced their uncompromising devotion to the Confession of Augsburg, asked for a positive statement of Rojas' position in writing, demanded his credentials and generally conveyed the impression that they looked upon the matter as a plot to destroy Protestantism.

However opinion was evidently divided because a more moderate statement originated from another Hungarian community.⁵⁷ All talk of reunion must begin with the thought of the Brothers Walenburg, in other words with the humanist, tolerant approach cultivated in the Mainz Circle during the reign of von Schönborn. A synod of twelve Protestants and twelve Catholics could be assembled, observe the regulation *silentium charitativum*, compare the Augsburg Confession and the Roman Breviary⁵⁸ article by article to see whether they be found in Holy Writ, and certainty on all points is to be reached by a majority vote. The Roman Church will allow the Mass to be celebrated in German, the Protestants united to the Holy See will be called Reformed Catholic and in return the pope will be recognized as "Obristen Priester der gantzen Christenheit."

The document continues in an even more optimistic vein. Henceforth members of the former Protestant churches will take their places in the pope's councils, communion under both species will be permitted, and Catholics will be able to commune in what were formerly Protestant churches. Auricular confession is styled a Spanish or Italian practice but where it manages to survive it should be tolerated. As a concession to Catholic Lenten practices fourteen days before Easter can be designated as days of fast and observed as a memorial to Christ's suffering.⁵⁹ Above all, a new version of the Bible should be put together from the earliest manuscripts in Hebrew, Syriac,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 68 and 71. The latter is a letter from the Observantissimi Seniores Communitatis Evangelicae in Pressburg to Rojas. No date.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 9313: 70, Rojas to the Emperor, 1691.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 73. No date. Signed by Winans and Angerer and obviously addressed to Rojas.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 75, Vienna, February 16, 1692.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 80 *et seq.*, *Systema generale*, March 2, 1692.

⁵² At this point Rojas gives a list of the prominent irenicists who had been instrumental in forming the ecumenical thought of the seventeenth century. The names which appear are the Brothers Walenburg, John Caramuel von Lobkowitz, Augustine Gibbo von Burgo (all Catholics), George Calixtus, Matthias Suecus, Conrad Horneius and Christian Dreierus (all Protestants). Also included are the Cardinal Marquis of Baden, Johann Philipp of Mainz, Andrew Kühn, Elias Henry Reinhard Castor of St. Nicholas in Leipzig, and Pareus, Davennant and Hornbeck from Heidelberg. This reads like a nearly complete list of the important irenicists in this century. About the only ones missing are the English group such as John Dury, and the important figures of Leibniz, Molanus, and Rojas himself.

⁵³ Hansitz, 9313: 80. The two Jesuits and two Dominicans also witnessed this.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 100. Archbishop of Strigonia to Bishop of Veszprem. No date.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 101. Resolutions of the people of Casovienses (Kassa), dated May 9, 1691 (but more probably 1692) and countersigned by John Sarossy, Pastor Ecclesiae Hungaricae Cassoviensis Invariatae Augustanae Confessionis addictae.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 103 *et seq.*, signed Epp. (Esp) eriesini which is certainly Veszprem.

⁵⁸ The Roman Breviary was often cited because it contained essentially the decrees of Trent in an applied form and also a statement of the Pian Creed.

⁵⁹ On other matters intercession of the saints shall be determined by the practice of the Primitive Church, belief in Purgatory will be a matter of personal choice and marriage is to be permitted to bishops and priests but not to monks and nuns.

Arabic, Greek, and Chaldean, and compared with the views of the greatest Fathers and

... this shall remain fast on scriptural grounds that his [the pope's] position of judge shall no longer be regarded as valid and that he cannot err, but contrarywise he shall be considered as the general of all priests, Catholic and Protestant, which priests shall exercise their free vote and in cooperation shall act as assessors and judges of the Sacred Scriptures in certain difficult cases.

What Rojas was doing in Hungary, or rather attempting to do, is significant. It is even more meaningful to realize that nothing could be accomplished there unless similar advances were made in Germany (and particularly in Hanover) and Rome. In other words the success of the reunion program depended upon how universal it could be made. The role of Molanus and the Court of Hanover and the opinions and views of other German princes and theologians may be put aside for a moment while papal policy is considered during this period. It is generally assumed that the successors of Innocent XI took a dim view of the Bishop's career but this is true only in part. Innocent XI died in 1689 and was followed by Alexander VIII (1689–1691) and Innocent XII (1691–1700). Both these popes were more friendly to the French cause in European politics than Innocent XI had been and this meant that Germany suffered as a result. But the popes then, as indeed, now, did not constitute the whole Church and on the Catholic side opinion was divided with regard to the Bishop of Neustadt. One notable example in point was Fabrizio (Cardinal) Spada who informed the Abbot Tucci in Vienna that he welcomed the efforts of the Bishop of Neustadt "to reduce the Protestants of Germany and Hungary to our Holy Faith." The project had received the blessing of the Pope (Alexander VII) and Spada instructed Tucci not "to omit encouraging [Rojas] in the fullest manner."⁶⁰

Apparently after leaving the Hungarian scene in suspension or, better, leaving it only to attack at a more propitious time, Rojas spent the winter of 1692–1693 in his diocese attempting to carry through the reforms which he had initiated. He had a quarrel with Cardinal Kollonitz over the control of certain parishes and cases of matrimony.⁶¹ More to the point he prepared the ground for the reunion measures he planned to take in Germany in the spring and summer of 1693. This was to be his final attempt to draw together all the strands of unity for which he had worked so long and, although it was to be a failure like the earlier attempts, it deserves special attention, if for no other reason than to prove that the chief qualification for

an irenicist is limitless hope in the face of constant failure.

It was most important to integrate Hanover into the general scheme of things and he thought chiefly of Molanus, but he also wanted the affair to take on a European complex and he wrote to the King of Poland, to Andrew Kuhn (Danzig), to Johann Ludwig Fabritius (Smith-Schmidt) (Heidelberg), to Johann Sachs (Anhalt), and also considered opening a correspondence with the King of Sweden.⁶² The letters are almost identical in tone and suggestion. Some success has been had in Hungary and if the whole problem of religious reunion can be treated on a German and imperial scale, it might be solved. In view of this, Rojas proposed a conference to be held in Frankfurt in the spring of 1693 and promised expense money to the theologians who would come.

Hanover did not show the customary enthusiasm. After all, the cause had grown cold. The Elector could now profit greatly from remaining a Protestant and his consort even more so because she might one day be in line for the English throne⁶³ and there was no longer any need in Hanover to affect an interest in Catholicism because the coveted patent of elector had become a reality, at least in Vienna and Brunswick. As early as January, Rojas had written Molanus to sound out his opinions. The Abbot was not long in making his position clear. He had surveyed the situation rather completely and found very little interest in Wolfenbüttel, Helmstedt, and Zell, where people were either not interested at all or too timid or too old to engage again in reunion talks. As for himself, he was unable to meet the Bishop anywhere outside Hanover because even the slightest noise, even the gnawing of the smallest mouse, made sleep impossible for him outside his quarters in Loccum and Hanover.⁶⁴

Leibniz also explained that Molanus was incapable of meeting Rojas in Frankfort.⁶⁵ The Abbot was old and the tendencies of the times were not favorable. Spirits were not ready for such a meeting as Rojas proposed and Leibniz himself would like to be better

⁶² *Ibid.* 9310: 197 verso and *ibid.* 9313: 120, Rojas to Molanus, April 8, 1693; 121, Rojas to Fabritius, March 17, 1693; 122, Rojas to Sachs, March 17, 1693. See also L., *Irenica*, 10: 21, Rojas to Molanus, March 17, 1693.

⁶³ William and Mary had no offspring and no prospects of any and Anne, despite her fecundity, had one child die after another. However, it was not until 1700 with the death of her last surviving child, the Duke of Gloucester, that all impediments were removed for the succession of Sophia and her heirs in England.

⁶⁴ L., *Irenica*, I/10: 269–270. Molanus to Rojas, Hanover, March, 1693. He declares that the hardships of the road and bad weather are difficult enough for him to bear but "quas nihil curo, sed propter somnium, qui extra cubile meum Hanoveranorum aut Luccense ita me destituit, ut ad mortem sufficeret mihi soli quatuordecim ex itinere dies totidemque noctes insomnes."

⁶⁵ Hansitz, 9313: 123, Leibniz to Rojas, March 21/31, 1693. Cf. L., *Irenica* 10: 132.

⁶⁰ Nunz. Ger., p. 41, Rome, March 22, 1692. Vatican Archives.

⁶¹ Hansitz, 9313: 117, Rojas to the Archbishop of Salzburg, February 13, 1692. See also *ibid.* 9310: 197 and verso where Hansitz summarizes the affair with Cardinal Kollonitz.

informed on what the exact program in Frankfurt would be and what had already taken place in Hungary. Personally he was just as enthusiastic as ever and he had taken the trouble to keep Bossuet informed about events in Germany and Hungary as best he knew them. Above this letter looms the politics of Hanover. It is clear that the Duke (now Elector by patent) had no further interest in the business.

Molanus himself was afraid he had gone too far. As Consistorial Director in Hanover, he was in a delicate position and the slightest suggestion that he was guilty of syncretism would ruin him not only with the Duke but with the Lutheran theologians in Germany who followed a firmly orthodox line.⁶⁶ He was also convinced that the new Pope Innocent XII did not have the same favorable disposition toward the Protestants which Innocent XI had had. Furthermore he had determined that, if the *Methodus* was not used as basis for church reunion, then the only hope for the future lay in a *mutua tolerantia* rather than an *unio actualis*.⁶⁷

But Molanus was willing to hold another conference in Loccum should Rojas want to come there and his thoughts on church reunion still represented the extreme limit to which Protestantism could go and still remain Protestant. His approach was well founded historically, as he reckoned. Both Protestants and Catholics should look back to the Council of Florence where no demands were made but where the widest possible basis for agreement was discovered by systematically comparing different points of view and leaving all unresolved controversies for the decision of a later council. In this approach he made the common error which modern High Church people make. He did not interpret correctly the legal mind of Rome and assumed that desire for a legitimate episcopacy was enough to raise heretics into the class of schismatics.

His thought is contained in the *Liquidationes Controversiarum* which were submitted to Leibniz in the early part of 1694. The assumption behind the *Liquidationes* are many. Like Calixtus, Molanus thought most controversies were *verbales* rather than *reales*.⁶⁸ In view of this the only way to gain reunion was to compare all disputed points, having throughout a *suspensio condemnationum mutuarum*, and then agree on a *reunio praeliminaris salvandisque partis opinionibus et ritibus tolerabilibus*. In other words he insisted upon a method which Rome would never accept, namely that Protestant divines be recognized as having apostolic succession before the same divines acknowledged all

that Trent implied. In this case the chief thing it implied was the unconditional supremacy of the Church and the pope.⁶⁹

Rojas arrived in Frankfurt sometime in April. Molanus was informed that he would be there on April 11/12 (21/22) and was given specific instructions as to where mail should be sent.⁷⁰ At this juncture, as so often happens when well-intentioned people attempt to remake the world, a *deus ex machina* intervened and destroyed what feeble hope there was for convening a theological colloquy on the Main. In this case the exterior force was the French troops who systematically destroyed the Palatinate for the second time in six years. Even if Fabritius from Heidelberg had wanted to confer with Rojas, the uncertain conditions created by war would have made regular correspondence and communication impossible. Rojas, who had arrived in Frankfurt, was quite willing to proceed to Loccum and had written that he would be there about May 17. The matter collapsed at this point. Once more the vanity of Louis XIV and the overweening pride of the French played the villain of the piece.

Molanus went to Loccum on the twentieth of May and waited a week for the Bishop to appear but all in vain.⁷¹ The calf had been slain and the wine was cooled but the Bishop was helpless. He could not appear for a conference. Then he had from Molanus a detailed account of the Abbot's views.⁷² The Abbot had written not once but twice. A personal conference between him and Rojas was not only to be desired but was absolutely essential before further progress could be made. A conference of theologians beforehand would be pointless because at this point neither the Protestant nor Catholic princes in Germany were favorable and neither was the Pope.

Indeed the only thing which matters is that between us, the two poles, Arctic and Antarctic united in one axis around which the whole world of ecclesiastical concord turns and spins, there be nothing held secret, nothing in dispute, no lack of harmony.

If there was a colloquy what would be the subjects treated, what would be the final object, who would be the participants? Before there is any talk of a general

⁶⁶ Molanus was not only afraid of his critics. He was also sensitive to thunder storms. Cf. Chapter VII, Note 3.

⁶⁷ Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 80.

⁶⁸ One must note here that the *Plenitudo Potestatis* given by the Emperor to Rojas in 1691 used this same distinction between verbal and real controversies. It is also clear that personally Rojas believed that most religious controversies could be solved on the basis of the same distinction.

⁶⁹ The *Liquidationes* are found in L., *Irenica* 10: 2, in part in Foucher de careil, *op. cit.* 2: 184 *et seq.* (French translation from Latin). Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: 81 *et seq.* gives a summary. Some of the principle questions considered were (1) the Mass as a sacrifice, (2) prayers for the dead, (3) the number of sacraments, (4) the elevation of the Host, (5) man's justification and good works.

⁷⁰ L., *Irenica* 10: 21 verso, Vienna, Rojas to Molanus, April 8 N.S., 1693. Cf. Hansitz, 9313: 120. The mail was to be sent to M. le Prevost de S. Vlatrin, Frankfurt.

⁷¹ Hansitz, 9309: 176 *et seq.*, Linden, Molanus to Rojas, May 17, 1693.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 198 and verso; cf. *ibid.* 9313: 125. See also Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: Anhang 7, 171–172, where this letter is printed.

colloquy, if ". . . we are not of one mind, one spirit, then all our irenic strivings will go up in smoke."

Rojas was never again to appear in Hanover. As his Jesuit biographer says, "Vergebat etiam indies valetudo Episcopi."⁷³ He must also at last have felt the weight of perpetual failure. He may also have had a premonition of death. In any case he had explosive material in his hands in the form of a collection of documents assembled over a period of some twenty years which could, if made public, compromise a great many people. In view of this, he retired to his diocese and wandered no more. His papers he entrusted to a Franciscan cenobite who lived in the vicinity of Katzelsdorf.

He did not feel like moving but he could still write. He kept up his connection with his friend in Hanover.⁷⁴ In many ways Molanus and Rojas shared a similar type of mind. Both had a strong element of humanism and toleration in their thinking which drew them together despite their confessional differences, a phenomenon not unknown to the modern world of ecumenism. The burden of his message to Molanus concerned the publication of documents. Was there some way the *Confessio Hungarica*, a tract with virtually the same ideas contained in the earlier *Regulae*, could be published in Hanover with the imprimatur of the Consistory or some Protestant academy? The answer came via Leibniz with the sending of a copy of the *Liquidationes Controversiarum* to Neustadt.⁷⁵ Leibniz, to prove that the Hanoverian party still had the right intentions, proposed that his *Judicium Doctoris Catholici*, be printed in Vienna.

The *Judicium* virtually admits the rectitude of Rojas' position and acknowledges that what he has done all along has been the right approach.⁷⁶ It is based on the principle that reunion is impossible "unless the Protestants admit everything which is claimed to be held by faith and divine law by the Catholic Church." There follows an idea familiar to Leibniz. He feared papal tyranny and infallibility but he was ready to use it if it proved to be expedient. The pope, according to the *Judicium*, has a great deal of power. Between Councils he is the supreme ruler of the Church and can bring about reunion if he likes. First the Protestants will admit that the Church is infallible in all things pertaining to faith, that this infallibility is exercised by an ecumenical council under the presidency of the pope, that the Roman pontiff is superior to all other ecclesiastics not only in dignity but in primacy of power, that the Eucharist is the symbol of Christian unity, and that the power of absolving sins lies in the hierarchy. Moreover, the Catholics should have no fear that anything will be declared in a new council which contradicts a dogma declared by any previous ecumenical

council. In the interim, however, so-called heretics may remain in error temporarily, if they promise to obey the pope and the decrees defined in a future council. By this approach the "Catholic Doctor" thinks that "the Pontifex Maximus can receive into the bosom of the Church nations and provinces who are ready to accept the conditions of the [*Judicium*]."

This was Leibniz' view but it was not the view of the generality of Protestants. If it had been, then Rome might have been more inclined to take seriously the whole career of Rojas and his manner of thinking. On the other hand it is dubious, given the immediate post-Trentine mentality of most Catholic clergy and laity, that anything by way of major concession could have been expected from them. In a certain sense all three of the chief participants in the ecumenical events of 1683-1693, Rojas, Leibniz, and Molanus, lived in a cloistered academic community, shared many views in common which had nothing to do with the great masses of believing Catholics and Protestants, and expected a miraculous intervention from some pope or secular prince to transform their dream into a reality.

There was to be no more activity on the Bishop's part. The problem appeared insoluble and went like a chess game played by first-class experts. Fundamentally Molanus and Rojas had to agree. They were the theologians and, no matter what Leibniz may have written from a philosophical and political point of view, it could not be taken as a practical and serious proposal for church reunion because it was based on the assumption that both Catholics and Protestants believed something which, in the main, they did not believe and possibly could not believe. As far as Molanus and Rojas was concerned they had not moved an inch beyond the *Methodus* and *Regulae* of 1683.

Rojas was sixty-eight. For years his naturally good temper and conciliatory nature had triumphed over ill health, criticism from all confessional camps, fear of straying too far from orthodoxy in the hope of gaining greater good by concession and the fickleness of kings and princes. The struggle had exhausted him and he died in his bishopric (March 12, 1695) and was buried in his cathedral.⁷⁷

Both Leibniz and Molanus regarded his death as a major tragedy and Molanus wrote a Scanzon in his honor which concludes, "Oh, thrice blessed are those who advise and make peace; they shall be called the sons of God."⁷⁸ But they were also worried about the fate of Rojas' papers. They feared that they would fall into the hands of people who might make improper use of them. During the interregnum in Neustadt,

⁷³ Hansitz, 9310: 199.

⁷⁴ He wrote Molanus on March 22 and April 20, 1694.

⁷⁵ L., Irenica 10: 42, Leibniz to Rojas, May 7, 1694.

⁷⁶ Hansitz, 9313: 33 *et seq.*

⁷⁷ The exact spot of burial now lies some distance under the present floor of the Dom in Neustadt and is unmarked. This information was supplied by Dr. Lindek-Pozzer (now deceased), Biblioteksrat in Wiener Neustadt and also Dompropst.

⁷⁸ L. Irenica, I/10: 2. Printed in Weidemann, *op. cit.* 2: Anhang 8, 173-174.

Reiner Vlostorf was Vicar and he reassured Leibniz that all was well and that the documents were under imperial seal, locked away from prying eyes.⁷⁹

Rojas' successor in Neustadt was Franz Anton, Graf von Buchheim. Buchheim had not much interest in the work of his predecessor and it was only by an order from Rome in 1698⁸⁰ that he emerged from his silence, and then the aim could hardly be called irenic in a broad sense for the matter in question was simply the conversion of Anton Ulrich of Wolfenbüttel to the Roman Church. A conference was held in Loccum at which Leibniz and Molanus represented the Protestants and Buchheim and an Augustinian friar, the Catholics. The essence of the conversations was printed⁸¹ but they are nothing more than a rehash of the *Methodus* and the *Liquidationes*. The main significance of the meeting lies in the fact that it demonstrates how the ideas of men can survive after they have closed their work in this world. The atmosphere which Spinola created died with him for the most part in the following two centuries. There were intra-Protestant church reunions but it was only in the twentieth century that the major lines of the Union Conference of 1683 were to be refurbished and used again as points of reference for the ecumenical movement.

EPILOGUE

BOSSUET AND ROJAS

It is quite obvious that Bossuet and Rojas were two very different types of men on most counts. No comparison can justly be made between their achievements except as they appear in history as irenicists. Bossuet will always be immortal as the ecclesiastical epitome of the *grand siècle*. If he had done nothing else than help to mold the French language into the instrument of beauty and precision which it is today his name would be remembered. It goes without saying that he was more than a mere master of language. His sympathetic dealings with the Protestants were exceptional for a century when persecution and condemnation were the rules for interconfessional relations. On the other hand his *Variations des Eglises Protestantes* is still useful as one of the clearest, and therefore, perhaps most deadly, instruments in the hands of Catholics who care to point out the weaknesses of Protestantism. He is a theologian of the highest achievements and was denominated by Migne as the "last of the great scholastics," and his defense of Gallican principles was certainly the most able of the century because it was not based on wishful thinking but on sound historical analysis. As a priest with the care of souls as his

primary duty, his record is superb. There is some question that his training of the Dauphin was an unqualified success but it certainly cannot be said that he did not take his duties seriously for he felt he was preparing a prince for the obligation of governing France wisely and well. Therefore in the previous pages and in this epilogue no basis for comparison has been thought of between Bossuet and Rojas except in their sometimes similar, sometimes variant, approach to the question of church unity.

One of the great misfortunes of Rojas' career is that he was never in close communication with Bossuet. Leibniz or Mme de Brinon or both could have served as a go-between, but did not, more likely could not, do so. Why Leibniz did not serve this function is not simple to explain. The probable reason is that Leibniz stood in no way to influence Bossuet until after 1691, and it was precisely at this time that Rojas' energies were being exerted in Hungary and not in Hanover.¹ However, Bossuet was aware as early as 1678 of Rojas' projects,² but he showed little interest at that time. Leibniz cannot be condemned for not having seen what good might have resulted from personal meetings between the two Catholic prelates for he was not aware until much later of the full importance of Rojas' plan and his influence at Rome. Certainly he cannot be censured for having been victimized by subservience to a religion of state—the one factor which prevented all the principals involved in irenic plans from making decisive moves. The powerful Bossuet was clearly a victim of his political and social environment and probably, like his sovereign, regarded German unity, at least from a political point of view, a grave danger to the greatness and glory of France.³

¹ Klopp, O., *Correspondence avec l'Electrice*, 1: Introduction, 24, London and Paris, 1875. Klopp makes Bossuet's total information come from Leibniz. "Et cependant cet évêque [Rojas] n'avait de cette correspondance avec Bossuet qu'une connaissance superficielle, d'après les renseignements que Leibniz lui transmettait à l'occasion." Klopp of course refers to the Bossuet-Leibniz interchange. It should be noted here that many now regard the Anglican Church as the *via media*, the bridge between the extremes of evangelical Protestantism and integralist Catholicism, as did many in the seventeenth century, Leibniz included, consider the Gallican Church as the golden compromise which would unite the two extremes. It is also significant that Bossuet at first thought Leibniz to be Catholic. Cf. Leibniz, *S. S.*, first ser., 3: 416. Simon de la Loubère to Leibniz, Paris, Aug. 10, 1680.

² Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 62. Leibniz to Bossuet, probably 1678.

³ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart* etc., 6: 231, Vienna, 1875–1888. Klopp has it that the prime cause for the failure of the entire irenic movement at this time lay in the absence of a direct meeting and personal correspondence between the two prelates. "Der Mittelpunkt dieser eigentlichen Verhandlungen lag weder in Hannover, noch viel weniger in Paris oder Meux, sondern in der Persönlichkeit des Bischofs Christoph Rojas. Er stand nicht in Verbindung mit Bossuet." Although there is much truth in this observation the fact that the irenic agreements in Germany never quite jelled should also be taken into account. It is common for German historians to place the blame for Rojas' failure on something French.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 2 *et seq.*, Vlostorf to Leibniz, Neustadt, May 5, 1695; cf. Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 2: 98 *et seq.*, Vlostorf to Leibniz, Neustadt, October 17, 1695.

⁸⁰ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 2: 172.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 168. In a French translation. The originals were in Latin.

Despite what might have happened if Bossuet and Rojas had met or had even written to each other, the fact remains that they did not meet and the only course open to historical speculation lies in a comparison of their opinions, principles, and methods. The chances are that if the two prelates had been in contact, neither would have altered his opinions to any great degree. Fundamentally they were in perfect theological harmony. Politically there was less chance for agreement, for one was the servant of Louis XIV and the other the agent of Leopold I and Innocent XI.

Both bishops sincerely desired the reestablishment of Christian unity and both made remarkable strides toward this end.⁴ Both were confidants of ruling princes and both exercised real influence at court. Both were suspect at Rome, but on different counts—Bossuet for being too narrowly Gallican, Rojas for being too broadly Catholic. The two of them were conciliarists but in a different fashion. The Frenchman held that Trent had definitively settled the status of the Protestants and so they had only to renounce their errors, condemned by the Trentine decrees, in order to become once more full communicants with Rome. At the same time he resisted the claims of the ultramontanes, scarcely more anathema to the Protestants than to him.⁵ The Austrian Bishop held that the solution to the Protestant-Catholic feud was to be found in the decisions of a council, but one which would, if not change the Trentine formularies, at least examine some of them in a light favorable to Protestant weaknesses. The two bishops were ever ready to discuss matters with the Protestants, but both probably erred in the extreme and in their individual way. At times Bossuet seemed to be a man “whom one instinctively approached on all fours,” whereas Rojas’ constantly receptive and mediating attitude caused the Protestants to regard him as a slippery fellow not to be taken too seriously, and the Catholics to regard him as forever bordering on the heretical. Bossuet’s method was that of writing books, Rojas’ that of the *pourparler*. Probably both had in mind the initial aim of removing misunderstandings, hate, and *partipris*.

According to Rojas the initial step was to gain the Protestant admission (after prolonged talks on the subject) that the Church had absolute doctrinal authority (subject to the theological definition tested by

Patristics and history) and that the pope and Church together were infallible. The logical consequence of this was that all must submit to doctrines defined by a legitimate council. What was a legitimate council? Anything was such which was in harmony with the conditions under which the first four ecumenical councils had been held. If there was disagreement on the legitimacy of a council (and Rojas thought always of Trent), then the application of its decrees could be provisionally suspended, pending the convocation of another council which would at least discuss all the matters in dispute. In expectation of another ecumenical council, however, both sides could agree to accept certain basic dogmas (*dogmata fundamentalia*). In addition there were nonfundamental dogmas (*dogmata non-fundamentalia*) to which the Protestants need give only an implicit consent (*consensus implicitus*) while they waited for more convincing evidence. Rojas held this implicit consent not to be a serious obstacle to reunion since the Protestants already believed “implicitly” what the Catholics believed as proved by the signed formularies which he had got from well-disposed German theologians and rulers.⁶

As has been observed, the greatest concession to be granted to the Protestants was the proper ordination of their bishops and priests. Following their canonical ordination, they would be seated and be permitted to vote in the ecumenical council which would iron out the remaining problems. Concessions of a lesser nature would be made to Protestants with regard to discipline, but nothing was actually assured them on a strictly official basis. Rojas only promised to work for these concessions from the Holy See who alone could grant them.

Rojas, as far as his personal beliefs are concerned, was clearly orthodox. When he spoke of Trent and the suspension of its anathemas, he thought not so much of a permanent suspension as of a clarification so that they would be acceptable to the Protestants. In this sense he was in perfect harmony with Bossuet’s expository method but he, unlike the Bishop of Meaux, wished preliminary sweeping concessions so that minds on both sides could be prepared to discuss differences in a mood of Christian harmony and fraternal love.⁷

Probably Rojas’ greatest weakness lay in leaving the impression of too great optimism with the Protestants whom he met. It must be remembered that centers such as the court of Hanover and Mainz and the University of Helmstedt were rarities in a country where rigid Lutheran orthodoxy claimed an infinitely greater number of adherents than did the irenical party. The Bishop, however, in his optimism may have misrepresented the possibilities for reunion and he no doubt permitted the politician to carry him beyond the

⁴ Bossuet had begun his talks with the Protestants while a Canon at Metz (cf. Bossuet, *Œuvres complètes*, for his relation with the Calvinist Pastor Paul Ferry see Urbain and Levesque, *Correspondance de Bossuet*, 15 v., 1, Paris, 1909–1925, and the flowering of his genius in treating with non-Romans is to be found in his *Exposition de la foi catholique* which stands with the work of the Brothers Walenburg as a competent and, if one might invent a word, Protestantizing explanation of the Catholic religion).

⁵ For Bossuet’s conciliar attitude see A. Martimort, *Le Gallicanisme de Bossuet*, Paris, 1953, chiefly Part III, where Martimort shows how the four articles of the Gallican Clergy were a direct result of Bossuet’s customary thinking.

⁶ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 1: 26–27.

⁷ Menge, *op. cit.* 2: 59–60. See also Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: Preface xxxiii–xxxiv.

realistic circumstances which governed the papacy and its policies.⁸ But it is not well to look upon the things of the spirit in too mundane a fashion and to consider Roman Catholicism as having completely institutionalized and strait-jacketed the Holy Spirit as does Haselbeck when he states that the "tragic fault of Rojas (lies in the fact) that he firmly believed in the attainability (*Erreichbarkeit*) of the unobtainable (*Unreichbaren*)," ⁹ Catholic-Protestant reunion may not be the work of today, or even of tomorrow, but it is inevitable in the fullness of time. Every century has seen efforts toward this end ¹⁰ and all those in the past and those who are presently engaged in the ecumenical movement bear witness that the pioneer work of Rojas and other seventeenth-century irenicists was, and is, not in vain.

"Teneamus quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est." ¹¹ This was the cornerstone of Bossuet's thought and his interpretation of it was rigid. In his work, *Communion sous les deux Espèces*,¹² he argues the question of the historicity of communion under two kinds. In his exhaustive discussion of the problem he concludes that there is no real reason why the cup cannot be granted, but the overall spirit of the *Communion* seems to suggest that, despite the fact that disciplinary concessions may be made, there is no actual reason why practice, as Bossuet knew it, should be departed from. He had seen the result of revolution in the Fronde as a political thing and he feared excess in religious practices even more. In brief there was a marked tendency for him to translate *ubique* as Post-Trentine Europe, *semper* as the reign of Louis XIV and *ab omnibus* as the Gallican Church.

Bossuet's method could take no account of the suspension of any part of the Trentine decrees. It could explain and gloss Trent but that was all. Bossuet, himself, could see no place for a discussion of the matter except in a negative sense. When Leibniz attempted to prove that the Calixtines had had a conciliar decree relaxed at Constance ¹³ and that at least the anathemas of Trent could likewise be relaxed, Bossuet replied that the circumstances were altogether different. To be sure the Council of Basel had taken under consideration a decree of Constance, but the Calixtines who desired the cup for the laity had not come as judges but as suppliants to Basel. The only thing offered them by the Fathers at Basel was "a discussion aimable avec les contradicteurs pour les instruire."

⁸ Teetaert, A., "Spinola," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 14(2): 2486-2488.

⁹ Haselbeck, *op. cit.* 1: 35.

¹⁰ For a broad survey of the ecumenical movement since the Reformation see *A history of the ecumenical movement* (eds. Rouse, Ruth, and S. C. Neill), Philadelphia, 1954.

¹¹ Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium* (ed. Maxon) 1, p. xv, London, 1937.

¹² Bossuet, *op. cit.* 16: 245-364.

¹³ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: 521-527. Leibniz to Bossuet, October 23, 1693.

So that constitutes a suspension of the Council of Constance! The Calixtines, however, were obliged to consult the Council; they came there to be instructed. People hoped that in their appearing before the tribunal, the majesty, the charity and the authority of the Council which they recognized, would bring about their conversion. Finally, the question they put to the Council was terminated by a decision conforming, in every respect, to that of the Council of Constance."¹⁴

In as far as Bossuet supported the contention that Trent had made no innovations in dogma and precious few in discipline, he was correct.¹⁵ Baruzzi, who approaches this matter of the relations between Bossuet and Leibniz from the point of view of a philosopher to the practical exclusion of the theologian, repeats the charge made by Leibniz that Bossuet confused the "immediately anterior tradition with the vast and general tradition of the universal Church," and yesterday with the day before yesterday. This heavy accusation is true in part. It is true in the sense that Bossuet emphasized the principle, both in religion and politics, that authority once attacked and weakened only leads to further attacks and weakening until at last the whole system comes crashing down. In other words, he confused a healthy criticism and desire for reform within the Church with malign criticism and anarchy. But several facts stand out. Bossuet was no mean historian.¹⁶ He was not ignorant of Biblical criticism. There was probably no prelate of his time more qualified to speak on the Church Fathers than he. If he showed a rigidity of temper, as Rojas did not, this attitude nonetheless saved him from the suspicion of syncretism, a thing which haunted Rojas from the beginning until the end of his career.

Bossuet rejected the notion of a temporary suspension of the Trentine anathemas to say nothing of the conciliar decrees, but on the other hand he did infinitely more good in clarifying Catholic dogma by his

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 1: 354. Bossuet to Pellison, May 7, 1692.

¹⁵ Christiani, L., *L'Eglise à l'époque du Concile de Trente* 231, Paris, 1948. "... le concile de Trente est dans la descendance naturelle et légitime de tous les conciles qui l'ont précédé. Les théologiens et les Pères qui y ont délibéré et voté avaient une formation toute médiévale. Leur pensée est un épanouissement de la pensée du Moyen Age. Ils n'étaient pas au surplus étrangers au mouvement des idées de leur époque. Ils n'ont voulu ni adapter ni encore moins changer la religion. Il serait aisé de démontrer qu'ils ne l'ont pas fait, même sans le vouloir et sans s'en apercevoir. L'histoire de leurs débats d'idées est décisive à cet égard. Le concile n'a fait que codifier des dogmes établis et admis, au moins implicitement, depuis longtemps, on pourrait dire depuis toujours. Le concile s'est d'ordinaire abstenu systématiquement de trancher les questions controversées entre théologiens catholiques. Il n'a eu qu'un souci qui était de dresser le rampart imposant de la tradition la mieux assurée en face des innovations protestantes. Même dans le domaine disciplinaire, ou son oeuvre aussi a été considérable, bienque moins importante, au total, que dans le domaine dogmatique, il a peu inventé. Il n'a guère fait que généraliser une réforme déjà commencée spontanément en beaucoup de lieux et presque achevée en quelques-uns."

¹⁶ For a study of Bossuet's historical method see Rebelliau, A., *Bossuet: historien du Protestantisme*, Paris, 1909.

Exposition than did Rojas with all his numerous contacts and perpetual negotiating. Exposition was Bossuet's forte. He would have none of Rojas' preliminary reunion. He desired "nothing except a dogmatic exposition and all the explanations the Protestants would wish" on Catholic doctrine. He feared the method of suspension as advocated by Rojas because he saw in it the seeds of a more dreadful schism than that which already disfigured the Church.¹⁷ His *Exposition* shows how mild were his views and how much could be done in the way of explanation to dispel misunderstanding and hate.¹⁸ Both Rojas and Bossuet

must be considered the greatest irenicists of the seventeenth century in the Roman Church, but it must be confessed that there is more kinship between Cardinal Mercier and other Roman prelates of an ecumenical frame of mind and Rojas than between them and Bossuet. Bossuet held the line while the Church collected its forces for the bitter struggle with the rationalism of the eighteenth century; Rojas acted as the sapper for the zealous Catholic irenicism of today. The Roman Church then and now has generally been great and universal enough to find a place for both types.

¹⁷ Foucher de Careil, *op. cit.* 1: Preface, xxiv-xxv.

¹⁸ Klopp, O., *Das Verhältniss von Leibniz zu den kirchlichen Reunionsversuchen* 24, Hanover, 1861. Klopp's judgment on

Bossuet's activities takes no account of the Bishop's irenical contributions. "Bossuet verlangt nicht die Ausgleichung, nicht die Versöhnung; er verlangt die Unterwerfung."

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